TSTP Solution File: SWW955+1 by Enigma---0.5.1

View Problem - Process Solution

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : Enigma---0.5.1
% Problem  : SWW955+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v7.4.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : enigmatic-eprover.py %s %d 1

% Computer : n021.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 600s
% DateTime : Thu Jul 21 00:03:11 EDT 2022

% Result   : Theorem 14.12s 3.31s
% Output   : CNFRefutation 14.12s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : Refutation
%            Derivation depth      :    6
%            Number of leaves      :   11
% Syntax   : Number of clauses     :   32 (  13 unt;   0 nHn;  28 RR)
%            Number of literals    :   54 (   4 equ;  25 neg)
%            Maximal clause size   :    3 (   1 avg)
%            Maximal term depth    :    3 (   1 avg)
%            Number of predicates  :    3 (   1 usr;   1 prp; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of functors    :   11 (  11 usr;   3 con; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of variables   :   30 (   3 sgn)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(i_0_80,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_4(constr_enc(name_objective,name_m_9)))
    | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_A_in_2(X1)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ij2ma5t2/input.p',i_0_80) ).

cnf(i_0_71,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(tuple_A_in_2(X1))
    | ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ij2ma5t2/input.p',i_0_71) ).

cnf(i_0_68,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(X1)
    | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_3(X1)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ij2ma5t2/input.p',i_0_68) ).

cnf(i_0_79,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_3(constr_comm_dec(X1,name_Ka)))
    | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_A_in_2(X1)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ij2ma5t2/input.p',i_0_79) ).

cnf(i_0_78,plain,
    pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_1(constr_comm_enc(name_m_9,name_Ka))),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ij2ma5t2/input.p',i_0_78) ).

cnf(i_0_47,plain,
    constr_comm_dec(constr_comm_enc(X1,X2),X2) = X1,
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ij2ma5t2/input.p',i_0_47) ).

cnf(i_0_51,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(constr_dec(X1,X2))
    | ~ pred_attacker(X2)
    | ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ij2ma5t2/input.p',i_0_51) ).

cnf(i_0_46,plain,
    constr_dec(constr_enc(X1,X2),X2) = X1,
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ij2ma5t2/input.p',i_0_46) ).

cnf(i_0_66,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(X1)
    | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_4(X1)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ij2ma5t2/input.p',i_0_66) ).

cnf(i_0_70,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(X1)
    | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_1(X1)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ij2ma5t2/input.p',i_0_70) ).

cnf(i_0_82,negated_conjecture,
    ~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ij2ma5t2/input.p',i_0_82) ).

cnf(c_0_94,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_4(constr_enc(name_objective,name_m_9)))
    | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_A_in_2(X1)) ),
    i_0_80 ).

cnf(c_0_95,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(tuple_A_in_2(X1))
    | ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
    i_0_71 ).

cnf(c_0_96,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(X1)
    | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_3(X1)) ),
    i_0_68 ).

cnf(c_0_97,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_3(constr_comm_dec(X1,name_Ka)))
    | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_A_in_2(X1)) ),
    i_0_79 ).

cnf(c_0_98,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_4(constr_enc(name_objective,name_m_9)))
    | ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_94,c_0_95]) ).

cnf(c_0_99,plain,
    pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_1(constr_comm_enc(name_m_9,name_Ka))),
    i_0_78 ).

cnf(c_0_100,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(constr_comm_dec(X1,name_Ka))
    | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_A_in_2(X1)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_96,c_0_97]) ).

cnf(c_0_101,plain,
    constr_comm_dec(constr_comm_enc(X1,X2),X2) = X1,
    i_0_47 ).

cnf(c_0_102,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(constr_dec(X1,X2))
    | ~ pred_attacker(X2)
    | ~ pred_attacker(X1) ),
    i_0_51 ).

cnf(c_0_103,plain,
    constr_dec(constr_enc(X1,X2),X2) = X1,
    i_0_46 ).

cnf(c_0_104,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(X1)
    | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_4(X1)) ),
    i_0_66 ).

cnf(c_0_105,plain,
    pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_4(constr_enc(name_objective,name_m_9))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_98,c_0_99]) ).

cnf(c_0_106,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(X1)
    | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_A_in_2(constr_comm_enc(X1,name_Ka))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_100,c_0_101]) ).

cnf(c_0_107,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(X1)
    | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_1(X1)) ),
    i_0_70 ).

cnf(c_0_108,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(X1)
    | ~ pred_attacker(constr_enc(X1,X2))
    | ~ pred_attacker(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_102,c_0_103]) ).

cnf(c_0_109,plain,
    pred_attacker(constr_enc(name_objective,name_m_9)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_104,c_0_105]) ).

cnf(c_0_110,negated_conjecture,
    ~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
    i_0_82 ).

cnf(c_0_111,plain,
    ( pred_attacker(X1)
    | ~ pred_attacker(constr_comm_enc(X1,name_Ka)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_106,c_0_95]) ).

cnf(c_0_112,plain,
    pred_attacker(constr_comm_enc(name_m_9,name_Ka)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_107,c_0_99]) ).

cnf(c_0_113,plain,
    ~ pred_attacker(name_m_9),
    inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_108,c_0_109]),c_0_110]) ).

cnf(c_0_114,plain,
    $false,
    inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_111,c_0_112]),c_0_113]),
    [proof] ).

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.06/0.12  % Problem  : SWW955+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v7.4.0.
% 0.06/0.12  % Command  : enigmatic-eprover.py %s %d 1
% 0.12/0.33  % Computer : n021.cluster.edu
% 0.12/0.33  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.12/0.33  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.12/0.33  % Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% 0.12/0.33  % OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.12/0.33  % CPULimit : 300
% 0.12/0.33  % WCLimit  : 600
% 0.12/0.33  % DateTime : Sun Jun  5 16:51:21 EDT 2022
% 0.12/0.34  % CPUTime  : 
% 0.18/0.44  # ENIGMATIC: Selected complete mode:
% 14.12/3.31  # ENIGMATIC: Solved by Enigma+tptp-cade20-model02-h2e15+lgb-t150-d30-l6400-e0.15+coop-mzr02:
% 14.12/3.31  # ENIGMA: LightGBM model '/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/data/Enigma/tptp-cade20-model02-h2e15/lgb-t150-d30-l6400-e0.15/model.lgb' loaded. (hash_base: 32768; conj_feats: 15; version: 991; iters: 150)
% 14.12/3.31  # Preprocessing time       : 0.834 s
% 14.12/3.31  
% 14.12/3.31  # Proof found!
% 14.12/3.31  # SZS status Theorem
% 14.12/3.31  # SZS output start CNFRefutation
% See solution above
% 14.12/3.31  # Training examples: 0 positive, 0 negative
% 14.12/3.31  
% 14.12/3.31  # -------------------------------------------------
% 14.12/3.31  # User time                : 0.726 s
% 14.12/3.31  # System time              : 0.113 s
% 14.12/3.31  # Total time               : 0.839 s
% 14.12/3.31  # ...preprocessing         : 0.834 s
% 14.12/3.31  # ...main loop             : 0.005 s
% 14.12/3.31  # Maximum resident set size: 168068 pages
% 14.12/3.31  
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------