TSTP Solution File: SWW964+1 by Zipperpin---2.1.9999
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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Zipperpin---2.1.9999
% Problem : SWW964+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v7.4.0.
% Transfm : NO INFORMATION
% Format : NO INFORMATION
% Command : python3 /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/portfolio.lams.parallel.py %s %d /export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/tmp.PPISx47wUL true
% Computer : n010.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Fri Sep 1 01:43:34 EDT 2023
% Result : Theorem 1.68s 1.28s
% Output : Refutation 1.68s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 16
% Number of leaves : 60
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 130 ( 32 unt; 34 typ; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 237 ( 40 equ; 0 cnn)
% Maximal formula atoms : 8 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 829 ( 100 ~; 110 |; 15 &; 588 @)
% ( 0 <=>; 16 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 19 ( 7 avg)
% Number of types : 2 ( 0 usr)
% Number of type conns : 42 ( 42 >; 0 *; 0 +; 0 <<)
% Number of symbols : 36 ( 34 usr; 8 con; 0-4 aty)
% Number of variables : 178 ( 0 ^; 178 !; 0 ?; 178 :)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
thf(name_B_type,type,
name_B: $i ).
thf(name_skB_type,type,
name_skB: $i ).
thf(constr_sign_type,type,
constr_sign: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tuple_keys_type,type,
tuple_keys: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tuple_3_type,type,
tuple_3: $i > $i > $i > $i ).
thf(name_A_type,type,
name_A: $i ).
thf(constr_ecb_dec_1_type,type,
constr_ecb_dec_1: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(constr_checksign_type,type,
constr_checksign: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(constr_tuple_3_get_1_bitstring_type,type,
constr_tuple_3_get_1_bitstring: $i > $i ).
thf(tuple_key_register_server_in_1_type,type,
tuple_key_register_server_in_1: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tuple_client_B_out_6_type,type,
tuple_client_B_out_6: $i > $i ).
thf(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring_type,type,
constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring: $i > $i ).
thf(name_objective_type,type,
name_objective: $i ).
thf(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring_type,type,
constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring: $i > $i ).
thf(pred_attacker_type,type,
pred_attacker: $i > $o ).
thf(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1_type,type,
tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(constr_ecb_enc_1_type,type,
constr_ecb_enc_1: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2_type,type,
tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2: $i > $i ).
thf(sk__type,type,
sk_: $i ).
thf(tuple_2_type,type,
tuple_2: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(pred_table_type,type,
pred_table: $i > $o ).
thf(constr_tuple_2_get_1_type,type,
constr_tuple_2_get_1: $i > $i ).
thf(constr_CONST_0x30_type,type,
constr_CONST_0x30: $i ).
thf(constr_pkey_type,type,
constr_pkey: $i > $i ).
thf(name_Nb_type,type,
name_Nb: $i > $i ).
thf(pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring_type,type,
pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring: $i > $i > $o ).
thf(constr_ecb_dec_2_type,type,
constr_ecb_dec_2: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tuple_client_B_in_2_type,type,
tuple_client_B_in_2: $i > $i ).
thf(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_type,type,
constr_tuple_2_get_0x30: $i > $i ).
thf(tuple_client_B_in_5_type,type,
tuple_client_B_in_5: $i > $i ).
thf(name_skS_type,type,
name_skS: $i ).
thf(constr_ecb_enc_3_type,type,
constr_ecb_enc_3: $i > $i > $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tuple_client_B_in_3_type,type,
tuple_client_B_in_3: $i > $i ).
thf(tuple_client_B_out_4_type,type,
tuple_client_B_out_4: $i > $i ).
thf(ax171,axiom,
! [VAR_V_377: $i,VAR_V_378: $i] :
( ( ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_377 )
& ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_378 ) )
=> ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_2 @ VAR_V_377 @ VAR_V_378 ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl171,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X1 )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_2 @ X0 @ X1 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax171]) ).
thf(co0,conjecture,
! [VAR_V_823: $i] : ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_2 @ ( name_Nb @ VAR_V_823 ) @ name_objective ) ) ).
thf(zf_stmt_0,negated_conjecture,
~ ! [VAR_V_823: $i] : ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_2 @ ( name_Nb @ VAR_V_823 ) @ name_objective ) ),
inference('cnf.neg',[status(esa)],[co0]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl195,plain,
~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_2 @ ( name_Nb @ sk_ ) @ name_objective ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[zf_stmt_0]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl653,plain,
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ name_objective )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( name_Nb @ sk_ ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl171,zip_derived_cl195]) ).
thf(ax161,axiom,
pred_attacker @ constr_CONST_0x30 ).
thf(zip_derived_cl161,plain,
pred_attacker @ constr_CONST_0x30,
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax161]) ).
thf(ax143,axiom,
! [VAR_V_244: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_244 )
=> ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ VAR_V_244 ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl143,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax143]) ).
thf(ax141,axiom,
! [VAR_V_238: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_238 )
=> ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_3 @ VAR_V_238 ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl141,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_3 @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax141]) ).
thf(ax192,axiom,
! [VAR_0X40SID_718: $i,VAR_ECB_ENC_NA_A_720X30: $i,VAR_ECB_ENC_NB_719: $i,VAR_SIGN_A_PKA_721: $i] :
( ( ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ ( name_Nb @ VAR_0X40SID_718 ) @ ( constr_ecb_dec_1 @ VAR_ECB_ENC_NB_719 @ name_skB ) )
& ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_5 @ VAR_ECB_ENC_NB_719 ) )
& ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ name_A @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_1 @ ( constr_ecb_dec_2 @ VAR_ECB_ENC_NA_A_720X30 @ name_skB ) ) )
& ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_3 @ VAR_ECB_ENC_NA_A_720X30 ) )
& ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ name_A @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_0x30 @ ( constr_checksign @ VAR_SIGN_A_PKA_721 @ ( constr_pkey @ name_skS ) ) ) )
& ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ VAR_SIGN_A_PKA_721 ) ) )
=> ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_6 @ name_objective ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl192,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_6 @ name_objective ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_3 @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ name_A @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_1 @ ( constr_ecb_dec_2 @ X0 @ name_skB ) ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_5 @ X1 ) )
| ~ ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ ( name_Nb @ X2 ) @ ( constr_ecb_dec_1 @ X1 @ name_skB ) )
| ~ ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ name_A @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_0x30 @ ( constr_checksign @ X3 @ ( constr_pkey @ name_skS ) ) ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ X3 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax192]) ).
thf(ax95,axiom,
! [VAR_X_66: $i,VAR_Y_67: $i] : ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ VAR_X_66 @ VAR_Y_67 ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl95,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] : ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ X0 @ X1 ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax95]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl95_001,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] : ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ X0 @ X1 ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax95]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl95_002,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] : ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ X0 @ X1 ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax95]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl759,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X3: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_6 @ name_objective ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_3 @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_5 @ X1 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ X3 ) ) ),
inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl192,zip_derived_cl95,zip_derived_cl95,zip_derived_cl95]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl760,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_6 @ name_objective ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_5 @ X1 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ X2 ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl141,zip_derived_cl759]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl766,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ X0 ) )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_6 @ name_objective ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_5 @ X1 ) ) ),
inference(condensation,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl760]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl767,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_6 @ name_objective ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_5 @ X1 ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl143,zip_derived_cl766]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl768,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_5 @ X0 ) )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_6 @ name_objective ) ) ),
inference(condensation,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl767]) ).
thf(ax139,axiom,
! [VAR_V_232: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_232 )
=> ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_5 @ VAR_V_232 ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl139,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_5 @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax139]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl769,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_6 @ name_objective ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 ) ),
inference('s_sup+',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl768,zip_derived_cl139]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl780,plain,
pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_6 @ name_objective ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl161,zip_derived_cl769]) ).
thf(ax133,axiom,
! [VAR_V_20X307: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_6 @ VAR_V_20X307 ) )
=> ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_20X307 ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl133,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_6 @ X0 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax133]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl841,plain,
pred_attacker @ name_objective,
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl780,zip_derived_cl133]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl842,plain,
~ ( pred_attacker @ ( name_Nb @ sk_ ) ),
inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl653,zip_derived_cl841]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl161_003,plain,
pred_attacker @ constr_CONST_0x30,
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax161]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl161_004,plain,
pred_attacker @ constr_CONST_0x30,
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax161]) ).
thf(ax114,axiom,
! [VAR_V_119: $i,VAR_V_120X30: $i] :
( ( ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_119 )
& ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_120X30 ) )
=> ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1 @ VAR_V_119 @ VAR_V_120X30 ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl114,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X1 )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1 @ X0 @ X1 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax114]) ).
thf(ax117,axiom,
! [VAR_V_135: $i,VAR_V_136: $i] :
( ( ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_135 )
& ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_136 ) )
=> ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_register_server_in_1 @ VAR_V_135 @ VAR_V_136 ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl117,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X1 )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_register_server_in_1 @ X0 @ X1 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax117]) ).
thf(ax194,axiom,
! [VAR_HOST_814: $i,VAR_PK_815: $i] :
( ( ( VAR_HOST_814 != name_B )
& ( VAR_HOST_814 != name_A )
& ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_register_server_in_1 @ VAR_HOST_814 @ VAR_PK_815 ) ) )
=> ( pred_table @ ( tuple_keys @ VAR_HOST_814 @ VAR_PK_815 ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl194,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( X0 = name_A )
| ( X0 = name_B )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_register_server_in_1 @ X0 @ X1 ) )
| ( pred_table @ ( tuple_keys @ X0 @ X1 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax194]) ).
thf(ax193,axiom,
! [VAR_DST_760X30: $i,VAR_PKDST_761: $i,VAR_SRC_762: $i] :
( ( ( pred_table @ ( tuple_keys @ VAR_DST_760X30 @ VAR_PKDST_761 ) )
& ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1 @ VAR_SRC_762 @ VAR_DST_760X30 ) ) )
=> ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2 @ ( constr_sign @ ( tuple_2 @ VAR_DST_760X30 @ VAR_PKDST_761 ) @ name_skS ) ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl193,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2 @ ( constr_sign @ ( tuple_2 @ X0 @ X1 ) @ name_skS ) ) )
| ~ ( pred_table @ ( tuple_keys @ X0 @ X1 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1 @ X2 @ X0 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax193]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl651,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i,X4: $i] :
( ( ( tuple_keys @ X0 @ X1 )
!= ( tuple_keys @ X3 @ X2 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_register_server_in_1 @ X0 @ X1 ) )
| ( X0 = name_B )
| ( X0 = name_A )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1 @ X4 @ X3 ) )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2 @ ( constr_sign @ ( tuple_2 @ X3 @ X2 ) @ name_skS ) ) ) ),
inference('dp-resolution',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl194,zip_derived_cl193]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl941,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i,X4: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X1 )
| ( ( tuple_keys @ X1 @ X0 )
!= ( tuple_keys @ X3 @ X2 ) )
| ( X1 = name_B )
| ( X1 = name_A )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1 @ X4 @ X3 ) )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2 @ ( constr_sign @ ( tuple_2 @ X3 @ X2 ) @ name_skS ) ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl117,zip_derived_cl651]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1279,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i,X4: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X1 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X2 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X3 )
| ( ( tuple_keys @ X3 @ X2 )
!= ( tuple_keys @ X0 @ X4 ) )
| ( X3 = name_B )
| ( X3 = name_A )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2 @ ( constr_sign @ ( tuple_2 @ X0 @ X4 ) @ name_skS ) ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl114,zip_derived_cl941]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1282,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2 @ ( constr_sign @ ( tuple_2 @ X1 @ X0 ) @ name_skS ) ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X1 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X2 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X3 )
| ( ( tuple_keys @ X3 @ X2 )
!= ( tuple_keys @ X1 @ X0 ) )
| ( X3 = name_B )
| ( X3 = name_A ) ),
inference(condensation,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl1279]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1283,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( X0 = name_A )
| ( X0 = name_B )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X1 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2 @ ( constr_sign @ ( tuple_2 @ X0 @ X1 ) @ name_skS ) ) ) ),
inference(eq_res,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl1282]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1284,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2 @ ( constr_sign @ ( tuple_2 @ X0 @ X1 ) @ name_skS ) ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X1 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ( X0 = name_B )
| ( X0 = name_A ) ),
inference(simplify,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl1283]) ).
thf(ax113,axiom,
! [VAR_V_115: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2 @ VAR_V_115 ) )
=> ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_115 ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl113,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2 @ X0 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax113]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1293,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( X1 = name_A )
| ( X1 = name_B )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X1 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_sign @ ( tuple_2 @ X1 @ X0 ) @ name_skS ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl1284,zip_derived_cl113]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl143_005,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax143]) ).
thf(ax89,axiom,
! [VAR_X0X30_16: $i,VAR_X1_17: $i] :
( ( constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring @ ( tuple_2 @ VAR_X0X30_16 @ VAR_X1_17 ) )
= VAR_X1_17 ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl89,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring @ ( tuple_2 @ X1 @ X0 ) )
= X0 ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax89]) ).
thf(ax80,axiom,
! [VAR_K_44: $i,VAR_M_0X30: $i] :
( ( constr_checksign @ ( constr_sign @ VAR_M_0X30 @ VAR_K_44 ) @ ( constr_pkey @ VAR_K_44 ) )
= VAR_M_0X30 ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl80,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( constr_checksign @ ( constr_sign @ X0 @ X1 ) @ ( constr_pkey @ X1 ) )
= X0 ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax80]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl141_006,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_3 @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax141]) ).
thf(ax191,axiom,
! [VAR_0X40SID_688: $i,VAR_ECB_ENC_NA_A_686: $i,VAR_SIGN_A_PKA_687: $i] :
( ( ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ name_A @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_1 @ ( constr_ecb_dec_2 @ VAR_ECB_ENC_NA_A_686 @ name_skB ) ) )
& ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_3 @ VAR_ECB_ENC_NA_A_686 ) )
& ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ name_A @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_0x30 @ ( constr_checksign @ VAR_SIGN_A_PKA_687 @ ( constr_pkey @ name_skS ) ) ) )
& ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ VAR_SIGN_A_PKA_687 ) ) )
=> ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_4 @ ( constr_ecb_enc_3 @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring @ ( constr_ecb_dec_2 @ VAR_ECB_ENC_NA_A_686 @ name_skB ) ) @ ( name_Nb @ VAR_0X40SID_688 ) @ name_B @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring @ ( constr_checksign @ VAR_SIGN_A_PKA_687 @ ( constr_pkey @ name_skS ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl191,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_3 @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ name_A @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_1 @ ( constr_ecb_dec_2 @ X0 @ name_skB ) ) )
| ~ ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ name_A @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_0x30 @ ( constr_checksign @ X1 @ ( constr_pkey @ name_skS ) ) ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ X1 ) )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_4 @ ( constr_ecb_enc_3 @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring @ ( constr_ecb_dec_2 @ X0 @ name_skB ) ) @ ( name_Nb @ X2 ) @ name_B @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring @ ( constr_checksign @ X1 @ ( constr_pkey @ name_skS ) ) ) ) ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax191]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl95_007,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] : ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ X0 @ X1 ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax95]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl95_008,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] : ( pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring @ X0 @ X1 ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax95]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl892,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_3 @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ X1 ) )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_4 @ ( constr_ecb_enc_3 @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring @ ( constr_ecb_dec_2 @ X0 @ name_skB ) ) @ ( name_Nb @ X2 ) @ name_B @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring @ ( constr_checksign @ X1 @ ( constr_pkey @ name_skS ) ) ) ) ) ) ),
inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl191,zip_derived_cl95,zip_derived_cl95]) ).
thf(ax135,axiom,
! [VAR_V_213: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_4 @ VAR_V_213 ) )
=> ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_213 ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl135,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_out_4 @ X0 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax135]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl893,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_3 @ X2 ) )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_enc_3 @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring @ ( constr_ecb_dec_2 @ X2 @ name_skB ) ) @ ( name_Nb @ X1 ) @ name_B @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring @ ( constr_checksign @ X0 @ ( constr_pkey @ name_skS ) ) ) ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl892,zip_derived_cl135]) ).
thf(ax86,axiom,
! [VAR_K_25: $i,VAR_X1_23: $i,VAR_X2_24: $i,VAR_X3_0X30: $i] :
( ( constr_ecb_enc_3 @ VAR_X1_23 @ VAR_X2_24 @ VAR_X3_0X30 @ VAR_K_25 )
= ( tuple_3 @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ VAR_X1_23 @ VAR_K_25 ) @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ VAR_X2_24 @ VAR_K_25 ) @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ VAR_X3_0X30 @ VAR_K_25 ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl86,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
( ( constr_ecb_enc_3 @ X0 @ X2 @ X3 @ X1 )
= ( tuple_3 @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ X0 @ X1 ) @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ X2 @ X1 ) @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ X3 @ X1 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax86]) ).
thf(ax88,axiom,
! [VAR_X0X30_18: $i,VAR_X1_19: $i,VAR_X2_20X30: $i] :
( ( constr_tuple_3_get_1_bitstring @ ( tuple_3 @ VAR_X0X30_18 @ VAR_X1_19 @ VAR_X2_20X30 ) )
= VAR_X1_19 ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl88,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ( constr_tuple_3_get_1_bitstring @ ( tuple_3 @ X1 @ X0 @ X2 ) )
= X0 ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax88]) ).
thf(ax97,axiom,
! [VAR_V_75: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_75 )
=> ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_tuple_3_get_1_bitstring @ VAR_V_75 ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl97,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_tuple_3_get_1_bitstring @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax97]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl662,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_3 @ X2 @ X0 @ X1 ) ) ),
inference('s_sup+',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl88,zip_derived_cl97]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl681,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ X2 @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_enc_3 @ X3 @ X2 @ X1 @ X0 ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl86,zip_derived_cl662]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1134,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_3 @ X2 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ X0 ) )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ ( name_Nb @ X1 ) @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring @ ( constr_checksign @ X0 @ ( constr_pkey @ name_skS ) ) ) ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl893,zip_derived_cl681]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1219,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ X1 ) )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ ( name_Nb @ X2 ) @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring @ ( constr_checksign @ X1 @ ( constr_pkey @ name_skS ) ) ) ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl141,zip_derived_cl1134]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1220,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ ( name_Nb @ X1 ) @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring @ ( constr_checksign @ X0 @ ( constr_pkey @ name_skS ) ) ) ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ X0 ) ) ),
inference(condensation,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl1219]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1221,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ ( name_Nb @ X1 ) @ ( constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring @ X0 ) ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ ( constr_sign @ X0 @ name_skS ) ) ) ),
inference('s_sup+',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl80,zip_derived_cl1220]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1248,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ ( name_Nb @ X2 ) @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( tuple_client_B_in_2 @ ( constr_sign @ ( tuple_2 @ X1 @ X0 ) @ name_skS ) ) ) ),
inference('s_sup+',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl89,zip_derived_cl1221]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1251,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_sign @ ( tuple_2 @ X1 @ X0 ) @ name_skS ) )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ ( name_Nb @ X2 ) @ X0 ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl143,zip_derived_cl1248]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1301,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X1 )
| ( X1 = name_B )
| ( X1 = name_A )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ ( name_Nb @ X2 ) @ X0 ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl1293,zip_derived_cl1251]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1547,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ( constr_CONST_0x30 = name_B )
| ( constr_CONST_0x30 = name_A )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ ( name_Nb @ X1 ) @ X0 ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl161,zip_derived_cl1301]) ).
thf(ax4,axiom,
constr_CONST_0x30 != name_A ).
thf(zip_derived_cl4,plain,
constr_CONST_0x30 != name_A,
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax4]) ).
thf(ax5,axiom,
constr_CONST_0x30 != name_B ).
thf(zip_derived_cl5,plain,
constr_CONST_0x30 != name_B,
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax5]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1655,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ ( name_Nb @ X1 ) @ X0 ) ) ),
inference('simplify_reflect-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl1547,zip_derived_cl4,zip_derived_cl5]) ).
thf(ax84,axiom,
! [VAR_K_31: $i,VAR_X1_30X30: $i] :
( ( constr_ecb_dec_1 @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ VAR_X1_30X30 @ ( constr_pkey @ VAR_K_31 ) ) @ VAR_K_31 )
= VAR_X1_30X30 ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl84,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( constr_ecb_dec_1 @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ X0 @ ( constr_pkey @ X1 ) ) @ X1 )
= X0 ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax84]) ).
thf(ax130,axiom,
! [VAR_V_197: $i,VAR_V_198: $i] :
( ( ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_197 )
& ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_198 ) )
=> ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_dec_1 @ VAR_V_197 @ VAR_V_198 ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl130,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X1 )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_dec_1 @ X0 @ X1 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax130]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl730,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_ecb_enc_1 @ X0 @ ( constr_pkey @ X1 ) ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X1 )
| ( pred_attacker @ X0 ) ),
inference('s_sup+',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl84,zip_derived_cl130]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1792,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_pkey @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 )
| ( pred_attacker @ ( name_Nb @ X1 ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl1655,zip_derived_cl730]) ).
thf(ax105,axiom,
! [VAR_V_91: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ VAR_V_91 )
=> ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_pkey @ VAR_V_91 ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl105,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( constr_pkey @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[ax105]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1793,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( pred_attacker @ ( name_Nb @ X1 ) )
| ~ ( pred_attacker @ X0 ) ),
inference(clc,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl1792,zip_derived_cl105]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1794,plain,
! [X0: $i] : ( pred_attacker @ ( name_Nb @ X0 ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl161,zip_derived_cl1793]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1906,plain,
$false,
inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl842,zip_derived_cl1794]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.12 % Problem : SWW964+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v7.4.0.
% 0.12/0.13 % Command : python3 /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/portfolio.lams.parallel.py %s %d /export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/tmp.PPISx47wUL true
% 0.13/0.34 % Computer : n010.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % DateTime : Sun Aug 27 21:37:34 EDT 2023
% 0.13/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 0.13/0.34 % Running portfolio for 300 s
% 0.13/0.34 % File : /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.13/0.35 % Number of cores: 8
% 0.13/0.35 % Python version: Python 3.6.8
% 0.13/0.35 % Running in FO mode
% 0.21/0.66 % Total configuration time : 435
% 0.21/0.66 % Estimated wc time : 1092
% 0.21/0.66 % Estimated cpu time (7 cpus) : 156.0
% 0.21/0.71 % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/fo/fo6_bce.sh running for 75s
% 0.21/0.73 % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/fo/fo3_bce.sh running for 75s
% 0.21/0.75 % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/fo/fo1_av.sh running for 75s
% 0.84/0.76 % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/fo/fo7.sh running for 63s
% 0.84/0.76 % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/fo/fo13.sh running for 50s
% 0.84/0.76 % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/fo/fo5.sh running for 50s
% 0.84/0.76 % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/fo/fo4.sh running for 50s
% 1.37/0.79 % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/fo/fo1_lcnf.sh running for 50s
% 1.40/0.88 % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/fo/fo17_bce.sh running for 50s
% 1.54/0.91 % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/fo/fo8.sh running for 50s
% 1.68/1.28 % Solved by fo/fo17_bce.sh.
% 1.68/1.28 % BCE start: 196
% 1.68/1.28 % BCE eliminated: 1
% 1.68/1.28 % PE start: 195
% 1.68/1.28 logic: eq
% 1.68/1.28 % PE eliminated: 3
% 1.68/1.28 % done 500 iterations in 0.368s
% 1.68/1.28 % SZS status Theorem for '/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p'
% 1.68/1.28 % SZS output start Refutation
% See solution above
% 1.68/1.28
% 1.68/1.28
% 1.68/1.28 % Terminating...
% 4.94/1.36 % Runner terminated.
% 4.94/1.38 % Zipperpin 1.5 exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------