TSTP Solution File: SWW964+1 by Enigma---0.5.1
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- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Enigma---0.5.1
% Problem : SWW964+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v7.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : enigmatic-eprover.py %s %d 1
% Computer : n022.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 600s
% DateTime : Thu Jul 21 00:03:12 EDT 2022
% Result : Theorem 22.98s 4.30s
% Output : CNFRefutation 22.98s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 14
% Number of leaves : 30
% Syntax : Number of clauses : 94 ( 31 unt; 11 nHn; 70 RR)
% Number of literals : 220 ( 32 equ; 114 neg)
% Maximal clause size : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 7 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 4 ( 2 usr; 1 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 35 ( 35 usr; 9 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 142 ( 55 sgn)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(i_0_194,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X3,X1))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_194) ).
cnf(i_0_184,plain,
pred_table(tuple_keys(name_B,constr_pkey(name_skB))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_184) ).
cnf(i_0_192,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X3),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_192) ).
cnf(i_0_142,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_142) ).
cnf(i_0_115,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_115) ).
cnf(i_0_179,plain,
pred_attacker(name_B),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_179) ).
cnf(i_0_193,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_193) ).
cnf(i_0_140,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_140) ).
cnf(i_0_144,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_144) ).
cnf(i_0_189,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_3(tuple_2(constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Na(X1),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_189) ).
cnf(i_0_155,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_155) ).
cnf(i_0_182,plain,
pred_attacker(name_new0x2Dname(X1)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_182) ).
cnf(i_0_195,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_195) ).
cnf(i_0_118,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_118) ).
cnf(i_0_136,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_136) ).
cnf(i_0_81,plain,
constr_checksign(constr_sign(X1,X2),constr_pkey(X2)) = X1,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_81) ).
cnf(i_0_114,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_114) ).
cnf(i_0_170,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_3(X2,X1,X3)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_170) ).
cnf(i_0_90,plain,
constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(tuple_2(X1,X2)) = X2,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_90) ).
cnf(i_0_185,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_out_1(constr_pkey(name_skA))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_185) ).
cnf(i_0_134,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_134) ).
cnf(i_0_188,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_1(name_A,name_I)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_188) ).
cnf(i_0_131,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_ecb_dec_1(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_131) ).
cnf(i_0_85,plain,
constr_ecb_dec_1(constr_ecb_enc_1(X1,constr_pkey(X2)),X2) = X1,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_85) ).
cnf(i_0_196,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(esk1_0),name_objective)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_196) ).
cnf(i_0_172,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_172) ).
cnf(i_0_106,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_106) ).
cnf(i_0_54,plain,
name_objective != name_A,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_54) ).
cnf(i_0_60,plain,
name_objective != name_B,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_60) ).
cnf(i_0_162,plain,
pred_attacker(constr_CONST_0x30),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-yofhr44i/input.p',i_0_162) ).
cnf(c_0_227,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X3,X1))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2)) ),
i_0_194 ).
cnf(c_0_228,plain,
pred_table(tuple_keys(name_B,constr_pkey(name_skB))),
i_0_184 ).
cnf(c_0_229,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X3),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2)) ),
i_0_192 ).
cnf(c_0_230,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_142 ).
cnf(c_0_231,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(name_B,constr_pkey(name_skB)),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X1,name_B)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_227,c_0_228]) ).
cnf(c_0_232,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_115 ).
cnf(c_0_233,plain,
pred_attacker(name_B),
i_0_179 ).
cnf(c_0_234,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3)) ),
i_0_193 ).
cnf(c_0_235,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_140 ).
cnf(c_0_236,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X3),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_229,c_0_230]) ).
cnf(c_0_237,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_144 ).
cnf(c_0_238,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_3(tuple_2(constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Na(X1),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2)) ),
i_0_189 ).
cnf(c_0_239,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_155 ).
cnf(c_0_240,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(name_B,constr_pkey(name_skB)),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_231,c_0_232]),c_0_233])]) ).
cnf(c_0_241,plain,
pred_attacker(name_new0x2Dname(X1)),
i_0_182 ).
cnf(c_0_242,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X1,X2)) ),
i_0_195 ).
cnf(c_0_243,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_118 ).
cnf(c_0_244,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_234,c_0_235]) ).
cnf(c_0_245,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X1)) ),
i_0_136 ).
cnf(c_0_246,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X3),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_236,c_0_237]) ).
cnf(c_0_247,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_3(tuple_2(constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Na(X1),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_238,c_0_239]) ).
cnf(c_0_248,plain,
constr_checksign(constr_sign(X1,X2),constr_pkey(X2)) = X1,
i_0_81 ).
cnf(c_0_249,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(X1)) ),
i_0_114 ).
cnf(c_0_250,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(name_B,constr_pkey(name_skB)),name_skS))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_240,c_0_241]) ).
cnf(c_0_251,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_242,c_0_243]) ).
cnf(c_0_252,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_244,c_0_230]) ).
cnf(c_0_253,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_3(X2,X1,X3)) ),
i_0_170 ).
cnf(c_0_254,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_3(constr_ecb_enc_1(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X3),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_B,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_245,c_0_246]) ).
cnf(c_0_255,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_3(tuple_2(constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Na(X1),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(X2)),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(X2)))))
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_sign(X2,name_skS)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_247,c_0_248]) ).
cnf(c_0_256,plain,
pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(name_B,constr_pkey(name_skB)),name_skS)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_249,c_0_250]) ).
cnf(c_0_257,plain,
constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(tuple_2(X1,X2)) = X2,
i_0_90 ).
cnf(c_0_258,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X3,X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_227,c_0_251]) ).
cnf(c_0_259,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_252,c_0_237]) ).
cnf(c_0_260,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_out_1(constr_pkey(name_skA))),
i_0_185 ).
cnf(c_0_261,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X1),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))
| ~ pred_attacker(X3)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_253,c_0_254]) ).
cnf(c_0_262,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_3(tuple_2(constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Na(X1),constr_pkey(name_skB)),constr_ecb_enc_1(name_A,constr_pkey(name_skB))))),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_255,c_0_256]),c_0_257]),c_0_257]) ).
cnf(c_0_263,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_258,c_0_232]) ).
cnf(c_0_264,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X1)) ),
i_0_134 ).
cnf(c_0_265,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_259,c_0_260]) ).
cnf(c_0_266,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X1),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_261,c_0_262]) ).
cnf(c_0_267,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_249,c_0_263]) ).
cnf(c_0_268,plain,
( pred_attacker(name_objective)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_264,c_0_265]) ).
cnf(c_0_269,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_1(name_A,name_I)),
i_0_188 ).
cnf(c_0_270,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_ecb_dec_1(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_131 ).
cnf(c_0_271,plain,
constr_ecb_dec_1(constr_ecb_enc_1(X1,constr_pkey(X2)),X2) = X1,
i_0_85 ).
cnf(c_0_272,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X1),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(X2)))
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_sign(X2,name_skS)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_266,c_0_248]) ).
cnf(c_0_273,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_267,c_0_262]) ).
cnf(c_0_274,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(esk1_0),name_objective)),
i_0_196 ).
cnf(c_0_275,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_172 ).
cnf(c_0_276,plain,
( pred_attacker(name_objective)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_268,c_0_269]) ).
cnf(c_0_277,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(X1,constr_pkey(X2)))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_270,c_0_271]) ).
cnf(c_0_278,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_attacker(constr_ecb_enc_1(name_Nb(X2),X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(X3)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_272,c_0_273]),c_0_257]) ).
cnf(c_0_279,negated_conjecture,
( ~ pred_attacker(name_Nb(esk1_0))
| ~ pred_attacker(name_objective) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_274,c_0_275]) ).
cnf(c_0_280,plain,
pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_276,c_0_269]) ).
cnf(c_0_281,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_attacker(name_Nb(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(X3)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_277,c_0_278]) ).
cnf(c_0_282,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_106 ).
cnf(c_0_283,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(name_Nb(esk1_0)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_279,c_0_280])]) ).
cnf(c_0_284,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_attacker(name_Nb(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X3)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_281,c_0_282]) ).
cnf(c_0_285,negated_conjecture,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_283,c_0_284]) ).
cnf(c_0_286,plain,
name_objective != name_A,
i_0_54 ).
cnf(c_0_287,plain,
name_objective != name_B,
i_0_60 ).
cnf(c_0_288,plain,
pred_attacker(constr_CONST_0x30),
i_0_162 ).
cnf(c_0_289,plain,
~ pred_attacker(X1),
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_285,c_0_280]),c_0_286]),c_0_287]) ).
cnf(c_0_290,plain,
$false,
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[c_0_288,c_0_289]),
[proof] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.07/0.12 % Problem : SWW964+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v7.4.0.
% 0.07/0.12 % Command : enigmatic-eprover.py %s %d 1
% 0.12/0.33 % Computer : n022.cluster.edu
% 0.12/0.33 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.12/0.33 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.12/0.33 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.12/0.33 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.12/0.33 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.12/0.33 % WCLimit : 600
% 0.12/0.33 % DateTime : Sun Jun 5 22:34:37 EDT 2022
% 0.12/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 0.19/0.45 # ENIGMATIC: Selected complete mode:
% 22.98/4.30 # ENIGMATIC: Solved by Enigma+tptp-cade20-model03-h2e15+lgb-t150-d30-l6400-e0.15+coop-eprover66:
% 22.98/4.30 # ENIGMA: LightGBM model '/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/data/Enigma/tptp-cade20-model03-h2e15/lgb-t150-d30-l6400-e0.15/model.lgb' loaded. (hash_base: 32768; conj_feats: 28; version: 991; iters: 150)
% 22.98/4.30 # Preprocessing time : 0.842 s
% 22.98/4.30 # Presaturation interreduction done
% 22.98/4.30
% 22.98/4.30 # Proof found!
% 22.98/4.30 # SZS status Theorem
% 22.98/4.30 # SZS output start CNFRefutation
% See solution above
% 22.98/4.30 # Training examples: 0 positive, 0 negative
% 22.98/4.30
% 22.98/4.30 # -------------------------------------------------
% 22.98/4.30 # User time : 1.716 s
% 22.98/4.30 # System time : 0.112 s
% 22.98/4.30 # Total time : 1.828 s
% 22.98/4.30 # ...preprocessing : 0.842 s
% 22.98/4.30 # ...main loop : 0.986 s
% 22.98/4.30 # Maximum resident set size: 167988 pages
% 22.98/4.30
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------