TSTP Solution File: SWV014-1 by Etableau---0.67

View Problem - Process Solution

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : Etableau---0.67
% Problem  : SWV014-1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : etableau --auto --tsmdo --quicksat=10000 --tableau=1 --tableau-saturation=1 -s -p --tableau-cores=8 --cpu-limit=%d %s

% Computer : n021.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 600s
% DateTime : Wed Jul 20 18:18:56 EDT 2022

% Result   : Unsatisfiable 0.20s 0.40s
% Output   : CNFRefutation 0.20s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : -

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----WARNING: Could not form TPTP format derivation
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.07/0.13  % Problem  : SWV014-1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.07/0.14  % Command  : etableau --auto --tsmdo --quicksat=10000 --tableau=1 --tableau-saturation=1 -s -p --tableau-cores=8 --cpu-limit=%d %s
% 0.13/0.35  % Computer : n021.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.35  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.35  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.35  % Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.35  % OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.35  % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.35  % WCLimit  : 600
% 0.13/0.35  % DateTime : Wed Jun 15 20:10:29 EDT 2022
% 0.13/0.35  % CPUTime  : 
% 0.13/0.38  # No SInE strategy applied
% 0.13/0.38  # Auto-Mode selected heuristic G_E___208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d
% 0.13/0.38  # and selection function SelectCQIPrecWNTNp.
% 0.13/0.38  #
% 0.13/0.38  # Presaturation interreduction done
% 0.13/0.38  # Number of axioms: 34 Number of unprocessed: 34
% 0.13/0.38  # Tableaux proof search.
% 0.13/0.38  # APR header successfully linked.
% 0.13/0.38  # Hello from C++
% 0.13/0.39  # The folding up rule is enabled...
% 0.13/0.39  # Local unification is enabled...
% 0.13/0.39  # Any saturation attempts will use folding labels...
% 0.13/0.39  # 34 beginning clauses after preprocessing and clausification
% 0.13/0.39  # Creating start rules for all 1 conjectures.
% 0.13/0.39  # There are 1 start rule candidates:
% 0.13/0.39  # Found 11 unit axioms.
% 0.13/0.39  # 1 start rule tableaux created.
% 0.13/0.39  # 23 extension rule candidate clauses
% 0.13/0.39  # 11 unit axiom clauses
% 0.13/0.39  
% 0.13/0.39  # Requested 8, 32 cores available to the main process.
% 0.13/0.39  # There are not enough tableaux to fork, creating more from the initial 1
% 0.13/0.39  # Returning from population with 14 new_tableaux and 0 remaining starting tableaux.
% 0.13/0.39  # We now have 14 tableaux to operate on
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 total branch saturation attempts.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 of these attempts blocked.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 deferred branch saturation attempts.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 free duplicated saturations.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 total successful branch saturations.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 successful branch saturations in interreduction.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 successful branch saturations on the branch.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 successful branch saturations after the branch.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 total branch saturation attempts.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 of these attempts blocked.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 deferred branch saturation attempts.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 free duplicated saturations.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 total successful branch saturations.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 successful branch saturations in interreduction.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 successful branch saturations on the branch.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 successful branch saturations after the branch.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 total branch saturation attempts.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 of these attempts blocked.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 deferred branch saturation attempts.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 free duplicated saturations.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 total successful branch saturations.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 successful branch saturations in interreduction.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 successful branch saturations on the branch.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 successful branch saturations after the branch.
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS status Unsatisfiable for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS output start for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin clausification derivation
% 0.20/0.40  
% 0.20/0.40  # End clausification derivation
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin listing active clauses obtained from FOF to CNF conversion
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_35, plain, (party_of_protocol(a))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_39, plain, (party_of_protocol(b))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_46, plain, (party_of_protocol(t))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_40, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_65, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_67, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_66, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_44, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_45, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_37, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_36, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_50, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_63, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_58, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_52, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_51, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_57, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_56, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_55, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_64, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_62, plain, (message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_59, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_60, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_42, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_43, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_38, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_41, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_47, plain, (message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))|~a_nonce(X3)|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~t_holds(key(X5,X1))|~message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6)))))).
% 0.20/0.40  # End listing active clauses.  There is an equivalent clause to each of these in the clausification!
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin printing tableau
% 0.20/0.40  # Found 15 steps
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))|~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(start_rule)).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_70, plain, (~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_43])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_189, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_62])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_305, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_306, plain, (~party_of_pr# There were 2 total branch saturation attempts.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 of these attempts blocked.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 deferred branch saturation attempts.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 free duplicated saturations.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 total successful branch saturations.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 successful branch saturations in interreduction.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 successful branch saturations on the branch.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 successful branch saturations after the branch.
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS status Unsatisfiable for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS output start for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin clausification derivation
% 0.20/0.40  
% 0.20/0.40  # End clausification derivation
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin listing active clauses obtained from FOF to CNF conversion
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_35, plain, (party_of_protocol(a))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_39, plain, (party_of_protocol(b))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_46, plain, (party_of_protocol(t))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_40, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_65, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_67, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_66, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_44, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_45, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_37, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_36, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_50, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_63, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_58, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_52, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_51, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_57, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_56, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_55, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_64, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_62, plain, (message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_59, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_60, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_42, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_43, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_38, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_41, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_47, plain, (message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))|~a_nonce(X3)|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~t_holds(key(X5,X1))|~message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6)))))).
% 0.20/0.40  # End listing active clauses.  There is an equivalent clause to each of these in the clausification!
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin printing tableau
% 0.20/0.40  # Found 15 steps
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))|~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(start_rule)).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_70, plain, (~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_43])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_189, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_62])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_305, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_306, plain, (~party_of_protocol(a)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_35])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_304, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_56])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_188, plain, (~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_42])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_557, plain, (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_40])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_558, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_69, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_63])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_567, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_566, plain, (~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_50])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_569, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_48])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_573, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_464, plain, (~intruder_message(quadruple(X7,X8,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)),X9))), inference(etableau_closure_rule, [i_0_464, ...])).
% 0.20/0.40  # End printing tableau
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS output end
% 0.20/0.40  # Branches closed with saturation will be marked with an "s"
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS status Unsatisfiable for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS output start for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin clausification derivation
% 0.20/0.40  
% 0.20/0.40  # End clausification derivation
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin listing active clauses obtained from FOF to CNF conversion
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_35, plain, (party_of_protocol(a))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_39, plain, (party_of_protocol(b))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_46, plain, (party_of_protocol(t))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_40, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_65, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_67, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_66, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_44, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_45, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_37, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_36, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_50, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_63, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_58, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_52, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_51, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_57, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_56, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_55, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_64, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_62, plain, (message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_59, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_60, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_42, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_43, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_38, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_41, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_47, plain, (message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))|~a_nonce(X3)|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~t_holds(key(X5,X1))|~message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6)))))).
% 0.20/0.40  # End listing active clauses.  There is an equivalent clause to each of these in the clausification!
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin printing tableau
% 0.20/0.40  # Found 15 steps
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))|~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(start_rule)).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_70, plain, (~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_43])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_189, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_62])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_305, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_306, plain, (~party_of_protocol(a)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_35])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_304, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_54])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_188, plain, (~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_42])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_557, plain, (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_40])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_558, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_69, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_63])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_567, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_566, plain, (~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_50])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_569, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_48])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_573, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_468, plain, (~intruder_message(quadruple(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)),X7,X8,X9))), inference(etableau_closure_rule, [i_0_468, ...])).
% 0.20/0.40  # End printing tableau
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS output end
% 0.20/0.40  # Branches closed with saturation will be marked with an "s"
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS status Unsatisfiable for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS output start for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin clausification derivation
% 0.20/0.40  
% 0.20/0.40  # End clausification derivation
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin listing active clauses obtained from FOF to CNF conversion
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_35, plain, (party_of_protocol(a))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_39, plain, (party_of_protocol(b))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_46, plain, (party_of_protocol(t))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_40, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_65, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_67, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_66, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_44, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_45, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_37, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_36, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_50, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_63, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_58, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_52, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_51, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_57, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_56, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_55, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_64, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_62, plain, (message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_59, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_60, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_42, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_43, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_38, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_41, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_47, plain, (message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))|~a_nonce(X3)|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~t_holds(key(X5,X1))|~message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6)))))).
% 0.20/0.40  # End listing active clauses.  There is an equivalent clause to each of these in the clausification!
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin printing tableau
% 0.20/0.40  # Found 15 steps
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))|~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(start_rule)).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_70, plain, (~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_43])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_189, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_62])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_305, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_306, plain, (~party_of_protocol(a)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_35])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_304, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_57])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_188, plain, (~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_42])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_557, plain, (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_40])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_558, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_69, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_63])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_567, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_566, plain, (~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_50])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_569, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_48])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_573, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_462, plain, (~intruder_message(quadruple(X7,X8,X9,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(etableau_closure_rule, [i_0_462, ...])).
% 0.20/0.40  # End printing tableau
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS output end
% 0.20/0.40  # Branches closed with saturation will be marked with an "s"
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 total branch saturation attempts.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 of these attempts blocked.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 deferred branch saturation attempts.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 free duplicated saturations.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 total successful branch saturations.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 successful branch saturations in interreduction.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 successful branch saturations on the branch.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 successful branch saturations after the branch.
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS status Unsatisfiable for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS output start for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin clausification derivation
% 0.20/0.40  
% 0.20/0.40  # End clausification derivation
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin listing active clauses obtained from FOF to CNF conversion
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_35, plain, (party_of_protocol(a))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_39, plain, (party_of_protocol(b))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_46, plain, (party_of_protocol(t))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_40, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_65, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_67, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_66, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_44, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_45, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_37, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_36, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_50, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_63, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_58, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_52, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_51, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_57, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_56, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_55, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_64, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_62, plain, (message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_59, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_60, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_42, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_43, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_38, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_41, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_47, plain, (message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))|~a_nonce(X3)|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~t_holds(key(X5,X1))|~message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6)))))).
% 0.20/0.40  # End listing active clauses.  There is an equivalent clause to each of these in the clausification!
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin printing tableau
% 0.20/0.40  # Found 15 steps
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))|~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(start_rule)).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_70, plain, (~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_43])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_189, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_62])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_305, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_306, plain, (~party_of_protocol(a)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_35])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_304, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_51])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_188, plain, (~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_42])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_557, plain, (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_40])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_558, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_69, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_63])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_567, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_566, plain, (~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_50])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_569, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_48])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_573, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_460, plain, (~intruder_message(triple(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)),X7,X8))), inference(etableau_closure_rule, [i_0_460, ...])).
% 0.20/0.40  # End printing tableau
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS output end
% 0.20/0.40  # Branches closed with saturation will be marked with an "s"
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 total branch saturation attempts.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 of these attempts blocked.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 deferred branch saturation attempts.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 free duplicated saturations.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 total successful branch saturations.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 successful branch saturations in interreduction.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 0 successful branch saturations on the branch.
% 0.20/0.40  # There were 2 successful branch saturations after the branch.
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS status Unsatisfiable for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS output start for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin clausification derivation
% 0.20/0.40  
% 0.20/0.40  # End clausification derivation
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin listing active clauses obtained from FOF to CNF conversion
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_35, plain, (party_of_protocol(a))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_39, plain, (party_of_protocol(b))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_46, plain, (party_of_protocol(t))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_40, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_65, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_67, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_66, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_44, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_45, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_37, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_36, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_50, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_63, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_58, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_52, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_51, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_57, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_56, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_55, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_64, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_62, plain, (message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_59, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_60, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_42, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_43, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_38, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_41, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))))).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_47, plain, (message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))|~a_nonce(X3)|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~t_holds(key(X5,X1))|~message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6)))))).
% 0.20/0.40  # End listing active clauses.  There is an equivalent clause to each of these in the clausification!
% 0.20/0.40  # Begin printing tableau
% 0.20/0.40  # Found 15 steps
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))|~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(start_rule)).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_70, plain, (~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_43])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_189, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_62])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_305, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_306, plain, (~party_of_protocol(a)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_35])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_304, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_52])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_188, plain, (~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_42])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_557, plain, (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_40])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_558, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_69, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_63])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_567, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_566, plain, (~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_50])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_569, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_48])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_573, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_458, plain, (~intruder_message(triple(X7,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)),X8))), inference(etableau_closure_rule, [i_0_458, ...])).
% 0.20/0.40  # End printing tableau
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS output end
% 0.20/0.40  # Branches closed with saturation will be marked with an "s"
% 0.20/0.40  # Child (30429) has found a proof.
% 0.20/0.40  
% 0.20/0.40  otocol(a)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_35])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_304, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_55])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_188, plain, (~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_42])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_557, plain, (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_40])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_558, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_69, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_63])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_567, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_566, plain, (~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_50])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_569, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_48])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_573, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])).
% 0.20/0.40  cnf(i_0_466, plain, (~intruder_message(quadruple(X7,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)),X8,X9))), inference(etableau_closure_rule, [i_0_466, ...])).
% 0.20/0.40  # End printing tableau
% 0.20/0.40  # SZS output end
% 0.20/0.40  # Branches closed with saturation will be marked with an "s"
% 0.20/0.41  # Proof search is over...
% 0.20/0.41  # Freeing feature tree
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------