TSTP Solution File: SWV018-1 by E-SAT---3.1

View Problem - Process Solution

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : E-SAT---3.1
% Problem  : SWV018-1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : run_E %s %d THM

% Computer : n023.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 2400s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Tue Oct 10 19:55:51 EDT 2023

% Result   : Satisfiable 0.15s 0.43s
% Output   : Saturation 0.15s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : ERROR: Analysing output (Could not find formula named intruder_key_encrypts_33)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(c_0_41,axiom,
    ( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))) ),
    b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_11,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_42,axiom,
    ( message(sent(X1,X2,X3))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    intruder_message_sent_31,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_43,axiom,
    party_of_protocol(b),
    b_is_party_of_protocol_8,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_44,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_41,c_0_42]),c_0_43])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_45,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    intruder_composes_pairs_27,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_46,axiom,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X3))
    | ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))) ),
    b_accepts_secure_session_key_12,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_47,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_45]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_48,axiom,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))) ),
    b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_49,axiom,
    ( message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X3)
    | ~ message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6))))
    | ~ t_holds(key(X5,X1))
    | ~ t_holds(key(X6,X2)) ),
    server_t_generates_key_16,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_50,axiom,
    t_holds(key(bt,b)),
    t_holds_key_bt_for_b_14,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_51,axiom,
    message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
    a_sent_message_i_to_b_3,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_52,axiom,
    fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
    nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_53,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_47]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_54,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
    intruder_key_encrypts_33,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_55,axiom,
    ( intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    intruder_holds_key_32,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_56,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_42]),c_0_43])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_57,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),X3),bt),X5)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X2)
    | ~ t_holds(key(X4,X1))
    | ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X5,encrypt(triple(X1,X2,X3),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_50]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_58,axiom,
    t_holds(key(at,a)),
    t_holds_key_at_for_a_13,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_59,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(X2,X3,X1)) ),
    intruder_can_record_17,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_60,plain,
    message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_51]),c_0_52])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_61,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_42]),c_0_43])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_63,axiom,
    party_of_protocol(t),
    t_is_party_of_protocol_15,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_64,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_56,c_0_45]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_65,axiom,
    ( message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))
    | ~ a_stored(pair(X1,X5))
    | ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))) ),
    a_forwards_secure_5,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_66,axiom,
    a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)),
    a_stored_message_i_4,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_67,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57,c_0_58]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_68,axiom,
    a_nonce(an_a_nonce),
    an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce_34,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_69,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_triples_20,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_70,plain,
    intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_60]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_71,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57,c_0_50]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_72,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61,c_0_45]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_73,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_63]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_74,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_triples_21,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_75,plain,
    ( intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_64]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_76,plain,
    ( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
    | ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65,c_0_66]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_77,axiom,
    party_of_protocol(a),
    a_is_party_of_protocol_2,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_78,plain,
    message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67,c_0_60]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_79,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67,c_0_42]),c_0_63]),c_0_43])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_80,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    intruder_composes_triples_28,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_81,plain,
    intruder_message(b),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_69,c_0_70]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_82,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_triples_22,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_83,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_71,c_0_42]),c_0_63]),c_0_43])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_84,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X3))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_72,c_0_73]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_85,plain,
    ( intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74,c_0_75]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_86,plain,
    ( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_76,c_0_42]),c_0_77]),c_0_63])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_87,plain,
    intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_78]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_88,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_79,c_0_80]),c_0_81])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_89,plain,
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_82,c_0_70]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_90,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_pairs_18,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_91,plain,
    intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_51]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_92,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_83,c_0_80]),c_0_81])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_93,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_82,c_0_75]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_94,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X4)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_85]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_95,plain,
    b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_41,c_0_51]),c_0_52])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_96,plain,
    ( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_86,c_0_80]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_97,plain,
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_69,c_0_87]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_98,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_88,c_0_89]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_99,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_71,c_0_64]),c_0_81]),c_0_43])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_100,plain,
    intruder_message(a),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_90,c_0_91]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_101,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_92,c_0_93]),c_0_81]),c_0_43])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_102,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),X3),at),X5)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X2)
    | ~ t_holds(key(X4,X1))
    | ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X5,encrypt(triple(X1,X2,X3),at)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_58]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_103,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_pairs_19,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_104,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X3)) ),
    co1_44,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_105,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_94,c_0_93]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_106,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,a))
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_95]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_107,plain,
    ( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_96,c_0_97]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_108,plain,
    message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_76,c_0_78]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_109,plain,
    ( message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_76,c_0_98]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_110,plain,
    ( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_99]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_111,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67,c_0_64]),c_0_100]),c_0_77])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_112,plain,
    ( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_101]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_113,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_102,c_0_58]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_114,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_102,c_0_50]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_115,plain,
    intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_103,c_0_91]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_116,axiom,
    a_key(generate_key(X1)),
    generated_keys_are_keys_39,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_117,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X4)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_104,c_0_105]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_118,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,a))
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))
    | ~ a_key(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_106,c_0_42]),c_0_43]),c_0_77])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_119,plain,
    ( intruder_message(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_107]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_120,plain,
    intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_108]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_121,plain,
    ( intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_109]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_122,plain,
    ( intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_82,c_0_110]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_123,plain,
    ( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_111]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_125,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_113,c_0_42]),c_0_63]),c_0_77])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_126,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_114,c_0_42]),c_0_63]),c_0_77])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_127,plain,
    b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),a)),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_108]),c_0_115]),c_0_100]),c_0_116]),c_0_52]),c_0_77])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_128,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_117,c_0_55]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_129,plain,
    intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74,c_0_70]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_130,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,a))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))
    | ~ a_key(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_118,c_0_45]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_131,axiom,
    b_holds(key(bt,t)),
    b_hold_key_bt_for_t_7,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_132,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61,c_0_119]),c_0_116])]),c_0_85]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_133,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_56,c_0_120]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_134,axiom,
    ( fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(X1) ),
    fresh_intruder_nonces_are_fresh_to_b_42,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_135,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_56,c_0_121]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_136,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_88,c_0_93]),c_0_100]),c_0_77])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_137,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_121]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_138,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_122]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_139,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74,c_0_123]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_140,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_124,c_0_87]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_142,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_56,c_0_119]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_143,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_125,c_0_80]),c_0_100])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_144,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_107]),c_0_100])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_145,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_126,c_0_80]),c_0_100])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_146,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_119]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_148,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_41,c_0_107]),c_0_100])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_149,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_120]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_150,plain,
    intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_103,c_0_120]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_151,negated_conjecture,
    ~ intruder_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_104,c_0_127]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_152,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(generate_key(X1))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_128,c_0_116]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_153,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(X1) ),
    fresh_intruder_nonces_are_fresh_to_b_43,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_154,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_129]),c_0_115]),c_0_52])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_155,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,a))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_key(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_130,c_0_73]),c_0_129])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_156,axiom,
    ( fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_intruder_nonce(X1))
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(X1) ),
    can_generate_more_fresh_intruder_nonces_41,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_157,negated_conjecture,
    ~ intruder_holds(key(bt,X1)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_104,c_0_131]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_158,axiom,
    ( ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    nothing_is_a_nonce_and_a_key_38,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_160,axiom,
    fresh_intruder_nonce(an_intruder_nonce),
    an_intruder_nonce_is_a_fresh_intruder_nonce_40,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_161,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_133,c_0_134]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_162,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_135,c_0_134]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_163,plain,
    ( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_136]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_164,plain,
    ( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_98]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_165,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_137,c_0_134]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_166,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_69,c_0_123]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_167,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),a))
    | ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_138,c_0_139]),c_0_100]),c_0_116]),c_0_77])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_168,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),b))
    | ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_138,c_0_140]),c_0_81]),c_0_116]),c_0_43])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_169,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_141,c_0_87]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_170,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_142,c_0_134]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_171,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(at)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_143,c_0_73]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_172,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_144,c_0_134]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_173,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(at)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_145,c_0_73]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_174,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_146,c_0_134]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_175,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_147,c_0_87]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_176,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_148,c_0_134]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_177,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_149,c_0_134]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_178,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_72,c_0_150]),c_0_115]),c_0_116]),c_0_52])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_179,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ intruder_message(generate_key(an_a_nonce))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_151,c_0_55]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_180,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_88,c_0_73]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_181,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_92,c_0_73]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_182,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_key(X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
    inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_152,c_0_134]),c_0_153]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_183,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_key(an_a_nonce)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_154,c_0_93]),c_0_115]),c_0_52])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_184,plain,
    ( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
    | ~ intruder_message(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4))
    | ~ intruder_message(at)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_96,c_0_73]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_185,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,a))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ a_key(X1) ),
    inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_155,c_0_73]),c_0_74]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_186,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
    | ~ a_key(an_a_nonce) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_155,c_0_89]),c_0_115])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_187,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))
    | ~ intruder_message(X4)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    intruder_composes_quadruples_29,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_188,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    intruder_interception_30,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_189,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_quadruples_23,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_190,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_quadruples_24,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_191,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_quadruples_25,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_192,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_quadruples_26,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_193,plain,
    ( intruder_message(generate_intruder_nonce(X1))
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_153,c_0_156]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_194,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_157,c_0_55]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_195,plain,
    ~ a_nonce(generate_key(X1)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_158,c_0_116]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_196,plain,
    b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_159,c_0_87]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_197,plain,
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_90,c_0_120]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_198,axiom,
    a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)),
    generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces_36,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_199,axiom,
    a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)),
    generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces_37,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_200,plain,
    intruder_message(an_intruder_nonce),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_153,c_0_160]),
    [final] ).

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.09  % Problem    : SWV018-1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.10  % Command    : run_E %s %d THM
% 0.09/0.30  % Computer : n023.cluster.edu
% 0.09/0.30  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.09/0.30  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.09/0.30  % Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% 0.09/0.30  % OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.09/0.30  % CPULimit   : 2400
% 0.09/0.30  % WCLimit    : 300
% 0.09/0.30  % DateTime   : Tue Oct  3 04:09:22 EDT 2023
% 0.09/0.30  % CPUTime    : 
% 0.15/0.40  Running first-order model finding
% 0.15/0.40  Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/eprover --delete-bad-limit=2000000000 --definitional-cnf=24 -s --print-statistics -R --print-version --proof-object --satauto-schedule=8 --cpu-limit=300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/tmp.Y7dnKRud8S/E---3.1_6205.p
% 0.15/0.43  # Version: 3.1pre001
% 0.15/0.43  # Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.15/0.43  # Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.15/0.43  # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.15/0.43  # Starting new_bool_3 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.43  # Starting new_bool_1 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.43  # Starting sh5l with 300s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.43  # G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with pid 6282 completed with status 1
% 0.15/0.43  # Result found by G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN
% 0.15/0.43  # Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.15/0.43  # Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.15/0.43  # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.15/0.43  # No SInE strategy applied
% 0.15/0.43  # Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 0.15/0.43  # Scheduled 6 strats onto 5 cores with 1500 seconds (1500 total)
% 0.15/0.43  # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d with 811s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.43  # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 151s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.43  # Starting new_bool_3 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.43  # Starting new_bool_1 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.43  # Starting sh5l with 136s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.43  # G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d with pid 6287 completed with status 1
% 0.15/0.43  # Result found by G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d
% 0.15/0.43  # Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.15/0.43  # Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.15/0.43  # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.15/0.43  # No SInE strategy applied
% 0.15/0.43  # Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 0.15/0.43  # Scheduled 6 strats onto 5 cores with 1500 seconds (1500 total)
% 0.15/0.43  # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d with 811s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.43  # Preprocessing time       : 0.001 s
% 0.15/0.43  # Presaturation interreduction done
% 0.15/0.43  
% 0.15/0.43  # No proof found!
% 0.15/0.43  # SZS status Satisfiable
% 0.15/0.43  # SZS output start Saturation
% See solution above
% 0.15/0.43  # Parsed axioms                        : 41
% 0.15/0.43  # Removed by relevancy pruning/SinE    : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # Initial clauses                      : 41
% 0.15/0.43  # Removed in clause preprocessing      : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # Initial clauses in saturation        : 41
% 0.15/0.43  # Processed clauses                    : 237
% 0.15/0.43  # ...of these trivial                  : 4
% 0.15/0.43  # ...subsumed                          : 30
% 0.15/0.43  # ...remaining for further processing  : 203
% 0.15/0.43  # Other redundant clauses eliminated   : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # Clauses deleted for lack of memory   : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # Backward-subsumed                    : 7
% 0.15/0.43  # Backward-rewritten                   : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # Generated clauses                    : 274
% 0.15/0.43  # ...of the previous two non-redundant : 223
% 0.15/0.43  # ...aggressively subsumed             : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # Contextual simplify-reflections      : 3
% 0.15/0.43  # Paramodulations                      : 274
% 0.15/0.43  # Factorizations                       : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # NegExts                              : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # Equation resolutions                 : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # Total rewrite steps                  : 257
% 0.15/0.43  # Propositional unsat checks           : 0
% 0.15/0.43  #    Propositional check models        : 0
% 0.15/0.43  #    Propositional check unsatisfiable : 0
% 0.15/0.43  #    Propositional clauses             : 0
% 0.15/0.43  #    Propositional clauses after purity: 0
% 0.15/0.43  #    Propositional unsat core size     : 0
% 0.15/0.43  #    Propositional preprocessing time  : 0.000
% 0.15/0.43  #    Propositional encoding time       : 0.000
% 0.15/0.43  #    Propositional solver time         : 0.000
% 0.15/0.43  #    Success case prop preproc time    : 0.000
% 0.15/0.43  #    Success case prop encoding time   : 0.000
% 0.15/0.43  #    Success case prop solver time     : 0.000
% 0.15/0.43  # Current number of processed clauses  : 155
% 0.15/0.43  #    Positive orientable unit clauses  : 33
% 0.15/0.43  #    Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0
% 0.15/0.43  #    Negative unit clauses             : 3
% 0.15/0.43  #    Non-unit-clauses                  : 119
% 0.15/0.43  # Current number of unprocessed clauses: 0
% 0.15/0.43  # ...number of literals in the above   : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # Current number of archived formulas  : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # Current number of archived clauses   : 48
% 0.15/0.43  # Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 6616
% 0.15/0.43  # Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 2279
% 0.15/0.43  # Non-unit clause-clause subsumptions  : 34
% 0.15/0.43  # Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 146
% 0.15/0.43  # Rewrite failures with RHS unbound    : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # BW rewrite match attempts            : 20
% 0.15/0.43  # BW rewrite match successes           : 1
% 0.15/0.43  # Condensation attempts                : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # Condensation successes               : 0
% 0.15/0.43  # Termbank termtop insertions          : 9210
% 0.15/0.43  
% 0.15/0.43  # -------------------------------------------------
% 0.15/0.43  # User time                : 0.016 s
% 0.15/0.43  # System time              : 0.004 s
% 0.15/0.43  # Total time               : 0.021 s
% 0.15/0.43  # Maximum resident set size: 1696 pages
% 0.15/0.43  
% 0.15/0.43  # -------------------------------------------------
% 0.15/0.43  # User time                : 0.092 s
% 0.15/0.43  # System time              : 0.008 s
% 0.15/0.43  # Total time               : 0.100 s
% 0.15/0.43  # Maximum resident set size: 1732 pages
% 0.15/0.43  % E---3.1 exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------