TSTP Solution File: SWW968+1 by iProver---3.9
View Problem
- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : iProver---3.9
% Problem : SWW968+1 : TPTP v8.2.0. Released v7.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_iprover %s %d THM
% Computer : n018.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Mon Jun 24 18:19:00 EDT 2024
% Result : Theorem 4.02s 1.16s
% Output : CNFRefutation 4.02s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : ERROR: Analysing output (Could not find formula named definition)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f81,axiom,
! [X9,X10,X11] : constr_cbc_dec_2(constr_cbc_enc_2(X10,X11,X9),X9) = tuple_2(X10,X11),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax80) ).
fof(f84,axiom,
! [X19,X20,X21,X22,X23] : constr_cbc_4_get_2_prefixes(constr_cbc_enc_4(X20,X21,X22,X23,X19)) = constr_cbc_enc_2(X20,X21,X19),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax83) ).
fof(f89,axiom,
! [X40,X41] : constr_dec(constr_enc(X41,X40),X40) = X41,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax88) ).
fof(f92,axiom,
! [X50,X51] : constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(tuple_2(X50,X51)) = X50,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax91) ).
fof(f96,axiom,
! [X62,X63] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X62,X63),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax95) ).
fof(f103,axiom,
pred_attacker(tuple_true),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax102) ).
fof(f107,axiom,
! [X73] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_out_2(X73))
=> pred_attacker(X73) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax106) ).
fof(f108,axiom,
! [X74,X75,X76] :
( ( pred_attacker(X76)
& pred_attacker(X75)
& pred_attacker(X74) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_in_1(X74,X75,X76)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax107) ).
fof(f114,axiom,
! [X88,X89] :
( ( pred_attacker(X89)
& pred_attacker(X88) )
=> pred_attacker(constr_dec(X88,X89)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax113) ).
fof(f119,axiom,
! [X94] :
( pred_attacker(X94)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_1(X94)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax118) ).
fof(f122,axiom,
! [X97] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X97))
=> pred_attacker(X97) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax121) ).
fof(f130,axiom,
! [X105] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(X105))
=> pred_attacker(X105) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax129) ).
fof(f135,axiom,
! [X118] :
( pred_attacker(X118)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X118)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax134) ).
fof(f137,axiom,
! [X120] :
( pred_attacker(X120)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X120)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax136) ).
fof(f139,axiom,
! [X122] :
( pred_attacker(X122)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X122)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax138) ).
fof(f141,axiom,
! [X124] :
( pred_attacker(X124)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X124)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax140) ).
fof(f152,axiom,
! [X149] :
( pred_attacker(X149)
=> pred_attacker(constr_cbc_4_get_2_prefixes(X149)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax151) ).
fof(f157,axiom,
pred_attacker(constr_CONST_4),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax156) ).
fof(f171,axiom,
! [X186,X187] :
( ( pred_attacker(X187)
& pred_attacker(X186) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_2(X186,X187)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax170) ).
fof(f186,axiom,
! [X208,X209,X210,X211,X212] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X210))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X208),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X210,name_Kas)))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X210,name_Kas)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X211))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X209))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X209,name_Kas)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X212))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X211,X210,X208)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X212,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X209,name_Kas)))) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax185) ).
fof(f187,axiom,
! [X213,X214,X215,X216,X217] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X215))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X213),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X215,name_Kas)))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X215,name_Kas)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X216))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X214))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X214,name_Kas)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X217))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X216,X215,X213)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X217,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X214,name_Kas)))) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X214,name_Kas))))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax186) ).
fof(f189,axiom,
! [X220,X221,X222,X223] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_in_1(X221,X222,X223))
=> pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_out_2(constr_cbc_enc_4(X223,X222,name_Kab_66(X220),constr_cbc_enc_2(name_Kab_66(X220),X221,name_Kbs),name_Kas))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax188) ).
fof(f190,conjecture,
pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_objective1,name_objective2)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co0) ).
fof(f191,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_objective1,name_objective2)),
inference(negated_conjecture,[],[f190]) ).
fof(f193,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] : constr_cbc_dec_2(constr_cbc_enc_2(X1,X2,X0),X0) = tuple_2(X1,X2),
inference(rectify,[],[f81]) ).
fof(f196,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] : constr_cbc_enc_2(X1,X2,X0) = constr_cbc_4_get_2_prefixes(constr_cbc_enc_4(X1,X2,X3,X4,X0)),
inference(rectify,[],[f84]) ).
fof(f201,plain,
! [X0,X1] : constr_dec(constr_enc(X1,X0),X0) = X1,
inference(rectify,[],[f89]) ).
fof(f204,plain,
! [X0,X1] : constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(tuple_2(X0,X1)) = X0,
inference(rectify,[],[f92]) ).
fof(f208,plain,
! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(rectify,[],[f96]) ).
fof(f218,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_out_2(X0))
=> pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f107]) ).
fof(f219,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( pred_attacker(X2)
& pred_attacker(X1)
& pred_attacker(X0) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_in_1(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f108]) ).
fof(f224,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( pred_attacker(X1)
& pred_attacker(X0) )
=> pred_attacker(constr_dec(X0,X1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f114]) ).
fof(f229,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_1(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f119]) ).
fof(f232,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X0))
=> pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f122]) ).
fof(f240,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(X0))
=> pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f130]) ).
fof(f245,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f135]) ).
fof(f247,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f137]) ).
fof(f249,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f139]) ).
fof(f251,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f141]) ).
fof(f262,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(constr_cbc_4_get_2_prefixes(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f152]) ).
fof(f276,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( pred_attacker(X1)
& pred_attacker(X0) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f171]) ).
fof(f287,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f186]) ).
fof(f288,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas))))) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f187]) ).
fof(f290,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_in_1(X1,X2,X3))
=> pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_out_2(constr_cbc_enc_4(X3,X2,name_Kab_66(X0),constr_cbc_enc_2(name_Kab_66(X0),X1,name_Kbs),name_Kas))) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f189]) ).
fof(f291,plain,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_objective1,name_objective2)),
inference(flattening,[],[f191]) ).
fof(f302,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_out_2(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f218]) ).
fof(f303,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_in_1(X0,X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f219]) ).
fof(f304,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_in_1(X0,X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f303]) ).
fof(f310,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(constr_dec(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f224]) ).
fof(f311,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(constr_dec(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f310]) ).
fof(f316,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_1(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f229]) ).
fof(f319,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f232]) ).
fof(f327,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f240]) ).
fof(f333,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f245]) ).
fof(f335,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f247]) ).
fof(f337,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f249]) ).
fof(f339,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f251]) ).
fof(f358,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(constr_cbc_4_get_2_prefixes(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f262]) ).
fof(f374,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f276]) ).
fof(f375,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f374]) ).
fof(f388,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f287]) ).
fof(f389,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f388]) ).
fof(f390,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f288]) ).
fof(f391,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f390]) ).
fof(f394,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_out_2(constr_cbc_enc_4(X3,X2,name_Kab_66(X0),constr_cbc_enc_2(name_Kab_66(X0),X1,name_Kbs),name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_in_1(X1,X2,X3)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f290]) ).
fof(f475,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] : constr_cbc_dec_2(constr_cbc_enc_2(X1,X2,X0),X0) = tuple_2(X1,X2),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f193]) ).
fof(f478,plain,
! [X2,X3,X0,X1,X4] : constr_cbc_enc_2(X1,X2,X0) = constr_cbc_4_get_2_prefixes(constr_cbc_enc_4(X1,X2,X3,X4,X0)),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f196]) ).
fof(f483,plain,
! [X0,X1] : constr_dec(constr_enc(X1,X0),X0) = X1,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f201]) ).
fof(f486,plain,
! [X0,X1] : constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(tuple_2(X0,X1)) = X0,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f204]) ).
fof(f490,plain,
! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f208]) ).
fof(f497,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_true),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f103]) ).
fof(f501,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_out_2(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f302]) ).
fof(f502,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_in_1(X0,X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f304]) ).
fof(f508,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(constr_dec(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f311]) ).
fof(f513,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_1(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f316]) ).
fof(f516,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f319]) ).
fof(f524,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f327]) ).
fof(f529,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f333]) ).
fof(f531,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f335]) ).
fof(f533,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f337]) ).
fof(f535,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f339]) ).
fof(f546,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(constr_cbc_4_get_2_prefixes(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f358]) ).
fof(f551,plain,
pred_attacker(constr_CONST_4),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f157]) ).
fof(f565,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f375]) ).
fof(f579,plain,
! [X2,X3,X0,X1,X4] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f389]) ).
fof(f580,plain,
! [X2,X3,X0,X1,X4] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f391]) ).
fof(f582,plain,
! [X2,X3,X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_out_2(constr_cbc_enc_4(X3,X2,name_Kab_66(X0),constr_cbc_enc_2(name_Kab_66(X0),X1,name_Kbs),name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_in_1(X1,X2,X3)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f394]) ).
fof(f583,plain,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_objective1,name_objective2)),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f291]) ).
cnf(c_129,plain,
constr_cbc_dec_2(constr_cbc_enc_2(X0,X1,X2),X2) = tuple_2(X0,X1),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f475]) ).
cnf(c_132,plain,
constr_cbc_4_get_2_prefixes(constr_cbc_enc_4(X0,X1,X2,X3,X4)) = constr_cbc_enc_2(X0,X1,X4),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f478]) ).
cnf(c_137,plain,
constr_dec(constr_enc(X0,X1),X1) = X0,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f483]) ).
cnf(c_140,plain,
constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(tuple_2(X0,X1)) = X0,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f486]) ).
cnf(c_144,plain,
pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f490]) ).
cnf(c_151,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_true),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f497]) ).
cnf(c_155,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_out_2(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f501]) ).
cnf(c_156,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_in_1(X2,X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f502]) ).
cnf(c_162,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| pred_attacker(constr_dec(X1,X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f508]) ).
cnf(c_167,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_1(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f513]) ).
cnf(c_170,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f516]) ).
cnf(c_178,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f524]) ).
cnf(c_183,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f529]) ).
cnf(c_185,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f531]) ).
cnf(c_187,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f533]) ).
cnf(c_189,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f535]) ).
cnf(c_200,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(constr_cbc_4_get_2_prefixes(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f546]) ).
cnf(c_205,plain,
pred_attacker(constr_CONST_4),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f551]) ).
cnf(c_219,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| pred_attacker(tuple_2(X1,X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f565]) ).
cnf(c_233,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X0,X1,X2)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X3,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas))))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X2),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X4))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f579]) ).
cnf(c_234,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X0,X1,X2)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X3,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas))))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X2),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X4))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas))))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f580]) ).
cnf(c_236,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_in_1(X0,X1,X2))
| pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_out_2(constr_cbc_enc_4(X2,X1,name_Kab_66(X3),constr_cbc_enc_2(name_Kab_66(X3),X0,name_Kbs),name_Kas))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f582]) ).
cnf(c_237,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_objective1,name_objective2)),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f583]) ).
cnf(c_376,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0)) ),
inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_187]) ).
cnf(c_723,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X0,X1,X2)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X3,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas))))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X2),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X4))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective1)) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_233,c_376]) ).
cnf(c_724,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X0,X1,X2)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X3,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas))))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X2),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X4))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas))))) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_234,c_376]) ).
cnf(c_755,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X4)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective1)) ),
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_723,c_144]) ).
cnf(c_756,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X4)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X2,name_Kas))))) ),
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_724,c_144]) ).
cnf(c_1367,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X3)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective1)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_755,c_144,c_144,c_144]) ).
cnf(c_1392,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X3)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas))))) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_756,c_144,c_144,c_144]) ).
cnf(c_1876,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0)) ),
inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_183]) ).
cnf(c_2229,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X3)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective1)) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_1367,c_1876]) ).
cnf(c_2230,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X3)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X0,name_Kas))))) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_1392,c_1876]) ).
cnf(c_3243,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ sP0_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[sP0_iProver_def])],[c_2230]) ).
cnf(c_3244,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0))
| ~ sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[sP1_iProver_def])],[c_2230]) ).
cnf(c_3245,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X0,name_Kas)))))
| ~ sP2_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[sP2_iProver_def])],[c_2230]) ).
cnf(c_3246,plain,
( sP0_iProver_def
| sP1_iProver_def
| sP2_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[])],[c_2230]) ).
cnf(c_3247,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
| ~ sP3_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[sP3_iProver_def])],[c_2229]) ).
cnf(c_3248,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective1))
| sP0_iProver_def
| sP1_iProver_def
| sP3_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[])],[c_2229]) ).
cnf(c_3249,plain,
tuple_2(name_objective1,name_objective2) = sP4_iProver_def,
definition ).
cnf(c_3250,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(sP4_iProver_def),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[c_237,c_3249]) ).
cnf(c_5984,plain,
~ sP0_iProver_def,
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_151,c_3243]) ).
cnf(c_6000,plain,
( sP1_iProver_def
| sP2_iProver_def ),
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3246,c_5984]) ).
cnf(c_6212,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_189,c_3244]) ).
cnf(c_6249,plain,
~ sP1_iProver_def,
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_205,c_6212]) ).
cnf(c_6264,plain,
sP2_iProver_def,
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6000,c_6249]) ).
cnf(c_6288,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ sP3_iProver_def ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_185,c_3247]) ).
cnf(c_6325,plain,
~ sP3_iProver_def,
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_205,c_6288]) ).
cnf(c_6340,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective1)),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_3248,c_3248,c_5984,c_6249,c_6325]) ).
cnf(c_6342,plain,
pred_attacker(name_objective1),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6340,c_170]) ).
cnf(c_6457,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(constr_enc(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_137,c_162]) ).
cnf(c_6505,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(name_objective1)
| ~ pred_attacker(name_objective2)
| pred_attacker(sP4_iProver_def) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_3249,c_219]) ).
cnf(c_6508,plain,
~ pred_attacker(name_objective2),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6505,c_3250,c_6342]) ).
cnf(c_6688,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(constr_cbc_enc_4(X0,X1,X2,X3,X4))
| pred_attacker(constr_cbc_enc_2(X0,X1,X4)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_132,c_200]) ).
cnf(c_6783,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X0,name_Kas)))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0)) ),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_3245,c_3245,c_6264]) ).
cnf(c_6784,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_10(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X0,name_Kas))))) ),
inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_6783]) ).
cnf(c_6790,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
| pred_attacker(constr_enc(name_objective2,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X0,name_Kas)))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6784,c_178]) ).
cnf(c_6803,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X0,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
| pred_attacker(name_objective2) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6790,c_6457]) ).
cnf(c_6804,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X0,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6803,c_6508]) ).
cnf(c_6817,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(constr_cbc_enc_2(X0,X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(tuple_2(X0,X1))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_129,c_6804]) ).
cnf(c_6820,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(constr_cbc_enc_2(X0,X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(light_normalisation,[status(thm)],[c_6817,c_140]) ).
cnf(c_6842,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(constr_cbc_enc_2(X0,X1,name_Kas))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_185,c_6820]) ).
cnf(c_6933,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_in_1(X0,X1,X2))
| pred_attacker(constr_cbc_enc_4(X2,X1,name_Kab_66(X3),constr_cbc_enc_2(name_Kab_66(X3),X0,name_Kbs),name_Kas)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_236,c_155]) ).
cnf(c_7232,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_server_S_in_1(X0,X1,X2))
| pred_attacker(constr_cbc_enc_2(X2,X1,name_Kas)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6933,c_6688]) ).
cnf(c_7264,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| pred_attacker(constr_cbc_enc_2(X1,X0,name_Kas)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_156,c_7232]) ).
cnf(c_7473,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7264,c_6842]) ).
cnf(c_7485,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_219,c_7473]) ).
cnf(c_7594,plain,
~ pred_attacker(X0),
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_167,c_7485]) ).
cnf(c_7675,plain,
$false,
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_151,c_7594]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.03/0.13 % Problem : SWW968+1 : TPTP v8.2.0. Released v7.4.0.
% 0.03/0.13 % Command : run_iprover %s %d THM
% 0.13/0.34 % Computer : n018.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % DateTime : Wed Jun 19 09:48:54 EDT 2024
% 0.13/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 0.21/0.48 Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.21/0.48 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/run_problem --schedule fof_schedule --heuristic_context casc_unsat --no_cores 8 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300
% 4.02/1.16 % SZS status Started for theBenchmark.p
% 4.02/1.16 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 %---------------- iProver v3.9 (pre CASC 2024/SMT-COMP 2024) ----------------%
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 ------ iProver source info
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 git: date: 2024-06-12 09:56:46 +0000
% 4.02/1.16 git: sha1: 4869ab62f0a3398f9d3a35e6db7918ebd3847e49
% 4.02/1.16 git: non_committed_changes: false
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 ------ Parsing...
% 4.02/1.16 ------ Clausification by vclausify_rel & Parsing by iProver...
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 ------ Preprocessing... sup_sim: 0 sf_s rm: 2 0s sf_e pe_s pe:1:0s pe_e sup_sim: 0 sf_s rm: 1 0s sf_e pe_s pe_e
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 ------ Preprocessing... gs_s sp: 8 0s gs_e snvd_s sp: 0 0s snvd_e
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 ------ Preprocessing... sf_s rm: 2 0s sf_e sf_s rm: 0 0s sf_e
% 4.02/1.16 ------ Proving...
% 4.02/1.16 ------ Problem Properties
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 clauses 191
% 4.02/1.16 conjectures 1
% 4.02/1.16 EPR 92
% 4.02/1.16 Horn 189
% 4.02/1.16 unary 110
% 4.02/1.16 binary 61
% 4.02/1.16 lits 305
% 4.02/1.16 lits eq 96
% 4.02/1.16 fd_pure 0
% 4.02/1.16 fd_pseudo 0
% 4.02/1.16 fd_cond 0
% 4.02/1.16 fd_pseudo_cond 0
% 4.02/1.16 AC symbols 0
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 ------ Schedule dynamic 5 is on
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 ------ Input Options "--resolution_flag false --inst_lit_sel_side none" Time Limit: 10.
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 ------
% 4.02/1.16 Current options:
% 4.02/1.16 ------
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 ------ Proving...
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
% 4.02/1.16
% 4.02/1.16
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------