TSTP Solution File: SWV014+1 by Zipperpin---2.1.9999
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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Zipperpin---2.1.9999
% Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : NO INFORMATION
% Format : NO INFORMATION
% Command : python3 /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/portfolio.lams.parallel.py %s %d /export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/tmp.sPdyZH8Jwt true
% Computer : n019.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Fri Sep 1 00:07:13 EDT 2023
% Result : Theorem 0.22s 0.77s
% Output : Refutation 0.22s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 16
% Number of leaves : 34
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 82 ( 23 unt; 19 typ; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 145 ( 0 equ; 0 cnn)
% Maximal formula atoms : 5 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 667 ( 74 ~; 59 |; 14 &; 511 @)
% ( 0 <=>; 9 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 16 ( 8 avg)
% Number of types : 2 ( 0 usr)
% Number of type conns : 21 ( 21 >; 0 *; 0 +; 0 <<)
% Number of symbols : 20 ( 19 usr; 6 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 84 ( 0 ^; 82 !; 2 ?; 84 :)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
thf(party_of_protocol_type,type,
party_of_protocol: $i > $o ).
thf(sent_type,type,
sent: $i > $i > $i > $i ).
thf(pair_type,type,
pair: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(encrypt_type,type,
encrypt: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(intruder_holds_type,type,
intruder_holds: $i > $o ).
thf(generate_expiration_time_type,type,
generate_expiration_time: $i > $i ).
thf(intruder_message_type,type,
intruder_message: $i > $o ).
thf(a_type,type,
a: $i ).
thf(message_type,type,
message: $i > $o ).
thf(key_type,type,
key: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(b_holds_type,type,
b_holds: $i > $o ).
thf(triple_type,type,
triple: $i > $i > $i > $i ).
thf(bt_type,type,
bt: $i ).
thf(fresh_to_b_type,type,
fresh_to_b: $i > $o ).
thf(t_type,type,
t: $i ).
thf(generate_b_nonce_type,type,
generate_b_nonce: $i > $i ).
thf(b_stored_type,type,
b_stored: $i > $o ).
thf(b_type,type,
b: $i ).
thf(an_a_nonce_type,type,
an_a_nonce: $i ).
thf(a_sent_message_i_to_b,axiom,
message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ a @ an_a_nonce ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl2,plain,
message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ a @ an_a_nonce ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b]) ).
thf(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b,axiom,
fresh_to_b @ an_a_nonce ).
thf(zip_derived_cl8,plain,
fresh_to_b @ an_a_nonce,
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b]) ).
thf(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ U @ b @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) )
& ( fresh_to_b @ V ) )
=> ( ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ V ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ U @ V @ ( generate_expiration_time @ V ) ) @ bt ) ) ) )
& ( b_stored @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl9,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ X0 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ X1 @ X0 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ X0 ) ) @ bt ) ) ) )
| ~ ( fresh_to_b @ X0 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ X1 @ b @ ( pair @ X1 @ X0 ) ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl41,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ X0 @ b @ ( pair @ X0 @ an_a_nonce ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ X0 @ an_a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ) ) ) ) ),
inference('dp-resolution',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl8,zip_derived_cl9]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl70,plain,
message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ an_a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ) ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl2,zip_derived_cl41]) ).
thf(intruder_can_record,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( message @ ( sent @ U @ V @ W ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ W ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl16,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ X1 @ X2 @ X0 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[intruder_can_record]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl72,plain,
intruder_message @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ an_a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl70,zip_derived_cl16]) ).
thf(intruder_decomposes_triples,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ U @ V @ W ) )
=> ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V )
& ( intruder_message @ W ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl21,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ X1 @ X2 @ X0 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[intruder_decomposes_triples]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl77,plain,
intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ an_a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl72,zip_derived_cl21]) ).
thf(intruder_holds_key,axiom,
! [V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ V )
& ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
=> ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl31,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ X1 )
| ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ X0 @ X1 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[intruder_holds_key]) ).
thf(intruder_key_encrypts,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) )
& ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ U @ V ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl32,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ X0 @ X1 ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ X1 @ X2 ) )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ X2 ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[intruder_key_encrypts]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl47,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ X0 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X2 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ X0 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X1 )
| ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ X1 @ X2 ) ) ),
inference('dp-resolution',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl31,zip_derived_cl32]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl62,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ X1 @ X2 ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X1 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X2 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ X0 ) ),
inference(simplify,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl47]) ).
thf(intruder_composes_pairs,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl26,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X1 )
| ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ X0 @ X1 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[intruder_composes_pairs]) ).
thf(intruder_message_sent,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( party_of_protocol @ V )
& ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
=> ( message @ ( sent @ V @ W @ U ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl30,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ X0 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X1 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ X2 )
| ( message @ ( sent @ X0 @ X2 @ X1 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[intruder_message_sent]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl31_001,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ X1 )
| ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ X0 @ X1 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[intruder_holds_key]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl8_002,plain,
fresh_to_b @ an_a_nonce,
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl10,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( b_stored @ ( pair @ X0 @ X1 ) )
| ~ ( fresh_to_b @ X1 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ X0 @ b @ ( pair @ X0 @ X1 ) ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time]) ).
thf(b_accepts_secure_session_key,axiom,
! [V: $i,X: $i,Y: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ X @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ X @ V @ ( generate_expiration_time @ Y ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ Y ) @ V ) ) ) )
& ( b_stored @ ( pair @ X @ Y ) ) )
=> ( b_holds @ ( key @ V @ X ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl11,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ( b_holds @ ( key @ X0 @ X1 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ X1 @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ X1 @ X0 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ X2 ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ X2 ) @ X0 ) ) ) )
| ~ ( b_stored @ ( pair @ X1 @ X2 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[b_accepts_secure_session_key]) ).
thf(co1,conjecture,
? [U: $i] :
( ( b_holds @ ( key @ U @ a ) )
& ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ U @ b ) ) ) ).
thf(zf_stmt_0,negated_conjecture,
~ ? [U: $i] :
( ( b_holds @ ( key @ U @ a ) )
& ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ U @ b ) ) ),
inference('cnf.neg',[status(esa)],[co1]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl37,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ ( b_holds @ ( key @ X0 @ a ) )
| ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ X0 @ b ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[zf_stmt_0]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl39,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( b_stored @ ( pair @ a @ X1 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ X0 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ X1 ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ X1 ) @ X0 ) ) ) )
| ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ X0 @ b ) ) ),
inference('dp-resolution',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl11,zip_derived_cl37]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl40,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ a @ X1 ) ) )
| ~ ( fresh_to_b @ X1 )
| ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ X0 @ b ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ X0 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ X1 ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ X1 ) @ X0 ) ) ) ) ),
inference('dp-resolution',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl10,zip_derived_cl39]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl42,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ X0 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce ) @ X0 ) ) ) )
| ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ X0 @ b ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ a @ an_a_nonce ) ) ) ),
inference('dp-resolution',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl8,zip_derived_cl40]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl48,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ b )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ a @ an_a_nonce ) ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ X0 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce ) @ X0 ) ) ) ) ),
inference('dp-resolution',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl31,zip_derived_cl42]) ).
thf(b_is_party_of_protocol,axiom,
party_of_protocol @ b ).
thf(zip_derived_cl7,plain,
party_of_protocol @ b,
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[b_is_party_of_protocol]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl2_003,plain,
message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ a @ an_a_nonce ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl54,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ X0 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce ) @ X0 ) ) ) ) ),
inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl48,zip_derived_cl7,zip_derived_cl2]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl59,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ b )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ X0 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce ) @ X0 ) ) )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ a )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X0 ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl30,zip_derived_cl54]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl7_004,plain,
party_of_protocol @ b,
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[b_is_party_of_protocol]) ).
thf(a_is_party_of_protocol,axiom,
party_of_protocol @ a ).
thf(zip_derived_cl1,plain,
party_of_protocol @ a,
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[a_is_party_of_protocol]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl60,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ X0 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce ) @ X0 ) ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X0 ) ),
inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl59,zip_derived_cl7,zip_derived_cl1]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl61,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce ) @ X0 ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ X0 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X0 ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl26,zip_derived_cl60]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl63,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ X1 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ X0 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X0 ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl62,zip_derived_cl61]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl64,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ X0 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ X1 ) ),
inference(simplify,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl63]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl72_005,plain,
intruder_message @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ an_a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl70,zip_derived_cl16]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl20,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ X1 @ X0 @ X2 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[intruder_decomposes_triples]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl76,plain,
intruder_message @ ( generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl72,zip_derived_cl20]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl78,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ a @ X0 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce ) ) @ bt ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ X1 ) ),
inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl64,zip_derived_cl76]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl84,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ an_a_nonce )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ X0 ) ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl77,zip_derived_cl78]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl2_006,plain,
message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ a @ an_a_nonce ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl16_007,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ X1 @ X2 @ X0 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[intruder_can_record]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl49,plain,
intruder_message @ ( pair @ a @ an_a_nonce ),
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl2,zip_derived_cl16]) ).
thf(intruder_decomposes_pairs,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ U @ V ) )
=> ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V ) ) ) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl18,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ X0 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ X1 @ X0 ) ) ),
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[intruder_decomposes_pairs]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl51,plain,
intruder_message @ an_a_nonce,
inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl49,zip_derived_cl18]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl85,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
~ ( party_of_protocol @ X0 ),
inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl84,zip_derived_cl51]) ).
thf(t_is_party_of_protocol,axiom,
party_of_protocol @ t ).
thf(zip_derived_cl14,plain,
party_of_protocol @ t,
inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[t_is_party_of_protocol]) ).
thf(zip_derived_cl86,plain,
$false,
inference('s_sup+',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl85,zip_derived_cl14]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.12 % Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.13 % Command : python3 /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/portfolio.lams.parallel.py %s %d /export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/tmp.sPdyZH8Jwt true
% 0.14/0.34 % Computer : n019.cluster.edu
% 0.14/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.14/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.14/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.14/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.14/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.14/0.34 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.14/0.35 % DateTime : Tue Aug 29 06:32:28 EDT 2023
% 0.14/0.35 % CPUTime :
% 0.14/0.35 % Running portfolio for 300 s
% 0.14/0.35 % File : /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.14/0.35 % Number of cores: 8
% 0.14/0.35 % Python version: Python 3.6.8
% 0.14/0.35 % Running in FO mode
% 0.22/0.63 % Total configuration time : 435
% 0.22/0.63 % Estimated wc time : 1092
% 0.22/0.63 % Estimated cpu time (7 cpus) : 156.0
% 0.22/0.71 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/fo/fo6_bce.sh running for 75s
% 0.22/0.73 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/fo/fo3_bce.sh running for 75s
% 0.22/0.74 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/fo/fo1_av.sh running for 75s
% 0.22/0.75 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/fo/fo7.sh running for 63s
% 0.22/0.76 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/fo/fo13.sh running for 50s
% 0.22/0.76 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/fo/fo5.sh running for 50s
% 0.22/0.76 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/fo/fo4.sh running for 50s
% 0.22/0.76 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/fo/fo1_lcnf.sh running for 50s
% 0.22/0.77 % Solved by fo/fo6_bce.sh.
% 0.22/0.77 % BCE start: 38
% 0.22/0.77 % BCE eliminated: 4
% 0.22/0.77 % PE start: 34
% 0.22/0.77 logic: neq
% 0.22/0.77 % PE eliminated: 7
% 0.22/0.77 % done 38 iterations in 0.026s
% 0.22/0.77 % SZS status Theorem for '/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p'
% 0.22/0.77 % SZS output start Refutation
% See solution above
% 0.22/0.78
% 0.22/0.78
% 0.22/0.78 % Terminating...
% 1.07/0.84 % Runner terminated.
% 1.07/0.85 % Zipperpin 1.5 exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------