TSTP Solution File: SWV014+1 by Leo-III---1.7.7

View Problem - Process Solution

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : Leo-III---1.7.7
% Problem  : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : run_Leo-III %s %d

% Computer : n016.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Fri May 19 12:13:34 EDT 2023

% Result   : Theorem 3.78s 1.87s
% Output   : Refutation 4.15s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : Refutation
%            Derivation depth      :    3
%            Number of leaves      :   55
% Syntax   : Number of formulae    :   86 (  25 unt;  26 typ;   0 def)
%            Number of atoms       :  149 (   0 equ;   0 cnn)
%            Maximal formula atoms :    5 (   2 avg)
%            Number of connectives :  547 (   4   ~;   0   |;  59   &; 454   @)
%                                         (   0 <=>;  30  =>;   0  <=;   0 <~>)
%            Maximal formula depth :   20 (   7 avg)
%            Number of types       :    2 (   0 usr)
%            Number of type conns  :   30 (  30   >;   0   *;   0   +;   0  <<)
%            Number of symbols     :   27 (  26 usr;   7 con; 0-4 aty)
%            Number of variables   :  107 (   0   ^; 104   !;   3   ?; 107   :)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
thf(intruder_holds_type,type,
    intruder_holds: $i > $o ).

thf(key_type,type,
    key: $i > $i > $i ).

thf(b_type,type,
    b: $i ).

thf(b_holds_type,type,
    b_holds: $i > $o ).

thf(a_type,type,
    a: $i ).

thf(a_nonce_type,type,
    a_nonce: $i > $o ).

thf(an_a_nonce_type,type,
    an_a_nonce: $i ).

thf(intruder_message_type,type,
    intruder_message: $i > $o ).

thf(triple_type,type,
    triple: $i > $i > $i > $i ).

thf(party_of_protocol_type,type,
    party_of_protocol: $i > $o ).

thf(t_type,type,
    t: $i ).

thf(generate_expiration_time_type,type,
    generate_expiration_time: $i > $i ).

thf(generate_b_nonce_type,type,
    generate_b_nonce: $i > $i ).

thf(generate_key_type,type,
    generate_key: $i > $i ).

thf(quadruple_type,type,
    quadruple: $i > $i > $i > $i > $i ).

thf(message_type,type,
    message: $i > $o ).

thf(sent_type,type,
    sent: $i > $i > $i > $i ).

thf(fresh_to_b_type,type,
    fresh_to_b: $i > $o ).

thf(pair_type,type,
    pair: $i > $i > $i ).

thf(t_holds_type,type,
    t_holds: $i > $o ).

thf(at_type,type,
    at: $i ).

thf(encrypt_type,type,
    encrypt: $i > $i > $i ).

thf(a_stored_type,type,
    a_stored: $i > $o ).

thf(a_holds_type,type,
    a_holds: $i > $o ).

thf(bt_type,type,
    bt: $i ).

thf(b_stored_type,type,
    b_stored: $i > $o ).

thf(27,axiom,
    a_holds @ ( key @ at @ t ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_holds_key_at_for_t) ).

thf(88,plain,
    a_holds @ ( key @ at @ t ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[27]) ).

thf(10,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( message @ ( sent @ A @ B @ C ) )
     => ( intruder_message @ C ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_can_record) ).

thf(52,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( message @ ( sent @ A @ B @ C ) )
     => ( intruder_message @ C ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[10]) ).

thf(25,axiom,
    a_stored @ ( pair @ b @ an_a_nonce ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_stored_message_i) ).

thf(84,plain,
    a_stored @ ( pair @ b @ an_a_nonce ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[25]) ).

thf(3,axiom,
    a_nonce @ an_a_nonce,
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce) ).

thf(33,plain,
    a_nonce @ an_a_nonce,
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[3]) ).

thf(23,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i,E: $i,F: $i,G: $i] :
      ( ( ( message @ ( sent @ A @ t @ ( triple @ A @ B @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ C @ D @ E ) @ F ) ) ) )
        & ( t_holds @ ( key @ F @ A ) )
        & ( t_holds @ ( key @ G @ C ) )
        & ( a_nonce @ D ) )
     => ( message @ ( sent @ t @ C @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ A @ D @ ( generate_key @ D ) @ E ) @ G ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ C @ ( generate_key @ D ) @ E ) @ F ) @ B ) ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',server_t_generates_key) ).

thf(81,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i,E: $i,F: $i,G: $i] :
      ( ( ( message @ ( sent @ A @ t @ ( triple @ A @ B @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ C @ D @ E ) @ F ) ) ) )
        & ( t_holds @ ( key @ F @ A ) )
        & ( t_holds @ ( key @ G @ C ) )
        & ( a_nonce @ D ) )
     => ( message @ ( sent @ t @ C @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ A @ D @ ( generate_key @ D ) @ E ) @ G ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ C @ ( generate_key @ D ) @ E ) @ F ) @ B ) ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[23]) ).

thf(12,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( party_of_protocol @ B )
        & ( party_of_protocol @ C ) )
     => ( message @ ( sent @ B @ C @ A ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_message_sent) ).

thf(55,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( party_of_protocol @ B )
        & ( party_of_protocol @ C ) )
     => ( message @ ( sent @ B @ C @ A ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[12]) ).

thf(20,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ B @ C ) )
        & ( party_of_protocol @ C ) )
     => ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ A @ B ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_key_encrypts) ).

thf(75,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ B @ C ) )
        & ( party_of_protocol @ C ) )
     => ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ A @ B ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[20]) ).

thf(5,axiom,
    party_of_protocol @ t,
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',t_is_party_of_protocol) ).

thf(36,plain,
    party_of_protocol @ t,
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[5]) ).

thf(22,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( party_of_protocol @ B ) )
     => ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ A @ B ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_holds_key) ).

thf(79,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( party_of_protocol @ B ) )
     => ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ A @ B ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[22]) ).

thf(15,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ A @ B @ C ) )
     => ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_message @ B )
        & ( intruder_message @ C ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples) ).

thf(62,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ A @ B @ C ) )
     => ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_message @ B )
        & ( intruder_message @ C ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[15]) ).

thf(7,axiom,
    ! [A: $i] :
      ~ ( a_nonce @ ( generate_key @ A ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',generated_keys_are_not_nonces) ).

thf(42,plain,
    ! [A: $i] :
      ~ ( a_nonce @ ( generate_key @ A ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[7]) ).

thf(6,axiom,
    ! [A: $i] :
      ( ( a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ A ) )
      & ( a_nonce @ ( generate_b_nonce @ A ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces) ).

thf(37,plain,
    ! [A: $i] :
      ( ( a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ A ) )
      & ( a_nonce @ ( generate_b_nonce @ A ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[6]) ).

thf(13,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i] :
      ( ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ A @ B ) )
     => ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_message @ B ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_pairs) ).

thf(57,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i] :
      ( ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ A @ B ) )
     => ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_message @ B ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[13]) ).

thf(21,axiom,
    party_of_protocol @ b,
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol) ).

thf(78,plain,
    party_of_protocol @ b,
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[21]) ).

thf(28,axiom,
    message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ a @ an_a_nonce ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b) ).

thf(89,plain,
    message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ a @ an_a_nonce ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[28]) ).

thf(19,axiom,
    t_holds @ ( key @ bt @ b ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',t_holds_key_bt_for_b) ).

thf(74,plain,
    t_holds @ ( key @ bt @ b ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[19]) ).

thf(14,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_message @ B ) )
     => ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ A @ B ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_pairs) ).

thf(60,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_message @ B ) )
     => ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ A @ B ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[14]) ).

thf(26,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ A @ B ) )
        & ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ B @ C ) )
        & ( party_of_protocol @ C ) )
     => ( intruder_message @ B ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_interception) ).

thf(85,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ A @ B ) )
        & ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ B @ C ) )
        & ( party_of_protocol @ C ) )
     => ( intruder_message @ B ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[26]) ).

thf(4,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_message @ B )
        & ( intruder_message @ C ) )
     => ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ A @ B @ C ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_triples) ).

thf(34,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_message @ B )
        & ( intruder_message @ C ) )
     => ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ A @ B @ C ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[4]) ).

thf(8,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i] :
      ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ A @ B @ C @ D ) )
     => ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_message @ B )
        & ( intruder_message @ C )
        & ( intruder_message @ D ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_quadruples) ).

thf(45,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i] :
      ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ A @ B @ C @ D ) )
     => ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_message @ B )
        & ( intruder_message @ C )
        & ( intruder_message @ D ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[8]) ).

thf(18,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( ( message @ ( sent @ B @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ B @ A @ ( generate_expiration_time @ C ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ C ) @ A ) ) ) )
        & ( b_stored @ ( pair @ B @ C ) ) )
     => ( b_holds @ ( key @ A @ B ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key) ).

thf(71,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( ( message @ ( sent @ B @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ B @ A @ ( generate_expiration_time @ C ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ C ) @ A ) ) ) )
        & ( b_stored @ ( pair @ B @ C ) ) )
     => ( b_holds @ ( key @ A @ B ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[18]) ).

thf(11,axiom,
    fresh_to_b @ an_a_nonce,
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b) ).

thf(54,plain,
    fresh_to_b @ an_a_nonce,
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[11]) ).

thf(30,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i] :
      ( ( ( message @ ( sent @ A @ b @ ( pair @ A @ B ) ) )
        & ( fresh_to_b @ B ) )
     => ( ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ B ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ A @ B @ ( generate_expiration_time @ B ) ) @ bt ) ) ) )
        & ( b_stored @ ( pair @ A @ B ) ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time) ).

thf(91,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i] :
      ( ( ( message @ ( sent @ A @ b @ ( pair @ A @ B ) ) )
        & ( fresh_to_b @ B ) )
     => ( ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ B ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ A @ B @ ( generate_expiration_time @ B ) ) @ bt ) ) ) )
        & ( b_stored @ ( pair @ A @ B ) ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[30]) ).

thf(16,axiom,
    t_holds @ ( key @ at @ a ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',t_holds_key_at_for_a) ).

thf(66,plain,
    t_holds @ ( key @ at @ a ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[16]) ).

thf(9,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_message @ B )
        & ( intruder_message @ C )
        & ( intruder_message @ D ) )
     => ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ A @ B @ C @ D ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_quadruples) ).

thf(50,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i] :
      ( ( ( intruder_message @ A )
        & ( intruder_message @ B )
        & ( intruder_message @ C )
        & ( intruder_message @ D ) )
     => ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ A @ B @ C @ D ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[9]) ).

thf(17,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i,E: $i,F: $i] :
      ( ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ E @ F @ C @ B ) @ at ) @ D @ A ) ) )
        & ( a_stored @ ( pair @ E @ F ) ) )
     => ( ( message @ ( sent @ a @ E @ ( pair @ D @ ( encrypt @ A @ C ) ) ) )
        & ( a_holds @ ( key @ C @ E ) ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_forwards_secure) ).

thf(67,plain,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i,E: $i,F: $i] :
      ( ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ E @ F @ C @ B ) @ at ) @ D @ A ) ) )
        & ( a_stored @ ( pair @ E @ F ) ) )
     => ( ( message @ ( sent @ a @ E @ ( pair @ D @ ( encrypt @ A @ C ) ) ) )
        & ( a_holds @ ( key @ C @ E ) ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[17]) ).

thf(1,conjecture,
    ? [A: $i] :
      ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ A @ b ) )
      & ( b_holds @ ( key @ A @ a ) ) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co1) ).

thf(2,negated_conjecture,
    ~ ? [A: $i] :
        ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ A @ b ) )
        & ( b_holds @ ( key @ A @ a ) ) ),
    inference(neg_conjecture,[status(cth)],[1]) ).

thf(31,plain,
    ~ ? [A: $i] :
        ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ A @ b ) )
        & ( b_holds @ ( key @ A @ a ) ) ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[2]) ).

thf(29,axiom,
    party_of_protocol @ a,
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol) ).

thf(90,plain,
    party_of_protocol @ a,
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[29]) ).

thf(24,axiom,
    b_holds @ ( key @ bt @ t ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_hold_key_bt_for_t) ).

thf(83,plain,
    b_holds @ ( key @ bt @ t ),
    inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[24]) ).

thf(94,plain,
    $false,
    inference(e,[status(thm)],[88,52,84,33,81,55,75,36,79,62,42,37,57,78,89,74,60,85,34,45,71,54,91,66,50,67,31,90,83]) ).

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.11/0.11  % Problem  : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.11/0.15  % Command  : run_Leo-III %s %d
% 0.14/0.35  % Computer : n016.cluster.edu
% 0.14/0.35  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.14/0.35  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.14/0.35  % Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% 0.14/0.35  % OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.14/0.35  % CPULimit : 300
% 0.14/0.35  % WCLimit  : 300
% 0.14/0.35  % DateTime : Fri May 19 02:58:13 EDT 2023
% 0.14/0.36  % CPUTime  : 
% 0.89/0.84  % [INFO] 	 Parsing problem /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p ... 
% 1.23/0.97  % [INFO] 	 Parsing done (128ms). 
% 1.23/0.98  % [INFO] 	 Running in sequential loop mode. 
% 1.85/1.18  % [INFO] 	 eprover registered as external prover. 
% 1.85/1.19  % [INFO] 	 cvc4 registered as external prover. 
% 1.85/1.19  % [INFO] 	 Scanning for conjecture ... 
% 1.97/1.25  % [INFO] 	 Found a conjecture and 28 axioms. Running axiom selection ... 
% 1.97/1.30  % [INFO] 	 Axiom selection finished. Selected 28 axioms (removed 0 axioms). 
% 2.24/1.34  % [INFO] 	 Problem is first-order (TPTP FOF). 
% 2.24/1.35  % [INFO] 	 Type checking passed. 
% 2.24/1.35  % [CONFIG] 	 Using configuration: timeout(300) with strategy<name(default),share(1.0),primSubst(3),sos(false),unifierCount(4),uniDepth(8),boolExt(true),choice(true),renaming(true),funcspec(false), domConstr(0),specialInstances(39),restrictUniAttempts(true),termOrdering(CPO)>.  Searching for refutation ... 
% 3.78/1.87  % External prover 'e' found a proof!
% 3.78/1.87  % [INFO] 	 Killing All external provers ... 
% 3.78/1.87  % Time passed: 1355ms (effective reasoning time: 890ms)
% 3.78/1.87  % Solved by strategy<name(default),share(1.0),primSubst(3),sos(false),unifierCount(4),uniDepth(8),boolExt(true),choice(true),renaming(true),funcspec(false), domConstr(0),specialInstances(39),restrictUniAttempts(true),termOrdering(CPO)>
% 3.78/1.87  % Axioms used in derivation (28): intruder_can_record, a_stored_message_i, t_holds_key_at_for_a, b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time, generated_keys_are_not_nonces, intruder_decomposes_pairs, server_t_generates_key, intruder_holds_key, intruder_decomposes_quadruples, intruder_decomposes_triples, an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce, generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces, intruder_message_sent, a_forwards_secure, a_holds_key_at_for_t, b_is_party_of_protocol, a_is_party_of_protocol, intruder_key_encrypts, t_is_party_of_protocol, b_hold_key_bt_for_t, intruder_composes_triples, t_holds_key_bt_for_b, nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b, a_sent_message_i_to_b, intruder_interception, b_accepts_secure_session_key, intruder_composes_quadruples, intruder_composes_pairs
% 3.78/1.87  % No. of inferences in proof: 60
% 3.78/1.87  % SZS status Theorem for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p : 1355 ms resp. 890 ms w/o parsing
% 4.15/1.95  % SZS output start Refutation for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
% 4.15/1.95  % [INFO] 	 Killing All external provers ... 
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