TSTP Solution File: SWV014+1 by Vampire-SAT---4.8
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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Vampire-SAT---4.8
% Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : vampire --mode casc_sat -m 16384 --cores 7 -t %d %s
% Computer : n026.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Sun May 5 10:41:06 EDT 2024
% Result : Theorem 0.22s 0.39s
% Output : Refutation 0.22s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 17
% Number of leaves : 17
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 83 ( 20 unt; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 210 ( 0 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 5 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 230 ( 103 ~; 93 |; 21 &)
% ( 2 <=>; 11 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 9 ( 5 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 10 ( 9 usr; 3 prp; 0-1 aty)
% Number of functors : 12 ( 12 usr; 5 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 122 ( 120 !; 2 ?)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f190,plain,
$false,
inference(avatar_sat_refutation,[],[f117,f123,f189]) ).
fof(f189,plain,
~ spl0_1,
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f188]) ).
fof(f188,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl0_1 ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f186,f99]) ).
fof(f99,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(resolution,[],[f98,f77]) ).
fof(f77,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f36]) ).
fof(f36,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) )
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f16]) ).
fof(f16,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
=> ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_pairs) ).
fof(f98,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(resolution,[],[f82,f72]) ).
fof(f72,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f3]) ).
fof(f3,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b) ).
fof(f82,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,X1,X2))
| intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f43]) ).
fof(f43,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(X2)
| ~ message(sent(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f15]) ).
fof(f15,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( message(sent(X0,X1,X2))
=> intruder_message(X2) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_can_record) ).
fof(f186,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ spl0_1 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f185,f156]) ).
fof(f156,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
inference(resolution,[],[f150,f85]) ).
fof(f85,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))
| intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f44]) ).
fof(f44,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) )
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f17]) ).
fof(f17,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))
=> ( intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples) ).
fof(f150,plain,
intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
inference(resolution,[],[f146,f82]) ).
fof(f146,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
inference(resolution,[],[f133,f72]) ).
fof(f133,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,an_a_nonce)))
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f80,f63]) ).
fof(f63,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f8]) ).
fof(f8,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b) ).
fof(f80,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f42]) ).
fof(f42,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) )
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f41]) ).
fof(f41,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) )
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f9]) ).
fof(f9,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( fresh_to_b(X1)
& message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) )
=> ( b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time) ).
fof(f185,plain,
( ! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X0) )
| ~ spl0_1 ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f184,f102]) ).
fof(f102,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f101,f67]) ).
fof(f67,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f7]) ).
fof(f7,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(f101,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f78,f62]) ).
fof(f62,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f35]) ).
fof(f35,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f30]) ).
fof(f30,negated_conjecture,
~ ? [X0] :
( b_holds(key(X0,a))
& intruder_holds(key(X0,b)) ),
inference(negated_conjecture,[],[f29]) ).
fof(f29,conjecture,
? [X0] :
( b_holds(key(X0,a))
& intruder_holds(key(X0,b)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co1) ).
fof(f78,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f38]) ).
fof(f38,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f37]) ).
fof(f37,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f31]) ).
fof(f31,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) )
=> intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f24]) ).
fof(f24,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X2)
& intruder_message(X1) )
=> intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_holds_key) ).
fof(f184,plain,
( ! [X0] :
( b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X0) )
| ~ spl0_1 ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f183,f157]) ).
fof(f157,plain,
intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
inference(resolution,[],[f150,f84]) ).
fof(f84,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f44]) ).
fof(f183,plain,
( ! [X0] :
( b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)) )
| ~ spl0_1 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f145,f113]) ).
fof(f113,plain,
( ! [X2,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) )
| ~ spl0_1 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f112]) ).
fof(f112,plain,
( spl0_1
<=> ! [X2,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ) ),
introduced(avatar_definition,[new_symbols(naming,[spl0_1])]) ).
fof(f145,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0))
| b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f142,f79]) ).
fof(f79,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f40]) ).
fof(f40,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f39]) ).
fof(f39,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f19]) ).
fof(f19,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) )
=> intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_pairs) ).
fof(f142,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))
| b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f141,f66]) ).
fof(f66,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f2]) ).
fof(f2,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(f141,plain,
! [X0] :
( b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ party_of_protocol(a)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0))) ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f140,f67]) ).
fof(f140,plain,
! [X0] :
( b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ party_of_protocol(a)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0))) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f134,f86]) ).
fof(f86,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( message(sent(X1,X2,X0))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f46]) ).
fof(f46,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( message(sent(X1,X2,X0))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f45]) ).
fof(f45,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( message(sent(X1,X2,X0))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f23]) ).
fof(f23,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X2)
& party_of_protocol(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) )
=> message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_message_sent) ).
fof(f134,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0))))
| b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f90,f130]) ).
fof(f130,plain,
b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(resolution,[],[f125,f72]) ).
fof(f125,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,an_a_nonce)))
| b_stored(pair(X0,an_a_nonce)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f81,f63]) ).
fof(f81,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f42]) ).
fof(f90,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| b_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f54]) ).
fof(f54,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( b_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f53]) ).
fof(f53,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( b_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f32]) ).
fof(f32,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
& message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) )
=> b_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f10]) ).
fof(f10,axiom,
! [X1,X3,X4] :
( ( b_stored(pair(X3,X4))
& message(sent(X3,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X3,X1,generate_expiration_time(X4)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X4),X1)))) )
=> b_holds(key(X1,X3)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key) ).
fof(f123,plain,
~ spl0_2,
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f118]) ).
fof(f118,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl0_2 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f116,f65]) ).
fof(f65,plain,
party_of_protocol(t),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f13]) ).
fof(f13,axiom,
party_of_protocol(t),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',t_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(f116,plain,
( ! [X0] : ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ spl0_2 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f115]) ).
fof(f115,plain,
( spl0_2
<=> ! [X0] : ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
introduced(avatar_definition,[new_symbols(naming,[spl0_2])]) ).
fof(f117,plain,
( spl0_1
| spl0_2 ),
inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f110,f115,f112]) ).
fof(f110,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(duplicate_literal_removal,[],[f109]) ).
fof(f109,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f88,f78]) ).
fof(f88,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f50]) ).
fof(f50,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f49]) ).
fof(f49,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f25]) ).
fof(f25,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X2)
& intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
& intruder_message(X0) )
=> intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_key_encrypts) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.08/0.13 % Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.08/0.15 % Command : vampire --mode casc_sat -m 16384 --cores 7 -t %d %s
% 0.15/0.36 % Computer : n026.cluster.edu
% 0.15/0.36 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.15/0.36 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.15/0.36 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.15/0.36 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.15/0.36 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.15/0.36 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.15/0.36 % DateTime : Fri May 3 21:05:53 EDT 2024
% 0.15/0.36 % CPUTime :
% 0.15/0.37 % (6858)Running in auto input_syntax mode. Trying TPTP
% 0.22/0.38 % (6862)fmb+10_1_bce=on:fmbas=expand:fmbksg=on:fmbsr=1.3:gsp=on:nm=4_470 on theBenchmark for (470ds/0Mi)
% 0.22/0.38 % (6860)fmb+10_1_bce=on:fmbas=expand:fmbksg=on:fmbsr=1.3_569 on theBenchmark for (569ds/0Mi)
% 0.22/0.38 % (6861)dis-2_2:3_amm=sco:anc=none:bce=on:fsr=off:gsp=on:nm=16:nwc=1.2:nicw=on:sac=on:sp=weighted_frequency_476 on theBenchmark for (476ds/0Mi)
% 0.22/0.38 % (6863)dis+1_20_av=off:lcm=predicate:nm=2:nwc=2.0_396 on theBenchmark for (396ds/0Mi)
% 0.22/0.38 % (6864)dis+11_4:5_nm=4_216 on theBenchmark for (216ds/0Mi)
% 0.22/0.38 % (6859)fmb+10_1_fmbas=off:fmbsr=1.3:nm=2_1451 on theBenchmark for (1451ds/0Mi)
% 0.22/0.38 % (6865)fmb+10_1_fmbas=off:fmbsr=1.3:nm=2:si=on:rtra=on:rawr=on:rp=on:fmbksg=on_1451 on theBenchmark for (1451ds/0Mi)
% 0.22/0.39 % (6864)First to succeed.
% 0.22/0.39 TRYING [1]
% 0.22/0.39 TRYING [1]
% 0.22/0.39 TRYING [1]
% 0.22/0.39 TRYING [1]
% 0.22/0.39 TRYING [2]
% 0.22/0.39 % (6864)Solution written to "/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/vampire-proof-6858"
% 0.22/0.39 TRYING [2]
% 0.22/0.39 TRYING [2]
% 0.22/0.39 TRYING [2]
% 0.22/0.39 % (6864)Refutation found. Thanks to Tanya!
% 0.22/0.39 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark
% 0.22/0.39 % SZS output start Proof for theBenchmark
% See solution above
% 0.22/0.39 % (6864)------------------------------
% 0.22/0.39 % (6864)Version: Vampire 4.8 (commit 3a798227e on 2024-05-03 07:42:47 +0200)
% 0.22/0.39 % (6864)Termination reason: Refutation
% 0.22/0.39
% 0.22/0.39 % (6864)Memory used [KB]: 868
% 0.22/0.39 % (6864)Time elapsed: 0.008 s
% 0.22/0.39 % (6864)Instructions burned: 9 (million)
% 0.22/0.39 % (6858)Success in time 0.024 s
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------