TSTP Solution File: SWV014+1 by Enigma---0.5.1
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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Enigma---0.5.1
% Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : enigmatic-eprover.py %s %d 1
% Computer : n024.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 600s
% DateTime : Wed Jul 20 17:45:19 EDT 2022
% Result : Theorem 8.97s 2.60s
% Output : CNFRefutation 8.97s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 8
% Number of leaves : 16
% Syntax : Number of clauses : 47 ( 17 unt; 0 nHn; 47 RR)
% Number of literals : 99 ( 0 equ; 57 neg)
% Maximal clause size : 4 ( 2 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 8 ( 7 usr; 1 prp; 0-1 aty)
% Number of functors : 12 ( 12 usr; 5 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 68 ( 17 sgn)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(i_0_10,plain,
( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_10) ).
cnf(i_0_3,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_3) ).
cnf(i_0_9,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_9) ).
cnf(i_0_12,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X3))
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_12) ).
cnf(i_0_11,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_11) ).
cnf(i_0_31,plain,
( message(sent(X1,X2,X3))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_31) ).
cnf(i_0_8,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_8) ).
cnf(i_0_2,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_2) ).
cnf(i_0_17,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,X3,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_17) ).
cnf(i_0_27,plain,
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_27) ).
cnf(i_0_33,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_33) ).
cnf(i_0_32,plain,
( intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_32) ).
cnf(i_0_21,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_21) ).
cnf(i_0_38,negated_conjecture,
( ~ b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_38) ).
cnf(i_0_20,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_20) ).
cnf(i_0_18,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-gs9e0zio/lgb.p',i_0_18) ).
cnf(c_0_55,plain,
( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))) ),
i_0_10 ).
cnf(c_0_56,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
i_0_3 ).
cnf(c_0_57,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
i_0_9 ).
cnf(c_0_58,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X3))
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))) ),
i_0_12 ).
cnf(c_0_59,plain,
b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_56]),c_0_57])]) ).
cnf(c_0_60,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))) ),
i_0_11 ).
cnf(c_0_61,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_58,c_0_59]) ).
cnf(c_0_62,plain,
( message(sent(X1,X2,X3))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3) ),
i_0_31 ).
cnf(c_0_63,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
i_0_8 ).
cnf(c_0_64,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
i_0_2 ).
cnf(c_0_65,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,X3,X1)) ),
i_0_17 ).
cnf(c_0_66,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_60,c_0_56]),c_0_57])]) ).
cnf(c_0_67,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61,c_0_62]),c_0_63]),c_0_64])]) ).
cnf(c_0_68,plain,
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
i_0_27 ).
cnf(c_0_69,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3)) ),
i_0_33 ).
cnf(c_0_70,plain,
( intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
i_0_32 ).
cnf(c_0_71,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)) ),
i_0_21 ).
cnf(c_0_72,plain,
intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65,c_0_66]) ).
cnf(c_0_73,negated_conjecture,
( ~ b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
i_0_38 ).
cnf(c_0_74,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67,c_0_68]) ).
cnf(c_0_75,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_69,c_0_70]) ).
cnf(c_0_76,plain,
intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_71,c_0_72]) ).
cnf(c_0_77,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ b_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_73,c_0_70]),c_0_63])]) ).
cnf(c_0_78,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)) ),
i_0_20 ).
cnf(c_0_79,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)) ),
i_0_18 ).
cnf(c_0_80,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65,c_0_56]) ).
cnf(c_0_81,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X2,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74,c_0_75]),c_0_76])]),c_0_77]) ).
cnf(c_0_82,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_78,c_0_72]) ).
cnf(c_0_83,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_79,c_0_80]) ).
cnf(c_0_84,plain,
~ party_of_protocol(X1),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_81,c_0_82]),c_0_83])]) ).
cnf(c_0_85,plain,
$false,
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[c_0_63,c_0_84]),
[proof] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.07/0.12 % Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.07/0.13 % Command : enigmatic-eprover.py %s %d 1
% 0.12/0.34 % Computer : n024.cluster.edu
% 0.12/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.12/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.12/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.12/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.12/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.12/0.34 % WCLimit : 600
% 0.12/0.34 % DateTime : Wed Jun 15 09:19:20 EDT 2022
% 0.12/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 0.19/0.45 # ENIGMATIC: Selected complete mode:
% 8.97/2.60 # ENIGMATIC: Solved by autoschedule-lgb:
% 8.97/2.60 # No SInE strategy applied
% 8.97/2.60 # Trying AutoSched0 for 150 seconds
% 8.97/2.60 # AutoSched0-Mode selected heuristic G_____0026_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_S4S
% 8.97/2.60 # and selection function SelectNewComplexAHPNS.
% 8.97/2.60 #
% 8.97/2.60 # Preprocessing time : 0.023 s
% 8.97/2.60
% 8.97/2.60 # Proof found!
% 8.97/2.60 # SZS status Theorem
% 8.97/2.60 # SZS output start CNFRefutation
% See solution above
% 8.97/2.60 # Training examples: 0 positive, 0 negative
% 8.97/2.60
% 8.97/2.60 # -------------------------------------------------
% 8.97/2.60 # User time : 0.026 s
% 8.97/2.60 # System time : 0.007 s
% 8.97/2.60 # Total time : 0.032 s
% 8.97/2.60 # Maximum resident set size: 7124 pages
% 8.97/2.60
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------