%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : SInE---0.4
% Problem  : SWV236+1 : TPTP v5.0.0. Released v3.2.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : Source/sine.py -e eprover -t %d %s

% Computer : art05.cs.miami.edu
% Model    : i686 i686
% CPU      : Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 2.80GHz @ 2793MHz
% Memory   : 2018MB
% OS       : Linux 2.6.26.8-57.fc8
% CPULimit : 300s
% DateTime : Sun Dec 26 12:26:19 EST 2010

% Result   : Theorem 0.28s
% Output   : CNFRefutation 0.28s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : Refutation
%            Derivation depth      :   12
%            Number of leaves      :    9
% Syntax   : Number of formulae    :   42 (  18 unt;   0 def)
%            Number of atoms       :   82 (   6 equ)
%            Maximal formula atoms :    4 (   1 avg)
%            Number of connectives :   76 (  36   ~;  32   |;   5   &)
%                                         (   0 <=>;   3  =>;   0  <=;   0 <~>)
%            Maximal formula depth :    8 (   3 avg)
%            Maximal term depth    :    3 (   1 avg)
%            Number of predicates  :    3 (   1 usr;   1 prp; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of functors    :    8 (   8 usr;   5 con; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of variables   :   50 (   0 sgn  29   !;   2   ?)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(1,axiom,
    ! [X1,X2] : decrypt(X1,crypt(X1,X2)) = X2,
    file('/tmp/tmp2mGfqU/sel_SWV236+1.p_1',encryption_decryption_cancellation) ).

fof(4,conjecture,
    ? [X8] :
      ( p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X8))
      & p(X8) ),
    file('/tmp/tmp2mGfqU/sel_SWV236+1.p_1',find_known_exporter) ).

fof(16,axiom,
    p(crypt(xor(km,data),eurk)),
    file('/tmp/tmp2mGfqU/sel_SWV236+1.p_1',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_8) ).

fof(18,axiom,
    p(id),
    file('/tmp/tmp2mGfqU/sel_SWV236+1.p_1',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_4) ).

fof(19,axiom,
    p(crypt(xor(km,exp),eurk)),
    file('/tmp/tmp2mGfqU/sel_SWV236+1.p_1',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_7) ).

fof(21,axiom,
    ! [X1] : xor(X1,id) = X1,
    file('/tmp/tmp2mGfqU/sel_SWV236+1.p_1',xor_rules_1) ).

fof(24,axiom,
    ! [X1,X5] :
      ( ( p(X1)
        & p(crypt(xor(km,data),X5)) )
     => p(decrypt(X5,X1)) ),
    file('/tmp/tmp2mGfqU/sel_SWV236+1.p_1',decrypt_data) ).

fof(26,axiom,
    ! [X1,X2] :
      ( p(crypt(xor(X1,data),X2))
     => p(crypt(X1,X2)) ),
    file('/tmp/tmp2mGfqU/sel_SWV236+1.p_1',data_cv_is_known_to_be_zero) ).

fof(28,axiom,
    ! [X10,X5,X3] :
      ( ( p(crypt(xor(km,X10),X5))
        & p(X10)
        & p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X3)) )
     => p(crypt(xor(X3,X10),X5)) ),
    file('/tmp/tmp2mGfqU/sel_SWV236+1.p_1',key_export) ).

fof(29,negated_conjecture,
    ~ ? [X8] :
        ( p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X8))
        & p(X8) ),
    inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[4]) ).

fof(30,plain,
    ! [X3,X4] : decrypt(X3,crypt(X3,X4)) = X4,
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[1]) ).

cnf(31,plain,
    decrypt(X1,crypt(X1,X2)) = X2,
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[30]) ).

fof(36,negated_conjecture,
    ! [X8] :
      ( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X8))
      | ~ p(X8) ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[29]) ).

fof(37,negated_conjecture,
    ! [X9] :
      ( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X9))
      | ~ p(X9) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[36]) ).

cnf(38,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X1)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[37]) ).

cnf(63,plain,
    p(crypt(xor(km,data),eurk)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[16]) ).

cnf(66,plain,
    p(id),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[18]) ).

cnf(67,plain,
    p(crypt(xor(km,exp),eurk)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[19]) ).

fof(69,plain,
    ! [X2] : xor(X2,id) = X2,
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[21]) ).

cnf(70,plain,
    xor(X1,id) = X1,
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[69]) ).

fof(74,plain,
    ! [X1,X5] :
      ( ~ p(X1)
      | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,data),X5))
      | p(decrypt(X5,X1)) ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[24]) ).

fof(75,plain,
    ! [X6,X7] :
      ( ~ p(X6)
      | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,data),X7))
      | p(decrypt(X7,X6)) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[74]) ).

cnf(76,plain,
    ( p(decrypt(X1,X2))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,data),X1))
    | ~ p(X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[75]) ).

fof(80,plain,
    ! [X1,X2] :
      ( ~ p(crypt(xor(X1,data),X2))
      | p(crypt(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[26]) ).

fof(81,plain,
    ! [X3,X4] :
      ( ~ p(crypt(xor(X3,data),X4))
      | p(crypt(X3,X4)) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[80]) ).

cnf(82,plain,
    ( p(crypt(X1,X2))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(X1,data),X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[81]) ).

fof(86,plain,
    ! [X10,X5,X3] :
      ( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X10),X5))
      | ~ p(X10)
      | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X3))
      | p(crypt(xor(X3,X10),X5)) ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[28]) ).

fof(87,plain,
    ! [X11,X12,X13] :
      ( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X11),X12))
      | ~ p(X11)
      | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X13))
      | p(crypt(xor(X13,X11),X12)) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[86]) ).

cnf(88,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(X1,X2),X3))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X1))
    | ~ p(X2)
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X2),X3)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[87]) ).

cnf(96,negated_conjecture,
    ~ p(eurk),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[38,67,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(109,plain,
    p(crypt(km,eurk)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[82,63,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(113,plain,
    ( p(decrypt(eurk,X1))
    | ~ p(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[76,63,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(143,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(eurk,X1),X2))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X1),X2))
    | ~ p(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[88,67,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(208,plain,
    ( p(X1)
    | ~ p(crypt(eurk,X1)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[113,31,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(969,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(eurk,id),X1))
    | ~ p(crypt(km,X1))
    | ~ p(id) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[143,70,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(986,plain,
    ( p(crypt(eurk,X1))
    | ~ p(crypt(km,X1))
    | ~ p(id) ),
    inference(rw,[status(thm)],[969,70,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(987,plain,
    ( p(crypt(eurk,X1))
    | ~ p(crypt(km,X1))
    | $false ),
    inference(rw,[status(thm)],[986,66,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(988,plain,
    ( p(crypt(eurk,X1))
    | ~ p(crypt(km,X1)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[987,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(1006,plain,
    p(crypt(eurk,eurk)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[988,109,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(1013,plain,
    p(eurk),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[208,1006,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(1015,plain,
    $false,
    inference(sr,[status(thm)],[1013,96,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(1016,plain,
    $false,
    1015,
    [proof] ).

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% % SZS status Started for /home/graph/tptp/TPTP/Problems/SWV/SWV236+1.p
% --creating new selector for []
% -running prover on /tmp/tmp2mGfqU/sel_SWV236+1.p_1 with time limit 29
% -prover status Theorem
% Problem SWV236+1.p solved in phase 0.
% % SZS status Theorem for /home/graph/tptp/TPTP/Problems/SWV/SWV236+1.p
% % SZS status Ended for /home/graph/tptp/TPTP/Problems/SWV/SWV236+1.p
% Solved 1 out of 1.
% # Problem is unsatisfiable (or provable), constructing proof object
% # SZS status Theorem
% # SZS output start CNFRefutation.
% See solution above
% # SZS output end CNFRefutation
% 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------