TSTP Solution File: SWV015-10 by Moca---0.1
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- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Moca---0.1
% Problem : SWV015-10 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v7.5.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : moca.sh %s
% Computer : n020.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 600s
% DateTime : Wed Jul 20 20:40:56 EDT 2022
% Result : Unknown 68.65s 68.25s
% Output : None
% Verified :
% SZS Type : -
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----WARNING: Could not form TPTP format derivation
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.11/0.12 % Problem : SWV015-10 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v7.5.0.
% 0.11/0.13 % Command : moca.sh %s
% 0.13/0.34 % Computer : n020.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % WCLimit : 600
% 0.13/0.34 % DateTime : Wed Jun 15 19:03:19 EDT 2022
% 0.13/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 68.65/68.25 % SZS status Satisfiable
% 68.65/68.25 % SZS output start Proof
% 68.65/68.25 The input problem is satisfiable because
% 68.65/68.25
% 68.65/68.25 [1] the following set of Horn clauses is satisfiable:
% 68.65/68.25
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(A, A, B, C) = B
% 68.65/68.25 party_of_protocol(a) = true
% 68.65/68.25 message(sent(a, b, pair(a, an_a_nonce))) = true
% 68.65/68.25 a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce)) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(a_stored(pair(A, B)), true, ifeq(message(sent(t, a, triple(encrypt(quadruple(A, B, C, D), at), E, F))), true, message(sent(a, A, pair(E, encrypt(F, C)))), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 party_of_protocol(b) = true
% 68.65/68.25 fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(fresh_to_b(B), true, ifeq(message(sent(A, b, pair(A, B))), true, message(sent(b, t, triple(b, generate_b_nonce(B), encrypt(triple(A, B, generate_expiration_time(B)), bt)))), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 t_holds(key(at, a)) = true
% 68.65/68.25 t_holds(key(bt, b)) = true
% 68.65/68.25 party_of_protocol(t) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(a_nonce(D), true, ifeq(t_holds(key(F, A)), true, ifeq(t_holds(key(G, C)), true, ifeq(message(sent(A, t, triple(A, B, encrypt(triple(C, D, E), F)))), true, message(sent(t, C, triple(encrypt(quadruple(A, D, generate_key(D), E), G), encrypt(triple(C, generate_key(D), E), F), B))), true), true), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(message(sent(A, B, C)), true, intruder_message(C), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(pair(A, B)), true, intruder_message(A), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(pair(A, B)), true, intruder_message(B), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(triple(A, B, C)), true, intruder_message(A), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(triple(A, B, C)), true, intruder_message(B), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(triple(A, B, C)), true, intruder_message(C), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(quadruple(A, B, C, D)), true, intruder_message(A), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(quadruple(A, B, C, D)), true, intruder_message(B), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(quadruple(A, B, C, D)), true, intruder_message(C), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(quadruple(A, B, C, D)), true, intruder_message(D), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(B), true, ifeq(intruder_message(A), true, intruder_message(pair(A, B)), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(C), true, ifeq(intruder_message(B), true, ifeq(intruder_message(A), true, intruder_message(triple(A, B, C)), true), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(D), true, ifeq(intruder_message(C), true, ifeq(intruder_message(B), true, ifeq(intruder_message(A), true, intruder_message(quadruple(A, B, C, D)), true), true), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_holds(key(B, C)), true, ifeq(intruder_message(encrypt(A, B)), true, ifeq(party_of_protocol(C), true, intruder_message(B), true), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(A), true, ifeq(party_of_protocol(C), true, ifeq(party_of_protocol(B), true, message(sent(B, C, A)), true), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(A), true, ifeq(party_of_protocol(B), true, intruder_holds(key(A, B)), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_holds(key(B, C)), true, ifeq(intruder_message(A), true, ifeq(party_of_protocol(C), true, intruder_message(encrypt(A, B)), true), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 a_nonce(an_a_nonce) = true
% 68.65/68.25 a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(A)) = true
% 68.65/68.25 a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(A)) = true
% 68.65/68.25 tuple(a_nonce(A), a_key(A)) = tuple(true, true) ==> \bottom
% 68.65/68.25 a_key(generate_key(A)) = true
% 68.65/68.25
% 68.65/68.25 This holds because
% 68.65/68.25
% 68.65/68.25 [2] the following E does not entail the following G (Claessen-Smallbone's transformation (2018)):
% 68.65/68.25
% 68.65/68.25 E:
% 68.65/68.25 a_key(generate_key(A)) = true
% 68.65/68.25 a_nonce(an_a_nonce) = true
% 68.65/68.25 a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(A)) = true
% 68.65/68.25 a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(A)) = true
% 68.65/68.25 a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce)) = true
% 68.65/68.25 f1(tuple(a_nonce(A), a_key(A))) = false__
% 68.65/68.25 f1(tuple(true, true)) = true__
% 68.65/68.25 fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(A, A, B, C) = B
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(a_nonce(D), true, ifeq(t_holds(key(F, A)), true, ifeq(t_holds(key(G, C)), true, ifeq(message(sent(A, t, triple(A, B, encrypt(triple(C, D, E), F)))), true, message(sent(t, C, triple(encrypt(quadruple(A, D, generate_key(D), E), G), encrypt(triple(C, generate_key(D), E), F), B))), true), true), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(a_stored(pair(A, B)), true, ifeq(message(sent(t, a, triple(encrypt(quadruple(A, B, C, D), at), E, F))), true, message(sent(a, A, pair(E, encrypt(F, C)))), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(fresh_to_b(B), true, ifeq(message(sent(A, b, pair(A, B))), true, message(sent(b, t, triple(b, generate_b_nonce(B), encrypt(triple(A, B, generate_expiration_time(B)), bt)))), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_holds(key(B, C)), true, ifeq(intruder_message(A), true, ifeq(party_of_protocol(C), true, intruder_message(encrypt(A, B)), true), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_holds(key(B, C)), true, ifeq(intruder_message(encrypt(A, B)), true, ifeq(party_of_protocol(C), true, intruder_message(B), true), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(A), true, ifeq(party_of_protocol(B), true, intruder_holds(key(A, B)), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(A), true, ifeq(party_of_protocol(C), true, ifeq(party_of_protocol(B), true, message(sent(B, C, A)), true), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(B), true, ifeq(intruder_message(A), true, intruder_message(pair(A, B)), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(C), true, ifeq(intruder_message(B), true, ifeq(intruder_message(A), true, intruder_message(triple(A, B, C)), true), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(D), true, ifeq(intruder_message(C), true, ifeq(intruder_message(B), true, ifeq(intruder_message(A), true, intruder_message(quadruple(A, B, C, D)), true), true), true), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(pair(A, B)), true, intruder_message(A), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(pair(A, B)), true, intruder_message(B), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(quadruple(A, B, C, D)), true, intruder_message(A), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(quadruple(A, B, C, D)), true, intruder_message(B), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(quadruple(A, B, C, D)), true, intruder_message(C), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(quadruple(A, B, C, D)), true, intruder_message(D), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(triple(A, B, C)), true, intruder_message(A), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(triple(A, B, C)), true, intruder_message(B), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(intruder_message(triple(A, B, C)), true, intruder_message(C), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq(message(sent(A, B, C)), true, intruder_message(C), true) = true
% 68.65/68.25 message(sent(a, b, pair(a, an_a_nonce))) = true
% 68.65/68.25 party_of_protocol(a) = true
% 68.65/68.25 party_of_protocol(b) = true
% 68.65/68.25 party_of_protocol(t) = true
% 68.65/68.25 t_holds(key(at, a)) = true
% 68.65/68.25 t_holds(key(bt, b)) = true
% 68.65/68.25 G:
% 68.65/68.25 true__ = false__
% 68.65/68.25
% 68.65/68.25 This holds because
% 68.65/68.25
% 68.65/68.25 [3] the following ground-complete ordered TRS entails E but does not entail G:
% 68.65/68.25
% 68.65/68.25
% 68.65/68.25 a_key(generate_key(A)) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 a_nonce(an_a_nonce) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(A)) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(A)) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 f1(tuple(a_nonce(A), a_key(A))) -> false__
% 68.65/68.25 f1(tuple(a_nonce(generate_key(X0)), a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce)))) -> false__
% 68.65/68.25 f1(tuple(a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce)), a_key(an_a_nonce))) -> false__
% 68.65/68.25 f1(tuple(a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce)), a_key(generate_b_nonce(X0)))) -> false__
% 68.65/68.25 f1(tuple(a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce)), a_key(generate_expiration_time(X0)))) -> false__
% 68.65/68.25 f1(tuple(a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce)), a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce)))) -> true__
% 68.65/68.25 fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 intruder_holds(key(A, B)) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 intruder_message(C) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 intruder_message(encrypt(A, B)) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 intruder_message(pair(A, B)) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 intruder_message(quadruple(A, B, C, D)) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 intruder_message(triple(A, B, C)) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 message(sent(B, C, A)) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 message(sent(a, A, pair(E, encrypt(F, C)))) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 message(sent(a, b, pair(a, an_a_nonce))) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 message(sent(b, t, triple(b, generate_b_nonce(B), encrypt(triple(A, B, generate_expiration_time(B)), bt)))) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 message(sent(t, C, triple(encrypt(quadruple(A, D, generate_key(D), E), G), encrypt(triple(C, generate_key(D), E), F), B))) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 party_of_protocol(a) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 party_of_protocol(b) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 party_of_protocol(t) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 t_holds(key(at, a)) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 t_holds(key(bt, b)) -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 true -> a_stored(pair(b, an_a_nonce))
% 68.65/68.25 with the LPO induced by
% 68.65/68.25 encrypt > t > party_of_protocol > intruder_holds > quadruple > triple > a > generate_expiration_time > intruder_message > sent > message > ifeq > tuple > f1 > bt > at > a_key > a_nonce > fresh_to_b > true > key > t_holds > pair > generate_b_nonce > a_stored > generate_key > an_a_nonce > b > false__ > true__
% 68.65/68.25 with the following interpretations:
% 68.65/68.25 ifeq returns 3rd variable
% 68.65/68.25 % SZS output end Proof
% 68.65/68.25
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------