TSTP Solution File: SWV014+1 by SnakeForV-SAT---1.0
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- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : SnakeForV-SAT---1.0
% Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : vampire --input_syntax tptp --proof tptp --output_axiom_names on --mode portfolio --schedule snake_tptp_sat --cores 0 -t %d %s
% Computer : n007.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Wed Aug 31 18:55:14 EDT 2022
% Result : Theorem 0.21s 0.52s
% Output : Refutation 0.21s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 14
% Number of leaves : 19
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 104 ( 18 unt; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 273 ( 0 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 5 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 291 ( 122 ~; 111 |; 35 &)
% ( 5 <=>; 18 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 9 ( 5 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 13 ( 12 usr; 5 prp; 0-1 aty)
% Number of functors : 12 ( 12 usr; 5 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 152 ( 150 !; 2 ?)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f294,plain,
$false,
inference(avatar_sat_refutation,[],[f137,f149,f269,f288,f293]) ).
fof(f293,plain,
~ spl2_12,
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f292]) ).
fof(f292,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl2_12 ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f291,f125]) ).
fof(f125,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(resolution,[],[f124,f118]) ).
fof(f118,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f83]) ).
fof(f83,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) )
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f71]) ).
fof(f71,plain,
! [X1,X0] :
( ( intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X1) )
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f36]) ).
fof(f36,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X0))
=> ( intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X1) ) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f16]) ).
fof(f16,axiom,
! [X1,X0] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
=> ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_pairs) ).
fof(f124,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(resolution,[],[f116,f105]) ).
fof(f105,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X2,X1,X0))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f78]) ).
fof(f78,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(X0)
| ~ message(sent(X2,X1,X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f53]) ).
fof(f53,plain,
! [X1,X2,X0] :
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,X2,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f31]) ).
fof(f31,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( message(sent(X0,X2,X1))
=> intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f15]) ).
fof(f15,axiom,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( message(sent(X0,X1,X2))
=> intruder_message(X2) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_can_record) ).
fof(f116,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f3]) ).
fof(f3,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b) ).
fof(f291,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ spl2_12 ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f290,f87]) ).
fof(f87,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f7]) ).
fof(f7,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(f290,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ spl2_12 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f289,f111]) ).
fof(f111,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f64]) ).
fof(f64,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f63]) ).
fof(f63,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f34]) ).
fof(f34,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( intruder_message(X1)
& party_of_protocol(X0) )
=> intruder_holds(key(X1,X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f24]) ).
fof(f24,axiom,
! [X2,X1] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X2)
& intruder_message(X1) )
=> intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_holds_key) ).
fof(f289,plain,
( ~ intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))
| ~ spl2_12 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f264,f104]) ).
fof(f104,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f65]) ).
fof(f65,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f30]) ).
fof(f30,negated_conjecture,
~ ? [X0] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
& b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(negated_conjecture,[],[f29]) ).
fof(f29,conjecture,
? [X0] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
& b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co1) ).
fof(f264,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ spl2_12 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f262]) ).
fof(f262,plain,
( spl2_12
<=> b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
introduced(avatar_definition,[new_symbols(naming,[spl2_12])]) ).
fof(f288,plain,
( ~ spl2_1
| spl2_13 ),
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f287]) ).
fof(f287,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl2_1
| spl2_13 ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f286,f125]) ).
fof(f286,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ spl2_1
| spl2_13 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f285,f133]) ).
fof(f133,plain,
( ! [X0] :
( ~ sP0(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) )
| ~ spl2_1 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f132]) ).
fof(f132,plain,
( spl2_1
<=> ! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ sP0(X0) ) ),
introduced(avatar_definition,[new_symbols(naming,[spl2_1])]) ).
fof(f285,plain,
( sP0(an_a_nonce)
| spl2_13 ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f284,f203]) ).
fof(f203,plain,
intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
inference(resolution,[],[f201,f100]) ).
fof(f100,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X0))
| intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f77]) ).
fof(f77,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X0))
| ( intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X1) ) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f58]) ).
fof(f58,plain,
! [X2,X1,X0] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X0,X2))
| ( intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X1) ) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f33]) ).
fof(f33,plain,
! [X1,X2,X0] :
( intruder_message(triple(X1,X0,X2))
=> ( intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X1) ) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f17]) ).
fof(f17,axiom,
! [X1,X0,X2] :
( intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))
=> ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X2) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples) ).
fof(f201,plain,
intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
inference(resolution,[],[f199,f105]) ).
fof(f199,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f196,f106]) ).
fof(f106,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f8]) ).
fof(f8,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b) ).
fof(f196,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f96,f116]) ).
fof(f96,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f76]) ).
fof(f76,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ( b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f62]) ).
fof(f62,plain,
! [X1,X0] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0)
| ( b_stored(pair(X1,X0))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))) ) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f61]) ).
fof(f61,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( b_stored(pair(X1,X0))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))) )
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f39]) ).
fof(f39,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
& fresh_to_b(X0) )
=> ( b_stored(pair(X1,X0))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))) ) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f9]) ).
fof(f9,axiom,
! [X1,X0] :
( ( message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
& fresh_to_b(X1) )
=> ( b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time) ).
fof(f284,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))
| sP0(an_a_nonce)
| spl2_13 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f268,f120]) ).
fof(f120,plain,
! [X2,X0] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| sP0(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f120_D]) ).
fof(f120_D,plain,
! [X0] :
( ! [X2] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X2) )
<=> ~ sP0(X0) ),
introduced(general_splitting_component_introduction,[new_symbols(naming,[sP0])]) ).
fof(f268,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| spl2_13 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f266]) ).
fof(f266,plain,
( spl2_13
<=> intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)) ),
introduced(avatar_definition,[new_symbols(naming,[spl2_13])]) ).
fof(f269,plain,
( spl2_12
| ~ spl2_13 ),
inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f260,f266,f262]) ).
fof(f260,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f259,f94]) ).
fof(f94,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f2]) ).
fof(f2,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(f259,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| ~ party_of_protocol(a)
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f245,f191]) ).
fof(f191,plain,
b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f188,f106]) ).
fof(f188,plain,
( b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))
| ~ fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f97,f116]) ).
fof(f97,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f76]) ).
fof(f245,plain,
( ~ b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ party_of_protocol(a)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f244,f202]) ).
fof(f202,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
inference(resolution,[],[f201,f101]) ).
fof(f101,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X0))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f77]) ).
fof(f244,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X2,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X2))
| b_holds(key(X2,X0))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f243,f93]) ).
fof(f93,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f69]) ).
fof(f69,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f68]) ).
fof(f68,plain,
! [X1,X0] :
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f37]) ).
fof(f37,plain,
! [X1,X0] :
( ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) )
=> intruder_message(pair(X1,X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f19]) ).
fof(f19,axiom,
! [X1,X0] :
( ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) )
=> intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_pairs) ).
fof(f243,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| b_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f242,f87]) ).
fof(f242,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| b_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f113,f103]) ).
fof(f103,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( message(sent(X1,X0,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f50]) ).
fof(f50,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| message(sent(X1,X0,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f49]) ).
fof(f49,plain,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( message(sent(X1,X0,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f32]) ).
fof(f32,plain,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X1)
& party_of_protocol(X0)
& intruder_message(X2) )
=> message(sent(X1,X0,X2)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f23]) ).
fof(f23,axiom,
! [X2,X1,X0] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X2)
& intruder_message(X0)
& party_of_protocol(X1) )
=> message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_message_sent) ).
fof(f113,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X0))))
| b_holds(key(X0,X2))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f80]) ).
fof(f80,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( b_holds(key(X0,X2))
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X0))))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f55]) ).
fof(f55,plain,
! [X2,X1,X0] :
( b_holds(key(X2,X0))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X2,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X2))))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f54]) ).
fof(f54,plain,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( b_holds(key(X2,X0))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X2,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X2)))) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f42]) ).
fof(f42,plain,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( ( b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
& message(sent(X0,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X2,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X2)))) )
=> b_holds(key(X2,X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f10]) ).
fof(f10,axiom,
! [X3,X4,X1] :
( ( b_stored(pair(X3,X4))
& message(sent(X3,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X3,X1,generate_expiration_time(X4)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X4),X1)))) )
=> b_holds(key(X1,X3)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key) ).
fof(f149,plain,
~ spl2_2,
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f146]) ).
fof(f146,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl2_2 ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f94,f136]) ).
fof(f136,plain,
( ! [X1] : ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ spl2_2 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f135]) ).
fof(f135,plain,
( spl2_2
<=> ! [X1] : ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
introduced(avatar_definition,[new_symbols(naming,[spl2_2])]) ).
fof(f137,plain,
( spl2_1
| spl2_2 ),
inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f130,f135,f132]) ).
fof(f130,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ sP0(X0) ),
inference(duplicate_literal_removal,[],[f129]) ).
fof(f129,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ sP0(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f121,f111]) ).
fof(f121,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ sP0(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(general_splitting,[],[f112,f120_D]) ).
fof(f112,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X0))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f48]) ).
fof(f48,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X0))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f47]) ).
fof(f47,plain,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X0))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f35]) ).
fof(f35,plain,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( ( intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
& intruder_message(X2)
& party_of_protocol(X1) )
=> intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f25]) ).
fof(f25,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X0] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X2)
& intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) )
=> intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_key_encrypts) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.07/0.13 % Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.07/0.14 % Command : vampire --input_syntax tptp --proof tptp --output_axiom_names on --mode portfolio --schedule snake_tptp_sat --cores 0 -t %d %s
% 0.13/0.35 % Computer : n007.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.35 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.35 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.35 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.35 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.35 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.35 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.13/0.35 % DateTime : Tue Aug 30 18:41:01 EDT 2022
% 0.13/0.35 % CPUTime :
% 0.21/0.50 % (26662)ott-1_1:6_av=off:cond=on:fsr=off:nwc=3.0:i=51:si=on:rawr=on:rtra=on_0 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/51Mi)
% 0.21/0.50 % (26669)dis+34_1:32_abs=on:add=off:bsr=on:gsp=on:sp=weighted_frequency:i=99:si=on:rawr=on:rtra=on_0 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/99Mi)
% 0.21/0.50 % (26669)First to succeed.
% 0.21/0.52 % (26669)Refutation found. Thanks to Tanya!
% 0.21/0.52 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark
% 0.21/0.52 % SZS output start Proof for theBenchmark
% See solution above
% 0.21/0.52 % (26669)------------------------------
% 0.21/0.52 % (26669)Version: Vampire 4.7 (commit 807e37dd9 on 2022-08-23 09:55:27 +0200)
% 0.21/0.52 % (26669)Linked with Z3 4.8.13.0 f03d756e086f81f2596157241e0decfb1c982299 z3-4.8.4-5390-gf03d756e0
% 0.21/0.52 % (26669)Termination reason: Refutation
% 0.21/0.52
% 0.21/0.52 % (26669)Memory used [KB]: 5628
% 0.21/0.52 % (26669)Time elapsed: 0.097 s
% 0.21/0.52 % (26669)Instructions burned: 7 (million)
% 0.21/0.52 % (26669)------------------------------
% 0.21/0.52 % (26669)------------------------------
% 0.21/0.52 % (26652)Success in time 0.154 s
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------