TSTP Solution File: SWW964+1 by iProver---3.9
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- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : iProver---3.9
% Problem : SWW964+1 : TPTP v8.2.0. Released v7.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_iprover %s %d THM
% Computer : n032.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Mon Jun 24 18:18:59 EDT 2024
% Result : Theorem 3.89s 0.95s
% Output : CNFRefutation 3.89s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : ERROR: Analysing output (Could not find formula named definition)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f54,axiom,
name_A != name_objective,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax53) ).
fof(f60,axiom,
name_B != name_objective,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax59) ).
fof(f81,axiom,
! [X4,X5] : constr_checksign(constr_sign(X5,X4),constr_pkey(X4)) = X5,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax80) ).
fof(f85,axiom,
! [X18,X19] : constr_ecb_dec_1(constr_ecb_enc_1(X19,constr_pkey(X18)),X18) = X19,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax84) ).
fof(f87,axiom,
! [X25,X26,X27,X28] : constr_ecb_enc_3(X26,X27,X28,X25) = tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(X26,X25),constr_ecb_enc_1(X27,X25),constr_ecb_enc_1(X28,X25)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax86) ).
fof(f90,axiom,
! [X35,X36] : constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(tuple_2(X35,X36)) = X36,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax89) ).
fof(f96,axiom,
! [X49,X50] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X49,X50),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax95) ).
fof(f104,axiom,
pred_attacker(tuple_true),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax103) ).
fof(f106,axiom,
! [X60] :
( pred_attacker(X60)
=> pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X60)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax105) ).
fof(f108,axiom,
! [X62] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_out_3(X62))
=> pred_attacker(X62) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax107) ).
fof(f114,axiom,
! [X68] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(X68))
=> pred_attacker(X68) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax113) ).
fof(f115,axiom,
! [X69,X70] :
( ( pred_attacker(X70)
& pred_attacker(X69) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X69,X70)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax114) ).
fof(f118,axiom,
! [X75,X76] :
( ( pred_attacker(X76)
& pred_attacker(X75) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X75,X76)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax117) ).
fof(f131,axiom,
! [X104,X105] :
( ( pred_attacker(X105)
& pred_attacker(X104) )
=> pred_attacker(constr_ecb_dec_1(X104,X105)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax130) ).
fof(f134,axiom,
! [X109] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X109))
=> pred_attacker(X109) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax133) ).
fof(f136,axiom,
! [X111] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X111))
=> pred_attacker(X111) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax135) ).
fof(f140,axiom,
! [X118] :
( pred_attacker(X118)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X118)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax139) ).
fof(f142,axiom,
! [X120] :
( pred_attacker(X120)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X120)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax141) ).
fof(f144,axiom,
! [X122] :
( pred_attacker(X122)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X122)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax143) ).
fof(f170,axiom,
! [X166,X167,X168] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_3(X166,X167,X168))
=> pred_attacker(X167) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax169) ).
fof(f172,axiom,
! [X172,X173] :
( ( pred_attacker(X173)
& pred_attacker(X172) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_2(X172,X173)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax171) ).
fof(f187,axiom,
pred_attacker(tuple_out_3(constr_pkey(name_skS))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax186) ).
fof(f191,axiom,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_1(name_B,name_A)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax190) ).
fof(f192,axiom,
! [X189,X190,X191] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X191))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X191,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X190))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X190,name_skB))) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_ecb_enc_3(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X190,name_skB)),name_Nb(X189),name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X191,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax191) ).
fof(f193,axiom,
! [X192,X193,X194,X195] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X195))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X195,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X193))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X193,name_skB)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X194))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X192),constr_ecb_dec_1(X194,name_skB)) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax192) ).
fof(f194,axiom,
! [X196,X197,X198] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X198,X196))
& pred_table(tuple_keys(X196,X197)) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X196,X197),name_skS))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax193) ).
fof(f195,axiom,
! [X199,X200] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X199,X200))
& name_A != X199
& name_B != X199 )
=> pred_table(tuple_keys(X199,X200)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax194) ).
fof(f196,conjecture,
! [X201] : pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(X201),name_objective)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co0) ).
fof(f197,negated_conjecture,
~ ! [X201] : pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(X201),name_objective)),
inference(negated_conjecture,[],[f196]) ).
fof(f199,plain,
! [X0,X1] : constr_checksign(constr_sign(X1,X0),constr_pkey(X0)) = X1,
inference(rectify,[],[f81]) ).
fof(f203,plain,
! [X0,X1] : constr_ecb_dec_1(constr_ecb_enc_1(X1,constr_pkey(X0)),X0) = X1,
inference(rectify,[],[f85]) ).
fof(f205,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3] : constr_ecb_enc_3(X1,X2,X3,X0) = tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(X1,X0),constr_ecb_enc_1(X2,X0),constr_ecb_enc_1(X3,X0)),
inference(rectify,[],[f87]) ).
fof(f208,plain,
! [X0,X1] : constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(tuple_2(X0,X1)) = X1,
inference(rectify,[],[f90]) ).
fof(f214,plain,
! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(rectify,[],[f96]) ).
fof(f223,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f106]) ).
fof(f225,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_out_3(X0))
=> pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f108]) ).
fof(f231,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(X0))
=> pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f114]) ).
fof(f232,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( pred_attacker(X1)
& pred_attacker(X0) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X0,X1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f115]) ).
fof(f235,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( pred_attacker(X1)
& pred_attacker(X0) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f118]) ).
fof(f247,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( pred_attacker(X1)
& pred_attacker(X0) )
=> pred_attacker(constr_ecb_dec_1(X0,X1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f131]) ).
fof(f250,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0))
=> pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f134]) ).
fof(f252,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0))
=> pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f136]) ).
fof(f256,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f140]) ).
fof(f258,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f142]) ).
fof(f260,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f144]) ).
fof(f281,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_3(X0,X1,X2))
=> pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f170]) ).
fof(f283,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( pred_attacker(X1)
& pred_attacker(X0) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f172]) ).
fof(f292,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB))) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_ecb_enc_3(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X0),name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f192]) ).
fof(f293,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB)) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f193]) ).
fof(f294,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X2,X0))
& pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS))) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f194]) ).
fof(f295,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1))
& name_A != X0
& name_B != X0 )
=> pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f195]) ).
fof(f296,plain,
~ ! [X0] : pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(X0),name_objective)),
inference(rectify,[],[f197]) ).
fof(f307,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f223]) ).
fof(f309,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_out_3(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f225]) ).
fof(f315,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f231]) ).
fof(f316,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f232]) ).
fof(f317,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f316]) ).
fof(f320,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f235]) ).
fof(f321,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f320]) ).
fof(f341,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(constr_ecb_dec_1(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f247]) ).
fof(f342,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(constr_ecb_dec_1(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f341]) ).
fof(f346,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f250]) ).
fof(f348,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f252]) ).
fof(f353,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f256]) ).
fof(f355,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f258]) ).
fof(f357,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f260]) ).
fof(f382,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_3(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f281]) ).
fof(f384,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f283]) ).
fof(f385,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f384]) ).
fof(f396,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_ecb_enc_3(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X0),name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB))) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f292]) ).
fof(f397,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_ecb_enc_3(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X0),name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB))) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f396]) ).
fof(f398,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f293]) ).
fof(f399,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f398]) ).
fof(f400,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X2,X0))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f294]) ).
fof(f401,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X2,X0))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f400]) ).
fof(f402,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| name_A = X0
| name_B = X0 ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f295]) ).
fof(f403,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| name_A = X0
| name_B = X0 ),
inference(flattening,[],[f402]) ).
fof(f404,plain,
? [X0] : ~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(X0),name_objective)),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f296]) ).
fof(f405,plain,
( ? [X0] : ~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(X0),name_objective))
=> ~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(sK0),name_objective)) ),
introduced(choice_axiom,[]) ).
fof(f406,plain,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(sK0),name_objective)),
inference(skolemisation,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK0])],[f404,f405]) ).
fof(f460,plain,
name_A != name_objective,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f54]) ).
fof(f466,plain,
name_B != name_objective,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f60]) ).
fof(f487,plain,
! [X0,X1] : constr_checksign(constr_sign(X1,X0),constr_pkey(X0)) = X1,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f199]) ).
fof(f491,plain,
! [X0,X1] : constr_ecb_dec_1(constr_ecb_enc_1(X1,constr_pkey(X0)),X0) = X1,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f203]) ).
fof(f493,plain,
! [X2,X3,X0,X1] : constr_ecb_enc_3(X1,X2,X3,X0) = tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(X1,X0),constr_ecb_enc_1(X2,X0),constr_ecb_enc_1(X3,X0)),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f205]) ).
fof(f496,plain,
! [X0,X1] : constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(tuple_2(X0,X1)) = X1,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f208]) ).
fof(f502,plain,
! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f214]) ).
fof(f510,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_true),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f104]) ).
fof(f512,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f307]) ).
fof(f514,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_out_3(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f309]) ).
fof(f520,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f315]) ).
fof(f521,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f317]) ).
fof(f524,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f321]) ).
fof(f537,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(constr_ecb_dec_1(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f342]) ).
fof(f540,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f346]) ).
fof(f542,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f348]) ).
fof(f546,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f353]) ).
fof(f548,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f355]) ).
fof(f550,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f357]) ).
fof(f576,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_3(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f382]) ).
fof(f578,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f385]) ).
fof(f592,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_out_3(constr_pkey(name_skS))),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f187]) ).
fof(f596,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_1(name_B,name_A)),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f191]) ).
fof(f597,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_ecb_enc_3(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X0),name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f397]) ).
fof(f598,plain,
! [X2,X3,X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f399]) ).
fof(f599,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X2,X0))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f401]) ).
fof(f600,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| name_A = X0
| name_B = X0 ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f403]) ).
fof(f601,plain,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(sK0),name_objective)),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f406]) ).
fof(f609,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X0),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB))) ),
inference(definition_unfolding,[],[f597,f493]) ).
cnf(c_102,plain,
name_A != name_objective,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f460]) ).
cnf(c_108,plain,
name_B != name_objective,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f466]) ).
cnf(c_129,plain,
constr_checksign(constr_sign(X0,X1),constr_pkey(X1)) = X0,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f487]) ).
cnf(c_133,plain,
constr_ecb_dec_1(constr_ecb_enc_1(X0,constr_pkey(X1)),X1) = X0,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f491]) ).
cnf(c_135,plain,
constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(tuple_2(X0,X1)) = X1,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f496]) ).
cnf(c_141,plain,
pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f502]) ).
cnf(c_149,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_true),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f510]) ).
cnf(c_151,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f512]) ).
cnf(c_153,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_out_3(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f514]) ).
cnf(c_159,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f520]) ).
cnf(c_160,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X1,X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f521]) ).
cnf(c_163,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X1,X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f524]) ).
cnf(c_176,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| pred_attacker(constr_ecb_dec_1(X1,X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f537]) ).
cnf(c_179,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f540]) ).
cnf(c_181,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f542]) ).
cnf(c_185,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f546]) ).
cnf(c_187,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f548]) ).
cnf(c_189,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f550]) ).
cnf(c_215,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_3(X0,X1,X2))
| pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f576]) ).
cnf(c_217,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| pred_attacker(tuple_2(X1,X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f578]) ).
cnf(c_231,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_out_3(constr_pkey(name_skS))),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f592]) ).
cnf(c_235,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_1(name_B,name_A)),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f596]) ).
cnf(c_236,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X2),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f609]) ).
cnf(c_237,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X1),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X3,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f598]) ).
cnf(c_238,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2))
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f599]) ).
cnf(c_239,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| X0 = name_A
| X0 = name_B
| pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f600]) ).
cnf(c_240,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(sK0),name_objective)),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f601]) ).
cnf(c_359,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0)) ),
inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_189]) ).
cnf(c_715,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X2),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_236,c_359]) ).
cnf(c_716,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X1),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X3,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_237,c_359]) ).
cnf(c_745,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X0,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X0,name_skB)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X2),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))) ),
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_715,c_141]) ).
cnf(c_747,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X1,name_skB))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X2,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X3)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_716,c_141]) ).
cnf(c_1296,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X0,name_skB)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X2),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_745,c_141]) ).
cnf(c_1349,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_747,c_141,c_141]) ).
cnf(c_1882,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_185]) ).
cnf(c_1886,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_187]) ).
cnf(c_2235,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X0,name_skB)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X2),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_1296,c_1886]) ).
cnf(c_2237,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_1349,c_1882]) ).
cnf(c_3307,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ sP0_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[sP0_iProver_def])],[c_2237]) ).
cnf(c_3308,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
| ~ sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[sP1_iProver_def])],[c_2237]) ).
cnf(c_3309,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| sP0_iProver_def
| sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[])],[c_2237]) ).
cnf(c_3310,plain,
name_Nb(sK0) = sP2_iProver_def,
definition ).
cnf(c_3311,plain,
tuple_2(sP2_iProver_def,name_objective) = sP3_iProver_def,
definition ).
cnf(c_3312,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(sP3_iProver_def),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[c_240,c_3310,c_3311]) ).
cnf(c_6035,plain,
~ sP0_iProver_def,
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_235,c_3307]) ).
cnf(c_6038,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_3309,c_3309,c_6035]) ).
cnf(c_6096,plain,
pred_attacker(constr_pkey(name_skS)),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_231,c_153]) ).
cnf(c_6151,plain,
( pred_attacker(name_objective)
| sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6038,c_179]) ).
cnf(c_6163,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| pred_attacker(tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X0,name_skB)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X2),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2235,c_181]) ).
cnf(c_6263,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_187,c_3308]) ).
cnf(c_6313,plain,
~ sP1_iProver_def,
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6096,c_6263]) ).
cnf(c_6320,plain,
pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6151,c_6313]) ).
cnf(c_6420,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X2),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS))))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6163,c_215]) ).
cnf(c_6554,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(X0,constr_pkey(X1)))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_133,c_176]) ).
cnf(c_6601,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(name_objective)
| ~ pred_attacker(sP2_iProver_def)
| pred_attacker(sP3_iProver_def) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_3311,c_217]) ).
cnf(c_6606,plain,
~ pred_attacker(sP2_iProver_def),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6601,c_3312,c_6320]) ).
cnf(c_6743,plain,
( ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_160,c_238]) ).
cnf(c_6757,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X0)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_163,c_239]) ).
cnf(c_7105,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X1),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS))))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6320,c_6420]) ).
cnf(c_7192,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(sP2_iProver_def,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS))))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_3310,c_7105]) ).
cnf(c_7204,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(constr_sign(X0,name_skS))
| pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(sP2_iProver_def,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(X0))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_129,c_7192]) ).
cnf(c_7212,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS))
| pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(sP2_iProver_def,X1)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_135,c_7204]) ).
cnf(c_8048,plain,
( ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6320,c_6743]) ).
cnf(c_8104,plain,
( ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_8048,c_159]) ).
cnf(c_8120,plain,
( ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(sP2_iProver_def,X1)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_8104,c_7212]) ).
cnf(c_8180,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(sP2_iProver_def,X0)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6757,c_8120]) ).
cnf(c_8869,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| name_A = name_objective
| name_B = name_objective
| pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(sP2_iProver_def,X0)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6320,c_8180]) ).
cnf(c_8923,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(sP2_iProver_def,X0)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8869,c_108,c_102]) ).
cnf(c_8932,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(sP2_iProver_def) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_8923,c_6554]) ).
cnf(c_8934,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8932,c_6606]) ).
cnf(c_8937,plain,
~ pred_attacker(X0),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_8934,c_151,c_8934]) ).
cnf(c_8939,plain,
$false,
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_149,c_8937]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.02/0.07 % Problem : SWW964+1 : TPTP v8.2.0. Released v7.4.0.
% 0.02/0.07 % Command : run_iprover %s %d THM
% 0.07/0.26 % Computer : n032.cluster.edu
% 0.07/0.26 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.07/0.26 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.07/0.26 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.07/0.26 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.07/0.26 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.07/0.26 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.07/0.26 % DateTime : Wed Jun 19 08:32:09 EDT 2024
% 0.07/0.26 % CPUTime :
% 0.12/0.34 Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.12/0.34 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/run_problem --schedule fof_schedule --heuristic_context casc_unsat --no_cores 8 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300
% 3.89/0.95 % SZS status Started for theBenchmark.p
% 3.89/0.95 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 %---------------- iProver v3.9 (pre CASC 2024/SMT-COMP 2024) ----------------%
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 ------ iProver source info
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 git: date: 2024-06-12 09:56:46 +0000
% 3.89/0.95 git: sha1: 4869ab62f0a3398f9d3a35e6db7918ebd3847e49
% 3.89/0.95 git: non_committed_changes: false
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 ------ Parsing...
% 3.89/0.95 ------ Clausification by vclausify_rel & Parsing by iProver...
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 ------ Preprocessing... sup_sim: 0 sf_s rm: 2 0s sf_e pe_s pe:1:0s pe_e sup_sim: 0 sf_s rm: 1 0s sf_e pe_s pe_e
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 ------ Preprocessing... gs_s sp: 3 0s gs_e snvd_s sp: 0 0s snvd_e
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 ------ Preprocessing... sf_s rm: 1 0s sf_e sf_s rm: 0 0s sf_e
% 3.89/0.95 ------ Proving...
% 3.89/0.95 ------ Problem Properties
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 clauses 193
% 3.89/0.95 conjectures 1
% 3.89/0.95 EPR 91
% 3.89/0.95 Horn 191
% 3.89/0.95 unary 114
% 3.89/0.95 binary 55
% 3.89/0.95 lits 306
% 3.89/0.95 lits eq 96
% 3.89/0.95 fd_pure 0
% 3.89/0.95 fd_pseudo 0
% 3.89/0.95 fd_cond 1
% 3.89/0.95 fd_pseudo_cond 0
% 3.89/0.95 AC symbols 0
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 ------ Schedule dynamic 5 is on
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 ------ Input Options "--resolution_flag false --inst_lit_sel_side none" Time Limit: 10.
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 ------
% 3.89/0.95 Current options:
% 3.89/0.95 ------
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 ------ Proving...
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.95 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
% 3.89/0.95
% 3.89/0.96
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------