TSTP Solution File: SWV014+1 by SnakeForV---1.0
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- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : SnakeForV---1.0
% Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : vampire --input_syntax tptp --proof tptp --output_axiom_names on --mode portfolio --schedule snake_tptp_uns --cores 0 -t %d %s
% Computer : n015.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Wed Aug 31 18:43:50 EDT 2022
% Result : Theorem 0.19s 0.52s
% Output : Refutation 0.19s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 14
% Number of leaves : 18
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 93 ( 14 unt; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 258 ( 0 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 290 ( 125 ~; 117 |; 28 &)
% ( 4 <=>; 16 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 9 ( 5 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 12 ( 11 usr; 5 prp; 0-1 aty)
% Number of functors : 12 ( 12 usr; 5 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 144 ( 142 !; 2 ?)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f239,plain,
$false,
inference(avatar_sat_refutation,[],[f127,f133,f220,f224,f238]) ).
fof(f238,plain,
~ spl0_9,
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f237]) ).
fof(f237,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl0_9 ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f236,f137]) ).
fof(f137,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(resolution,[],[f135,f92]) ).
fof(f92,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X0))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f65]) ).
fof(f65,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) )
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f42]) ).
fof(f42,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X0))
=> ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) ) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f16]) ).
fof(f16,axiom,
! [X1,X0] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
=> ( intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X1) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_pairs) ).
fof(f135,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(resolution,[],[f82,f96]) ).
fof(f96,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,X0,X2))
| intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f59]) ).
fof(f59,plain,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,X0,X2))
| intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f43]) ).
fof(f43,plain,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( message(sent(X1,X0,X2))
=> intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f15]) ).
fof(f15,axiom,
! [X1,X0,X2] :
( message(sent(X0,X1,X2))
=> intruder_message(X2) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_can_record) ).
fof(f82,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f3]) ).
fof(f3,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b) ).
fof(f236,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ spl0_9 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f215,f110]) ).
fof(f110,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f109,f74]) ).
fof(f74,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f7]) ).
fof(f7,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(f109,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f102,f75]) ).
fof(f75,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f48]) ).
fof(f48,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f30]) ).
fof(f30,negated_conjecture,
~ ? [X0] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
& b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(negated_conjecture,[],[f29]) ).
fof(f29,conjecture,
? [X0] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
& b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co1) ).
fof(f102,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f56]) ).
fof(f56,plain,
! [X1,X0] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f55]) ).
fof(f55,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f31]) ).
fof(f31,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( intruder_message(X0)
& party_of_protocol(X1) )
=> intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f24]) ).
fof(f24,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( intruder_message(X1)
& party_of_protocol(X2) )
=> intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_holds_key) ).
fof(f215,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ spl0_9 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f213]) ).
fof(f213,plain,
( spl0_9
<=> b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
introduced(avatar_definition,[new_symbols(naming,[spl0_9])]) ).
fof(f224,plain,
( ~ spl0_1
| spl0_10 ),
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f223]) ).
fof(f223,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl0_1
| spl0_10 ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f222,f137]) ).
fof(f222,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ spl0_1
| spl0_10 ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f221,f177]) ).
fof(f177,plain,
intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f175,f85]) ).
fof(f85,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f8]) ).
fof(f8,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b) ).
fof(f175,plain,
( intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))
| ~ fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f164,f82]) ).
fof(f164,plain,
! [X4,X5] :
( ~ message(sent(X4,b,pair(X4,X5)))
| intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X5))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X5) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f155,f89]) ).
fof(f89,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X0,X1))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f68]) ).
fof(f68,plain,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X0) )
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X0,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f41]) ).
fof(f41,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(triple(X2,X0,X1))
=> ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X0) ) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f17]) ).
fof(f17,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X0] :
( intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))
=> ( intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X1) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples) ).
fof(f155,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f79,f96]) ).
fof(f79,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f54]) ).
fof(f54,plain,
! [X1,X0] :
( ~ fresh_to_b(X0)
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ( b_stored(pair(X1,X0))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))) ) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f53]) ).
fof(f53,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( b_stored(pair(X1,X0))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))) )
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0)
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0))) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f33]) ).
fof(f33,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( fresh_to_b(X0)
& message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0))) )
=> ( b_stored(pair(X1,X0))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))) ) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f9]) ).
fof(f9,axiom,
! [X1,X0] :
( ( message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
& fresh_to_b(X1) )
=> ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
& b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time) ).
fof(f221,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))
| ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ spl0_1
| spl0_10 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f219,f117]) ).
fof(f117,plain,
( ! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) )
| ~ spl0_1 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f116]) ).
fof(f116,plain,
( spl0_1
<=> ! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ) ),
introduced(avatar_definition,[new_symbols(naming,[spl0_1])]) ).
fof(f219,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| spl0_10 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f217]) ).
fof(f217,plain,
( spl0_10
<=> intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)) ),
introduced(avatar_definition,[new_symbols(naming,[spl0_10])]) ).
fof(f220,plain,
( spl0_9
| ~ spl0_10 ),
inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f211,f217,f213]) ).
fof(f211,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f210,f85]) ).
fof(f210,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| ~ fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f207,f86]) ).
fof(f86,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f2]) ).
fof(f2,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(f207,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ party_of_protocol(a)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| ~ fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f193,f82]) ).
fof(f193,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),X0))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| b_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f191,f80]) ).
fof(f80,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0)
| b_stored(pair(X1,X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f54]) ).
fof(f191,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X0))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0)
| b_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),X0)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f173,f162]) ).
fof(f162,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f155,f91]) ).
fof(f91,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X0,X1))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f68]) ).
fof(f173,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X2,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
| b_holds(key(X2,X0))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f152,f94]) ).
fof(f94,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f70]) ).
fof(f70,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f69]) ).
fof(f69,plain,
! [X1,X0] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f19]) ).
fof(f19,axiom,
! [X1,X0] :
( ( intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X1) )
=> intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_pairs) ).
fof(f152,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X2,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X2)))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
| b_holds(key(X2,X0))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f151,f74]) ).
fof(f151,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X2,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X2)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| b_holds(key(X2,X0))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(b) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f77,f98]) ).
fof(f98,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( message(sent(X2,X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f47]) ).
fof(f47,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( message(sent(X2,X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f46]) ).
fof(f46,plain,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( message(sent(X2,X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f37]) ).
fof(f37,plain,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X0)
& intruder_message(X1)
& party_of_protocol(X2) )
=> message(sent(X2,X0,X1)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f23]) ).
fof(f23,axiom,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X2)
& intruder_message(X0)
& party_of_protocol(X1) )
=> message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_message_sent) ).
fof(f77,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1))))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X2))
| b_holds(key(X1,X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f63]) ).
fof(f63,plain,
! [X1,X0,X2] :
( b_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X2))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1)))) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f62]) ).
fof(f62,plain,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( b_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1))))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X2)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f34]) ).
fof(f34,plain,
! [X0,X2,X1] :
( ( message(sent(X0,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1))))
& b_stored(pair(X0,X2)) )
=> b_holds(key(X1,X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f10]) ).
fof(f10,axiom,
! [X3,X1,X4] :
( ( b_stored(pair(X3,X4))
& message(sent(X3,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X3,X1,generate_expiration_time(X4)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X4),X1)))) )
=> b_holds(key(X1,X3)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key) ).
fof(f133,plain,
( spl0_1
| spl0_2 ),
inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f132,f119,f116]) ).
fof(f119,plain,
( spl0_2
<=> ! [X2] : ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
introduced(avatar_definition,[new_symbols(naming,[spl0_2])]) ).
fof(f132,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
inference(duplicate_literal_removal,[],[f131]) ).
fof(f131,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f103,f102]) ).
fof(f103,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f61]) ).
fof(f61,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f60]) ).
fof(f60,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f25]) ).
fof(f25,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X2)
& intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) )
=> intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_key_encrypts) ).
fof(f127,plain,
~ spl0_2,
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f122]) ).
fof(f122,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl0_2 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f120,f74]) ).
fof(f120,plain,
( ! [X2] : ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ spl0_2 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f119]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.12/0.12 % Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.12/0.13 % Command : vampire --input_syntax tptp --proof tptp --output_axiom_names on --mode portfolio --schedule snake_tptp_uns --cores 0 -t %d %s
% 0.13/0.34 % Computer : n015.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % DateTime : Tue Aug 30 19:07:06 EDT 2022
% 0.13/0.35 % CPUTime :
% 0.19/0.50 % (7984)dis+1010_1:1_bs=on:ep=RS:erd=off:newcnf=on:nwc=10.0:s2a=on:sgt=32:ss=axioms:i=30:si=on:rawr=on:rtra=on_0 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/30Mi)
% 0.19/0.50 % (7977)lrs+10_1:32_br=off:nm=16:sd=2:ss=axioms:st=2.0:urr=on:i=51:si=on:rawr=on:rtra=on_0 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/51Mi)
% 0.19/0.51 % (7984)First to succeed.
% 0.19/0.51 % (7969)dis+21_1:1_av=off:sos=on:sp=frequency:ss=included:to=lpo:i=15:si=on:rawr=on:rtra=on_0 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/15Mi)
% 0.19/0.51 % (7992)dis+2_3:1_aac=none:abs=on:ep=R:lcm=reverse:nwc=10.0:sos=on:sp=const_frequency:spb=units:urr=ec_only:i=8:si=on:rawr=on:rtra=on_0 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/8Mi)
% 0.19/0.51 % (7986)dis+1010_2:3_fs=off:fsr=off:nm=0:nwc=5.0:s2a=on:s2agt=32:i=82:si=on:rawr=on:rtra=on_0 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/82Mi)
% 0.19/0.52 % (7974)lrs+10_1:1_ep=R:lcm=predicate:lma=on:sos=all:spb=goal:ss=included:i=12:si=on:rawr=on:rtra=on_0 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/12Mi)
% 0.19/0.52 % (7978)lrs+10_1:1_ins=3:sp=reverse_frequency:spb=goal:to=lpo:i=3:si=on:rawr=on:rtra=on_0 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/3Mi)
% 0.19/0.52 % (7974)Refutation not found, incomplete strategy% (7974)------------------------------
% 0.19/0.52 % (7974)Version: Vampire 4.7 (commit 807e37dd9 on 2022-08-23 09:55:27 +0200)
% 0.19/0.52 % (7974)Linked with Z3 4.8.13.0 f03d756e086f81f2596157241e0decfb1c982299 z3-4.8.4-5390-gf03d756e0
% 0.19/0.52 % (7974)Termination reason: Refutation not found, incomplete strategy
% 0.19/0.52
% 0.19/0.52 % (7974)Memory used [KB]: 6012
% 0.19/0.52 % (7974)Time elapsed: 0.104 s
% 0.19/0.52 % (7974)Instructions burned: 2 (million)
% 0.19/0.52 % (7974)------------------------------
% 0.19/0.52 % (7974)------------------------------
% 0.19/0.52 % (7978)Instruction limit reached!
% 0.19/0.52 % (7978)------------------------------
% 0.19/0.52 % (7978)Version: Vampire 4.7 (commit 807e37dd9 on 2022-08-23 09:55:27 +0200)
% 0.19/0.52 % (7978)Linked with Z3 4.8.13.0 f03d756e086f81f2596157241e0decfb1c982299 z3-4.8.4-5390-gf03d756e0
% 0.19/0.52 % (7978)Termination reason: Unknown
% 0.19/0.52 % (7978)Termination phase: Saturation
% 0.19/0.52
% 0.19/0.52 % (7978)Memory used [KB]: 6012
% 0.19/0.52 % (7978)Time elapsed: 0.078 s
% 0.19/0.52 % (7978)Instructions burned: 3 (million)
% 0.19/0.52 % (7978)------------------------------
% 0.19/0.52 % (7978)------------------------------
% 0.19/0.52 % (7993)lrs-11_1:1_nm=0:sac=on:sd=4:ss=axioms:st=3.0:i=24:si=on:rawr=on:rtra=on_0 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/24Mi)
% 0.19/0.52 % (7986)Also succeeded, but the first one will report.
% 0.19/0.52 % (7982)ott+1010_1:1_sd=2:sos=on:sp=occurrence:ss=axioms:urr=on:i=2:si=on:rawr=on:rtra=on_0 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/2Mi)
% 0.19/0.52 % (7973)lrs+10_1:1_br=off:sos=on:ss=axioms:st=2.0:urr=on:i=33:si=on:rawr=on:rtra=on_0 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/33Mi)
% 0.19/0.52 % (7984)Refutation found. Thanks to Tanya!
% 0.19/0.52 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark
% 0.19/0.52 % SZS output start Proof for theBenchmark
% See solution above
% 0.19/0.52 % (7984)------------------------------
% 0.19/0.52 % (7984)Version: Vampire 4.7 (commit 807e37dd9 on 2022-08-23 09:55:27 +0200)
% 0.19/0.52 % (7984)Linked with Z3 4.8.13.0 f03d756e086f81f2596157241e0decfb1c982299 z3-4.8.4-5390-gf03d756e0
% 0.19/0.52 % (7984)Termination reason: Refutation
% 0.19/0.52
% 0.19/0.52 % (7984)Memory used [KB]: 6140
% 0.19/0.52 % (7984)Time elapsed: 0.100 s
% 0.19/0.52 % (7984)Instructions burned: 7 (million)
% 0.19/0.52 % (7984)------------------------------
% 0.19/0.52 % (7984)------------------------------
% 0.19/0.52 % (7963)Success in time 0.169 s
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------