TSTP Solution File: SWV018-1 by Otter---3.3
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- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Otter---3.3
% Problem : SWV018-1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : otter-tptp-script %s
% Computer : n018.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Wed Jul 27 13:19:41 EDT 2022
% Result : Timeout 299.88s 300.04s
% Output : None
% Verified :
% SZS Type : -
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----No solution output by system
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.04/0.12 % Problem : SWV018-1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.04/0.13 % Command : otter-tptp-script %s
% 0.12/0.34 % Computer : n018.cluster.edu
% 0.12/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.12/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.12/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.12/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.12/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.12/0.34 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.12/0.34 % DateTime : Wed Jul 27 06:03:46 EDT 2022
% 0.12/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 1.75/1.95 ----- Otter 3.3f, August 2004 -----
% 1.75/1.95 The process was started by sandbox on n018.cluster.edu,
% 1.75/1.95 Wed Jul 27 06:03:46 2022
% 1.75/1.95 The command was "./otter". The process ID is 13681.
% 1.75/1.95
% 1.75/1.95 set(prolog_style_variables).
% 1.75/1.95 set(auto).
% 1.75/1.95 dependent: set(auto1).
% 1.75/1.95 dependent: set(process_input).
% 1.75/1.95 dependent: clear(print_kept).
% 1.75/1.95 dependent: clear(print_new_demod).
% 1.75/1.95 dependent: clear(print_back_demod).
% 1.75/1.95 dependent: clear(print_back_sub).
% 1.75/1.95 dependent: set(control_memory).
% 1.75/1.95 dependent: assign(max_mem, 12000).
% 1.75/1.95 dependent: assign(pick_given_ratio, 4).
% 1.75/1.95 dependent: assign(stats_level, 1).
% 1.75/1.95 dependent: assign(max_seconds, 10800).
% 1.75/1.95 clear(print_given).
% 1.75/1.95
% 1.75/1.95 list(usable).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] party_of_protocol(a).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] message(sent(a,A,pair(E,encrypt(F,C))))| -a_stored(pair(A,B))| -message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,B,C,D),at),E,F))).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] b_holds(key(bt,t)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] party_of_protocol(b).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(B),encrypt(triple(A,B,generate_expiration_time(B)),bt))))| -fresh_to_b(B)| -message(sent(A,b,pair(A,B))).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] b_stored(pair(A,B))| -fresh_to_b(B)| -message(sent(A,b,pair(A,B))).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] b_holds(key(B,A))| -a_key(B)| -b_stored(pair(A,C))| -message(sent(A,b,pair(encrypt(triple(A,B,generate_expiration_time(C)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(C),B)))).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] t_holds(key(at,a)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] t_holds(key(bt,b)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] party_of_protocol(t).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] message(sent(t,C,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,D,generate_key(D),E),G),encrypt(triple(C,generate_key(D),E),F),B)))| -a_nonce(D)| -message(sent(A,t,triple(A,B,encrypt(triple(C,D,E),F))))| -t_holds(key(G,C))| -t_holds(key(F,A)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(C)| -message(sent(A,B,C)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(A)| -intruder_message(pair(A,B)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(pair(A,B)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(A)| -intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(C)| -intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(A)| -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(C)| -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(D)| -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(pair(A,B))| -intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(A).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(triple(A,B,C))| -intruder_message(C)| -intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(A).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D))| -intruder_message(D)| -intruder_message(C)| -intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(A).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(B)| -intruder_holds(key(B,C))| -intruder_message(encrypt(A,B))| -party_of_protocol(C).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] message(sent(B,C,A))| -intruder_message(A)| -party_of_protocol(C)| -party_of_protocol(B).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_holds(key(A,B))| -intruder_message(A)| -party_of_protocol(B).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(encrypt(A,B))| -intruder_holds(key(B,C))| -intruder_message(A)| -party_of_protocol(C).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] a_nonce(an_a_nonce).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(A)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(A)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] -a_key(A)| -a_nonce(A).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] a_key(generate_key(A)).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] fresh_intruder_nonce(an_intruder_nonce).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_intruder_nonce(A))| -fresh_intruder_nonce(A).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] fresh_to_b(A)| -fresh_intruder_nonce(A).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] intruder_message(A)| -fresh_intruder_nonce(A).
% 1.75/1.95 0 [] -b_holds(key(A,C))| -intruder_holds(key(A,B)).
% 1.75/1.95 end_of_list.
% 1.75/1.95
% 1.75/1.95 SCAN INPUT: prop=0, horn=1, equality=0, symmetry=0, max_lits=5.
% 1.75/1.95
% 1.75/1.95 This is a Horn set without equality. The strategy will
% 1.75/1.95 be hyperresolution, with satellites in sos and nuclei
% 1.75/1.95 in usable.
% 1.75/1.95
% 1.75/1.95 dependent: set(hyper_res).
% 1.75/1.95 dependent: clear(order_hyper).
% 1.75/1.95
% 1.75/1.95 ------------> process usable:
% 1.75/1.95 ** KEPT (pick-wt=27): 1 [] message(sent(a,A,pair(B,encrypt(C,D))))| -a_stored(pair(A,E))| -message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,E,D,F),at),B,C))).
% 1.75/1.95 ** KEPT (pick-wt=24): 2 [] message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(A),encrypt(triple(B,A,generate_expiration_time(A)),bt))))| -fresh_to_b(A)| -message(sent(B,b,pair(B,A))).
% 1.75/1.95 ** KEPT (pick-wt=13): 3 [] b_stored(pair(A,B))| -fresh_to_b(Alarm clock
% 299.88/300.04 Otter interrupted
% 299.88/300.04 PROOF NOT FOUND
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