TSTP Solution File: SWV013-1 by Mace4---1109a
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- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Mace4---1109a
% Problem : SWV013-1 : TPTP v6.4.0. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : mace4 -t %d -f %s
% Computer : n136.star.cs.uiowa.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2609 0 2.40GHz
% Memory : 32218.75MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-327.36.3.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% DateTime : Wed Feb 8 10:07:01 EST 2017
% Result : Satisfiable 0.06s
% Output : FiniteModel 0.06s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : None (Parsing solution fails)
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 0
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----WARNING: Could not form TPTP format derivation
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.03 % Problem : SWV013-1 : TPTP v6.4.0. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.04 % Command : mace4 -t %d -f %s
% 0.03/0.23 % Computer : n136.star.cs.uiowa.edu
% 0.03/0.23 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.03/0.23 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2609 0 @ 2.40GHz
% 0.03/0.23 % Memory : 32218.75MB
% 0.03/0.23 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-327.36.3.el7.x86_64
% 0.03/0.23 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.03/0.23 % DateTime : Tue Feb 7 22:56:32 CST 2017
% 0.03/0.23 % CPUTime :
% 0.06/0.43 % SZS status Satisfiable
% 0.06/0.43 ============================== Mace4 =================================
% 0.06/0.43 Mace4 (32) version 2009-11A, November 2009.
% 0.06/0.43 Process 19391 was started by sandbox2 on n136.star.cs.uiowa.edu,
% 0.06/0.43 Tue Feb 7 22:56:32 2017
% 0.06/0.43 The command was "/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/mace4 -t 300 -f /tmp/Mace4_input_19358_n136.star.cs.uiowa.edu".
% 0.06/0.43 ============================== end of head ===========================
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 ============================== INPUT =================================
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 % Reading from file /tmp/Mace4_input_19358_n136.star.cs.uiowa.edu
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 set(prolog_style_variables).
% 0.06/0.43 set(print_models_tabular).
% 0.06/0.43 % set(print_models_tabular) -> clear(print_models).
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 formulas(sos).
% 0.06/0.43 party_of_protocol(a) # label(a_is_party_of_protocol_2) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))) # label(a_sent_message_i_to_b_3) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)) # label(a_stored_message_i_4) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 message(sent(a,A,pair(E,encrypt(F,C)))) | -a_stored(pair(A,B)) | -message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,B,C,D),at),E,F))) # label(a_forwards_secure_5) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 party_of_protocol(b) # label(b_is_party_of_protocol_8) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) # label(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(B),encrypt(triple(A,B,generate_expiration_time(B)),bt)))) | -fresh_to_b(B) | -message(sent(A,b,pair(A,B))) # label(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 t_holds(key(at,a)) # label(t_holds_key_at_for_a_13) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 t_holds(key(bt,b)) # label(t_holds_key_bt_for_b_14) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 party_of_protocol(t) # label(t_is_party_of_protocol_15) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 message(sent(t,C,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,D,generate_key(D),E),G),encrypt(triple(C,generate_key(D),E),F),B))) | -a_nonce(D) | -message(sent(A,t,triple(A,B,encrypt(triple(C,D,E),F)))) | -t_holds(key(G,C)) | -t_holds(key(F,A)) # label(server_t_generates_key_16) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(C) | -message(sent(A,B,C)) # label(intruder_can_record_17) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -intruder_message(pair(A,B)) # label(intruder_decomposes_pairs_18) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(B) | -intruder_message(pair(A,B)) # label(intruder_decomposes_pairs_19) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)) # label(intruder_decomposes_triples_20) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(B) | -intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)) # label(intruder_decomposes_triples_21) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(C) | -intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)) # label(intruder_decomposes_triples_22) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)) # label(intruder_decomposes_quadruples_23) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(B) | -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)) # label(intruder_decomposes_quadruples_24) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(C) | -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)) # label(intruder_decomposes_quadruples_25) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(D) | -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)) # label(intruder_decomposes_quadruples_26) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(pair(A,B)) | -intruder_message(B) | -intruder_message(A) # label(intruder_composes_pairs_27) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)) | -intruder_message(C) | -intruder_message(B) | -intruder_message(A) # label(intruder_composes_triples_28) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)) | -intruder_message(D) | -intruder_message(C) | -intruder_message(B) | -intruder_message(A) # label(intruder_composes_quadruples_29) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(B) | -intruder_holds(key(B,C)) | -intruder_message(encrypt(A,B)) | -party_of_protocol(C) # label(intruder_interception_30) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 message(sent(B,C,A)) | -intruder_message(A) | -party_of_protocol(C) | -party_of_protocol(B) # label(intruder_message_sent_31) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_holds(key(A,B)) | -intruder_message(A) | -party_of_protocol(B) # label(intruder_holds_key_32) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(encrypt(A,B)) | -intruder_holds(key(B,C)) | -intruder_message(A) | -party_of_protocol(C) # label(intruder_key_encrypts_33) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 a_nonce(an_a_nonce) # label(an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce_34) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(A)) # label(generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces_36) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(A)) # label(generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces_37) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 end_of_list.
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 % From the command line: assign(max_seconds, 300).
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 ============================== end of input ==========================
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 ============================== PROCESS NON-CLAUSAL FORMULAS ==========
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 % Formulas that are not ordinary clauses:
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 ============================== end of process non-clausal formulas ===
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 ============================== CLAUSES FOR SEARCH ====================
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 formulas(mace4_clauses).
% 0.06/0.43 party_of_protocol(a) # label(a_is_party_of_protocol_2) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))) # label(a_sent_message_i_to_b_3) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)) # label(a_stored_message_i_4) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 message(sent(a,A,pair(B,encrypt(C,D)))) | -a_stored(pair(A,E)) | -message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,E,D,F),at),B,C))) # label(a_forwards_secure_5) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 party_of_protocol(b) # label(b_is_party_of_protocol_8) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) # label(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(A),encrypt(triple(B,A,generate_expiration_time(A)),bt)))) | -fresh_to_b(A) | -message(sent(B,b,pair(B,A))) # label(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 t_holds(key(at,a)) # label(t_holds_key_at_for_a_13) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 t_holds(key(bt,b)) # label(t_holds_key_bt_for_b_14) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 party_of_protocol(t) # label(t_is_party_of_protocol_15) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 message(sent(t,A,triple(encrypt(quadruple(B,C,generate_key(C),D),E),encrypt(triple(A,generate_key(C),D),F),V6))) | -a_nonce(C) | -message(sent(B,t,triple(B,V6,encrypt(triple(A,C,D),F)))) | -t_holds(key(E,A)) | -t_holds(key(F,B)) # label(server_t_generates_key_16) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -message(sent(B,C,A)) # label(intruder_can_record_17) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -intruder_message(pair(A,B)) # label(intruder_decomposes_pairs_18) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -intruder_message(pair(B,A)) # label(intruder_decomposes_pairs_19) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)) # label(intruder_decomposes_triples_20) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -intruder_message(triple(B,A,C)) # label(intruder_decomposes_triples_21) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -intruder_message(triple(B,C,A)) # label(intruder_decomposes_triples_22) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)) # label(intruder_decomposes_quadruples_23) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -intruder_message(quadruple(B,A,C,D)) # label(intruder_decomposes_quadruples_24) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -intruder_message(quadruple(B,C,A,D)) # label(intruder_decomposes_quadruples_25) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -intruder_message(quadruple(B,C,D,A)) # label(intruder_decomposes_quadruples_26) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(pair(A,B)) | -intruder_message(B) | -intruder_message(A) # label(intruder_composes_pairs_27) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)) | -intruder_message(C) | -intruder_message(B) | -intruder_message(A) # label(intruder_composes_triples_28) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)) | -intruder_message(D) | -intruder_message(C) | -intruder_message(B) | -intruder_message(A) # label(intruder_composes_quadruples_29) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(A) | -intruder_holds(key(A,B)) | -intruder_message(encrypt(C,A)) | -party_of_protocol(B) # label(intruder_interception_30) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 message(sent(A,B,C)) | -intruder_message(C) | -party_of_protocol(B) | -party_of_protocol(A) # label(intruder_message_sent_31) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_holds(key(A,B)) | -intruder_message(A) | -party_of_protocol(B) # label(intruder_holds_key_32) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message(encrypt(A,B)) | -intruder_holds(key(B,C)) | -intruder_message(A) | -party_of_protocol(C) # label(intruder_key_encrypts_33) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 a_nonce(an_a_nonce) # label(an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce_34) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(A)) # label(generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces_36) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(A)) # label(generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces_37) # label(axiom).
% 0.06/0.43 end_of_list.
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 ============================== end of clauses for search =============
% 0.06/0.43 % SZS output start FiniteModel
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 % There are no natural numbers in the input.
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 a : 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 an_a_nonce : 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 at : 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 b : 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 bt : 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 t : 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 generate_b_nonce :
% 0.06/0.43 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 -------
% 0.06/0.43 0 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 generate_expiration_time :
% 0.06/0.43 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 -------
% 0.06/0.43 0 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 generate_key :
% 0.06/0.43 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 -------
% 0.06/0.43 0 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 encrypt :
% 0.06/0.43 | 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 --+----
% 0.06/0.43 0 | 0 0
% 0.06/0.43 1 | 0 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 key :
% 0.06/0.43 | 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 --+----
% 0.06/0.43 0 | 0 0
% 0.06/0.43 1 | 0 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 pair :
% 0.06/0.43 | 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 --+----
% 0.06/0.43 0 | 0 0
% 0.06/0.43 1 | 0 0
% 0.06/0.43 sent(0,0,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 sent(0,0,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 sent(0,1,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 sent(0,1,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 sent(1,0,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 sent(1,0,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 sent(1,1,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 sent(1,1,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 triple(0,0,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 triple(0,0,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 triple(0,1,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 triple(0,1,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 triple(1,0,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 triple(1,0,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 triple(1,1,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 triple(1,1,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(0,0,0,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(0,0,0,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(0,0,1,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(0,0,1,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(0,1,0,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(0,1,0,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(0,1,1,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(0,1,1,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(1,0,0,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(1,0,0,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(1,0,1,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(1,0,1,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(1,1,0,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(1,1,0,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(1,1,1,0) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43 quadruple(1,1,1,1) = 0.
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 a_nonce :
% 0.06/0.43 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 -------
% 0.06/0.43 1 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 a_stored :
% 0.06/0.43 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 -------
% 0.06/0.43 1 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 fresh_to_b :
% 0.06/0.43 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 -------
% 0.06/0.43 1 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_holds :
% 0.06/0.43 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 -------
% 0.06/0.43 1 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 intruder_message :
% 0.06/0.43 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 -------
% 0.06/0.43 1 1
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 message :
% 0.06/0.43 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 -------
% 0.06/0.43 1 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 party_of_protocol :
% 0.06/0.43 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 -------
% 0.06/0.43 1 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 t_holds :
% 0.06/0.43 0 1
% 0.06/0.43 -------
% 0.06/0.43 1 0
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 % SZS output end FiniteModel
% 0.06/0.43 ------ process 19391 exit (max_models) ------
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 User_CPU=0.01, System_CPU=0.00, Wall_clock=0.
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 Exiting with 1 model.
% 0.06/0.43
% 0.06/0.43 Process 19391 exit (max_models) Tue Feb 7 22:56:32 2017
% 0.06/0.43 The process finished Tue Feb 7 22:56:32 2017
% 0.06/0.43 Mace4 ended
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------