TSTP Solution File: ITP091^1 by Satallax---3.5
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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Satallax---3.5
% Problem : ITP091^1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v7.5.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : satallax -E eprover-ho -P picomus -M modes -p tstp -t %d %s
% Computer : n021.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 600s
% DateTime : Sun Jul 17 00:29:04 EDT 2022
% Result : Theorem 14.14s 14.24s
% Output : Proof 14.14s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : -
% Comments :
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%----WARNING: Could not form TPTP format derivation
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.07/0.12 % Problem : ITP091^1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v7.5.0.
% 0.07/0.12 % Command : satallax -E eprover-ho -P picomus -M modes -p tstp -t %d %s
% 0.14/0.33 % Computer : n021.cluster.edu
% 0.14/0.33 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.14/0.33 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.14/0.33 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.14/0.33 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.14/0.33 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.14/0.33 % WCLimit : 600
% 0.14/0.33 % DateTime : Thu Jun 2 21:56:32 EDT 2022
% 0.14/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 14.14/14.24 % SZS status Theorem
% 14.14/14.24 % Mode: mode507:USE_SINE=true:SINE_TOLERANCE=3.0:SINE_GENERALITY_THRESHOLD=0:SINE_RANK_LIMIT=1.:SINE_DEPTH=1
% 14.14/14.24 % Inferences: 99
% 14.14/14.24 % SZS output start Proof
% 14.14/14.24 thf(conj_0,conjecture,(~(((member_Secrecy_KS @ (secrecy_sKS @ secret)) @ (localSecrets @ q))))).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(h0,negated_conjecture,((member_Secrecy_KS @ (secrecy_sKS @ secret)) @ (localSecrets @ q)),inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[conj_0])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(ax98, axiom, (~(p7)|p242), file('<stdin>', ax98)).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(pax2, axiom, (p2=>(fm)=(fsecrecy_sKS @ fsecret)), file('<stdin>', pax2)).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(ax24, axiom, (~(p242)|p309), file('<stdin>', ax24)).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(ax334, axiom, p7, file('<stdin>', ax334)).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(nax316, axiom, (p316<=(~(fine @ fq @ (fsecrecy_sE @ fsecret))=>fmember_Secrecy_KS @ (fsecrecy_sKS @ fsecret) @ (flocalSecrets @ fq))), file('<stdin>', nax316)).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(ax339, axiom, p2, file('<stdin>', ax339)).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(pax69, axiom, (p69=>fmember_Secrecy_KS @ (fsecrecy_sKS @ fsecret) @ (flocalSecrets @ fq)), file('<stdin>', pax69)).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(nax1, axiom, (p1<=fknowle945212990e_know @ fq @ fm), file('<stdin>', nax1)).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(ax340, axiom, ~(p1), file('<stdin>', ax340)).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(ax17, axiom, (~(p309)|p315|~(p316)), file('<stdin>', ax17)).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(ax272, axiom, p69, file('<stdin>', ax272)).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(pax315, axiom, (p315=>fknowle945212990e_know @ fq @ (fsecrecy_sKS @ fsecret)), file('<stdin>', pax315)).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_12, plain, (~p7|p242), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax98])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_13, plain, (~p2|(fm)=(fsecrecy_sKS @ fsecret)), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[pax2])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_14, plain, (~p242|p309), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax24])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_15, plain, (p242|~p7), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_12])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_16, plain, p7, inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[ax334])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_17, plain, ((~fine @ fq @ (fsecrecy_sE @ fsecret)|p316)&(~fmember_Secrecy_KS @ (fsecrecy_sKS @ fsecret) @ (flocalSecrets @ fq)|p316)), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[nax316])])])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_18, plain, ((fm)=(fsecrecy_sKS @ fsecret)|~p2), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_13])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_19, plain, p2, inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[ax339])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_20, plain, (~p69|fmember_Secrecy_KS @ (fsecrecy_sKS @ fsecret) @ (flocalSecrets @ fq)), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[pax69])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_21, plain, (~fknowle945212990e_know @ fq @ fm|p1), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[nax1])])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_22, plain, ~p1, inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax340])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_23, plain, (~p309|p315|~p316), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax17])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_24, plain, (p309|~p242), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_25, plain, p242, inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_15, c_0_16])])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_26, plain, (p316|~fmember_Secrecy_KS @ (fsecrecy_sKS @ fsecret) @ (flocalSecrets @ fq)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_17])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_27, plain, (fsecrecy_sKS @ fsecret)=(fm), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_18, c_0_19])])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_28, plain, (fmember_Secrecy_KS @ (fsecrecy_sKS @ fsecret) @ (flocalSecrets @ fq)|~p69), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_20])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_29, plain, p69, inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[ax272])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_30, plain, (~p315|fknowle945212990e_know @ fq @ (fsecrecy_sKS @ fsecret)), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[pax315])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_31, plain, (p1|~fknowle945212990e_know @ fq @ fm), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_21])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_32, plain, ~p1, inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_22])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_33, plain, (p315|~p309|~p316), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_23])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_34, plain, p309, inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_24, c_0_25])])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_35, plain, (p316|~fmember_Secrecy_KS @ fm @ (flocalSecrets @ fq)), inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_26, c_0_27])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_36, plain, fmember_Secrecy_KS @ fm @ (flocalSecrets @ fq), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_28, c_0_27]), c_0_29])])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_37, plain, (fknowle945212990e_know @ fq @ (fsecrecy_sKS @ fsecret)|~p315), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_30])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_38, plain, ~fknowle945212990e_know @ fq @ fm, inference(sr,[status(thm)],[c_0_31, c_0_32])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_39, plain, (p315|~p316), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_33, c_0_34])])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_40, plain, p316, inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_35, c_0_36])])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_41, plain, ~p315, inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_37, c_0_27]), c_0_38])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(c_0_42, plain, ($false), inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_39, c_0_40])]), c_0_41]), ['proof']).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(1,plain,$false,inference(eprover,[status(thm),assumptions([h0])],[])).
% 14.14/14.24 thf(0,theorem,(~(((member_Secrecy_KS @ (secrecy_sKS @ secret)) @ (localSecrets @ q)))),inference(contra,[status(thm),contra(discharge,[h0])],[1,h0])).
% 14.14/14.24 % SZS output end Proof
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