0.00/0.03 % Problem : theBenchmark.p : TPTP v0.0.0. Released v0.0.0. 0.00/0.04 % Command : eprover --delete-bad-limit=2000000000 --definitional-cnf=24 -s --print-statistics -R --print-version --proof-object --auto-schedule --cpu-limit=%d %s 0.02/0.23 % Computer : n180.star.cs.uiowa.edu 0.02/0.23 % Model : x86_64 x86_64 0.02/0.23 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2609 0 @ 2.40GHz 0.02/0.23 % Memory : 32218.625MB 0.02/0.23 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.2.2.el7.x86_64 0.02/0.23 % CPULimit : 300 0.02/0.23 % DateTime : Sat Jul 14 04:35:40 CDT 2018 0.02/0.23 % CPUTime : 0.02/0.23 # Version: 2.2pre001 0.02/0.23 # No SInE strategy applied 0.02/0.23 # Trying AutoSched0 for 151 seconds 0.02/0.24 # AutoSched0-Mode selected heuristic H_____011_C18_F1_PI_SE_SP_S2S 0.02/0.24 # and selection function SelectNewComplexAHP. 0.02/0.24 # 0.02/0.24 # Preprocessing time : 0.009 s 0.02/0.24 0.02/0.24 # Proof found! 0.02/0.24 # SZS status Theorem 0.02/0.24 # SZS output start CNFRefutation 0.02/0.24 fof(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((fresh_to_b(X2)&message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))=>(message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X2),encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))))&b_stored(pair(X1,X2)))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time)). 0.02/0.24 fof(b_accepts_secure_session_key, axiom, ![X2, X4, X5]:((b_stored(pair(X4,X5))&message(sent(X4,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X4,X2,generate_expiration_time(X5)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X5),X2)))))=>b_holds(key(X2,X4))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', b_accepts_secure_session_key)). 0.02/0.24 fof(a_sent_message_i_to_b, axiom, message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', a_sent_message_i_to_b)). 0.02/0.24 fof(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b, axiom, fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b)). 0.02/0.24 fof(intruder_message_sent, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:(message(sent(X2,X3,X1))<=((intruder_message(X1)&party_of_protocol(X2))&party_of_protocol(X3))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_message_sent)). 0.02/0.24 fof(intruder_key_encrypts, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:(intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))<=((intruder_message(X1)&party_of_protocol(X3))&intruder_holds(key(X2,X3)))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_key_encrypts)). 0.02/0.24 fof(intruder_holds_key, axiom, ![X2, X3]:(intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))<=(party_of_protocol(X3)&intruder_message(X2))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_holds_key)). 0.02/0.24 fof(intruder_can_record, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:(intruder_message(X3)<=message(sent(X1,X2,X3))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_can_record)). 0.02/0.24 fof(b_is_party_of_protocol, axiom, party_of_protocol(b), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', b_is_party_of_protocol)). 0.02/0.24 fof(a_is_party_of_protocol, axiom, party_of_protocol(a), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', a_is_party_of_protocol)). 0.02/0.24 fof(intruder_composes_pairs, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((intruder_message(X2)&intruder_message(X1))=>intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_composes_pairs)). 0.02/0.24 fof(intruder_decomposes_triples, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:(intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))=>((intruder_message(X1)&intruder_message(X2))&intruder_message(X3))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_decomposes_triples)). 0.02/0.24 fof(intruder_decomposes_pairs, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((intruder_message(X1)&intruder_message(X2))<=intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_decomposes_pairs)). 0.02/0.24 fof(co1, conjecture, ?[X1]:(intruder_holds(key(X1,b))&b_holds(key(X1,a))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', co1)). 0.02/0.24 fof(c_0_14, plain, ![X16, X17]:((message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X17),encrypt(triple(X16,X17,generate_expiration_time(X17)),bt))))|(~fresh_to_b(X17)|~message(sent(X16,b,pair(X16,X17)))))&(b_stored(pair(X16,X17))|(~fresh_to_b(X17)|~message(sent(X16,b,pair(X16,X17)))))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time])])])). 0.02/0.24 fof(c_0_15, plain, ![X58, X59, X60]:(~b_stored(pair(X59,X60))|~message(sent(X59,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X59,X58,generate_expiration_time(X60)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X60),X58))))|b_holds(key(X58,X59))), inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[b_accepts_secure_session_key])])])])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_16, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_17, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_18, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_19, plain, (b_holds(key(X3,X1))|~b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X3,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X3))))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_15])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_20, plain, (b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_16, c_0_17]), c_0_18])])). 0.02/0.24 fof(c_0_21, plain, ![X40, X41, X42]:(~intruder_message(X40)|~party_of_protocol(X41)|~party_of_protocol(X42)|message(sent(X41,X42,X40))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[intruder_message_sent])])])). 0.02/0.24 fof(c_0_22, plain, ![X37, X38, X39]:(~intruder_message(X37)|~party_of_protocol(X39)|~intruder_holds(key(X38,X39))|intruder_message(encrypt(X37,X38))), inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[intruder_key_encrypts])])])])])). 0.02/0.24 fof(c_0_23, plain, ![X43, X44]:(~party_of_protocol(X44)|~intruder_message(X43)|intruder_holds(key(X43,X44))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[intruder_holds_key])])])). 0.02/0.24 fof(c_0_24, plain, ![X12, X13, X14]:(~message(sent(X12,X13,X14))|intruder_message(X14)), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[intruder_can_record])])])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_25, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_26, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_19, c_0_20])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_27, plain, (message(sent(X2,X3,X1))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X3)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_21])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_28, plain, (party_of_protocol(b)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_is_party_of_protocol])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_29, plain, (party_of_protocol(a)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_is_party_of_protocol])). 0.02/0.24 fof(c_0_30, plain, ![X18, X19]:(~intruder_message(X19)|~intruder_message(X18)|intruder_message(pair(X18,X19))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_composes_pairs])])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_31, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~intruder_holds(key(X3,X2))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_22])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_32, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X2,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_23])). 0.02/0.24 fof(c_0_33, plain, ![X45, X46, X47]:(((intruder_message(X45)|~intruder_message(triple(X45,X46,X47)))&(intruder_message(X46)|~intruder_message(triple(X45,X46,X47))))&(intruder_message(X47)|~intruder_message(triple(X45,X46,X47)))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_triples])])])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_34, plain, (intruder_message(X3)|~message(sent(X1,X2,X3))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_24])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_35, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_25, c_0_17]), c_0_18])])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_36, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26, c_0_27]), c_0_28]), c_0_29])])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_37, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_30])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_38, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X3)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_31, c_0_32])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_39, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_33])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_40, plain, (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_34, c_0_35])). 0.02/0.24 fof(c_0_41, plain, ![X27, X28]:((intruder_message(X27)|~intruder_message(pair(X27,X28)))&(intruder_message(X28)|~intruder_message(pair(X27,X28)))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_pairs])])])])). 0.02/0.24 fof(c_0_42, negated_conjecture, ~(?[X1]:(intruder_holds(key(X1,b))&b_holds(key(X1,a)))), inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[co1])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_43, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_36, c_0_37])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_44, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_38, c_0_29])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_45, plain, (intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39, c_0_40])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_46, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_33])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_47, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_41])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_34, c_0_17])). 0.02/0.24 fof(c_0_49, negated_conjecture, ![X11]:(~intruder_holds(key(X11,b))|~b_holds(key(X11,a))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_42])])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_50, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_43, c_0_44]), c_0_45])])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_51, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46, c_0_40])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_52, plain, (intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_47, c_0_48])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_53, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_49])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_54, plain, (b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_50, c_0_51]), c_0_52])])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_55, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53, c_0_54])). 0.02/0.24 cnf(c_0_56, negated_conjecture, ($false), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55, c_0_32]), c_0_52]), c_0_28])]), ['proof']). 0.02/0.24 # SZS output end CNFRefutation 0.02/0.24 # Proof object total steps : 57 0.02/0.24 # Proof object clause steps : 32 0.02/0.24 # Proof object formula steps : 25 0.02/0.24 # Proof object conjectures : 6 0.02/0.24 # Proof object clause conjectures : 3 0.02/0.24 # Proof object formula conjectures : 3 0.02/0.24 # Proof object initial clauses used : 16 0.02/0.24 # Proof object initial formulas used : 14 0.02/0.24 # Proof object generating inferences : 16 0.02/0.24 # Proof object simplifying inferences : 14 0.02/0.24 # Training examples: 0 positive, 0 negative 0.02/0.24 # Parsed axioms : 29 0.02/0.24 # Removed by relevancy pruning/SinE : 0 0.02/0.24 # Initial clauses : 38 0.02/0.24 # Removed in clause preprocessing : 0 0.02/0.24 # Initial clauses in saturation : 38 0.02/0.24 # Processed clauses : 71 0.02/0.24 # ...of these trivial : 0 0.02/0.24 # ...subsumed : 0 0.02/0.24 # ...remaining for further processing : 71 0.02/0.24 # Other redundant clauses eliminated : 0 0.02/0.24 # Clauses deleted for lack of memory : 0 0.02/0.24 # Backward-subsumed : 1 0.02/0.24 # Backward-rewritten : 0 0.02/0.24 # Generated clauses : 57 0.02/0.24 # ...of the previous two non-trivial : 42 0.02/0.24 # Contextual simplify-reflections : 0 0.02/0.24 # Paramodulations : 57 0.02/0.24 # Factorizations : 0 0.02/0.24 # Equation resolutions : 0 0.02/0.24 # Propositional unsat checks : 0 0.02/0.24 # Propositional check models : 0 0.02/0.24 # Propositional check unsatisfiable : 0 0.02/0.24 # Propositional clauses : 0 0.02/0.24 # Propositional clauses after purity: 0 0.02/0.24 # Propositional unsat core size : 0 0.02/0.24 # Current number of processed clauses : 70 0.02/0.24 # Positive orientable unit clauses : 23 0.02/0.24 # Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0 0.02/0.24 # Negative unit clauses : 2 0.02/0.24 # Non-unit-clauses : 45 0.02/0.24 # Current number of unprocessed clauses: 7 0.02/0.24 # ...number of literals in the above : 28 0.02/0.24 # Current number of archived formulas : 0 0.02/0.24 # Current number of archived clauses : 1 0.02/0.24 # Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 140 0.02/0.24 # Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 44 0.02/0.24 # Non-unit clause-clause subsumptions : 1 0.02/0.24 # Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 12 0.02/0.24 # Rewrite failures with RHS unbound : 0 0.02/0.24 # BW rewrite match attempts : 1 0.02/0.24 # BW rewrite match successes : 0 0.02/0.24 # Condensation attempts : 0 0.02/0.24 # Condensation successes : 0 0.02/0.24 # Termbank termtop insertions : 3884 0.02/0.24 0.02/0.24 # ------------------------------------------------- 0.02/0.24 # User time : 0.011 s 0.02/0.24 # System time : 0.003 s 0.02/0.24 # Total time : 0.013 s 0.02/0.24 # Maximum resident set size: 1520 pages 0.02/0.24 EOF