TSTP Solution File: SWV014-1 by CSE_E---1.5
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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : CSE_E---1.5
% Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : java -jar /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/mcs_scs.jar %d %s
% Computer : n020.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Aug 31 21:36:08 EDT 2023
% Result : Unsatisfiable 0.20s 0.59s
% Output : CNFRefutation 0.20s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 11
% Number of leaves : 41
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 74 ( 17 unt; 25 typ; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 107 ( 0 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 5 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 120 ( 62 ~; 58 |; 0 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 0 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 6 ( 3 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of types : 2 ( 0 usr)
% Number of type conns : 29 ( 19 >; 10 *; 0 +; 0 <<)
% Number of predicates : 11 ( 10 usr; 1 prp; 0-1 aty)
% Number of functors : 15 ( 15 usr; 6 con; 0-4 aty)
% Number of variables : 71 ( 20 sgn; 0 !; 0 ?; 0 :)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
tff(decl_22,type,
a: $i ).
tff(decl_23,type,
party_of_protocol: $i > $o ).
tff(decl_24,type,
b: $i ).
tff(decl_25,type,
an_a_nonce: $i ).
tff(decl_26,type,
pair: ( $i * $i ) > $i ).
tff(decl_27,type,
sent: ( $i * $i * $i ) > $i ).
tff(decl_28,type,
message: $i > $o ).
tff(decl_29,type,
a_stored: $i > $o ).
tff(decl_30,type,
encrypt: ( $i * $i ) > $i ).
tff(decl_31,type,
t: $i ).
tff(decl_32,type,
quadruple: ( $i * $i * $i * $i ) > $i ).
tff(decl_33,type,
at: $i ).
tff(decl_34,type,
triple: ( $i * $i * $i ) > $i ).
tff(decl_35,type,
fresh_to_b: $i > $o ).
tff(decl_36,type,
generate_b_nonce: $i > $i ).
tff(decl_37,type,
generate_expiration_time: $i > $i ).
tff(decl_38,type,
bt: $i ).
tff(decl_39,type,
b_stored: $i > $o ).
tff(decl_40,type,
key: ( $i * $i ) > $i ).
tff(decl_41,type,
b_holds: $i > $o ).
tff(decl_42,type,
t_holds: $i > $o ).
tff(decl_43,type,
generate_key: $i > $i ).
tff(decl_44,type,
a_nonce: $i > $o ).
tff(decl_45,type,
intruder_message: $i > $o ).
tff(decl_46,type,
intruder_holds: $i > $o ).
cnf(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_11,axiom,
( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_11) ).
cnf(a_sent_message_i_to_b_3,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b_3) ).
cnf(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9) ).
cnf(b_accepts_secure_session_key_12,axiom,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X3))
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key_12) ).
cnf(intruder_message_sent_31,axiom,
( message(sent(X1,X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_message_sent_31) ).
cnf(b_is_party_of_protocol_8,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol_8) ).
cnf(a_is_party_of_protocol_2,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol_2) ).
cnf(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10,axiom,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10) ).
cnf(intruder_composes_pairs_27,axiom,
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_pairs_27) ).
cnf(intruder_key_encrypts_33,axiom,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_key_encrypts_33) ).
cnf(intruder_holds_key_32,axiom,
( intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_holds_key_32) ).
cnf(intruder_can_record_17,axiom,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,X3,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_can_record_17) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_triples_21,axiom,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples_21) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_triples_22,axiom,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples_22) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_pairs_19,axiom,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_pairs_19) ).
cnf(co1_38,negated_conjecture,
( ~ b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co1_38) ).
cnf(c_0_16,axiom,
( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))) ),
b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_11 ).
cnf(c_0_17,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
a_sent_message_i_to_b_3 ).
cnf(c_0_18,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9 ).
cnf(c_0_19,axiom,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X3))
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))) ),
b_accepts_secure_session_key_12 ).
cnf(c_0_20,plain,
b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_16,c_0_17]),c_0_18])]) ).
cnf(c_0_21,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_19,c_0_20]) ).
cnf(c_0_22,axiom,
( message(sent(X1,X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
intruder_message_sent_31 ).
cnf(c_0_23,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
b_is_party_of_protocol_8 ).
cnf(c_0_24,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
a_is_party_of_protocol_2 ).
cnf(c_0_25,axiom,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))) ),
b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10 ).
cnf(c_0_26,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_21,c_0_22]),c_0_23]),c_0_24])]) ).
cnf(c_0_27,axiom,
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
intruder_composes_pairs_27 ).
cnf(c_0_28,axiom,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
intruder_key_encrypts_33 ).
cnf(c_0_29,axiom,
( intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
intruder_holds_key_32 ).
cnf(c_0_30,axiom,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,X3,X1)) ),
intruder_can_record_17 ).
cnf(c_0_31,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_25,c_0_17]),c_0_18])]) ).
cnf(c_0_32,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26,c_0_27]) ).
cnf(c_0_33,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_28,c_0_29]) ).
cnf(c_0_34,axiom,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)) ),
intruder_decomposes_triples_21 ).
cnf(c_0_35,plain,
intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_30,c_0_31]) ).
cnf(c_0_36,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_32,c_0_33]) ).
cnf(c_0_37,plain,
intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_34,c_0_35]) ).
cnf(c_0_38,axiom,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)) ),
intruder_decomposes_triples_22 ).
cnf(c_0_39,axiom,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)) ),
intruder_decomposes_pairs_19 ).
cnf(c_0_40,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_30,c_0_17]) ).
cnf(c_0_41,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_36,c_0_37])]) ).
cnf(c_0_42,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_38,c_0_35]) ).
cnf(c_0_43,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39,c_0_40]) ).
cnf(c_0_44,negated_conjecture,
( ~ b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
co1_38 ).
cnf(c_0_45,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_41,c_0_42]),c_0_43])]) ).
cnf(c_0_46,negated_conjecture,
( ~ intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_45]) ).
cnf(c_0_47,negated_conjecture,
~ party_of_protocol(X1),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_29]),c_0_43]),c_0_23])]) ).
cnf(c_0_48,plain,
$false,
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[c_0_24,c_0_47]),
[proof] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.07/0.12 % Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.13/0.13 % Command : java -jar /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/mcs_scs.jar %d %s
% 0.13/0.35 % Computer : n020.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.35 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.35 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.35 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.35 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.35 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.35 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.13/0.35 % DateTime : Tue Aug 29 08:42:58 EDT 2023
% 0.13/0.35 % CPUTime :
% 0.20/0.57 start to proof: theBenchmark
% 0.20/0.59 % Version : CSE_E---1.5
% 0.20/0.59 % Problem : theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.59 % Proof found
% 0.20/0.59 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.59 % SZS output start Proof
% See solution above
% 0.20/0.59 % Total time : 0.009000 s
% 0.20/0.59 % SZS output end Proof
% 0.20/0.59 % Total time : 0.013000 s
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------