TSTP Solution File: SWV018+1 by E-SAT---3.1
View Problem
- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : E-SAT---3.1
% Problem : SWV018+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_E %s %d THM
% Computer : n026.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 2400s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Tue Oct 10 19:55:51 EDT 2023
% Result : CounterSatisfiable 0.17s 0.47s
% Output : Saturation 0.17s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : ERROR: Analysing output (Could not find formula named c_0_46)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(c_0_36,plain,
( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_34]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_37,plain,
( message(sent(X2,X3,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_35]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_38,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_is_party_of_protocol]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_41,plain,
( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_36,c_0_37]),c_0_38])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_42,plain,
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_39]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_44,plain,
( b_holds(key(X2,X1))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X2))))
| ~ a_key(X2)
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X3)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_40]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_45,plain,
( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_41,c_0_42]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_48,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_34]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_49,plain,
( message(sent(t,X3,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X4,generate_key(X4),X5),X7),encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X4),X5),X6),X2)))
| ~ message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X2,encrypt(triple(X3,X4,X5),X6))))
| ~ t_holds(key(X6,X1))
| ~ t_holds(key(X7,X3))
| ~ a_nonce(X4) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_43]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_50,plain,
t_holds(key(at,a)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_holds_key_at_for_a]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_52,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_53,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_54,plain,
t_holds(key(bt,b)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_holds_key_bt_for_b]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_55,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_45]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_56,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_46]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_57,plain,
( intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_47]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_58,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_37]),c_0_38])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_60,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),X5)))
| ~ a_nonce(X2)
| ~ t_holds(key(X4,X1))
| ~ message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X5,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_50]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_62,plain,
( intruder_message(X3)
| ~ message(sent(X1,X2,X3)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_51]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_63,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_52]),c_0_53])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_64,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),X5)))
| ~ a_nonce(X2)
| ~ t_holds(key(X4,X1))
| ~ message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X5,encrypt(triple(b,X2,X3),X4)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_54]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_65,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_37]),c_0_38])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_67,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_58,c_0_42]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_68,plain,
( message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))
| ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3)))
| ~ a_stored(pair(X1,X5)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_59]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_69,plain,
a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_stored_message_i]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_70,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_60,c_0_54]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_71,plain,
a_nonce(an_a_nonce),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_72,plain,
party_of_protocol(t),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_is_party_of_protocol]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_74,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_61]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_75,plain,
intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_63]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_76,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_54]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_77,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65,c_0_42]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_78,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_38]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_79,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_61]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_80,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_67]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_81,plain,
( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
| ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_68,c_0_69]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_82,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_is_party_of_protocol]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_83,plain,
message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_70,c_0_63]),c_0_71])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_84,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_70,c_0_37]),c_0_72]),c_0_38])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_85,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_73]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_86,plain,
intruder_message(b),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74,c_0_75]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_87,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_61]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_89,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_76,c_0_37]),c_0_72]),c_0_38])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_91,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X3))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_77,c_0_78]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_92,plain,
( intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_79,c_0_80]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_93,plain,
b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_36,c_0_52]),c_0_53])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_94,plain,
( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_81,c_0_37]),c_0_82]),c_0_72])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_95,plain,
intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_83]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_96,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_85]),c_0_86])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_97,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_87,c_0_75]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_98,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_88]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_99,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_52]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_100,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_89,c_0_85]),c_0_86])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_101,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_87,c_0_80]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_103,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X4)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_91,c_0_92]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_104,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_93]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_105,plain,
( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_94,c_0_85]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_106,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74,c_0_95]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_107,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_96,c_0_97]),c_0_71])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_108,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_76,c_0_67]),c_0_86]),c_0_38])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_109,plain,
intruder_message(a),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_98,c_0_99]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_110,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_100,c_0_101]),c_0_86]),c_0_38])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_111,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_88]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_113,negated_conjecture,
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ b_holds(key(X1,X3)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_102]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_114,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_103,c_0_101]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_115,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))
| ~ a_key(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_104,c_0_37]),c_0_38]),c_0_82])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_116,plain,
( a_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4),at),X5,X6)))
| ~ a_stored(pair(X2,X3)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_59]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_117,plain,
( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_105,c_0_106]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_118,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_81,c_0_83]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_119,plain,
( message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_81,c_0_107]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_120,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_108]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_121,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_70,c_0_67]),c_0_109]),c_0_82])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_122,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_110]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_123,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_60,c_0_50]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_124,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_111,c_0_99]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_125,plain,
a_key(generate_key(X1)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_112]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_126,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_50]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_127,negated_conjecture,
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X4)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_113,c_0_114]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_128,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))
| ~ a_key(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_115,c_0_42]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_129,plain,
( a_holds(key(X1,b))
| ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2),at),X3,X4))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_116,c_0_69]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_130,plain,
( intruder_message(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_117]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_131,plain,
intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_118]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_133,plain,
( intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_119]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_134,plain,
( intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_87,c_0_120]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_135,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_121]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_137,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_123,c_0_37]),c_0_72]),c_0_82])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_138,plain,
b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),a)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_118]),c_0_124]),c_0_109]),c_0_125]),c_0_53]),c_0_82])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_139,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_126,c_0_37]),c_0_72]),c_0_82])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_140,negated_conjecture,
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_127,c_0_57]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_141,plain,
intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_79,c_0_75]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_143,plain,
( a_holds(key(X1,b))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2),at),X3,X4)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_129,c_0_37]),c_0_82]),c_0_72])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_144,plain,
b_holds(key(bt,t)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_hold_key_bt_for_t]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_147,plain,
( b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65,c_0_130]),c_0_125])]),c_0_92]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_148,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_58,c_0_131]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_149,plain,
( fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_132]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_150,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_58,c_0_133]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_151,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_96,c_0_101]),c_0_109]),c_0_82])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_152,plain,
( b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_41,c_0_133]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_153,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_91,c_0_134]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_154,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_79,c_0_135]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_155,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_136,c_0_95]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_157,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_58,c_0_130]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_158,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_137,c_0_85]),c_0_109])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_159,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_117]),c_0_109])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_160,plain,
( b_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_41,c_0_130]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_162,plain,
( b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_36,c_0_117]),c_0_109])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_163,plain,
( b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_41,c_0_131]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_164,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_111,c_0_131]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_165,negated_conjecture,
~ intruder_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_113,c_0_138]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_166,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_139,c_0_85]),c_0_109])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_167,negated_conjecture,
( ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ fresh_to_b(generate_key(X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_140,c_0_125]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_168,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_132]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_169,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_91,c_0_141]),c_0_124]),c_0_53])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_170,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_key(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_142,c_0_141])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_171,plain,
( a_holds(key(X1,b))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2),at))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X4) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_143,c_0_85]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_175,negated_conjecture,
~ intruder_holds(key(bt,X1)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_113,c_0_144]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_176,plain,
( fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_intruder_nonce(X1))
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_145]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_181,plain,
fresh_intruder_nonce(an_intruder_nonce),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[an_intruder_nonce_is_a_fresh_intruder_nonce]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_182,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_148,c_0_149]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_183,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_150,c_0_149]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_184,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_151]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_185,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_107]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_186,plain,
( b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_152,c_0_149]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_187,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74,c_0_135]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_188,plain,
( b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),a))
| ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_153,c_0_154]),c_0_109]),c_0_125]),c_0_82])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_189,plain,
( b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),b))
| ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_153,c_0_155]),c_0_86]),c_0_125]),c_0_38])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_190,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_156,c_0_95]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_191,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_157,c_0_149]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_192,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(at)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_158,c_0_78]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_193,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_159,c_0_149]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_194,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_96,c_0_78]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_195,plain,
( b_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_160,c_0_149]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_196,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_161,c_0_95]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_197,plain,
( b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_162,c_0_149]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_198,plain,
( b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_163,c_0_149]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_199,plain,
( b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_77,c_0_164]),c_0_124]),c_0_125]),c_0_53])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_200,negated_conjecture,
( ~ intruder_message(generate_key(an_a_nonce))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_165,c_0_57]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_201,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(at)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_166,c_0_78]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_202,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_100,c_0_78]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_203,negated_conjecture,
( ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_key(X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_167,c_0_149]),c_0_168]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_204,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_key(an_a_nonce)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_169,c_0_101]),c_0_124]),c_0_53])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_205,plain,
( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4))
| ~ intruder_message(at)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_105,c_0_78]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_206,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ a_key(X1) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_170,c_0_78]),c_0_79]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_207,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ a_key(an_a_nonce) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_170,c_0_97]),c_0_124])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_208,plain,
( a_holds(key(X1,b))
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(at)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X4) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_171,c_0_78]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_209,plain,
( intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X4) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_172]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_210,plain,
( intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_173]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_211,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_174]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_212,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_174]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_213,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_174]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_214,negated_conjecture,
( ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_175,c_0_57]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_215,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_174]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_216,plain,
( intruder_message(generate_intruder_nonce(X1))
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_168,c_0_176]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_217,plain,
( ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_177]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_218,plain,
~ a_nonce(generate_key(X1)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_178]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_219,plain,
b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_179,c_0_95]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_220,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_98,c_0_131]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_221,plain,
a_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_129,c_0_83]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_222,plain,
a_holds(key(at,t)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_holds_key_at_for_t]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_223,plain,
a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_180]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_224,plain,
intruder_message(an_intruder_nonce),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_168,c_0_181]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_225,plain,
a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_180]),
[final] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.03/0.11 % Problem : SWV018+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.03/0.13 % Command : run_E %s %d THM
% 0.11/0.33 % Computer : n026.cluster.edu
% 0.11/0.33 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.11/0.33 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.11/0.33 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.11/0.33 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.11/0.33 % CPULimit : 2400
% 0.11/0.33 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.11/0.33 % DateTime : Tue Oct 3 03:32:44 EDT 2023
% 0.11/0.33 % CPUTime :
% 0.17/0.44 Running first-order model finding
% 0.17/0.44 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/eprover --delete-bad-limit=2000000000 --definitional-cnf=24 -s --print-statistics -R --print-version --proof-object --satauto-schedule=8 --cpu-limit=300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/tmp.A8XUrY0I7M/E---3.1_4417.p
% 0.17/0.47 # Version: 3.1pre001
% 0.17/0.47 # Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.17/0.47 # Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.17/0.47 # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.17/0.47 # Starting new_bool_3 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.17/0.47 # Starting new_bool_1 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.17/0.47 # Starting sh5l with 300s (1) cores
% 0.17/0.47 # G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with pid 4494 completed with status 1
% 0.17/0.47 # Result found by G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN
% 0.17/0.47 # Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.17/0.47 # Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.17/0.47 # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.17/0.47 # No SInE strategy applied
% 0.17/0.47 # Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 0.17/0.47 # Scheduled 6 strats onto 5 cores with 1500 seconds (1500 total)
% 0.17/0.47 # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d with 811s (1) cores
% 0.17/0.47 # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 151s (1) cores
% 0.17/0.47 # Starting new_bool_3 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.17/0.47 # Starting new_bool_1 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.17/0.47 # Starting sh5l with 136s (1) cores
% 0.17/0.47 # G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d with pid 4498 completed with status 1
% 0.17/0.47 # Result found by G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d
% 0.17/0.47 # Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.17/0.47 # Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.17/0.47 # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.17/0.47 # No SInE strategy applied
% 0.17/0.47 # Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 0.17/0.47 # Scheduled 6 strats onto 5 cores with 1500 seconds (1500 total)
% 0.17/0.47 # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d with 811s (1) cores
% 0.17/0.47 # Preprocessing time : 0.001 s
% 0.17/0.47 # Presaturation interreduction done
% 0.17/0.47
% 0.17/0.47 # No proof found!
% 0.17/0.47 # SZS status CounterSatisfiable
% 0.17/0.47 # SZS output start Saturation
% See solution above
% 0.17/0.47 # Parsed axioms : 34
% 0.17/0.47 # Removed by relevancy pruning/SinE : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Initial clauses : 44
% 0.17/0.47 # Removed in clause preprocessing : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Initial clauses in saturation : 44
% 0.17/0.47 # Processed clauses : 248
% 0.17/0.47 # ...of these trivial : 3
% 0.17/0.47 # ...subsumed : 31
% 0.17/0.47 # ...remaining for further processing : 214
% 0.17/0.47 # Other redundant clauses eliminated : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Clauses deleted for lack of memory : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Backward-subsumed : 7
% 0.17/0.47 # Backward-rewritten : 1
% 0.17/0.47 # Generated clauses : 288
% 0.17/0.47 # ...of the previous two non-redundant : 228
% 0.17/0.47 # ...aggressively subsumed : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Contextual simplify-reflections : 3
% 0.17/0.47 # Paramodulations : 288
% 0.17/0.47 # Factorizations : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # NegExts : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Equation resolutions : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Total rewrite steps : 283
% 0.17/0.47 # Propositional unsat checks : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Propositional check models : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Propositional check unsatisfiable : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Propositional clauses : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Propositional clauses after purity: 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Propositional unsat core size : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Propositional preprocessing time : 0.000
% 0.17/0.47 # Propositional encoding time : 0.000
% 0.17/0.47 # Propositional solver time : 0.000
% 0.17/0.47 # Success case prop preproc time : 0.000
% 0.17/0.47 # Success case prop encoding time : 0.000
% 0.17/0.47 # Success case prop solver time : 0.000
% 0.17/0.47 # Current number of processed clauses : 162
% 0.17/0.47 # Positive orientable unit clauses : 35
% 0.17/0.47 # Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Negative unit clauses : 3
% 0.17/0.47 # Non-unit-clauses : 124
% 0.17/0.47 # Current number of unprocessed clauses: 0
% 0.17/0.47 # ...number of literals in the above : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Current number of archived formulas : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Current number of archived clauses : 52
% 0.17/0.47 # Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 5406
% 0.17/0.47 # Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 1893
% 0.17/0.47 # Non-unit clause-clause subsumptions : 34
% 0.17/0.47 # Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 22
% 0.17/0.47 # Rewrite failures with RHS unbound : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # BW rewrite match attempts : 24
% 0.17/0.47 # BW rewrite match successes : 2
% 0.17/0.47 # Condensation attempts : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Condensation successes : 0
% 0.17/0.47 # Termbank termtop insertions : 11123
% 0.17/0.47
% 0.17/0.47 # -------------------------------------------------
% 0.17/0.47 # User time : 0.016 s
% 0.17/0.47 # System time : 0.002 s
% 0.17/0.47 # Total time : 0.018 s
% 0.17/0.47 # Maximum resident set size: 1848 pages
% 0.17/0.47
% 0.17/0.47 # -------------------------------------------------
% 0.17/0.47 # User time : 0.079 s
% 0.17/0.47 # System time : 0.006 s
% 0.17/0.47 # Total time : 0.085 s
% 0.17/0.47 # Maximum resident set size: 1720 pages
% 0.17/0.47 % E---3.1 exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------