TSTP Solution File: SWW967+1 by iProver---3.9
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- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : iProver---3.9
% Problem : SWW967+1 : TPTP v8.2.0. Released v7.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_iprover %s %d THM
% Computer : n007.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Mon Jun 24 18:19:00 EDT 2024
% Result : Theorem 3.67s 1.17s
% Output : CNFRefutation 3.67s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 15
% Number of leaves : 10
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 65 ( 22 unt; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 171 ( 0 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 9 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 196 ( 90 ~; 80 |; 14 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 12 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 15 ( 4 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 4 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 6 ( 5 usr; 4 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 21 ( 21 usr; 6 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 88 ( 18 sgn 51 !; 0 ?)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f84,axiom,
! [X62,X63] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X62,X63),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax83) ).
fof(f91,axiom,
pred_attacker(tuple_true),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax90) ).
fof(f110,axiom,
! [X97] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X97))
=> pred_attacker(X97) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax109) ).
fof(f121,axiom,
! [X116] :
( pred_attacker(X116)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X116)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax120) ).
fof(f123,axiom,
! [X118] :
( pred_attacker(X118)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X118)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax122) ).
fof(f125,axiom,
! [X120] :
( pred_attacker(X120)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X120)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax124) ).
fof(f127,axiom,
! [X122] :
( pred_attacker(X122)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X122)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax126) ).
fof(f143,axiom,
pred_attacker(constr_CONST_4),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax142) ).
fof(f172,axiom,
! [X206,X207,X208,X209,X210] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X208))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X206),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X208,name_Kas)))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X208,name_Kas)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X209))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X207))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X207,name_Kas)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X210))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X209,X208,X206)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X210,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X207,name_Kas)))) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax171) ).
fof(f175,conjecture,
pred_attacker(name_objective),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co0) ).
fof(f176,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(negated_conjecture,[],[f175]) ).
fof(f193,plain,
! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(rectify,[],[f84]) ).
fof(f217,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X0))
=> pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f110]) ).
fof(f228,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f121]) ).
fof(f230,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f123]) ).
fof(f232,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f125]) ).
fof(f234,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f127]) ).
fof(f270,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f172]) ).
fof(f273,plain,
~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(flattening,[],[f176]) ).
fof(f301,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f217]) ).
fof(f313,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f228]) ).
fof(f315,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f230]) ).
fof(f317,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f232]) ).
fof(f319,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f234]) ).
fof(f368,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f270]) ).
fof(f369,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f368]) ).
fof(f456,plain,
! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f193]) ).
fof(f463,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_true),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f91]) ).
fof(f482,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f301]) ).
fof(f493,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f313]) ).
fof(f495,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f315]) ).
fof(f497,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f317]) ).
fof(f499,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f319]) ).
fof(f515,plain,
pred_attacker(constr_CONST_4),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f143]) ).
fof(f543,plain,
! [X2,X3,X0,X1,X4] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f369]) ).
fof(f546,plain,
~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f273]) ).
cnf(c_132,plain,
pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f456]) ).
cnf(c_139,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_true),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f463]) ).
cnf(c_158,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f482]) ).
cnf(c_169,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f493]) ).
cnf(c_171,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f495]) ).
cnf(c_173,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f497]) ).
cnf(c_175,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f499]) ).
cnf(c_191,plain,
pred_attacker(constr_CONST_4),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f515]) ).
cnf(c_219,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X0,X1,X2)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X3,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas))))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X2),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X4))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f543]) ).
cnf(c_222,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f546]) ).
cnf(c_354,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0)) ),
inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_173]) ).
cnf(c_684,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X0,X1,X2)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X3,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas))))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X2),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X4))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_219,c_354]) ).
cnf(c_714,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X2,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X4)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)) ),
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_684,c_132]) ).
cnf(c_1292,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X3)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_714,c_132,c_132,c_132]) ).
cnf(c_1751,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0)) ),
inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_169]) ).
cnf(c_2087,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X3)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_1292,c_1751]) ).
cnf(c_3036,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ sP0_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[sP0_iProver_def])],[c_2087]) ).
cnf(c_3037,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0))
| ~ sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[sP1_iProver_def])],[c_2087]) ).
cnf(c_3038,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
| ~ sP2_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[sP2_iProver_def])],[c_2087]) ).
cnf(c_3039,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective))
| sP0_iProver_def
| sP1_iProver_def
| sP2_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[])],[c_2087]) ).
cnf(c_3040,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[c_222]) ).
cnf(c_5566,plain,
~ sP0_iProver_def,
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_139,c_3036]) ).
cnf(c_5785,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_175,c_3037]) ).
cnf(c_5842,plain,
~ sP1_iProver_def,
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_191,c_5785]) ).
cnf(c_5861,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ sP2_iProver_def ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_171,c_3038]) ).
cnf(c_5897,plain,
~ sP2_iProver_def,
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_191,c_5861]) ).
cnf(c_5912,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_3039,c_3039,c_5566,c_5842,c_5897]) ).
cnf(c_5914,plain,
pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_5912,c_158]) ).
cnf(c_5915,plain,
$false,
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5914,c_3040]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.08/0.15 % Problem : SWW967+1 : TPTP v8.2.0. Released v7.4.0.
% 0.08/0.15 % Command : run_iprover %s %d THM
% 0.16/0.37 % Computer : n007.cluster.edu
% 0.16/0.37 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.16/0.37 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.16/0.37 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.16/0.37 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.16/0.37 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.16/0.37 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.16/0.37 % DateTime : Wed Jun 19 06:17:09 EDT 2024
% 0.16/0.37 % CPUTime :
% 0.24/0.51 Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.24/0.51 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/run_problem --schedule fof_schedule --heuristic_context casc_unsat --no_cores 8 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300
% 3.67/1.17 % SZS status Started for theBenchmark.p
% 3.67/1.17 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 %---------------- iProver v3.9 (pre CASC 2024/SMT-COMP 2024) ----------------%
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 ------ iProver source info
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 git: date: 2024-06-12 09:56:46 +0000
% 3.67/1.17 git: sha1: 4869ab62f0a3398f9d3a35e6db7918ebd3847e49
% 3.67/1.17 git: non_committed_changes: false
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 ------ Parsing...
% 3.67/1.17 ------ Clausification by vclausify_rel & Parsing by iProver...
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 ------ Preprocessing... sup_sim: 0 sf_s rm: 2 0s sf_e pe_s pe:1:0s pe_e sup_sim: 0 sf_s rm: 1 0s sf_e pe_s pe_e
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 ------ Preprocessing... gs_s sp: 4 0s gs_e snvd_s sp: 0 0s snvd_e
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 ------ Preprocessing... sf_s rm: 1 0s sf_e sf_s rm: 0 0s sf_e
% 3.67/1.17 ------ Proving...
% 3.67/1.17 ------ Problem Properties
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 clauses 174
% 3.67/1.17 conjectures 1
% 3.67/1.17 EPR 79
% 3.67/1.17 Horn 173
% 3.67/1.17 unary 97
% 3.67/1.17 binary 59
% 3.67/1.17 lits 282
% 3.67/1.17 lits eq 83
% 3.67/1.17 fd_pure 0
% 3.67/1.17 fd_pseudo 0
% 3.67/1.17 fd_cond 0
% 3.67/1.17 fd_pseudo_cond 0
% 3.67/1.17 AC symbols 0
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 ------ Schedule dynamic 5 is on
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 ------ Input Options "--resolution_flag false --inst_lit_sel_side none" Time Limit: 10.
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 ------
% 3.67/1.17 Current options:
% 3.67/1.17 ------
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 ------ Proving...
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.17 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
% 3.67/1.17
% 3.67/1.18
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