TSTP Solution File: SWV013+1 by Otter---3.3
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- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Otter---3.3
% Problem : SWV013+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : otter-tptp-script %s
% Computer : n019.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Wed Jul 27 13:19:41 EDT 2022
% Result : Timeout 299.83s 300.01s
% Output : None
% Verified :
% SZS Type : -
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----No solution output by system
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.07/0.12 % Problem : SWV013+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.07/0.13 % Command : otter-tptp-script %s
% 0.14/0.34 % Computer : n019.cluster.edu
% 0.14/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.14/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.14/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.14/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.14/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.14/0.34 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.14/0.34 % DateTime : Wed Jul 27 05:49:37 EDT 2022
% 0.14/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 1.75/1.92 ----- Otter 3.3f, August 2004 -----
% 1.75/1.92 The process was started by sandbox on n019.cluster.edu,
% 1.75/1.92 Wed Jul 27 05:49:37 2022
% 1.75/1.92 The command was "./otter". The process ID is 10023.
% 1.75/1.92
% 1.75/1.92 set(prolog_style_variables).
% 1.75/1.92 set(auto).
% 1.75/1.92 dependent: set(auto1).
% 1.75/1.92 dependent: set(process_input).
% 1.75/1.92 dependent: clear(print_kept).
% 1.75/1.92 dependent: clear(print_new_demod).
% 1.75/1.92 dependent: clear(print_back_demod).
% 1.75/1.92 dependent: clear(print_back_sub).
% 1.75/1.92 dependent: set(control_memory).
% 1.75/1.92 dependent: assign(max_mem, 12000).
% 1.75/1.92 dependent: assign(pick_given_ratio, 4).
% 1.75/1.92 dependent: assign(stats_level, 1).
% 1.75/1.92 dependent: assign(max_seconds, 10800).
% 1.75/1.92 clear(print_given).
% 1.75/1.92
% 1.75/1.92 formula_list(usable).
% 1.75/1.92 a_holds(key(at,t)).
% 1.75/1.92 party_of_protocol(a).
% 1.75/1.92 message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))).
% 1.75/1.92 a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)).
% 1.75/1.92 all U V W X Y Z (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(Y,Z,W,V),at),X,U)))&a_stored(pair(Y,Z))->message(sent(a,Y,pair(X,encrypt(U,W))))&a_holds(key(W,Y))).
% 1.75/1.92 b_holds(key(bt,t)).
% 1.75/1.92 party_of_protocol(b).
% 1.75/1.92 fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce).
% 1.75/1.92 all U V (message(sent(U,b,pair(U,V)))&fresh_to_b(V)->message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(V),encrypt(triple(U,V,generate_expiration_time(V)),bt))))&b_stored(pair(U,V))).
% 1.75/1.92 all V X Y (message(sent(X,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X,V,generate_expiration_time(Y)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(Y),V))))&b_stored(pair(X,Y))->b_holds(key(V,X))).
% 1.75/1.92 t_holds(key(at,a)).
% 1.75/1.92 t_holds(key(bt,b)).
% 1.75/1.92 party_of_protocol(t).
% 1.75/1.92 all U V W X Y Z X1 (message(sent(U,t,triple(U,V,encrypt(triple(W,X,Y),Z))))&t_holds(key(Z,U))&t_holds(key(X1,W))&a_nonce(X)->message(sent(t,W,triple(encrypt(quadruple(U,X,generate_key(X),Y),X1),encrypt(triple(W,generate_key(X),Y),Z),V)))).
% 1.75/1.92 all U V W (message(sent(U,V,W))->intruder_message(W)).
% 1.75/1.92 all U V (intruder_message(pair(U,V))->intruder_message(U)&intruder_message(V)).
% 1.75/1.92 all U V W (intruder_message(triple(U,V,W))->intruder_message(U)&intruder_message(V)&intruder_message(W)).
% 1.75/1.92 all U V W X (intruder_message(quadruple(U,V,W,X))->intruder_message(U)&intruder_message(V)&intruder_message(W)&intruder_message(X)).
% 1.75/1.92 all U V (intruder_message(U)&intruder_message(V)->intruder_message(pair(U,V))).
% 1.75/1.92 all U V W (intruder_message(U)&intruder_message(V)&intruder_message(W)->intruder_message(triple(U,V,W))).
% 1.75/1.92 all U V W X (intruder_message(U)&intruder_message(V)&intruder_message(W)&intruder_message(X)->intruder_message(quadruple(U,V,W,X))).
% 1.75/1.92 all U V W (intruder_message(encrypt(U,V))&intruder_holds(key(V,W))&party_of_protocol(W)->intruder_message(V)).
% 1.75/1.92 all U V W (intruder_message(U)&party_of_protocol(V)&party_of_protocol(W)->message(sent(V,W,U))).
% 1.75/1.92 all V W (intruder_message(V)&party_of_protocol(W)->intruder_holds(key(V,W))).
% 1.75/1.92 all U V W (intruder_message(U)&intruder_holds(key(V,W))&party_of_protocol(W)->intruder_message(encrypt(U,V))).
% 1.75/1.92 a_nonce(an_a_nonce).
% 1.75/1.92 all U (-a_nonce(generate_key(U))).
% 1.75/1.92 all U (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(U))&a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(U))).
% 1.75/1.92 end_of_list.
% 1.75/1.92
% 1.75/1.92 -------> usable clausifies to:
% 1.75/1.92
% 1.75/1.92 list(usable).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] a_holds(key(at,t)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] party_of_protocol(a).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(Y,Z,W,V),at),X,U)))| -a_stored(pair(Y,Z))|message(sent(a,Y,pair(X,encrypt(U,W)))).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(Y,Z,W,V),at),X,U)))| -a_stored(pair(Y,Z))|a_holds(key(W,Y)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] b_holds(key(bt,t)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] party_of_protocol(b).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -message(sent(U,b,pair(U,V)))| -fresh_to_b(V)|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(V),encrypt(triple(U,V,generate_expiration_time(V)),bt)))).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -message(sent(U,b,pair(U,V)))| -fresh_to_b(V)|b_stored(pair(U,V)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -message(sent(X,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X,V,generate_expiration_time(Y)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(Y),V))))| -b_stored(pair(X,Y))|b_holds(key(V,X)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] t_holds(key(at,a)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] t_holds(key(bt,b)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] party_of_protocol(t).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -message(sent(U,t,triple(U,V,encrypt(triple(W,X,Y),Z))))| -t_holds(key(Z,U))| -t_holds(key(X1,W))| -a_nonce(X)|message(sent(t,W,triple(encrypt(quadruple(U,X,generate_key(X),Y),X1),encrypt(triple(W,generate_key(X),Y),Z),V))).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -message(sent(U,V,W))|intruder_message(W).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(pair(U,V))|intruder_message(U).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(pair(U,V))|intruder_message(V).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(triple(U,V,W))|intruder_message(U).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(triple(U,V,W))|intruder_message(V).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(triple(U,V,W))|intruder_message(W).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(quadruple(U,V,W,X))|intruder_message(U).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(quadruple(U,V,W,X))|intruder_message(V).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(quadruple(U,V,W,X))|intruder_message(W).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(quadruple(U,V,W,X))|intruder_message(X).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(U)| -intruder_message(V)|intruder_message(pair(U,V)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(U)| -intruder_message(V)| -intruder_message(W)|intruder_message(triple(U,V,W)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(U)| -intruder_message(V)| -intruder_message(W)| -intruder_message(X)|intruder_message(quadruple(U,V,W,X)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(encrypt(U,V))| -intruder_holds(key(V,W))| -party_of_protocol(W)|intruder_message(V).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(U)| -party_of_protocol(V)| -party_of_protocol(W)|message(sent(V,W,U)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(V)| -party_of_protocol(W)|intruder_holds(key(V,W)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -intruder_message(U)| -intruder_holds(key(V,W))| -party_of_protocol(W)|intruder_message(encrypt(U,V)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] a_nonce(an_a_nonce).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] -a_nonce(generate_key(U)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(U)).
% 1.75/1.92 0 [] a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(U)).
% 1.75/1.92 end_of_list.
% 1.75/1.92
% 1.75/1.92 SCAN INPUT: prop=0, horn=1, equality=0, symmetry=0, max_lits=5.
% 1.75/1.92
% 1.75/1.92 This is a Horn set without equality. The strategy will
% 1.75/1.92 be hyperresolution, with satellites in sos and nuclei
% 1.75/1.92 in usable.
% 1.75/1.92
% 1.75/1.92 dependent: set(hyper_res).
% 1.75/1.92 dependent: clear(order_hyper).
% 1.75/1.92
% 1.75/1.92 ------------> process usable:
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=27): 1 [] -message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,B,C,D),at),E,F)))| -a_stored(pair(A,B))|message(sent(a,A,pair(E,encrypt(F,C)))).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=22): 2 [] -message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,B,C,D),at),E,F)))| -a_stored(pair(A,B))|a_holds(key(C,A)).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=24): 3 [] -message(sent(A,b,pair(A,B)))| -fresh_to_b(B)|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(B),encrypt(triple(A,B,generate_expiration_time(B)),bt)))).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=13): 4 [] -message(sent(A,b,pair(A,B)))| -fresh_to_b(B)|b_stored(pair(A,B)).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=24): 5 [] -message(sent(A,b,pair(encrypt(triple(A,B,generate_expiration_time(C)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(C),B))))| -b_stored(pair(A,C))|b_holds(key(B,A)).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=44): 6 [] -message(sent(A,t,triple(A,B,encrypt(triple(C,D,E),F))))| -t_holds(key(F,A))| -t_holds(key(G,C))| -a_nonce(D)|message(sent(t,C,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,D,generate_key(D),E),G),encrypt(triple(C,generate_key(D),E),F),B))).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=7): 7 [] -message(sent(A,B,C))|intruder_message(C).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=6): 8 [] -intruder_message(pair(A,B))|intruder_message(A).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=6): 9 [] -intruder_message(pair(A,B))|intruder_message(B).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=7): 10 [] -intruder_message(triple(A,B,C))|intruder_message(A).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=7): 11 [] -intruder_message(triple(A,B,C))|intruder_message(B).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=7): 12 [] -intruder_message(triple(A,B,C))|intruder_message(C).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=8): 13 [] -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D))|intruder_message(A).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=8): 14 [] -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D))|intruder_message(B).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=8): 15 [] -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D))|intruder_message(C).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=8): 16 [] -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D))|intruder_message(D).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=8): 17 [] -intruder_message(A)| -intruder_message(B)|intruder_message(pair(A,B)).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=11): 18 [] -intruder_message(A)| -intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(C)|intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=14): 19 [] -intruder_message(A)| -intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(C)| -intruder_message(D)|intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=12): 20 [] -intruder_message(encrypt(A,B))| -intruder_holds(key(B,C))| -party_of_protocol(C)|intruder_message(B).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT (pick-wt=11): 21 [] -intruder_message(A)| -party_of_protocol(B)| -party_of_protocol(C)|message(sent(B,C,A)).
% 1.75/1.92 ** KEPT Alarm clock
% 299.83/300.01 Otter interrupted
% 299.83/300.01 PROOF NOT FOUND
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------