TSTP Solution File: SWW960+1 by Enigma---0.5.1
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- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Enigma---0.5.1
% Problem : SWW960+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v7.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : enigmatic-eprover.py %s %d 1
% Computer : n027.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 600s
% DateTime : Thu Jul 21 00:03:11 EDT 2022
% Result : Theorem 23.26s 4.31s
% Output : CNFRefutation 23.26s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 24
% Number of leaves : 33
% Syntax : Number of clauses : 118 ( 32 unt; 7 nHn; 85 RR)
% Number of literals : 268 ( 24 equ; 144 neg)
% Maximal clause size : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 4 ( 2 usr; 1 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 32 ( 32 usr; 8 con; 0-2 aty)
% Number of variables : 186 ( 64 sgn)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(i_0_166,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_166) ).
cnf(i_0_120,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_120) ).
cnf(i_0_122,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_122) ).
cnf(i_0_124,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_124) ).
cnf(i_0_161,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_1(name_A,name_I)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_161) ).
cnf(i_0_129,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_3(X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_129) ).
cnf(i_0_162,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_3(constr_aenc(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_162) ).
cnf(i_0_167,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X3,X1))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_167) ).
cnf(i_0_103,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_103) ).
cnf(i_0_82,plain,
constr_checksign(constr_sign(X1,X2),constr_pkey(X2)) = X1,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_82) ).
cnf(i_0_127,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_5(X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_127) ).
cnf(i_0_163,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_5(constr_aenc(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skA)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_163) ).
cnf(i_0_83,plain,
constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(tuple_2(X1,X2)) = X2,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_83) ).
cnf(i_0_102,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_102) ).
cnf(i_0_135,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_135) ).
cnf(i_0_168,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_168) ).
cnf(i_0_106,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_106) ).
cnf(i_0_114,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_114) ).
cnf(i_0_139,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_adec(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_139) ).
cnf(i_0_79,plain,
constr_adec(constr_aenc(X1,constr_pkey(X2)),X2) = X1,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_79) ).
cnf(i_0_54,plain,
name_objective != name_A,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_54) ).
cnf(i_0_60,plain,
name_objective != name_B,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_60) ).
cnf(i_0_157,plain,
pred_table(tuple_keys(name_B,constr_pkey(name_skB))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_157) ).
cnf(i_0_152,plain,
pred_attacker(name_B),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_152) ).
cnf(i_0_94,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_94) ).
cnf(i_0_116,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_116) ).
cnf(i_0_165,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_165) ).
cnf(i_0_146,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_146) ).
cnf(i_0_156,plain,
pred_table(tuple_keys(name_A,constr_pkey(name_skA))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_156) ).
cnf(i_0_153,plain,
pred_attacker(name_A),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_153) ).
cnf(i_0_133,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_133) ).
cnf(i_0_169,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(esk1_0),name_objective)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_169) ).
cnf(i_0_145,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-l82h2jgw/input.p',i_0_145) ).
cnf(c_0_203,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3)) ),
i_0_166 ).
cnf(c_0_204,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_120 ).
cnf(c_0_205,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_203,c_0_204]) ).
cnf(c_0_206,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_122 ).
cnf(c_0_207,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_205,c_0_206]) ).
cnf(c_0_208,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_124 ).
cnf(c_0_209,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_207,c_0_208]) ).
cnf(c_0_210,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_1(name_A,name_I)),
i_0_161 ).
cnf(c_0_211,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_209,c_0_210]) ).
cnf(c_0_212,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_3(X1)) ),
i_0_129 ).
cnf(c_0_213,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_3(constr_aenc(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2)) ),
i_0_162 ).
cnf(c_0_214,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X3,X1))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2)) ),
i_0_167 ).
cnf(c_0_215,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_103 ).
cnf(c_0_216,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_211,c_0_210]) ).
cnf(c_0_217,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_212,c_0_213]) ).
cnf(c_0_218,plain,
constr_checksign(constr_sign(X1,X2),constr_pkey(X2)) = X1,
i_0_82 ).
cnf(c_0_219,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_214,c_0_215]) ).
cnf(c_0_220,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_216,c_0_210]) ).
cnf(c_0_221,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_5(X1)) ),
i_0_127 ).
cnf(c_0_222,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_5(constr_aenc(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skA)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2)) ),
i_0_163 ).
cnf(c_0_223,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(X2)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(constr_sign(X2,name_skS))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_217,c_0_218]) ).
cnf(c_0_224,plain,
constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(tuple_2(X1,X2)) = X2,
i_0_83 ).
cnf(c_0_225,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(X1)) ),
i_0_102 ).
cnf(c_0_226,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_219,c_0_220]) ).
cnf(c_0_227,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skA)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_221,c_0_222]) ).
cnf(c_0_228,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A),X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X3,X2),name_skS))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_223,c_0_224]) ).
cnf(c_0_229,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_135 ).
cnf(c_0_230,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_225,c_0_226]) ).
cnf(c_0_231,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X1,X2)) ),
i_0_168 ).
cnf(c_0_232,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skA)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(X2)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(constr_sign(X2,name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_227,c_0_218]) ).
cnf(c_0_233,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A),X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(X3,X2),name_skS)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_228,c_0_229]) ).
cnf(c_0_234,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_230,c_0_231]) ).
cnf(c_0_235,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skA)),X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X3,X2),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_232,c_0_224]) ).
cnf(c_0_236,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(name_Na(X2),name_A),X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X1,X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_233,c_0_234]) ).
cnf(c_0_237,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_106 ).
cnf(c_0_238,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X1)) ),
i_0_114 ).
cnf(c_0_239,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skA)),X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(X3,X2),name_skS))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_235,c_0_229]) ).
cnf(c_0_240,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_adec(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_139 ).
cnf(c_0_241,plain,
constr_adec(constr_aenc(X1,constr_pkey(X2)),X2) = X1,
i_0_79 ).
cnf(c_0_242,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(name_Na(X2),name_A),X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_236,c_0_237]) ).
cnf(c_0_243,plain,
pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_238,c_0_220]) ).
cnf(c_0_244,plain,
name_objective != name_A,
i_0_54 ).
cnf(c_0_245,plain,
name_objective != name_B,
i_0_60 ).
cnf(c_0_246,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_3(constr_aenc(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(X2))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(constr_sign(X2,name_skS))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_213,c_0_218]) ).
cnf(c_0_247,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_attacker(constr_aenc(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_adec(X2,name_skA)),X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X1,X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_239,c_0_234]) ).
cnf(c_0_248,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_aenc(X1,constr_pkey(X2)))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_240,c_0_241]) ).
cnf(c_0_249,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A),X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_242,c_0_243]),c_0_244]),c_0_245]) ).
cnf(c_0_250,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_3(constr_aenc(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A),X2)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X3,X2),name_skS))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_246,c_0_224]) ).
cnf(c_0_251,plain,
pred_table(tuple_keys(name_B,constr_pkey(name_skB))),
i_0_157 ).
cnf(c_0_252,plain,
pred_attacker(name_B),
i_0_152 ).
cnf(c_0_253,plain,
( X1 = name_A
| X1 = name_B
| pred_attacker(constr_aenc(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_adec(X2,name_skA)),X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_247,c_0_237]) ).
cnf(c_0_254,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A))
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_248,c_0_249]) ).
cnf(c_0_255,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_94 ).
cnf(c_0_256,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_3(constr_aenc(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A),X2)))
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(X3,X2),name_skS)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_250,c_0_229]) ).
cnf(c_0_257,plain,
pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(name_B,constr_pkey(name_skB)),name_skS)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_230,c_0_251]),c_0_252])]) ).
cnf(c_0_258,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skA)),X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_253,c_0_243]),c_0_244]),c_0_245]) ).
cnf(c_0_259,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_254,c_0_255]) ).
cnf(c_0_260,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_3(constr_aenc(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A),constr_pkey(name_skB)))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_256,c_0_257]) ).
cnf(c_0_261,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X1)) ),
i_0_116 ).
cnf(c_0_262,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3)) ),
i_0_165 ).
cnf(c_0_263,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skA)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_248,c_0_258]) ).
cnf(c_0_264,plain,
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(X1,X2)) ),
i_0_146 ).
cnf(c_0_265,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Na(X1),name_A)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_259,c_0_260]) ).
cnf(c_0_266,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_261,c_0_262]) ).
cnf(c_0_267,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skA)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_263,c_0_255]) ).
cnf(c_0_268,plain,
pred_attacker(name_Na(X1)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_264,c_0_265]) ).
cnf(c_0_269,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(X3)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(constr_sign(X3,name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_266,c_0_218]) ).
cnf(c_0_270,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skA)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_267,c_0_268]) ).
cnf(c_0_271,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X4,X3),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_269,c_0_224]) ).
cnf(c_0_272,plain,
pred_table(tuple_keys(name_A,constr_pkey(name_skA))),
i_0_156 ).
cnf(c_0_273,plain,
pred_attacker(name_A),
i_0_153 ).
cnf(c_0_274,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(constr_aenc(X1,constr_pkey(name_skA)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_270,c_0_241]) ).
cnf(c_0_275,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_133 ).
cnf(c_0_276,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(X4,X3),name_skS))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_271,c_0_208]) ).
cnf(c_0_277,plain,
pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(name_A,constr_pkey(name_skA)),name_skS)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_230,c_0_272]),c_0_273])]) ).
cnf(c_0_278,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_aenc(X1,constr_pkey(name_skA))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_274,c_0_275]) ).
cnf(c_0_279,plain,
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),constr_pkey(name_skA)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_276,c_0_277]) ).
cnf(c_0_280,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(esk1_0),name_objective)),
i_0_169 ).
cnf(c_0_281,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
i_0_145 ).
cnf(c_0_282,plain,
( pred_attacker(name_Nb(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X2)) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_278,c_0_279]),c_0_224]) ).
cnf(c_0_283,negated_conjecture,
( ~ pred_attacker(name_Nb(esk1_0))
| ~ pred_attacker(name_objective) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_280,c_0_281]) ).
cnf(c_0_284,plain,
( pred_attacker(name_Nb(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_282,c_0_206]) ).
cnf(c_0_285,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(name_Nb(esk1_0)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_283,c_0_243])]) ).
cnf(c_0_286,plain,
pred_attacker(name_Nb(X1)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_284,c_0_268]) ).
cnf(c_0_287,negated_conjecture,
$false,
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_285,c_0_286])]),
[proof] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.08/0.12 % Problem : SWW960+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v7.4.0.
% 0.08/0.13 % Command : enigmatic-eprover.py %s %d 1
% 0.13/0.34 % Computer : n027.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % WCLimit : 600
% 0.13/0.34 % DateTime : Mon Jun 6 00:27:10 EDT 2022
% 0.13/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 0.20/0.46 # ENIGMATIC: Selected complete mode:
% 23.26/4.31 # ENIGMATIC: Solved by Enigma+tptp-cade20-model03-h2e15+lgb-t150-d60-l8000-e0.15+coop-eprover73:
% 23.26/4.31 # ENIGMA: LightGBM model '/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/data/Enigma/tptp-cade20-model03-h2e15/lgb-t150-d60-l8000-e0.15/model.lgb' loaded. (hash_base: 32768; conj_feats: 28; version: 991; iters: 150)
% 23.26/4.31 # Preprocessing time : 1.192 s
% 23.26/4.31 # Presaturation interreduction done
% 23.26/4.31
% 23.26/4.31 # Proof found!
% 23.26/4.31 # SZS status Theorem
% 23.26/4.31 # SZS output start CNFRefutation
% See solution above
% 23.26/4.31 # Training examples: 0 positive, 0 negative
% 23.26/4.31
% 23.26/4.31 # -------------------------------------------------
% 23.26/4.31 # User time : 1.716 s
% 23.26/4.31 # System time : 0.138 s
% 23.26/4.31 # Total time : 1.854 s
% 23.26/4.31 # ...preprocessing : 1.192 s
% 23.26/4.31 # ...main loop : 0.662 s
% 23.26/4.31 # Maximum resident set size: 187380 pages
% 23.26/4.31
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------