TSTP Solution File: SWV014+1 by LEO-II---1.7.0
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- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : LEO-II---1.7.0
% Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp
% Command : leo --timeout %d --proofoutput 1 --foatp e --atp e=./eprover %s
% Computer : n006.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 600s
% DateTime : Wed Jul 20 19:53:11 EDT 2022
% Result : Theorem 0.42s 0.61s
% Output : CNFRefutation 0.45s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 21
% Number of leaves : 55
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 347 ( 199 unt; 26 typ; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 2002 ( 489 equ; 0 cnn)
% Maximal formula atoms : 5 ( 6 avg)
% Number of connectives : 5016 ( 621 ~; 595 |; 78 &;3692 @)
% ( 0 <=>; 30 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 20 ( 4 avg)
% Number of types : 2 ( 0 usr)
% Number of type conns : 30 ( 30 >; 0 *; 0 +; 0 <<)
% Number of symbols : 29 ( 26 usr; 8 con; 0-4 aty)
% Number of variables : 1068 ( 0 ^1064 !; 4 ?;1068 :)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
thf(tp_a,type,
a: $i ).
thf(tp_a_holds,type,
a_holds: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_a_nonce,type,
a_nonce: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_a_stored,type,
a_stored: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_an_a_nonce,type,
an_a_nonce: $i ).
thf(tp_at,type,
at: $i ).
thf(tp_b,type,
b: $i ).
thf(tp_b_holds,type,
b_holds: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_b_stored,type,
b_stored: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_bt,type,
bt: $i ).
thf(tp_encrypt,type,
encrypt: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tp_fresh_to_b,type,
fresh_to_b: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_generate_b_nonce,type,
generate_b_nonce: $i > $i ).
thf(tp_generate_expiration_time,type,
generate_expiration_time: $i > $i ).
thf(tp_generate_key,type,
generate_key: $i > $i ).
thf(tp_intruder_holds,type,
intruder_holds: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_intruder_message,type,
intruder_message: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_key,type,
key: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tp_message,type,
message: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_pair,type,
pair: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tp_party_of_protocol,type,
party_of_protocol: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_quadruple,type,
quadruple: $i > $i > $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tp_sent,type,
sent: $i > $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tp_t,type,
t: $i ).
thf(tp_t_holds,type,
t_holds: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_triple,type,
triple: $i > $i > $i > $i ).
thf(1,axiom,
! [U: $i] :
( ( a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ U ) )
& ( a_nonce @ ( generate_b_nonce @ U ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces) ).
thf(2,axiom,
! [U: $i] :
~ ( a_nonce @ ( generate_key @ U ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',generated_keys_are_not_nonces) ).
thf(3,axiom,
a_nonce @ an_a_nonce,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce) ).
thf(4,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) )
& ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ U @ V ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_key_encrypts) ).
thf(5,axiom,
! [V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ V )
& ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
=> ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_holds_key) ).
thf(6,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( party_of_protocol @ V )
& ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
=> ( message @ ( sent @ V @ W @ U ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_message_sent) ).
thf(7,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ U @ V ) )
& ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) )
& ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ V ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_interception) ).
thf(8,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V )
& ( intruder_message @ W )
& ( intruder_message @ X ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_quadruples) ).
thf(9,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V )
& ( intruder_message @ W ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ U @ V @ W ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_triples) ).
thf(10,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_pairs) ).
thf(11,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) )
=> ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V )
& ( intruder_message @ W )
& ( intruder_message @ X ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_quadruples) ).
thf(12,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ U @ V @ W ) )
=> ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V )
& ( intruder_message @ W ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples) ).
thf(13,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ U @ V ) )
=> ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_pairs) ).
thf(14,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( message @ ( sent @ U @ V @ W ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ W ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_can_record) ).
thf(15,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i,Y: $i,Z: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ U @ t @ ( triple @ U @ V @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ W @ X @ Y ) @ Z ) ) ) )
& ( t_holds @ ( key @ Z @ U ) )
& ( t_holds @ ( key @ X1 @ W ) )
& ( a_nonce @ X ) )
=> ( message @ ( sent @ t @ W @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ U @ X @ ( generate_key @ X ) @ Y ) @ X1 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ W @ ( generate_key @ X ) @ Y ) @ Z ) @ V ) ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',server_t_generates_key) ).
thf(16,axiom,
party_of_protocol @ t,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',t_is_party_of_protocol) ).
thf(17,axiom,
t_holds @ ( key @ bt @ b ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',t_holds_key_bt_for_b) ).
thf(18,axiom,
t_holds @ ( key @ at @ a ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',t_holds_key_at_for_a) ).
thf(19,axiom,
! [V: $i,X: $i,Y: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ X @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ X @ V @ ( generate_expiration_time @ Y ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ Y ) @ V ) ) ) )
& ( b_stored @ ( pair @ X @ Y ) ) )
=> ( b_holds @ ( key @ V @ X ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key) ).
thf(20,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ U @ b @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) )
& ( fresh_to_b @ V ) )
=> ( ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ V ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ U @ V @ ( generate_expiration_time @ V ) ) @ bt ) ) ) )
& ( b_stored @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time) ).
thf(21,axiom,
fresh_to_b @ an_a_nonce,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b) ).
thf(22,axiom,
party_of_protocol @ b,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol) ).
thf(23,axiom,
b_holds @ ( key @ bt @ t ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_hold_key_bt_for_t) ).
thf(24,axiom,
! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i,Y: $i,Z: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ Y @ Z @ W @ V ) @ at ) @ X @ U ) ) )
& ( a_stored @ ( pair @ Y @ Z ) ) )
=> ( ( message @ ( sent @ a @ Y @ ( pair @ X @ ( encrypt @ U @ W ) ) ) )
& ( a_holds @ ( key @ W @ Y ) ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_forwards_secure) ).
thf(25,axiom,
a_stored @ ( pair @ b @ an_a_nonce ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_stored_message_i) ).
thf(26,axiom,
message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ a @ an_a_nonce ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b) ).
thf(27,axiom,
party_of_protocol @ a,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol) ).
thf(28,axiom,
a_holds @ ( key @ at @ t ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_holds_key_at_for_t) ).
thf(29,conjecture,
? [U: $i] :
( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ U @ b ) )
& ( b_holds @ ( key @ U @ a ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co1) ).
thf(30,negated_conjecture,
( ( ? [U: $i] :
( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ U @ b ) )
& ( b_holds @ ( key @ U @ a ) ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(negate_conjecture,[status(cth)],[29]) ).
thf(31,plain,
( ( ? [U: $i] :
( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ U @ b ) )
& ( b_holds @ ( key @ U @ a ) ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[30]) ).
thf(32,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i] :
( ( a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ U ) )
& ( a_nonce @ ( generate_b_nonce @ U ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[1]) ).
thf(33,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i] :
~ ( a_nonce @ ( generate_key @ U ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[2]) ).
thf(34,plain,
( ( a_nonce @ an_a_nonce )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[3]) ).
thf(35,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) )
& ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ U @ V ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[4]) ).
thf(36,plain,
( ( ! [V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ V )
& ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
=> ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[5]) ).
thf(37,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( party_of_protocol @ V )
& ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
=> ( message @ ( sent @ V @ W @ U ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[6]) ).
thf(38,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ U @ V ) )
& ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) )
& ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ V ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[7]) ).
thf(39,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V )
& ( intruder_message @ W )
& ( intruder_message @ X ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[8]) ).
thf(40,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V )
& ( intruder_message @ W ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ U @ V @ W ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[9]) ).
thf(41,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[10]) ).
thf(42,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) )
=> ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V )
& ( intruder_message @ W )
& ( intruder_message @ X ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[11]) ).
thf(43,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ U @ V @ W ) )
=> ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V )
& ( intruder_message @ W ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[12]) ).
thf(44,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ U @ V ) )
=> ( ( intruder_message @ U )
& ( intruder_message @ V ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[13]) ).
thf(45,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ( message @ ( sent @ U @ V @ W ) )
=> ( intruder_message @ W ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[14]) ).
thf(46,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i,Y: $i,Z: $i,X1: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ U @ t @ ( triple @ U @ V @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ W @ X @ Y ) @ Z ) ) ) )
& ( t_holds @ ( key @ Z @ U ) )
& ( t_holds @ ( key @ X1 @ W ) )
& ( a_nonce @ X ) )
=> ( message @ ( sent @ t @ W @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ U @ X @ ( generate_key @ X ) @ Y ) @ X1 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ W @ ( generate_key @ X ) @ Y ) @ Z ) @ V ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[15]) ).
thf(47,plain,
( ( party_of_protocol @ t )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[16]) ).
thf(48,plain,
( ( t_holds @ ( key @ bt @ b ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[17]) ).
thf(49,plain,
( ( t_holds @ ( key @ at @ a ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[18]) ).
thf(50,plain,
( ( ! [V: $i,X: $i,Y: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ X @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ X @ V @ ( generate_expiration_time @ Y ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ Y ) @ V ) ) ) )
& ( b_stored @ ( pair @ X @ Y ) ) )
=> ( b_holds @ ( key @ V @ X ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[19]) ).
thf(51,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ U @ b @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) )
& ( fresh_to_b @ V ) )
=> ( ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ V ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ U @ V @ ( generate_expiration_time @ V ) ) @ bt ) ) ) )
& ( b_stored @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[20]) ).
thf(52,plain,
( ( fresh_to_b @ an_a_nonce )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[21]) ).
thf(53,plain,
( ( party_of_protocol @ b )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[22]) ).
thf(54,plain,
( ( b_holds @ ( key @ bt @ t ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[23]) ).
thf(55,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i,Y: $i,Z: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ Y @ Z @ W @ V ) @ at ) @ X @ U ) ) )
& ( a_stored @ ( pair @ Y @ Z ) ) )
=> ( ( message @ ( sent @ a @ Y @ ( pair @ X @ ( encrypt @ U @ W ) ) ) )
& ( a_holds @ ( key @ W @ Y ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[24]) ).
thf(56,plain,
( ( a_stored @ ( pair @ b @ an_a_nonce ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[25]) ).
thf(57,plain,
( ( message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ a @ an_a_nonce ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[26]) ).
thf(58,plain,
( ( party_of_protocol @ a )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[27]) ).
thf(59,plain,
( ( a_holds @ ( key @ at @ t ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[28]) ).
thf(60,plain,
( ( ~ ? [U: $i] :
( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ U @ b ) )
& ( b_holds @ ( key @ U @ a ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(polarity_switch,[status(thm)],[31]) ).
thf(61,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i] :
( ~ ( b_holds @ ( key @ U @ a ) )
| ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ U @ b ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[60]) ).
thf(62,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i] : ( a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ U ) )
& ! [U: $i] : ( a_nonce @ ( generate_b_nonce @ U ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[32]) ).
thf(63,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ! [W: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ U )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
| ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ U @ V ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[35]) ).
thf(64,plain,
( ( ! [V: $i,W: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ V )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ W )
| ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[36]) ).
thf(65,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ U )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ V )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ W )
| ( message @ ( sent @ V @ W @ U ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[37]) ).
thf(66,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ! [W: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ U @ V ) )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
| ( intruder_message @ V ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[38]) ).
thf(67,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ U )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ V )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ W )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X )
| ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[39]) ).
thf(68,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ U )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ V )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ W )
| ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ U @ V @ W ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[40]) ).
thf(69,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ U )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ V )
| ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[41]) ).
thf(70,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ( ! [W: $i,X: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) )
| ( intruder_message @ U ) )
& ( ! [W: $i,X: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) )
| ( intruder_message @ V ) )
& ! [W: $i] :
( ! [X: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) )
| ( intruder_message @ W ) )
& ! [W: $i,X: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) )
| ( intruder_message @ X ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[42]) ).
thf(71,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i] :
( ( ! [V: $i,W: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ U @ V @ W ) )
| ( intruder_message @ U ) )
& ! [V: $i] :
( ! [W: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ U @ V @ W ) )
| ( intruder_message @ V ) )
& ! [V: $i,W: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ U @ V @ W ) )
| ( intruder_message @ W ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[43]) ).
thf(72,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i] :
( ! [V: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ U @ V ) )
| ( intruder_message @ U ) )
& ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ U @ V ) )
| ( intruder_message @ V ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[44]) ).
thf(73,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ U @ V @ W ) )
| ( intruder_message @ W ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[45]) ).
thf(74,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i,Y: $i,Z: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ U @ t @ ( triple @ U @ V @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ W @ X @ Y ) @ Z ) ) ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ Z @ U ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ X1 @ W ) )
| ~ ( a_nonce @ X )
| ( message @ ( sent @ t @ W @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ U @ X @ ( generate_key @ X ) @ Y ) @ X1 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ W @ ( generate_key @ X ) @ Y ) @ Z ) @ V ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[46]) ).
thf(75,plain,
( ( ! [V: $i,X: $i] :
( ! [Y: $i] :
( ~ ( b_stored @ ( pair @ X @ Y ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ X @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ X @ V @ ( generate_expiration_time @ Y ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ Y ) @ V ) ) ) ) )
| ( b_holds @ ( key @ V @ X ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[50]) ).
thf(76,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ V )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ U @ b @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) )
| ( b_stored @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) )
& ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ V )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ U @ b @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ V ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ U @ V @ ( generate_expiration_time @ V ) ) @ bt ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[51]) ).
thf(77,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i] :
( ! [Y: $i] :
( ! [Z: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ Y @ Z ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ Y @ Z @ W @ V ) @ at ) @ X @ U ) ) ) )
| ( a_holds @ ( key @ W @ Y ) ) )
& ! [Y: $i] :
( ! [Z: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ Y @ Z ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ Y @ Z @ W @ V ) @ at ) @ X @ U ) ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ a @ Y @ ( pair @ X @ ( encrypt @ U @ W ) ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[55]) ).
thf(78,plain,
( ( a_holds @ ( key @ at @ t ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[59]) ).
thf(79,plain,
( ( party_of_protocol @ a )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[58]) ).
thf(80,plain,
( ( message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ a @ an_a_nonce ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[57]) ).
thf(81,plain,
( ( a_stored @ ( pair @ b @ an_a_nonce ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[56]) ).
thf(82,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i] :
( ! [Y: $i] :
( ! [Z: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ Y @ Z ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ Y @ Z @ W @ V ) @ at ) @ X @ U ) ) ) )
| ( a_holds @ ( key @ W @ Y ) ) )
& ! [Y: $i] :
( ! [Z: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ Y @ Z ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ Y @ Z @ W @ V ) @ at ) @ X @ U ) ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ a @ Y @ ( pair @ X @ ( encrypt @ U @ W ) ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[77]) ).
thf(83,plain,
( ( b_holds @ ( key @ bt @ t ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[54]) ).
thf(84,plain,
( ( party_of_protocol @ b )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[53]) ).
thf(85,plain,
( ( fresh_to_b @ an_a_nonce )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[52]) ).
thf(86,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ V )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ U @ b @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) )
| ( b_stored @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) )
& ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ V )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ U @ b @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ V ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ U @ V @ ( generate_expiration_time @ V ) ) @ bt ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[76]) ).
thf(87,plain,
( ( ! [V: $i,X: $i] :
( ! [Y: $i] :
( ~ ( b_stored @ ( pair @ X @ Y ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ X @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ X @ V @ ( generate_expiration_time @ Y ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ Y ) @ V ) ) ) ) )
| ( b_holds @ ( key @ V @ X ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[75]) ).
thf(88,plain,
( ( t_holds @ ( key @ at @ a ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[49]) ).
thf(89,plain,
( ( t_holds @ ( key @ bt @ b ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[48]) ).
thf(90,plain,
( ( party_of_protocol @ t )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[47]) ).
thf(91,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i,Y: $i,Z: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ U @ t @ ( triple @ U @ V @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ W @ X @ Y ) @ Z ) ) ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ Z @ U ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ X1 @ W ) )
| ~ ( a_nonce @ X )
| ( message @ ( sent @ t @ W @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ U @ X @ ( generate_key @ X ) @ Y ) @ X1 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ W @ ( generate_key @ X ) @ Y ) @ Z ) @ V ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[74]) ).
thf(92,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ U @ V @ W ) )
| ( intruder_message @ W ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[73]) ).
thf(93,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i] :
( ! [V: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ U @ V ) )
| ( intruder_message @ U ) )
& ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ U @ V ) )
| ( intruder_message @ V ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[72]) ).
thf(94,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i] :
( ( ! [V: $i,W: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ U @ V @ W ) )
| ( intruder_message @ U ) )
& ! [V: $i] :
( ! [W: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ U @ V @ W ) )
| ( intruder_message @ V ) )
& ! [V: $i,W: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ U @ V @ W ) )
| ( intruder_message @ W ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[71]) ).
thf(95,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ( ! [W: $i,X: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) )
| ( intruder_message @ U ) )
& ( ! [W: $i,X: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) )
| ( intruder_message @ V ) )
& ! [W: $i] :
( ! [X: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) )
| ( intruder_message @ W ) )
& ! [W: $i,X: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) )
| ( intruder_message @ X ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[70]) ).
thf(96,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ U )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ V )
| ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ U @ V ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[69]) ).
thf(97,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ U )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ V )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ W )
| ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ U @ V @ W ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[68]) ).
thf(98,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i,X: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ U )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ V )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ W )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ X )
| ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ U @ V @ W @ X ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[67]) ).
thf(99,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ! [W: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ U @ V ) )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
| ( intruder_message @ V ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[66]) ).
thf(100,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i,W: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ U )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ V )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ W )
| ( message @ ( sent @ V @ W @ U ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[65]) ).
thf(101,plain,
( ( ! [V: $i,W: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ V )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ W )
| ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[64]) ).
thf(102,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i,V: $i] :
( ! [W: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ V @ W ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ U )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ W ) )
| ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ U @ V ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[63]) ).
thf(103,plain,
( ( a_nonce @ an_a_nonce )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[34]) ).
thf(104,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i] :
~ ( a_nonce @ ( generate_key @ U ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[33]) ).
thf(105,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i] : ( a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ U ) )
& ! [U: $i] : ( a_nonce @ ( generate_b_nonce @ U ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[62]) ).
thf(106,plain,
( ( ! [U: $i] :
( ~ ( b_holds @ ( key @ U @ a ) )
| ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ U @ b ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[61]) ).
thf(107,plain,
( ( ~ ( ~ ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SX1 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SX0 @ b @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) ) )
| ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SX1 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SX0 @ b @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SX1 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SX0 @ SX1 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SX1 ) ) @ bt ) ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[86]) ).
thf(108,plain,
( ( ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i] :
~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( ! [SX2: $i,SX3: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SX0 @ SX1 @ SX2 @ SX3 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX0 ) )
| ~ ( ! [SX2: $i,SX3: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SX0 @ SX1 @ SX2 @ SX3 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX1 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SX2: $i] :
( ! [SX3: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SX0 @ SX1 @ SX2 @ SX3 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX2 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SX2: $i,SX3: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SX0 @ SX1 @ SX2 @ SX3 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX3 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[95]) ).
thf(109,plain,
( ( ~ ( ~ ! [SX0: $i] :
( ! [SX1: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX0 ) )
| ~ ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX1 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[93]) ).
thf(110,plain,
( ( ~ ( ~ ! [SX0: $i] : ( a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SX0 ) )
| ~ ! [SX0: $i] : ( a_nonce @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SX0 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[105]) ).
thf(111,plain,
( ( ! [SX0: $i] :
~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( ! [SX1: $i,SX2: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SX0 @ SX1 @ SX2 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX0 ) )
| ~ ! [SX1: $i] :
( ! [SX2: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SX0 @ SX1 @ SX2 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX1 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SX1: $i,SX2: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SX0 @ SX1 @ SX2 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX2 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[94]) ).
thf(112,plain,
( ( ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i,SX2: $i,SX3: $i] :
~ ( ~ ! [SX4: $i] :
( ! [SX5: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SX4 @ SX5 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SX4 @ SX5 @ SX2 @ SX1 ) @ at ) @ SX3 @ SX0 ) ) ) )
| ( a_holds @ ( key @ SX2 @ SX4 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SX4: $i] :
( ! [SX5: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SX4 @ SX5 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SX4 @ SX5 @ SX2 @ SX1 ) @ at ) @ SX3 @ SX0 ) ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SX4 @ ( pair @ SX3 @ ( encrypt @ SX0 @ SX2 ) ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[82]) ).
thf(113,plain,
! [SV1: $i] :
( ( ! [SY53: $i] :
( ! [SY54: $i] :
( ~ ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SY53 @ SY54 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SY53 @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SY53 @ SV1 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SY54 ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SY54 ) @ SV1 ) ) ) ) )
| ( b_holds @ ( key @ SV1 @ SY53 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[87]) ).
thf(114,plain,
! [SV2: $i] :
( ( ! [SY55: $i,SY56: $i,SY57: $i,SY58: $i,SY59: $i,SY60: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SY55 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SY56 @ SY57 @ SY58 ) @ SY59 ) ) ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SY59 @ SV2 ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SY60 @ SY56 ) )
| ~ ( a_nonce @ SY57 )
| ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SY56 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SY57 @ ( generate_key @ SY57 ) @ SY58 ) @ SY60 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SY56 @ ( generate_key @ SY57 ) @ SY58 ) @ SY59 ) @ SY55 ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[91]) ).
thf(115,plain,
! [SV3: $i] :
( ( ! [SY61: $i,SY62: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV3 @ SY61 @ SY62 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY62 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[92]) ).
thf(116,plain,
! [SV4: $i] :
( ( ! [SY63: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV4 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SY63 )
| ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV4 @ SY63 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[96]) ).
thf(117,plain,
! [SV5: $i] :
( ( ! [SY64: $i,SY65: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV5 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SY64 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SY65 )
| ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV5 @ SY64 @ SY65 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[97]) ).
thf(118,plain,
! [SV6: $i] :
( ( ! [SY66: $i,SY67: $i,SY68: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV6 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SY66 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SY67 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SY68 )
| ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV6 @ SY66 @ SY67 @ SY68 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[98]) ).
thf(119,plain,
! [SV7: $i] :
( ( ! [SY69: $i] :
( ! [SY70: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SY69 @ SY70 ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV7 @ SY69 ) )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SY70 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY69 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[99]) ).
thf(120,plain,
! [SV8: $i] :
( ( ! [SY71: $i,SY72: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV8 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SY71 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SY72 )
| ( message @ ( sent @ SY71 @ SY72 @ SV8 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[100]) ).
thf(121,plain,
! [SV9: $i] :
( ( ! [SY73: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV9 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SY73 )
| ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV9 @ SY73 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[101]) ).
thf(122,plain,
! [SV10: $i] :
( ( ! [SY74: $i] :
( ! [SY75: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SY74 @ SY75 ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV10 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SY75 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV10 @ SY74 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[102]) ).
thf(123,plain,
! [SV11: $i] :
( ( ~ ( a_nonce @ ( generate_key @ SV11 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[104]) ).
thf(124,plain,
! [SV12: $i] :
( ( ~ ( b_holds @ ( key @ SV12 @ a ) )
| ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV12 @ b ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[106]) ).
thf(125,plain,
( ( ~ ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SX1 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SX0 @ b @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) ) )
| ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SX1 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SX0 @ b @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SX1 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SX0 @ SX1 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SX1 ) ) @ bt ) ) ) ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[107]) ).
thf(126,plain,
! [SV13: $i] :
( ( ! [SY76: $i] :
~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( ! [SY77: $i,SY78: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SY76 @ SY77 @ SY78 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV13 ) )
| ~ ( ! [SY79: $i,SY80: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SY76 @ SY79 @ SY80 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY76 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY81: $i] :
( ! [SY82: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SY76 @ SY81 @ SY82 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY81 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY83: $i,SY84: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SY76 @ SY83 @ SY84 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY84 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[108]) ).
thf(127,plain,
( ( ~ ! [SX0: $i] :
( ! [SX1: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX0 ) )
| ~ ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX1 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[109]) ).
thf(128,plain,
( ( ~ ! [SX0: $i] : ( a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SX0 ) )
| ~ ! [SX0: $i] : ( a_nonce @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SX0 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[110]) ).
thf(129,plain,
! [SV14: $i] :
( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( ! [SY85: $i,SY86: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY85 @ SY86 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV14 ) )
| ~ ! [SY87: $i] :
( ! [SY88: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY87 @ SY88 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY87 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY89: $i,SY90: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY89 @ SY90 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY90 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[111]) ).
thf(130,plain,
! [SV15: $i] :
( ( ! [SY91: $i,SY92: $i,SY93: $i] :
~ ( ~ ! [SY94: $i] :
( ! [SY95: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY94 @ SY95 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY94 @ SY95 @ SY92 @ SY91 ) @ at ) @ SY93 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( a_holds @ ( key @ SY92 @ SY94 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY96: $i] :
( ! [SY97: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY96 @ SY97 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY96 @ SY97 @ SY92 @ SY91 ) @ at ) @ SY93 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SY96 @ ( pair @ SY93 @ ( encrypt @ SV15 @ SY92 ) ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[112]) ).
thf(131,plain,
! [SV1: $i,SV16: $i] :
( ( ! [SY98: $i] :
( ~ ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SV16 @ SY98 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV16 @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV16 @ SV1 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SY98 ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SY98 ) @ SV1 ) ) ) ) )
| ( b_holds @ ( key @ SV1 @ SV16 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[113]) ).
thf(132,plain,
! [SV17: $i,SV2: $i] :
( ( ! [SY99: $i,SY100: $i,SY101: $i,SY102: $i,SY103: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SY99 @ SY100 @ SY101 ) @ SY102 ) ) ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SY102 @ SV2 ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SY103 @ SY99 ) )
| ~ ( a_nonce @ SY100 )
| ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SY99 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SY100 @ ( generate_key @ SY100 ) @ SY101 ) @ SY103 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SY99 @ ( generate_key @ SY100 ) @ SY101 ) @ SY102 ) @ SV17 ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[114]) ).
thf(133,plain,
! [SV18: $i,SV3: $i] :
( ( ! [SY104: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV3 @ SV18 @ SY104 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY104 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[115]) ).
thf(134,plain,
! [SV19: $i,SV4: $i] :
( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV4 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV19 )
| ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV4 @ SV19 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[116]) ).
thf(135,plain,
! [SV20: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ! [SY105: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV5 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV20 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SY105 )
| ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV5 @ SV20 @ SY105 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[117]) ).
thf(136,plain,
! [SV21: $i,SV6: $i] :
( ( ! [SY106: $i,SY107: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV6 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV21 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SY106 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SY107 )
| ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV6 @ SV21 @ SY106 @ SY107 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[118]) ).
thf(137,plain,
! [SV7: $i,SV22: $i] :
( ( ! [SY108: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV22 @ SY108 ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV7 @ SV22 ) )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SY108 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV22 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[119]) ).
thf(138,plain,
! [SV23: $i,SV8: $i] :
( ( ! [SY109: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV8 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV23 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SY109 )
| ( message @ ( sent @ SV23 @ SY109 @ SV8 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[120]) ).
thf(139,plain,
! [SV24: $i,SV9: $i] :
( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV9 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV24 )
| ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV9 @ SV24 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[121]) ).
thf(140,plain,
! [SV10: $i,SV25: $i] :
( ( ! [SY110: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV25 @ SY110 ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV10 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SY110 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV10 @ SV25 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[122]) ).
thf(141,plain,
! [SV11: $i] :
( ( a_nonce @ ( generate_key @ SV11 ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[123]) ).
thf(142,plain,
! [SV12: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( b_holds @ ( key @ SV12 @ a ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV12 @ b ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[124]) ).
thf(143,plain,
( ( ~ ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SX1 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SX0 @ b @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) ) )
| ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[125]) ).
thf(144,plain,
( ( ~ ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SX1 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SX0 @ b @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SX1 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SX0 @ SX1 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SX1 ) ) @ bt ) ) ) ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[125]) ).
thf(145,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( ! [SY111: $i,SY112: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY111 @ SY112 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV13 ) )
| ~ ( ! [SY113: $i,SY114: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY113 @ SY114 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV26 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY115: $i] :
( ! [SY116: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY115 @ SY116 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY115 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY117: $i,SY118: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY117 @ SY118 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY118 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[126]) ).
thf(146,plain,
( ( ~ ! [SX0: $i] :
( ! [SX1: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX0 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[127]) ).
thf(147,plain,
( ( ~ ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX1 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[127]) ).
thf(148,plain,
( ( ~ ! [SX0: $i] : ( a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SX0 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[128]) ).
thf(149,plain,
( ( ~ ! [SX0: $i] : ( a_nonce @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SX0 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[128]) ).
thf(150,plain,
! [SV14: $i] :
( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( ! [SY85: $i,SY86: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY85 @ SY86 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV14 ) )
| ~ ! [SY87: $i] :
( ! [SY88: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY87 @ SY88 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY87 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY89: $i,SY90: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY89 @ SY90 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY90 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[129]) ).
thf(151,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV27: $i] :
( ( ! [SY119: $i,SY120: $i] :
~ ( ~ ! [SY121: $i] :
( ! [SY122: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY121 @ SY122 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY121 @ SY122 @ SY119 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SY120 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( a_holds @ ( key @ SY119 @ SY121 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY123: $i] :
( ! [SY124: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY123 @ SY124 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY123 @ SY124 @ SY119 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SY120 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SY123 @ ( pair @ SY120 @ ( encrypt @ SV15 @ SY119 ) ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[130]) ).
thf(152,plain,
! [SV1: $i,SV16: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY98: $i] :
( ~ ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SV16 @ SY98 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV16 @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV16 @ SV1 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SY98 ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SY98 ) @ SV1 ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( b_holds @ ( key @ SV1 @ SV16 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[131]) ).
thf(153,plain,
! [SV28: $i,SV17: $i,SV2: $i] :
( ( ! [SY125: $i,SY126: $i,SY127: $i,SY128: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ SY125 @ SY126 ) @ SY127 ) ) ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SY127 @ SV2 ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SY128 @ SV28 ) )
| ~ ( a_nonce @ SY125 )
| ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SV28 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SY125 @ ( generate_key @ SY125 ) @ SY126 ) @ SY128 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ ( generate_key @ SY125 ) @ SY126 ) @ SY127 ) @ SV17 ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[132]) ).
thf(154,plain,
! [SV29: $i,SV18: $i,SV3: $i] :
( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV3 @ SV18 @ SV29 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV29 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[133]) ).
thf(155,plain,
! [SV19: $i,SV4: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV4 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV19 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV4 @ SV19 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[134]) ).
thf(156,plain,
! [SV30: $i,SV20: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV5 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV20 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV30 )
| ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV5 @ SV20 @ SV30 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[135]) ).
thf(157,plain,
! [SV31: $i,SV21: $i,SV6: $i] :
( ( ! [SY129: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV6 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV21 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV31 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SY129 )
| ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV6 @ SV21 @ SV31 @ SY129 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[136]) ).
thf(158,plain,
! [SV7: $i,SV22: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY108: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV22 @ SY108 ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV7 @ SV22 ) )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SY108 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV22 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[137]) ).
thf(159,plain,
! [SV32: $i,SV23: $i,SV8: $i] :
( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV8 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV23 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV32 )
| ( message @ ( sent @ SV23 @ SV32 @ SV8 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[138]) ).
thf(160,plain,
! [SV24: $i,SV9: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV9 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV24 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV9 @ SV24 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[139]) ).
thf(161,plain,
! [SV10: $i,SV25: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY110: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV25 @ SY110 ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV10 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SY110 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV10 @ SV25 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[140]) ).
thf(162,plain,
! [SV12: $i] :
( ( ( b_holds @ ( key @ SV12 @ a ) )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV12 @ b ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[142]) ).
thf(163,plain,
( ( ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SX1 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SX0 @ b @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) ) )
| ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[143]) ).
thf(164,plain,
( ( ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SX1 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SX0 @ b @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SX1 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SX0 @ SX1 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SX1 ) ) @ bt ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[144]) ).
thf(165,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( ! [SY111: $i,SY112: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY111 @ SY112 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV13 ) )
| ~ ( ! [SY113: $i,SY114: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY113 @ SY114 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV26 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY115: $i] :
( ! [SY116: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY115 @ SY116 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY115 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY117: $i,SY118: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY117 @ SY118 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY118 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[145]) ).
thf(166,plain,
( ( ! [SX0: $i] :
( ! [SX1: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX0 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[146]) ).
thf(167,plain,
( ( ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SX0 @ SX1 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SX1 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[147]) ).
thf(168,plain,
( ( ! [SX0: $i] : ( a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SX0 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[148]) ).
thf(169,plain,
( ( ! [SX0: $i] : ( a_nonce @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SX0 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[149]) ).
thf(170,plain,
! [SV14: $i] :
( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( ! [SY85: $i,SY86: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY85 @ SY86 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV14 ) )
| ~ ! [SY87: $i] :
( ! [SY88: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY87 @ SY88 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY87 ) ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[150]) ).
thf(171,plain,
! [SV14: $i] :
( ( ~ ! [SY89: $i,SY90: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY89 @ SY90 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY90 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[150]) ).
thf(172,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i] :
( ( ! [SY130: $i] :
~ ( ~ ! [SY131: $i] :
( ! [SY132: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY131 @ SY132 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY131 @ SY132 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SY130 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( a_holds @ ( key @ SV33 @ SY131 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY133: $i] :
( ! [SY134: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY133 @ SY134 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY133 @ SY134 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SY130 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SY133 @ ( pair @ SY130 @ ( encrypt @ SV15 @ SV33 ) ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[151]) ).
thf(173,plain,
! [SV1: $i,SV34: $i,SV16: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SV16 @ SV34 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV16 @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV16 @ SV1 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SV34 ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SV34 ) @ SV1 ) ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( b_holds @ ( key @ SV1 @ SV16 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[152]) ).
thf(174,plain,
! [SV35: $i,SV28: $i,SV17: $i,SV2: $i] :
( ( ! [SY135: $i,SY136: $i,SY137: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ SV35 @ SY135 ) @ SY136 ) ) ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SY136 @ SV2 ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SY137 @ SV28 ) )
| ~ ( a_nonce @ SV35 )
| ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SV28 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SV35 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SY135 ) @ SY137 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SY135 ) @ SY136 ) @ SV17 ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[153]) ).
thf(175,plain,
! [SV29: $i,SV18: $i,SV3: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV3 @ SV18 @ SV29 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV29 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[154]) ).
thf(176,plain,
! [SV19: $i,SV4: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV4 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV19 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV4 @ SV19 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[155]) ).
thf(177,plain,
! [SV30: $i,SV20: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV5 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV20 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV30 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV5 @ SV20 @ SV30 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[156]) ).
thf(178,plain,
! [SV36: $i,SV31: $i,SV21: $i,SV6: $i] :
( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV6 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV21 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV31 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV36 )
| ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV6 @ SV21 @ SV31 @ SV36 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[157]) ).
thf(179,plain,
! [SV7: $i,SV37: $i,SV22: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV22 @ SV37 ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV7 @ SV22 ) )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV37 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV22 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[158]) ).
thf(180,plain,
! [SV32: $i,SV23: $i,SV8: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV8 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV23 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV32 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV23 @ SV32 @ SV8 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[159]) ).
thf(181,plain,
! [SV24: $i,SV9: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV9 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV24 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV9 @ SV24 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[160]) ).
thf(182,plain,
! [SV10: $i,SV38: $i,SV25: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV25 @ SV38 ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV10 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV38 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV10 @ SV25 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[161]) ).
thf(183,plain,
! [SV12: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV12 @ b ) )
= $false )
| ( ( b_holds @ ( key @ SV12 @ a ) )
= $false ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[162]) ).
thf(184,plain,
! [SV39: $i] :
( ( ! [SY138: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SY138 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV39 @ b @ ( pair @ SV39 @ SY138 ) ) )
| ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SV39 @ SY138 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[163]) ).
thf(185,plain,
! [SV40: $i] :
( ( ! [SY139: $i] :
( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SY139 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV40 @ b @ ( pair @ SV40 @ SY139 ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SY139 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV40 @ SY139 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SY139 ) ) @ bt ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[164]) ).
thf(186,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( ! [SY111: $i,SY112: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY111 @ SY112 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV13 ) )
| ~ ( ! [SY113: $i,SY114: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY113 @ SY114 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV26 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY115: $i] :
( ! [SY116: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY115 @ SY116 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY115 ) ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[165]) ).
thf(187,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ~ ! [SY117: $i,SY118: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY117 @ SY118 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY118 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[165]) ).
thf(188,plain,
! [SV41: $i] :
( ( ! [SY140: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV41 @ SY140 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV41 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[166]) ).
thf(189,plain,
! [SV42: $i] :
( ( ! [SY141: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV42 @ SY141 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY141 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[167]) ).
thf(190,plain,
! [SV43: $i] :
( ( a_nonce @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SV43 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[168]) ).
thf(191,plain,
! [SV44: $i] :
( ( a_nonce @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SV44 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[169]) ).
thf(192,plain,
! [SV14: $i] :
( ( ~ ( ~ ( ! [SY85: $i,SY86: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY85 @ SY86 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV14 ) )
| ~ ! [SY87: $i] :
( ! [SY88: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY87 @ SY88 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY87 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[170]) ).
thf(193,plain,
! [SV14: $i] :
( ( ! [SY89: $i,SY90: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY89 @ SY90 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY90 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[171]) ).
thf(194,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i] :
( ( ~ ( ~ ! [SY142: $i] :
( ! [SY143: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY142 @ SY143 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY142 @ SY143 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( a_holds @ ( key @ SV33 @ SY142 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY144: $i] :
( ! [SY145: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY144 @ SY145 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY144 @ SY145 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SY144 @ ( pair @ SV45 @ ( encrypt @ SV15 @ SV33 ) ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[172]) ).
thf(195,plain,
! [SV1: $i,SV34: $i,SV16: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SV16 @ SV34 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV16 @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV16 @ SV1 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SV34 ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SV34 ) @ SV1 ) ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( b_holds @ ( key @ SV1 @ SV16 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[173]) ).
thf(196,plain,
! [SV46: $i,SV35: $i,SV28: $i,SV17: $i,SV2: $i] :
( ( ! [SY146: $i,SY147: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ SV35 @ SV46 ) @ SY146 ) ) ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SY146 @ SV2 ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SY147 @ SV28 ) )
| ~ ( a_nonce @ SV35 )
| ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SV28 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SV35 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SY147 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SY146 ) @ SV17 ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[174]) ).
thf(197,plain,
! [SV29: $i,SV18: $i,SV3: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV3 @ SV18 @ SV29 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV29 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[175]) ).
thf(198,plain,
! [SV19: $i,SV4: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV19 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV4 @ SV19 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[176]) ).
thf(199,plain,
! [SV30: $i,SV20: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV5 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV20 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV30 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV5 @ SV20 @ SV30 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[177]) ).
thf(200,plain,
! [SV36: $i,SV31: $i,SV21: $i,SV6: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV6 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV21 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV31 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV36 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV6 @ SV21 @ SV31 @ SV36 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[178]) ).
thf(201,plain,
! [SV7: $i,SV37: $i,SV22: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV22 @ SV37 ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV7 @ SV22 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV37 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV22 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[179]) ).
thf(202,plain,
! [SV32: $i,SV23: $i,SV8: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV8 )
| ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV23 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV32 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV23 @ SV32 @ SV8 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[180]) ).
thf(203,plain,
! [SV24: $i,SV9: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ SV9 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV24 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV9 @ SV24 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[181]) ).
thf(204,plain,
! [SV10: $i,SV38: $i,SV25: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV25 @ SV38 ) )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV10 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV38 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV10 @ SV25 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[182]) ).
thf(205,plain,
! [SV39: $i,SV47: $i] :
( ( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SV47 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV39 @ b @ ( pair @ SV39 @ SV47 ) ) )
| ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SV39 @ SV47 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[184]) ).
thf(206,plain,
! [SV40: $i,SV48: $i] :
( ( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SV48 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV40 @ b @ ( pair @ SV40 @ SV48 ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SV48 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV40 @ SV48 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SV48 ) ) @ bt ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[185]) ).
thf(207,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( ! [SY111: $i,SY112: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY111 @ SY112 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV13 ) )
| ~ ( ! [SY113: $i,SY114: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY113 @ SY114 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV26 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY115: $i] :
( ! [SY116: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY115 @ SY116 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY115 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[186]) ).
thf(208,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ! [SY117: $i,SY118: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY117 @ SY118 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY118 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[187]) ).
thf(209,plain,
! [SV41: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY140: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV41 @ SY140 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV41 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[188]) ).
thf(210,plain,
! [SV49: $i,SV42: $i] :
( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV42 @ SV49 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV49 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[189]) ).
thf(211,plain,
! [SV14: $i] :
( ( ~ ( ! [SY85: $i,SY86: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY85 @ SY86 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV14 ) )
| ~ ! [SY87: $i] :
( ! [SY88: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY87 @ SY88 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY87 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[192]) ).
thf(212,plain,
! [SV50: $i,SV14: $i] :
( ( ! [SY148: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SV50 @ SY148 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY148 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[193]) ).
thf(213,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i] :
( ( ~ ! [SY142: $i] :
( ! [SY143: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY142 @ SY143 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY142 @ SY143 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( a_holds @ ( key @ SV33 @ SY142 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY144: $i] :
( ! [SY145: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY144 @ SY145 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY144 @ SY145 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SY144 @ ( pair @ SV45 @ ( encrypt @ SV15 @ SV33 ) ) ) ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[194]) ).
thf(214,plain,
! [SV1: $i,SV34: $i,SV16: $i] :
( ( ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SV16 @ SV34 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV16 @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV16 @ SV1 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SV34 ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SV34 ) @ SV1 ) ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( b_holds @ ( key @ SV1 @ SV16 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[195]) ).
thf(215,plain,
! [SV51: $i,SV46: $i,SV35: $i,SV28: $i,SV17: $i,SV2: $i] :
( ( ! [SY149: $i] :
( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ SV35 @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) ) ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV51 @ SV2 ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SY149 @ SV28 ) )
| ~ ( a_nonce @ SV35 )
| ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SV28 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SV35 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SY149 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) @ SV17 ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[196]) ).
thf(216,plain,
! [SV4: $i,SV19: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ SV19 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV4 @ SV19 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[198]) ).
thf(217,plain,
! [SV30: $i,SV20: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV5 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV20 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV30 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV5 @ SV20 @ SV30 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[199]) ).
thf(218,plain,
! [SV36: $i,SV31: $i,SV21: $i,SV6: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV6 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV21 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV31 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV36 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV6 @ SV21 @ SV31 @ SV36 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[200]) ).
thf(219,plain,
! [SV7: $i,SV37: $i,SV22: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV22 @ SV37 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV7 @ SV22 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV37 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV22 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[201]) ).
thf(220,plain,
! [SV32: $i,SV23: $i,SV8: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV8 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV23 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV32 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV23 @ SV32 @ SV8 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[202]) ).
thf(221,plain,
! [SV9: $i,SV24: $i] :
( ( ( party_of_protocol @ SV24 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV9 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV9 @ SV24 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[203]) ).
thf(222,plain,
! [SV10: $i,SV38: $i,SV25: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV25 @ SV38 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV10 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV38 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV10 @ SV25 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[204]) ).
thf(223,plain,
! [SV39: $i,SV47: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SV47 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV39 @ b @ ( pair @ SV39 @ SV47 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SV39 @ SV47 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[205]) ).
thf(224,plain,
! [SV40: $i,SV48: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SV48 )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV40 @ b @ ( pair @ SV40 @ SV48 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SV48 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV40 @ SV48 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SV48 ) ) @ bt ) ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[206]) ).
thf(225,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( ! [SY111: $i,SY112: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY111 @ SY112 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV13 ) )
| ~ ( ! [SY113: $i,SY114: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY113 @ SY114 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV26 ) ) )
| ~ ! [SY115: $i] :
( ! [SY116: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY115 @ SY116 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY115 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[207]) ).
thf(226,plain,
! [SV52: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ! [SY150: $i] :
( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV52 @ SY150 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY150 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[208]) ).
thf(227,plain,
! [SV53: $i,SV41: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV41 @ SV53 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV41 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[209]) ).
thf(228,plain,
! [SV49: $i,SV42: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV42 @ SV49 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV49 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[210]) ).
thf(229,plain,
! [SV14: $i] :
( ( ~ ( ! [SY85: $i,SY86: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY85 @ SY86 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV14 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[211]) ).
thf(230,plain,
! [SV14: $i] :
( ( ~ ! [SY87: $i] :
( ! [SY88: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY87 @ SY88 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY87 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[211]) ).
thf(231,plain,
! [SV54: $i,SV50: $i,SV14: $i] :
( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SV50 @ SV54 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV54 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[212]) ).
thf(232,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i] :
( ( ~ ! [SY142: $i] :
( ! [SY143: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY142 @ SY143 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY142 @ SY143 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( a_holds @ ( key @ SV33 @ SY142 ) ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[213]) ).
thf(233,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i] :
( ( ~ ! [SY144: $i] :
( ! [SY145: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY144 @ SY145 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY144 @ SY145 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SY144 @ ( pair @ SV45 @ ( encrypt @ SV15 @ SV33 ) ) ) ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[213]) ).
thf(234,plain,
! [SV34: $i,SV1: $i,SV16: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV16 @ b @ ( pair @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV16 @ SV1 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SV34 ) ) @ bt ) @ ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SV34 ) @ SV1 ) ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SV16 @ SV34 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( b_holds @ ( key @ SV1 @ SV16 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[214]) ).
thf(235,plain,
! [SV55: $i,SV51: $i,SV46: $i,SV35: $i,SV28: $i,SV17: $i,SV2: $i] :
( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ SV35 @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) ) ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV51 @ SV2 ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV55 @ SV28 ) )
| ~ ( a_nonce @ SV35 )
| ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SV28 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SV35 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV55 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) @ SV17 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[215]) ).
thf(236,plain,
! [SV30: $i,SV20: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV20 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV30 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV5 @ SV20 @ SV30 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[217]) ).
thf(237,plain,
! [SV36: $i,SV31: $i,SV21: $i,SV6: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV6 )
| ~ ( intruder_message @ SV21 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV31 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV36 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV6 @ SV21 @ SV31 @ SV36 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[218]) ).
thf(238,plain,
! [SV7: $i,SV37: $i,SV22: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV22 @ SV37 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV7 @ SV22 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV37 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV22 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[219]) ).
thf(239,plain,
! [SV32: $i,SV23: $i,SV8: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ SV8 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV23 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV32 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV23 @ SV32 @ SV8 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[220]) ).
thf(240,plain,
! [SV10: $i,SV38: $i,SV25: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV25 @ SV38 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV10 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV38 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV10 @ SV25 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[222]) ).
thf(241,plain,
! [SV39: $i,SV47: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SV47 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV39 @ b @ ( pair @ SV39 @ SV47 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SV39 @ SV47 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[223]) ).
thf(242,plain,
! [SV40: $i,SV48: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( fresh_to_b @ SV48 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV40 @ b @ ( pair @ SV40 @ SV48 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SV48 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV40 @ SV48 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SV48 ) ) @ bt ) ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[224]) ).
thf(243,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( ! [SY111: $i,SY112: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY111 @ SY112 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV13 ) )
| ~ ( ! [SY113: $i,SY114: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY113 @ SY114 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV26 ) ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[225]) ).
thf(244,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ~ ! [SY115: $i] :
( ! [SY116: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY115 @ SY116 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY115 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[225]) ).
thf(245,plain,
! [SV56: $i,SV52: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV52 @ SV56 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV56 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[226]) ).
thf(246,plain,
! [SV53: $i,SV41: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV41 @ SV53 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV41 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[227]) ).
thf(247,plain,
! [SV49: $i,SV42: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ ( pair @ SV42 @ SV49 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV49 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[228]) ).
thf(248,plain,
! [SV14: $i] :
( ( ! [SY85: $i,SY86: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY85 @ SY86 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV14 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[229]) ).
thf(249,plain,
! [SV14: $i] :
( ( ! [SY87: $i] :
( ! [SY88: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY87 @ SY88 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY87 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[230]) ).
thf(250,plain,
! [SV54: $i,SV50: $i,SV14: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SV50 @ SV54 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV54 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[231]) ).
thf(251,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i] :
( ( ! [SY142: $i] :
( ! [SY143: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY142 @ SY143 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY142 @ SY143 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( a_holds @ ( key @ SV33 @ SY142 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[232]) ).
thf(252,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i] :
( ( ! [SY144: $i] :
( ! [SY145: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SY144 @ SY145 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SY144 @ SY145 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SY144 @ ( pair @ SV45 @ ( encrypt @ SV15 @ SV33 ) ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[233]) ).
thf(253,plain,
! [SV55: $i,SV51: $i,SV46: $i,SV35: $i,SV28: $i,SV17: $i,SV2: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ SV35 @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) ) ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV51 @ SV2 ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV55 @ SV28 ) )
| ~ ( a_nonce @ SV35 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SV28 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SV35 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV55 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) @ SV17 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[235]) ).
thf(254,plain,
! [SV30: $i,SV5: $i,SV20: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ SV20 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV30 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV5 @ SV20 @ SV30 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[236]) ).
thf(255,plain,
! [SV36: $i,SV31: $i,SV21: $i,SV6: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV6 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV21 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV31 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV36 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV6 @ SV21 @ SV31 @ SV36 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[237]) ).
thf(256,plain,
! [SV37: $i,SV22: $i,SV7: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV7 @ SV22 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV22 @ SV37 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV37 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV22 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[238]) ).
thf(257,plain,
! [SV32: $i,SV8: $i,SV23: $i] :
( ( ( party_of_protocol @ SV23 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV8 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV32 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV23 @ SV32 @ SV8 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[239]) ).
thf(258,plain,
! [SV38: $i,SV25: $i,SV10: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ SV10 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV25 @ SV38 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( party_of_protocol @ SV38 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV10 @ SV25 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[240]) ).
thf(259,plain,
! [SV39: $i,SV47: $i] :
( ( ( fresh_to_b @ SV47 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV39 @ b @ ( pair @ SV39 @ SV47 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SV39 @ SV47 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[241]) ).
thf(260,plain,
! [SV40: $i,SV48: $i] :
( ( ( fresh_to_b @ SV48 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV40 @ b @ ( pair @ SV40 @ SV48 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SV48 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV40 @ SV48 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SV48 ) ) @ bt ) ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[242]) ).
thf(261,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ~ ( ~ ( ! [SY111: $i,SY112: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY111 @ SY112 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV13 ) )
| ~ ( ! [SY113: $i,SY114: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY113 @ SY114 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV26 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[243]) ).
thf(262,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ! [SY115: $i] :
( ! [SY116: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY115 @ SY116 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SY115 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[244]) ).
thf(263,plain,
! [SV56: $i,SV52: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV52 @ SV56 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV56 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[245]) ).
thf(264,plain,
! [SV14: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY85: $i,SY86: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SY85 @ SY86 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV14 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[248]) ).
thf(265,plain,
! [SV57: $i,SV14: $i] :
( ( ! [SY151: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SV57 @ SY151 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV57 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[249]) ).
thf(266,plain,
! [SV54: $i,SV50: $i,SV14: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SV50 @ SV54 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV54 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[250]) ).
thf(267,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i,SV58: $i] :
( ( ! [SY152: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SV58 @ SY152 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV58 @ SY152 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( a_holds @ ( key @ SV33 @ SV58 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[251]) ).
thf(268,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i,SV59: $i] :
( ( ! [SY153: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SV59 @ SY153 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV59 @ SY153 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
| ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SV59 @ ( pair @ SV45 @ ( encrypt @ SV15 @ SV33 ) ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[252]) ).
thf(269,plain,
! [SV55: $i,SV51: $i,SV46: $i,SV35: $i,SV28: $i,SV17: $i,SV2: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ SV35 @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) ) ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV51 @ SV2 ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV55 @ SV28 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( a_nonce @ SV35 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SV28 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SV35 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV55 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) @ SV17 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[253]) ).
thf(270,plain,
! [SV20: $i,SV5: $i,SV30: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ SV30 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV20 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV5 @ SV20 @ SV30 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[254]) ).
thf(271,plain,
! [SV36: $i,SV31: $i,SV21: $i,SV6: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ SV6 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV21 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV31 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV36 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV6 @ SV21 @ SV31 @ SV36 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[255]) ).
thf(272,plain,
! [SV7: $i,SV22: $i,SV37: $i] :
( ( ( party_of_protocol @ SV37 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV22 @ SV37 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV7 @ SV22 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV22 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[256]) ).
thf(273,plain,
! [SV23: $i,SV8: $i,SV32: $i] :
( ( ( party_of_protocol @ SV32 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV8 )
= $false )
| ( ( party_of_protocol @ SV23 )
= $false )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV23 @ SV32 @ SV8 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[257]) ).
thf(274,plain,
! [SV10: $i,SV25: $i,SV38: $i] :
( ( ( party_of_protocol @ SV38 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_holds @ ( key @ SV25 @ SV38 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV10 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ SV10 @ SV25 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[258]) ).
thf(275,plain,
! [SV47: $i,SV39: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV39 @ b @ ( pair @ SV39 @ SV47 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( fresh_to_b @ SV47 )
= $false )
| ( ( b_stored @ ( pair @ SV39 @ SV47 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[259]) ).
thf(276,plain,
! [SV48: $i,SV40: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV40 @ b @ ( pair @ SV40 @ SV48 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( fresh_to_b @ SV48 )
= $false )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ b @ t @ ( triple @ b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ SV48 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV40 @ SV48 @ ( generate_expiration_time @ SV48 ) ) @ bt ) ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[260]) ).
thf(277,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ~ ( ! [SY111: $i,SY112: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY111 @ SY112 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV13 ) )
| ~ ( ! [SY113: $i,SY114: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY113 @ SY114 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV26 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[261]) ).
thf(278,plain,
! [SV60: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ! [SY154: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV60 @ SY154 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV60 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[262]) ).
thf(279,plain,
! [SV56: $i,SV52: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV52 @ SV56 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV56 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[263]) ).
thf(280,plain,
! [SV61: $i,SV14: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY155: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SV61 @ SY155 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV14 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[264]) ).
thf(281,plain,
! [SV57: $i,SV14: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY151: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SV57 @ SY151 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV57 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[265]) ).
thf(282,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i,SV58: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY152: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SV58 @ SY152 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV58 @ SY152 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( a_holds @ ( key @ SV33 @ SV58 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[267]) ).
thf(283,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i,SV59: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY153: $i] :
( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SV59 @ SY153 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV59 @ SY153 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SV59 @ ( pair @ SV45 @ ( encrypt @ SV15 @ SV33 ) ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[268]) ).
thf(284,plain,
! [SV55: $i,SV51: $i,SV46: $i,SV35: $i,SV28: $i,SV17: $i,SV2: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ SV35 @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) ) ) )
| ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV51 @ SV2 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV55 @ SV28 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( a_nonce @ SV35 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SV28 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SV35 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV55 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) @ SV17 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[269]) ).
thf(285,plain,
! [SV36: $i,SV31: $i,SV6: $i,SV21: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ SV21 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV6 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV31 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV36 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV6 @ SV21 @ SV31 @ SV36 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[271]) ).
thf(286,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ~ ( ! [SY111: $i,SY112: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY111 @ SY112 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV13 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[277]) ).
thf(287,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ~ ( ! [SY113: $i,SY114: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY113 @ SY114 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV26 ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[277]) ).
thf(288,plain,
! [SV60: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY154: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV60 @ SY154 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV60 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[278]) ).
thf(289,plain,
! [SV62: $i,SV61: $i,SV14: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SV61 @ SV62 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV14 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[280]) ).
thf(290,plain,
! [SV63: $i,SV57: $i,SV14: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SV57 @ SV63 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV57 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[281]) ).
thf(291,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i,SV64: $i,SV58: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SV58 @ SV64 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV58 @ SV64 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( a_holds @ ( key @ SV33 @ SV58 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[282]) ).
thf(292,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i,SV65: $i,SV59: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SV59 @ SV65 ) )
| ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV59 @ SV65 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SV59 @ ( pair @ SV45 @ ( encrypt @ SV15 @ SV33 ) ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[283]) ).
thf(293,plain,
! [SV55: $i,SV51: $i,SV46: $i,SV35: $i,SV28: $i,SV17: $i,SV2: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ SV35 @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV51 @ SV2 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV55 @ SV28 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( a_nonce @ SV35 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SV28 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SV35 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV55 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) @ SV17 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[284]) ).
thf(294,plain,
! [SV36: $i,SV21: $i,SV6: $i,SV31: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ SV31 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV6 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV21 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ SV36 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV6 @ SV21 @ SV31 @ SV36 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[285]) ).
thf(295,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ! [SY111: $i,SY112: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY111 @ SY112 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV13 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[286]) ).
thf(296,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ! [SY113: $i,SY114: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY113 @ SY114 ) )
| ( intruder_message @ SV26 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[287]) ).
thf(297,plain,
! [SV66: $i,SV60: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV60 @ SV66 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV60 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[288]) ).
thf(298,plain,
! [SV62: $i,SV61: $i,SV14: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SV61 @ SV62 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV14 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[289]) ).
thf(299,plain,
! [SV63: $i,SV57: $i,SV14: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ ( triple @ SV14 @ SV57 @ SV63 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV57 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[290]) ).
thf(300,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i,SV64: $i,SV58: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SV58 @ SV64 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV58 @ SV64 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( a_holds @ ( key @ SV33 @ SV58 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[291]) ).
thf(301,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i,SV65: $i,SV59: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SV59 @ SV65 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV59 @ SV65 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SV59 @ ( pair @ SV45 @ ( encrypt @ SV15 @ SV33 ) ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[292]) ).
thf(302,plain,
! [SV55: $i,SV51: $i,SV46: $i,SV35: $i,SV28: $i,SV17: $i,SV2: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ SV35 @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV51 @ SV2 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV55 @ SV28 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( a_nonce @ SV35 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SV28 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SV35 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV55 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) @ SV17 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[293]) ).
thf(303,plain,
! [SV31: $i,SV6: $i,SV21: $i,SV36: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ SV36 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV21 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV6 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV31 )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV6 @ SV21 @ SV31 @ SV36 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[294]) ).
thf(304,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY111: $i,SY112: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY111 @ SY112 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV13 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[295]) ).
thf(305,plain,
! [SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY113: $i,SY114: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SY113 @ SY114 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV26 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[296]) ).
thf(306,plain,
! [SV66: $i,SV60: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV60 @ SV66 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV60 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[297]) ).
thf(307,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i,SV64: $i,SV58: $i] :
( ( ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SV58 @ SV64 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV58 @ SV64 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( a_holds @ ( key @ SV33 @ SV58 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[300]) ).
thf(308,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i,SV65: $i,SV59: $i] :
( ( ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SV59 @ SV65 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV59 @ SV65 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SV59 @ ( pair @ SV45 @ ( encrypt @ SV15 @ SV33 ) ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[301]) ).
thf(309,plain,
! [SV55: $i,SV46: $i,SV35: $i,SV28: $i,SV17: $i,SV2: $i,SV51: $i] :
( ( ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV51 @ SV2 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ SV35 @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV55 @ SV28 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( a_nonce @ SV35 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SV28 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SV35 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV55 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) @ SV17 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[302]) ).
thf(310,plain,
! [SV67: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY156: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV67 @ SY156 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV13 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[304]) ).
thf(311,plain,
! [SV68: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ( ! [SY157: $i] :
~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV68 @ SY157 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV26 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[305]) ).
thf(312,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i,SV64: $i,SV58: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV58 @ SV64 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SV58 @ SV64 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( a_holds @ ( key @ SV33 @ SV58 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[307]) ).
thf(313,plain,
! [SV15: $i,SV45: $i,SV27: $i,SV33: $i,SV65: $i,SV59: $i] :
( ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ a @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV59 @ SV65 @ SV33 @ SV27 ) @ at ) @ SV45 @ SV15 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( a_stored @ ( pair @ SV59 @ SV65 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ a @ SV59 @ ( pair @ SV45 @ ( encrypt @ SV15 @ SV33 ) ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[308]) ).
thf(314,plain,
! [SV51: $i,SV46: $i,SV35: $i,SV17: $i,SV2: $i,SV28: $i,SV55: $i] :
( ( ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV55 @ SV28 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ SV35 @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV51 @ SV2 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( a_nonce @ SV35 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SV28 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SV35 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV55 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) @ SV17 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[309]) ).
thf(315,plain,
! [SV69: $i,SV67: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV67 @ SV69 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV13 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[310]) ).
thf(316,plain,
! [SV70: $i,SV68: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV68 @ SV70 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV26 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[311]) ).
thf(317,plain,
! [SV55: $i,SV46: $i,SV28: $i,SV17: $i,SV2: $i,SV51: $i,SV35: $i] :
( ( ( a_nonce @ SV35 )
= $false )
| ( ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV51 @ SV2 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ SV2 @ t @ ( triple @ SV2 @ SV17 @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ SV35 @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( t_holds @ ( key @ SV55 @ SV28 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( message @ ( sent @ t @ SV28 @ ( triple @ ( encrypt @ ( quadruple @ SV2 @ SV35 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV55 ) @ ( encrypt @ ( triple @ SV28 @ ( generate_key @ SV35 ) @ SV46 ) @ SV51 ) @ SV17 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[314]) ).
thf(318,plain,
! [SV69: $i,SV67: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV67 @ SV69 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV13 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[315]) ).
thf(319,plain,
! [SV70: $i,SV68: $i,SV26: $i,SV13: $i] :
( ( ( intruder_message @ ( quadruple @ SV13 @ SV26 @ SV68 @ SV70 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( intruder_message @ SV26 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[316]) ).
thf(320,plain,
$false = $true,
inference(fo_atp_e,[status(thm)],[78,319,318,317,313,312,306,303,299,298,279,276,275,274,273,272,270,266,247,246,234,221,216,197,191,190,183,141,103,90,89,88,85,84,83,81,80,79]) ).
thf(321,plain,
$false,
inference(solved_all_splits,[solved_all_splits(join,[])],[320]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.10/0.12 % Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.10/0.13 % Command : leo --timeout %d --proofoutput 1 --foatp e --atp e=./eprover %s
% 0.13/0.34 % Computer : n006.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % WCLimit : 600
% 0.13/0.34 % DateTime : Wed Jun 15 09:16:11 EDT 2022
% 0.13/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 0.13/0.37
% 0.13/0.37 No.of.Axioms: 28
% 0.13/0.37
% 0.13/0.37 Length.of.Defs: 0
% 0.13/0.37
% 0.13/0.37 Contains.Choice.Funs: false
% 0.13/0.40 (rf:0,axioms:28,ps:3,u:6,ude:true,rLeibEQ:true,rAndEQ:true,use_choice:true,use_extuni:true,use_extcnf_combined:true,expand_extuni:false,foatp:e,atp_timeout:600,atp_calls_frequency:10,ordering:none,proof_output:1,protocol_output:false,clause_count:30,loop_count:0,foatp_calls:0,translation:fof_full).......................
% 0.42/0.61
% 0.42/0.61 ********************************
% 0.42/0.61 * All subproblems solved! *
% 0.42/0.61 ********************************
% 0.42/0.61 % SZS status Theorem for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p : (rf:0,axioms:28,ps:3,u:6,ude:true,rLeibEQ:true,rAndEQ:true,use_choice:true,use_extuni:true,use_extcnf_combined:true,expand_extuni:false,foatp:e,atp_timeout:74,atp_calls_frequency:10,ordering:none,proof_output:1,protocol_output:false,clause_count:320,loop_count:0,foatp_calls:1,translation:fof_full)
% 0.45/0.64
% 0.45/0.64 %**** Beginning of derivation protocol ****
% 0.45/0.64 % SZS output start CNFRefutation
% See solution above
% 0.45/0.64
% 0.45/0.64 %**** End of derivation protocol ****
% 0.45/0.64 %**** no. of clauses in derivation: 321 ****
% 0.45/0.64 %**** clause counter: 320 ****
% 0.45/0.64
% 0.45/0.64 % SZS status Theorem for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p : (rf:0,axioms:28,ps:3,u:6,ude:true,rLeibEQ:true,rAndEQ:true,use_choice:true,use_extuni:true,use_extcnf_combined:true,expand_extuni:false,foatp:e,atp_timeout:74,atp_calls_frequency:10,ordering:none,proof_output:1,protocol_output:false,clause_count:320,loop_count:0,foatp_calls:1,translation:fof_full)
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------