TSTP Solution File: SWV234+1 by CSE_E---1.5
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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : CSE_E---1.5
% Problem : SWV234+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v3.2.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : java -jar /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/mcs_scs.jar %d %s
% Computer : n017.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Aug 31 21:37:08 EDT 2023
% Result : Theorem 35.38s 35.51s
% Output : CNFRefutation 35.38s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 14
% Number of leaves : 33
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 82 ( 40 unt; 15 typ; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 136 ( 20 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 4 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 127 ( 58 ~; 56 |; 8 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 5 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 10 ( 3 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 5 ( 2 avg)
% Number of types : 2 ( 0 usr)
% Number of type conns : 7 ( 4 >; 3 *; 0 +; 0 <<)
% Number of predicates : 3 ( 1 usr; 1 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 14 ( 14 usr; 11 con; 0-2 aty)
% Number of variables : 116 ( 0 sgn; 48 !; 0 ?; 0 :)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
tff(decl_22,type,
xor: ( $i * $i ) > $i ).
tff(decl_23,type,
crypt: ( $i * $i ) > $i ).
tff(decl_24,type,
decrypt: ( $i * $i ) > $i ).
tff(decl_25,type,
id: $i ).
tff(decl_26,type,
p: $i > $o ).
tff(decl_27,type,
km: $i ).
tff(decl_28,type,
imp: $i ).
tff(decl_29,type,
exp: $i ).
tff(decl_30,type,
kp: $i ).
tff(decl_31,type,
data: $i ).
tff(decl_32,type,
pin: $i ).
tff(decl_33,type,
kek: $i ).
tff(decl_34,type,
pp: $i ).
tff(decl_35,type,
a: $i ).
tff(decl_36,type,
k3: $i ).
fof(xor_commutative,axiom,
! [X1,X2] : xor(X1,X2) = xor(X2,X1),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',xor_commutative) ).
fof(xor_associative,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X3] : xor(X1,xor(X2,X3)) = xor(xor(X1,X2),X3),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',xor_associative) ).
fof(xor_rules_2,axiom,
! [X1] : xor(X1,X1) = id,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',xor_rules_2) ).
fof(xor_rules_1,axiom,
! [X1] : xor(X1,id) = X1,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',xor_rules_1) ).
fof(key_part_import___part_2,axiom,
! [X6,X9,X11] :
( ( p(X6)
& p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X9)),X11))
& p(X9) )
=> p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X9,kp)),xor(X6,X11))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',key_part_import___part_2) ).
fof(encrypt_data,axiom,
! [X1,X6] :
( ( p(X1)
& p(crypt(xor(km,data),X6)) )
=> p(crypt(X6,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',encrypt_data) ).
fof(key_import,axiom,
! [X4,X5,X6,X7,X8] :
( ( p(crypt(xor(X4,X5),X6))
& p(X7)
& p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X8)) )
=> p(crypt(xor(km,X7),decrypt(xor(X8,X7),crypt(xor(X4,X5),X6)))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',key_import) ).
fof(key_part_import___part_3,axiom,
! [X6,X9,X11] :
( ( p(X6)
& p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X9,kp)),X11))
& p(X9) )
=> p(crypt(xor(km,X9),xor(X11,X6))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',key_part_import___part_3) ).
fof(partially_completed_key,axiom,
p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,imp)),xor(kek,k3))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',partially_completed_key) ).
fof(inital_knowledge_of_intruder_3,axiom,
p(data),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',inital_knowledge_of_intruder_3) ).
fof(inital_knowledge_of_intruder_2,axiom,
p(imp),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',inital_knowledge_of_intruder_2) ).
fof(key_part,axiom,
p(k3),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',key_part) ).
fof(encryption_decryption_cancellation,axiom,
! [X1,X2] : decrypt(X1,crypt(X1,X2)) = X2,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',encryption_decryption_cancellation) ).
fof(combine_with_XOR,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( p(X1)
& p(X2) )
=> p(xor(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',combine_with_XOR) ).
fof(find_pin,conjecture,
p(crypt(pp,a)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',find_pin) ).
fof(pin_key_encrypted_for_transfer,axiom,
p(crypt(xor(kek,pin),pp)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',pin_key_encrypted_for_transfer) ).
fof(inital_knowledge_of_intruder_5,axiom,
p(pin),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',inital_knowledge_of_intruder_5) ).
fof(an_account_number,axiom,
p(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',an_account_number) ).
fof(c_0_18,plain,
! [X12,X13] : xor(X12,X13) = xor(X13,X12),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[xor_commutative]) ).
fof(c_0_19,plain,
! [X14,X15,X16] : xor(X14,xor(X15,X16)) = xor(xor(X14,X15),X16),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[xor_associative]) ).
cnf(c_0_20,plain,
xor(X1,X2) = xor(X2,X1),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_18]) ).
cnf(c_0_21,plain,
xor(X1,xor(X2,X3)) = xor(xor(X1,X2),X3),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_19]) ).
fof(c_0_22,plain,
! [X20] : xor(X20,X20) = id,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[xor_rules_2]) ).
fof(c_0_23,plain,
! [X19] : xor(X19,id) = X19,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[xor_rules_1]) ).
fof(c_0_24,plain,
! [X31,X32,X33] :
( ~ p(X31)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X32)),X33))
| ~ p(X32)
| p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X32,kp)),xor(X31,X33))) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[key_part_import___part_2])]) ).
cnf(c_0_25,plain,
xor(X1,xor(X2,X3)) = xor(X3,xor(X1,X2)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_20,c_0_21]) ).
cnf(c_0_26,plain,
xor(X1,X1) = id,
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_22]) ).
cnf(c_0_27,plain,
xor(X1,id) = X1,
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_23]) ).
fof(c_0_28,plain,
! [X37,X38] :
( ~ p(X37)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,data),X38))
| p(crypt(X38,X37)) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[encrypt_data])]) ).
fof(c_0_29,plain,
! [X21,X22,X23,X24,X25] :
( ~ p(crypt(xor(X21,X22),X23))
| ~ p(X24)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X25))
| p(crypt(xor(km,X24),decrypt(xor(X25,X24),crypt(xor(X21,X22),X23)))) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[key_import])]) ).
fof(c_0_30,plain,
! [X34,X35,X36] :
( ~ p(X34)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X35,kp)),X36))
| ~ p(X35)
| p(crypt(xor(km,X35),xor(X36,X34))) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[key_part_import___part_3])]) ).
cnf(c_0_31,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X2,kp)),xor(X1,X3)))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X2)),X3))
| ~ p(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_24]) ).
cnf(c_0_32,plain,
xor(X1,xor(X1,X2)) = X2,
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_25,c_0_26]),c_0_27]) ).
cnf(c_0_33,plain,
p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,imp)),xor(kek,k3))),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[partially_completed_key]) ).
cnf(c_0_34,plain,
( p(crypt(X2,X1))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,data),X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_28]) ).
cnf(c_0_35,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,X4),decrypt(xor(X5,X4),crypt(xor(X1,X2),X3))))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(X1,X2),X3))
| ~ p(X4)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X5)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_29]) ).
cnf(c_0_36,plain,
p(data),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inital_knowledge_of_intruder_3]) ).
cnf(c_0_37,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,X2),xor(X3,X1)))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X2,kp)),X3))
| ~ p(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_30]) ).
cnf(c_0_38,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X1,kp)),X2))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X1)),xor(X3,X2)))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_31,c_0_32]) ).
cnf(c_0_39,plain,
p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,imp)),xor(k3,kek))),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_33,c_0_20]) ).
cnf(c_0_40,plain,
p(imp),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inital_knowledge_of_intruder_2]) ).
cnf(c_0_41,plain,
p(k3),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[key_part]) ).
cnf(c_0_42,plain,
( p(crypt(decrypt(xor(X1,data),crypt(xor(X2,X3),X4)),X5))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X1))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(X2,X3),X4))
| ~ p(X5) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_34,c_0_35]),c_0_36])]) ).
cnf(c_0_43,plain,
xor(id,X1) = X1,
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_27,c_0_20]) ).
fof(c_0_44,plain,
! [X17,X18] : decrypt(X17,crypt(X17,X18)) = X18,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[encryption_decryption_cancellation]) ).
cnf(c_0_45,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,X1),xor(X2,X3)))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X1)),X2))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_37,c_0_20]) ).
cnf(c_0_46,plain,
p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,imp)),kek)),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_38,c_0_39]),c_0_40]),c_0_41])]),c_0_20]) ).
cnf(c_0_47,plain,
( p(crypt(decrypt(xor(X1,data),crypt(X2,X3)),X4))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X1))
| ~ p(crypt(X2,X3))
| ~ p(X4) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_42,c_0_43]) ).
cnf(c_0_48,plain,
decrypt(X1,crypt(X1,X2)) = X2,
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_44]) ).
cnf(c_0_49,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,imp),xor(kek,X1)))
| ~ p(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_45,c_0_46]),c_0_40])]) ).
cnf(c_0_50,plain,
( p(crypt(X1,X2))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X3))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(X3,data),X1))
| ~ p(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_47,c_0_48]) ).
cnf(c_0_51,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X1))
| ~ p(xor(kek,X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_32]) ).
cnf(c_0_52,plain,
( p(crypt(X1,X2))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(X3,data),X1))
| ~ p(xor(kek,X3))
| ~ p(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_50,c_0_51]) ).
cnf(c_0_53,plain,
( p(crypt(X1,X2))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(data,X3),X1))
| ~ p(xor(kek,X3))
| ~ p(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_52,c_0_20]) ).
cnf(c_0_54,plain,
xor(X1,xor(X2,X3)) = xor(X2,xor(X1,X3)),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_21,c_0_20]),c_0_21]) ).
fof(c_0_55,plain,
! [X47,X48] :
( ~ p(X47)
| ~ p(X48)
| p(xor(X47,X48)) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[combine_with_XOR])]) ).
cnf(c_0_56,plain,
( p(crypt(X1,X2))
| ~ p(xor(data,xor(kek,X3)))
| ~ p(crypt(X3,X1))
| ~ p(X2) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_32]),c_0_54]) ).
cnf(c_0_57,plain,
( p(xor(X1,X2))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_55]) ).
fof(c_0_58,negated_conjecture,
~ p(crypt(pp,a)),
inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[find_pin])]) ).
cnf(c_0_59,plain,
( p(crypt(X1,X2))
| ~ p(xor(kek,X3))
| ~ p(crypt(X3,X1))
| ~ p(X2) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_56,c_0_57]),c_0_36])]) ).
cnf(c_0_60,plain,
p(crypt(xor(kek,pin),pp)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[pin_key_encrypted_for_transfer]) ).
cnf(c_0_61,plain,
xor(X1,xor(X2,X1)) = X2,
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_25,c_0_26]),c_0_27]) ).
cnf(c_0_62,plain,
p(pin),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inital_knowledge_of_intruder_5]) ).
cnf(c_0_63,negated_conjecture,
~ p(crypt(pp,a)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_58]) ).
cnf(c_0_64,plain,
( p(crypt(pp,X1))
| ~ p(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_60]),c_0_20]),c_0_61]),c_0_62])]) ).
cnf(c_0_65,plain,
p(a),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[an_account_number]) ).
cnf(c_0_66,negated_conjecture,
$false,
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_63,c_0_64]),c_0_65])]),
[proof] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.10/0.12 % Problem : SWV234+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v3.2.0.
% 0.10/0.13 % Command : java -jar /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/mcs_scs.jar %d %s
% 0.12/0.33 % Computer : n017.cluster.edu
% 0.12/0.33 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.12/0.33 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.12/0.33 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.12/0.33 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.12/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.12/0.34 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.12/0.34 % DateTime : Tue Aug 29 04:47:58 EDT 2023
% 0.12/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 0.19/0.54 start to proof: theBenchmark
% 35.38/35.51 % Version : CSE_E---1.5
% 35.38/35.51 % Problem : theBenchmark.p
% 35.38/35.51 % Proof found
% 35.38/35.51 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 35.38/35.51 % SZS output start Proof
% See solution above
% 35.38/35.51 % Total time : 34.942000 s
% 35.38/35.51 % SZS output end Proof
% 35.38/35.51 % Total time : 34.947000 s
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------