0.00/0.03 % Problem : theBenchmark.p : TPTP v0.0.0. Released v0.0.0. 0.00/0.04 % Command : vampire -m 90000 --mode casc -t %d %s 0.02/0.27 % Computer : n117.star.cs.uiowa.edu 0.02/0.27 % Model : x86_64 x86_64 0.02/0.27 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2609 0 @ 2.40GHz 0.02/0.27 % Memory : 32218.625MB 0.02/0.27 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.2.2.el7.x86_64 0.02/0.27 % CPULimit : 300 0.02/0.27 % DateTime : Sat Jul 14 04:35:09 CDT 2018 0.02/0.27 % CPUTime : 0.06/0.27 Hi Geoff, go and have some cold beer while I am trying to solve this very hard problem! 0.06/0.27 % remaining time: 5999 next slice time: 4 0.06/0.31 lrs+1010_5:4_afp=100000:afq=1.2:anc=none:cond=on:fsr=off:ile=on:irw=on:nm=64:nwc=1:stl=30:sac=on:sp=occurrence:urr=on_2 on theBenchmark 0.56/0.80 % (37380)Time limit reached! 0.56/0.80 % ------------------------------ 0.56/0.80 % Version: Vampire 4.2 (commit c955596 on 2017-07-21 22:07:53 +0100) 0.56/0.80 % Termination reason: Time limit 0.56/0.80 % Termination phase: Saturation 0.56/0.80 0.56/0.80 % Memory used [KB]: 36971 0.56/0.80 % Time elapsed: 0.500 s 0.56/0.80 % ------------------------------ 0.56/0.80 % ------------------------------ 0.56/0.81 % remaining time: 5994 next slice time: 4 0.56/0.81 dis+1011_10_add=large:afr=on:afp=4000:afq=1.0:amm=off:anc=none:lma=on:nm=64:nwc=4:sac=on:sp=occurrence_2 on theBenchmark 0.56/0.81 % Refutation found. Thanks to Tanya! 0.56/0.81 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark 0.56/0.81 % SZS output start Proof for theBenchmark 0.56/0.81 fof(f4,axiom,( 0.56/0.81 fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f5,conjecture,( 0.56/0.81 ? [X0] : (b_holds(key(X0,a)) & intruder_holds(key(X0,b)))), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co1)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f6,negated_conjecture,( 0.56/0.81 ~? [X0] : (b_holds(key(X0,a)) & intruder_holds(key(X0,b)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(negated_conjecture,[],[f5])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f7,axiom,( 0.56/0.81 message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f10,axiom,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1,X2] : (message(sent(X0,X1,X2)) => intruder_message(X2))), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_can_record)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f11,axiom,( 0.56/0.81 party_of_protocol(a)), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f13,axiom,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1] : ((message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) & fresh_to_b(X1)) => (b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) & message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))))), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f14,axiom,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1] : ((intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1)) => intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)))), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_pairs)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f19,axiom,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) => (intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X0)))), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_pairs)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f23,axiom,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) & party_of_protocol(X2) & intruder_message(X0)) => intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)))), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_key_encrypts)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f24,axiom,( 0.56/0.81 party_of_protocol(b)), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f25,axiom,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((party_of_protocol(X2) & party_of_protocol(X1) & intruder_message(X0)) => message(sent(X1,X2,X0)))), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_message_sent)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f26,axiom,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X1,X2] : ((intruder_message(X1) & party_of_protocol(X2)) => intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)))), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_holds_key)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f27,axiom,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1,X2] : (intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) => (intruder_message(X2) & intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X0)))), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f30,axiom,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X1,X3,X4] : ((message(sent(X3,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X3,X1,generate_expiration_time(X4)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X4),X1)))) & b_stored(pair(X3,X4))) => b_holds(key(X1,X3)))), 0.56/0.81 file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key)). 0.56/0.81 fof(f31,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1] : ((intruder_message(X0) & party_of_protocol(X1)) => intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(rectify,[],[f26])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f32,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) & b_stored(pair(X1,X2))) => b_holds(key(X0,X1)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(rectify,[],[f30])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f35,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0] : (~b_holds(key(X0,a)) | ~intruder_holds(key(X0,b)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f6])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f36,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1] : ((intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X0)) | ~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f19])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f37,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1] : ((b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) & message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))) | (~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) | ~fresh_to_b(X1)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f13])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f38,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1] : ((b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) & message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))) | ~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) | ~fresh_to_b(X1))), 0.56/0.81 inference(flattening,[],[f37])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f39,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) | (~intruder_message(X0) | ~party_of_protocol(X1)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f31])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f40,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~party_of_protocol(X1))), 0.56/0.81 inference(flattening,[],[f39])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f41,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) | (~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f14])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f42,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1))), 0.56/0.81 inference(flattening,[],[f41])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f43,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1,X2] : (intruder_message(X2) | ~message(sent(X0,X1,X2)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f10])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f44,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((intruder_message(X2) & intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X0)) | ~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f27])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f47,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1,X2] : (message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) | (~party_of_protocol(X2) | ~party_of_protocol(X1) | ~intruder_message(X0)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f25])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f48,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1,X2] : (message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) | ~party_of_protocol(X2) | ~party_of_protocol(X1) | ~intruder_message(X0))), 0.56/0.81 inference(flattening,[],[f47])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f49,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1,X2] : (intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) | (~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) | ~party_of_protocol(X2) | ~intruder_message(X0)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f23])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f50,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1,X2] : (intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) | ~party_of_protocol(X2) | ~intruder_message(X0))), 0.56/0.81 inference(flattening,[],[f49])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f53,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1,X2] : (b_holds(key(X0,X1)) | (~message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) | ~b_stored(pair(X1,X2))))), 0.56/0.81 inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f32])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f54,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ! [X0,X1,X2] : (b_holds(key(X0,X1)) | ~message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) | ~b_stored(pair(X1,X2)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(flattening,[],[f53])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f62,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0] : (~b_holds(key(X0,a)) | ~intruder_holds(key(X0,b))) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f35])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f63,plain,( 0.56/0.81 fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f4])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f65,plain,( 0.56/0.81 party_of_protocol(b)), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f24])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f67,plain,( 0.56/0.81 party_of_protocol(a)), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f11])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f72,plain,( 0.56/0.81 message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f7])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f76,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0,X1] : (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) | intruder_message(X0)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f36])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f77,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0,X1] : (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) | intruder_message(X1)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f36])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f78,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0,X1] : (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) | ~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) | ~fresh_to_b(X1)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f38])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f79,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0,X1] : (b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) | ~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) | ~fresh_to_b(X1)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f38])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f80,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~party_of_protocol(X1)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f40])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f81,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f42])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f82,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (~message(sent(X0,X1,X2)) | intruder_message(X2)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f43])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f84,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) | intruder_message(X1)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f44])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f85,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) | intruder_message(X2)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f44])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f87,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) | ~party_of_protocol(X2) | ~party_of_protocol(X1) | ~intruder_message(X0)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f48])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f88,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) | intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) | ~party_of_protocol(X2) | ~intruder_message(X0)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f50])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f90,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (~b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) | ~message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) | b_holds(key(X0,X1))) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f54])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f98,plain,( 0.56/0.81 intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f82,f72])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f99,plain,( 0.56/0.81 intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f98,f77])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f100,plain,( 0.56/0.81 intruder_message(a)), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f98,f76])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f107,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) | ~party_of_protocol(X2) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1) | ~party_of_protocol(X2)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f88,f80])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f108,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) | ~party_of_protocol(X2) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(duplicate_literal_removal,[],[f107])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f110,plain,( 0.56/0.81 spl0_0 <=> ! [X2] : ~party_of_protocol(X2)), 0.56/0.81 introduced(avatar_definition,[new_symbols(naming,[spl0_0])])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f111,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X2] : (~party_of_protocol(X2)) ) | ~spl0_0), 0.56/0.81 inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f110])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f113,plain,( 0.56/0.81 spl0_2 <=> ! [X1,X0] : (intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_message(X1) | ~intruder_message(X0))), 0.56/0.81 introduced(avatar_definition,[new_symbols(naming,[spl0_2])])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f114,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_message(X1) | ~intruder_message(X0)) ) | ~spl0_2), 0.56/0.81 inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f113])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f115,plain,( 0.56/0.81 spl0_0 | spl0_2), 0.56/0.81 inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f108,f113,f110])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f121,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0,X1] : (~fresh_to_b(X1) | ~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) | intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f78,f82])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f122,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0] : (~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,an_a_nonce))) | intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f121,f63])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f123,plain,( 0.56/0.81 intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f122,f72])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f124,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0] : (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))) | ~party_of_protocol(b) | ~party_of_protocol(X0) | ~intruder_message(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f122,f87])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f125,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0] : (~intruder_message(pair(X0,an_a_nonce)) | ~party_of_protocol(X0) | intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f124,f65])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f127,plain,( 0.56/0.81 intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f123,f84])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f140,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (b_holds(key(X1,X0)) | ~message(sent(X0,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1)))) | ~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X2))) | ~fresh_to_b(X2)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f90,f79])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f144,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0] : (~party_of_protocol(X0) | intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f125,f81])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f145,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0] : (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))) | ~party_of_protocol(X0) | ~intruder_message(X0)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f144,f99])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f146,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0] : (intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~party_of_protocol(X0)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f145,f85])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f169,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0,X1] : (~intruder_holds(key(X0,b)) | ~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,X1))) | ~fresh_to_b(X1) | ~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X0))))) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f140,f62])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f170,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0,X1] : (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,X0))) | ~fresh_to_b(X0) | ~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),X1)))) | ~intruder_message(X1) | ~party_of_protocol(b)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f169,f80])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f171,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0,X1] : (~fresh_to_b(X0) | ~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,X0))) | ~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),X1)))) | ~intruder_message(X1)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f170,f65])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f172,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0] : (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))) | ~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))) | ~intruder_message(X0)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f171,f63])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f173,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0] : (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))) | ~intruder_message(X0)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f172,f72])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f175,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X2] : (~intruder_message(X2) | ~party_of_protocol(b) | ~party_of_protocol(a) | ~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X2,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X2)))) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f173,f87])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f176,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X2] : (~intruder_message(X2) | ~party_of_protocol(a) | ~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X2,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X2)))) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f175,f65])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f177,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X2] : (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X2,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X2))) | ~intruder_message(X2)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f176,f67])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f178,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0] : (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)) | ~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) | ~intruder_message(X0)) )), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f177,f81])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f179,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0] : (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))) ) | ~spl0_2), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f178,f114])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f180,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0] : (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))) ) | ~spl0_2), 0.56/0.81 inference(duplicate_literal_removal,[],[f179])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f181,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ( ! [X0] : (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) | ~intruder_message(X0)) ) | ~spl0_2), 0.56/0.81 inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f180,f127])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f183,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ~intruder_message(an_a_nonce) | ~intruder_message(a) | ~party_of_protocol(a) | ~spl0_2), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f181,f146])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f187,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ~intruder_message(a) | ~party_of_protocol(a) | ~spl0_2), 0.56/0.81 inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f183,f99])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f188,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ~party_of_protocol(a) | ~spl0_2), 0.56/0.81 inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f187,f100])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f189,plain,( 0.56/0.81 $false | ~spl0_2), 0.56/0.81 inference(subsumption_resolution,[],[f188,f67])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f190,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ~spl0_2), 0.56/0.81 inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f189])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f191,plain,( 0.56/0.81 $false | ~spl0_0), 0.56/0.81 inference(resolution,[],[f111,f65])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f196,plain,( 0.56/0.81 ~spl0_0), 0.56/0.81 inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f191])). 0.56/0.81 fof(f197,plain,( 0.56/0.81 $false), 0.56/0.81 inference(avatar_sat_refutation,[],[f115,f190,f196])). 0.56/0.81 % SZS output end Proof for theBenchmark 0.56/0.81 % ------------------------------ 0.56/0.81 % Version: Vampire 4.2 (commit c955596 on 2017-07-21 22:07:53 +0100) 0.56/0.81 % Termination reason: Refutation 0.56/0.81 0.56/0.81 % Memory used [KB]: 5117 0.56/0.81 % Time elapsed: 0.004 s 0.56/0.81 % ------------------------------ 0.56/0.81 % ------------------------------ 0.56/0.81 % Success in time 0.538 s 0.56/0.82 EOF