TSTP Solution File: SWV016-1 by E-SAT---3.1

View Problem - Process Solution

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : E-SAT---3.1
% Problem  : SWV016-1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : run_E %s %d THM

% Computer : n013.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 2400s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Tue Oct 10 19:55:50 EDT 2023

% Result   : Timeout 559.56s 300.14s
% Output   : None 
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : ERROR: Analysing output (Could not find formula named intruder_key_encrypts_33)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(c_0_37,axiom,
    ( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))) ),
    b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_11,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_38,axiom,
    ( message(sent(X1,X2,X3))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    intruder_message_sent_31,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_39,axiom,
    party_of_protocol(b),
    b_is_party_of_protocol_8,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_40,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_37,c_0_38]),c_0_39])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_41,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    intruder_composes_pairs_27,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_42,axiom,
    ( message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X3)
    | ~ message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6))))
    | ~ t_holds(key(X5,X1))
    | ~ t_holds(key(X6,X2)) ),
    server_t_generates_key_16,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_43,axiom,
    t_holds(key(bt,b)),
    t_holds_key_bt_for_b_14,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_44,axiom,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X3))
    | ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))) ),
    b_accepts_secure_session_key_12,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_45,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_40,c_0_41]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_46,axiom,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))) ),
    b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_47,axiom,
    message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
    a_sent_message_i_to_b_3,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_48,axiom,
    fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
    nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_49,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),X3),bt),X5)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X2)
    | ~ t_holds(key(X4,X1))
    | ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X5,encrypt(triple(X1,X2,X3),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_42,c_0_43]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_50,axiom,
    t_holds(key(at,a)),
    t_holds_key_at_for_a_13,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_51,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_45]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_52,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
    intruder_key_encrypts_33,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_53,axiom,
    ( intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    intruder_holds_key_32,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_54,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_38]),c_0_39])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_55,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(X2,X3,X1)) ),
    intruder_can_record_17,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_56,plain,
    message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_47]),c_0_48])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_57,axiom,
    ( message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))
    | ~ a_stored(pair(X1,X5))
    | ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))) ),
    a_forwards_secure_5,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_58,axiom,
    a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)),
    a_stored_message_i_4,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_59,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_50]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_60,axiom,
    a_nonce(an_a_nonce),
    an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce_34,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_61,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_51,c_0_38]),c_0_39])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_63,axiom,
    party_of_protocol(t),
    t_is_party_of_protocol_15,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_64,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_54,c_0_41]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_65,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_triples_20,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_66,plain,
    intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_56]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_67,plain,
    ( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
    | ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57,c_0_58]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_68,axiom,
    party_of_protocol(a),
    a_is_party_of_protocol_2,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_69,plain,
    message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_56]),c_0_60])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_70,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61,c_0_41]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_71,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_63]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_72,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_triples_21,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_73,plain,
    ( intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_64]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_74,plain,
    b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_37,c_0_47]),c_0_48])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_75,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_38]),c_0_63]),c_0_39])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_76,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    intruder_composes_triples_28,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_77,plain,
    intruder_message(b),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65,c_0_66]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_78,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_triples_22,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_79,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_43]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_80,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_pairs_18,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_81,plain,
    intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_47]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_82,plain,
    ( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67,c_0_38]),c_0_68]),c_0_63])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_83,plain,
    intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_69]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_84,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X3))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_70,c_0_71]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_85,plain,
    ( intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_72,c_0_73]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_86,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,a))
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_74]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_87,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_75,c_0_76]),c_0_77])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_88,plain,
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_78,c_0_66]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_89,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_79,c_0_64]),c_0_77]),c_0_39])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_90,plain,
    intruder_message(a),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_80,c_0_81]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_91,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),X3),at),X5)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X2)
    | ~ t_holds(key(X4,X1))
    | ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X5,encrypt(triple(X1,X2,X3),at)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_42,c_0_50]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_92,plain,
    ( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_82,c_0_76]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_93,plain,
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65,c_0_83]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_94,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_pairs_19,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_95,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X4)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_85]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_96,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_78,c_0_73]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_97,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,a))
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))
    | ~ a_key(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_86,c_0_38]),c_0_39]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_98,plain,
    message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67,c_0_69]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_99,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_87,c_0_88]),c_0_60])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_100,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_79,c_0_38]),c_0_63]),c_0_39])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_101,plain,
    ( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_89]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_102,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_64]),c_0_90]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_103,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_91,c_0_50]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_104,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_91,c_0_43]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_105,plain,
    ( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_92,c_0_93]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_106,plain,
    intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_94,c_0_81]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_107,axiom,
    a_key(generate_key(X1)),
    generated_keys_are_keys_39,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_108,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X3)) ),
    co1_40,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_109,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_95,c_0_96]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_110,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,a))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))
    | ~ a_key(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_97,c_0_41]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_111,plain,
    intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_98]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_112,plain,
    ( message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67,c_0_99]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_113,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_100,c_0_76]),c_0_77])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_114,plain,
    ( intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_78,c_0_101]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_115,plain,
    ( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_102]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_116,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_103,c_0_38]),c_0_63]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_117,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at)))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_104,c_0_38]),c_0_63]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_118,plain,
    ( intruder_message(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_105]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_119,plain,
    b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),a)),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_51,c_0_98]),c_0_106]),c_0_90]),c_0_107]),c_0_48]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_120,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X4)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_108,c_0_109]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_121,plain,
    intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_72,c_0_66]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_123,axiom,
    b_holds(key(bt,t)),
    b_hold_key_bt_for_t_7,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_124,plain,
    intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_94,c_0_111]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_125,plain,
    ( intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_112]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_126,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_87,c_0_96]),c_0_90]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_127,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_113,c_0_96]),c_0_77]),c_0_39])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_128,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_114]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_129,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_72,c_0_115]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_130,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_72,c_0_101]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_131,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_116,c_0_76]),c_0_90])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_132,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at))
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_117,c_0_76]),c_0_90])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_134,negated_conjecture,
    ~ intruder_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_108,c_0_119]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_135,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_120,c_0_53]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_136,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_121]),c_0_106]),c_0_48])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_137,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,a))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_key(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_122,c_0_121])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_138,negated_conjecture,
    ~ intruder_holds(key(bt,X1)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_108,c_0_123]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_139,axiom,
    ( ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    nothing_is_a_nonce_and_a_key_38,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_140,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_70,c_0_124]),c_0_106]),c_0_107]),c_0_48])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_141,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_54,c_0_111]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_142,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_54,c_0_125]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_143,plain,
    ( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_126]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_144,plain,
    ( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_127]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_145,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65,c_0_115]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_146,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),a))
    | ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_128,c_0_129]),c_0_90]),c_0_107]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_147,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_54,c_0_118]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_148,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65,c_0_101]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_149,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),b))
    | ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_128,c_0_130]),c_0_77]),c_0_107]),c_0_39])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_150,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(at)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_131,c_0_71]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_151,plain,
    ( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_99]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_152,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_40,c_0_125]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_153,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(at)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_132,c_0_71]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_154,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_87,c_0_71]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_155,plain,
    ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_105]),c_0_90])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_156,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_40,c_0_111]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_157,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61,c_0_118]),c_0_107])]),c_0_85]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_158,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_40,c_0_118]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_159,plain,
    ( b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_37,c_0_105]),c_0_90])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_160,plain,
    ( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_133,c_0_83]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_161,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ intruder_message(generate_key(an_a_nonce))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_134,c_0_53]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_162,plain,
    ( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_113,c_0_71]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_163,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(generate_key(X1))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_135,c_0_107]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_164,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ a_key(an_a_nonce)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_136,c_0_96]),c_0_106]),c_0_48])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_165,plain,
    ( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
    | ~ intruder_message(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4))
    | ~ intruder_message(at)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_92,c_0_71]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_166,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
    | ~ a_key(an_a_nonce) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_137,c_0_88]),c_0_106])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_167,plain,
    ( b_holds(key(X1,a))
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ a_key(X1) ),
    inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_137,c_0_71]),c_0_72]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_168,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))
    | ~ intruder_message(X4)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
    intruder_composes_quadruples_29,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_169,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
    intruder_interception_30,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_170,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_quadruples_23,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_171,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_quadruples_24,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_172,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_quadruples_25,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_173,axiom,
    ( intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)) ),
    intruder_decomposes_quadruples_26,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_174,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_138,c_0_53]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_175,plain,
    ~ a_nonce(generate_key(X1)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_139,c_0_107]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_176,plain,
    b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b)),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_140,c_0_130]),c_0_77]),c_0_39]),c_0_106]),c_0_60]),c_0_48])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_177,plain,
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_80,c_0_111]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_178,axiom,
    a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)),
    generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces_36,
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_179,axiom,
    a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)),
    generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces_37,
    [final] ).

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.08/0.14  % Problem    : SWV016-1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.08/0.15  % Command    : run_E %s %d THM
% 0.15/0.37  % Computer : n013.cluster.edu
% 0.15/0.37  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.15/0.37  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.15/0.37  % Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% 0.15/0.37  % OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.15/0.37  % CPULimit   : 2400
% 0.15/0.37  % WCLimit    : 300
% 0.15/0.37  % DateTime   : Tue Oct  3 03:33:59 EDT 2023
% 0.15/0.37  % CPUTime    : 
% 0.22/0.52  Running first-order model finding
% 0.22/0.52  Running: /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/eprover --delete-bad-limit=2000000000 --definitional-cnf=24 -s --print-statistics -R --print-version --proof-object --satauto-schedule=8 --cpu-limit=300 /export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/tmp.uwN6k1hS6S/E---3.1_12561.p
% 559.56/300.14  # Version: 3.1pre001
% 559.56/300.14  # Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 559.56/300.14  # Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting new_bool_3 with 300s (1) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting new_bool_1 with 300s (1) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting sh5l with 300s (1) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # sh5l with pid 12651 completed with status 1
% 559.56/300.14  # Result found by sh5l
% 559.56/300.14  # Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 559.56/300.14  # Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting new_bool_3 with 300s (1) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting new_bool_1 with 300s (1) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting sh5l with 300s (1) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # SinE strategy is gf500_gu_R04_F100_L20000
% 559.56/300.14  # Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 559.56/300.14  # Scheduled 5 strats onto 1 cores with 300 seconds (300 total)
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d with 181s (1) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d with pid 12655 completed with status 1
% 559.56/300.14  # Result found by G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d
% 559.56/300.14  # Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 559.56/300.14  # Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting new_bool_3 with 300s (1) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting new_bool_1 with 300s (1) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting sh5l with 300s (1) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # SinE strategy is gf500_gu_R04_F100_L20000
% 559.56/300.14  # Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 559.56/300.14  # Scheduled 5 strats onto 1 cores with 300 seconds (300 total)
% 559.56/300.14  # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d with 181s (1) cores
% 559.56/300.14  # Preprocessing time       : 0.002 s
% 559.56/300.14  # Presaturation interreduction done
% 559.56/300.14  
% 559.56/300.14  # No proof found!
% 559.56/300.14  # SZS status Satisfiable
% 559.56/300.14  # SZS output start Saturation
% See solution above
% 559.56/300.14  # Parsed axioms                        : 37
% 559.56/300.14  # Removed by relevancy pruning/SinE    : 0
% 559.56/300.14  # Initial clauses                      : 37
% 559.56/300.14  # Removed in clause preprocessing      : 0
% 559.56/300.14  # Initial clauses in saturation        : 37
% 559.56/300.14  # Processed clauses                    : 214
% 559.56/300.14  # ...of these trivial                  : 4
% 559.56/300.14  # ...subsumed                          : 29
% 559.56/300.14  # ...remaining for further processing  : 181
% 559.56/300.14  # Other redundant clauses eliminated   : 0
% 559.56/300.14  # Clauses deleted for lack of memory   : 0
% 559.56/300.14  # Backward-subsumed                    : 3
% 559.56/300.14  # Backward-rewritten                   : 1
% 559.56/300.14  # Generated clauses                    : 205
% 559.56/300.14  # ...of the previous two non-redundant : 158
% 559.56/300.14  # ...aggressively subsumed             : 0
% 559.56/300.14  # Contextual simplify-reflections      : 2
% 559.56/300.14  # Paramodulations                      : 205
% 559.56/300.14  # Factorizations                       : 0
% 559.56/300.14  # NegExts                              : 0
% 559.56/300.14  # Equation resolutions                 : 0
% 559.56/300.14  # Total rewrite steps                  : 235
% 559.56/300.14  # Propositional unsat checks           : 0
% 559.56/300.14  #    Propositional check models        : 0
% 559.56/300.14  #    Propositional check unsatisfiable : 0
% 559.56/300.14  #    Propositional clauses             : 0
% 559.56/300.14  #    Propositional clauses after purity: 0
% 559.56/300.14  #    Propositional unsat core size     : 0
% 559.56/300.14  #    Propositional preprocessing time  : 0.000
% 559.56/300.14  #    Propositional encoding time       : 0.000
% 559.56/300.14  #    Propositional solver time         : 0.000
% 559.56/300.14  #    Success case prop preproc time    : 0.000
% 559.56/300.14  #    Success case prop encoding time   : 0.000
% 559.56/300.14  #    Success case prop solver time     : 0.000
% 559.56/300.14  # Current number of processed clauses  : 140
% 559.56/300.14  #    Positive orientable unit clauses  : 31
% 559.56/300.14  #    Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0
% 559.56/300.14  #    Negative unit clauses             : 3
% 559.56/300.14  #    Non-unit-clauses                  : 106
% 559.56/300.14  # Current number of unprocessed clauses: 0
% 559.56/300.14  # ...number of literals in the above   : 0
% 559.56/300.14  # Current number of archived formulas  : 0
% 559.56/300.14  # Current number of archived clauses   : 41
% 559.56/300.14  # Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 3982
% 559.56/300.14  # Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 1171
% 559.56/300.14  # Non-unit clause-clause subsumptions  : 30
% 559.56/300.14  # Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 115
% 559.56/300.14  # Rewrite failures with RHS unbound    : 0
% 559.56/300.14  # BW rewrite match attempts            : 19
% 559.56/300.14  # BW rewrite match successes           : 1
% 559.56/300.14  # Condensation attempts                : 0
% 559.56/300.14  # Condensation successes               : 0
% 559.56/300.14  # Termbank termtop insertions          : 7614
% 559.56/300.14  
% 559.56/300.14  # -------------------------------------------------
% 559.56/300.14  # User time                : 0.018 s
% 559.56/300.14  # System time              : 0.005 s
% 559.56/300.14  # Total time               : 0.022 s
% 559.56/300.14  # Maximum resident set size: 1836 pages
% 559.56/300.14  
% 559.56/300.14  # -------------------------------------------------
% 559.56/300.14  # User time                : 0.020 s
% 559.56/300.14  # System time              : 0.007 s
% 559.56/300.14  # Total time               : 0.027 s
% 559.56/300.14  # Maximum resident set size: 1732 pages
% 559.56/300.14  % E---3.1 exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------