Connect++ 0.7.2

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name SEU140+2.p from annotated formula d3_tarski
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 't3' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture t63_xboole_1 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start Proof for SEU140+2
fof(d3_tarski, axiom,
    ! [ A,B ] : ( subset(A, B) <=> ! [ C ] : ( in(C, A) => in(C, B) ) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p', d3_tarski) ).

fof(t26_xboole_1, lemma,
    ! [ A,B,C ] : ( subset(A, B) => subset(set_intersection2(A, C), set_intersection2(B, C)) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p', t26_xboole_1) ).

fof(t4_xboole_0, lemma,
    ! [ A,B ] : ( ~( ( ~( disjoint(A, B) ) & ! [ C ] : ~( in(C, set_intersection2(A, B)) ) ) ) & ~( ( ? [ C ] : in(C, set_intersection2(A, B)) & disjoint(A, B) ) ) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p', t4_xboole_0) ).

fof(t63_xboole_1, conjecture,
    ! [ A,B,C ] : ( ( subset(A, B) & disjoint(B, C) ) => disjoint(A, C) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p', t63_xboole_1) ).

fof(f_8_1, plain,
    ! [ A,B ] : ( ( ~( subset(A, B) ) | ! [ C ] : ( ~( in(C, A) ) | in(C, B) ) ) & ( ? [ C ] : ( in(C, A) & ~( in(C, B) ) ) | subset(A, B) ) ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[d3_tarski]) ).

fof(f_8_2, plain,
    ! [ U_37,U_36 ] : ( ( ~( subset(U_37, U_36) ) | ! [ U_34 ] : ( ~( in(U_34, U_37) ) | in(U_34, U_36) ) ) & ( ? [ U_35 ] : ( in(U_35, U_37) & ~( in(U_35, U_36) ) ) | subset(U_37, U_36) ) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_8_1]) ).

fof(f_8_3, plain,
    ( ! [ U_40,U_38 ] : ( ~( subset(U_40, U_38) ) | ! [ U_34 ] : ( ~( in(U_34, U_40) ) | in(U_34, U_38) ) ) & ! [ U_41,U_39 ] : ( ? [ U_35 ] : ( in(U_35, U_41) & ~( in(U_35, U_39) ) ) | subset(U_41, U_39) ) ),
    inference(miniscope,[status(thm)],[f_8_2]) ).

fof(f_8_4, plain,
    ( ! [ U_40,U_38 ] : ( ~( subset(U_40, U_38) ) | ! [ U_34 ] : ( ~( in(U_34, U_40) ) | in(U_34, U_38) ) ) & ! [ U_41,U_39 ] : ( ( in(sK4(U_41, U_39), U_41) & ~( in(sK4(U_41, U_39), U_39) ) ) | subset(U_41, U_39) ) ),
    inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK4]),skolemize(U_35,sK4(U_41, U_39))],[f_8_3]) ).

fof(f_8_5, plain,
    ( ( ! [U_40, U_34, U_38] : ( ~subset(U_40, U_38) | ~in(U_34, U_40) | in(U_34, U_38) ) ) & ( ! [U_39, U_41] : ( sP5(U_39, U_41) | subset(U_41, U_39) ) ) & ( ! [U_39, U_41] : ( ~sP5(U_39, U_41) | in(sK4(U_41, U_39), U_41) ) ) & ( ! [U_39, U_41] : ( ~sP5(U_39, U_41) | ~in(sK4(U_41, U_39), U_39) ) ) ),
    inference(definitional_conversion,[status(esa),new_symbols(definitional,[sP5])],[f_8_4]) ).

cnf(f_8_6, plain,
    ( ~subset(U_40, U_38) | ~in(U_34, U_40) | in(U_34, U_38) ),
    inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_8_5]) ).

fof(f_33_1, plain,
    ! [ A,B,C ] : ( ~( subset(A, B) ) | subset(set_intersection2(A, C), set_intersection2(B, C)) ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[t26_xboole_1]) ).

fof(f_33_2, plain,
    ! [ U_119,U_118,U_117 ] : ( ~( subset(U_119, U_118) ) | subset(set_intersection2(U_119, U_117), set_intersection2(U_118, U_117)) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_33_1]) ).

fof(f_33_3, plain,
    ! [ U_119,U_118 ] : ( ~( subset(U_119, U_118) ) | ! [ U_117 ] : subset(set_intersection2(U_119, U_117), set_intersection2(U_118, U_117)) ),
    inference(miniscope,[status(thm)],[f_33_2]) ).

fof(f_33_4, plain,
    ( ( ! [U_118, U_117, U_119] : ( ~subset(U_119, U_118) | subset(set_intersection2(U_119, U_117), set_intersection2(U_118, U_117)) ) ) ),
    inference(definitional_conversion,[status(esa)],[f_33_3]) ).

cnf(f_33_5, plain,
    ( ~subset(U_119, U_118) | subset(set_intersection2(U_119, U_117), set_intersection2(U_118, U_117)) ),
    inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_33_4]) ).

fof(f_49_1, plain,
    ! [ A,B ] : ( ( disjoint(A, B) | ? [ C ] : in(C, set_intersection2(A, B)) ) & ( ! [ C ] : ~( in(C, set_intersection2(A, B)) ) | ~( disjoint(A, B) ) ) ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[t4_xboole_0]) ).

fof(f_49_2, plain,
    ! [ U_162,U_161 ] : ( ( disjoint(U_162, U_161) | ? [ U_159 ] : in(U_159, set_intersection2(U_162, U_161)) ) & ( ! [ U_160 ] : ~( in(U_160, set_intersection2(U_162, U_161)) ) | ~( disjoint(U_162, U_161) ) ) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_49_1]) ).

fof(f_49_3, plain,
    ( ! [ U_165,U_163 ] : ( disjoint(U_165, U_163) | ? [ U_159 ] : in(U_159, set_intersection2(U_165, U_163)) ) & ! [ U_166,U_164 ] : ( ! [ U_160 ] : ~( in(U_160, set_intersection2(U_166, U_164)) ) | ~( disjoint(U_166, U_164) ) ) ),
    inference(miniscope,[status(thm)],[f_49_2]) ).

fof(f_49_4, plain,
    ( ! [ U_165,U_163 ] : ( disjoint(U_165, U_163) | in(sK14(U_165, U_163), set_intersection2(U_165, U_163)) ) & ! [ U_166,U_164 ] : ( ! [ U_160 ] : ~( in(U_160, set_intersection2(U_166, U_164)) ) | ~( disjoint(U_166, U_164) ) ) ),
    inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK14]),skolemize(U_159,sK14(U_165, U_163))],[f_49_3]) ).

fof(f_49_5, plain,
    ( ( ! [U_165, U_163] : ( disjoint(U_165, U_163) | in(sK14(U_165, U_163), set_intersection2(U_165, U_163)) ) ) & ( ! [U_166, U_160, U_164] : ( ~in(U_160, set_intersection2(U_166, U_164)) | ~disjoint(U_166, U_164) ) ) ),
    inference(definitional_conversion,[status(esa)],[f_49_4]) ).

cnf(f_49_6, plain,
    ( disjoint(U_165, U_163) | in(sK14(U_165, U_163), set_intersection2(U_165, U_163)) ),
    inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_49_5]) ).

cnf(f_49_7, plain,
    ( ~in(U_160, set_intersection2(U_166, U_164)) | ~disjoint(U_166, U_164) ),
    inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_49_5]) ).

fof(f_51_1, negated_conjecture,
    ~( ! [ A,B,C ] : ( ( subset(A, B) & disjoint(B, C) ) => disjoint(A, C) ) ),
    inference(negate,[status(cth)],[t63_xboole_1]) ).

fof(f_51_2, negated_conjecture,
    ? [ A,B,C ] : ( ( subset(A, B) & disjoint(B, C) ) & ~( disjoint(A, C) ) ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[f_51_1]) ).

fof(f_51_3, negated_conjecture,
    ? [ U_171,U_170,U_169 ] : ( ( subset(U_171, U_170) & disjoint(U_170, U_169) ) & ~( disjoint(U_171, U_169) ) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_51_2]) ).

fof(f_51_4, negated_conjecture,
    ? [ U_170,U_169 ] : ( ( subset(sK15, U_170) & disjoint(U_170, U_169) ) & ~( disjoint(sK15, U_169) ) ),
    inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK15]),skolemize(U_171,sK15)],[f_51_3]) ).

fof(f_51_5, negated_conjecture,
    ? [ U_169 ] : ( ( subset(sK15, sK16) & disjoint(sK16, U_169) ) & ~( disjoint(sK15, U_169) ) ),
    inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK16]),skolemize(U_170,sK16)],[f_51_4]) ).

fof(f_51_6, negated_conjecture,
    ( ( subset(sK15, sK16) & disjoint(sK16, sK17) ) & ~( disjoint(sK15, sK17) ) ),
    inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK17]),skolemize(U_169,sK17)],[f_51_5]) ).

fof(f_51_7, negated_conjecture,
    ( ( ( subset(sK15, sK16) ) ) & ( ( disjoint(sK16, sK17) ) ) & ( ( ~disjoint(sK15, sK17) ) ) ),
    inference(definitional_conversion,[status(esa)],[f_51_6]) ).

cnf(f_51_8, negated_conjecture,
    ( subset(sK15, sK16) ),
    inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_51_7]) ).

cnf(f_51_9, negated_conjecture,
    ( disjoint(sK16, sK17) ),
    inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_51_7]) ).

cnf(f_51_10, negated_conjecture,
    ( ~disjoint(sK15, sK17) ),
    inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_51_7]) ).

cnf(t1, plain,            ( subset(sK15, sK16) ),
    inference(start, [status(thm), parent(0:0)], [f_51_8])  ).

cnf(t2, plain,            ( ~subset(sK15, sK16) | subset(set_intersection2(sK15, sK17), set_intersection2(sK16, sK17)) ),
    inference(extension, [status(thm), parent(t1:1)], [f_33_5])  ).

cnf(t3, plain,            $false,
    inference(connection, [status(thm), parent(t2:1)], [t2:1,t1:1])  ).

cnf(t4, plain,            ( ~subset(set_intersection2(sK15, sK17), set_intersection2(sK16, sK17)) | in(sK14(sK15, sK17), set_intersection2(sK16, sK17)) | ~in(sK14(sK15, sK17), set_intersection2(sK15, sK17)) ),
    inference(extension, [status(thm), parent(t2:2)], [f_8_6])  ).

cnf(t5, plain,            $false,
    inference(connection, [status(thm), parent(t4:1)], [t4:1,t2:2])  ).

cnf(t6, plain,            ( ~in(sK14(sK15, sK17), set_intersection2(sK16, sK17)) | ~disjoint(sK16, sK17) ),
    inference(extension, [status(thm), parent(t4:2)], [f_49_7])  ).

cnf(t7, plain,            $false,
    inference(connection, [status(thm), parent(t6:1)], [t6:1,t4:2])  ).

cnf(t8, plain,            ( disjoint(sK16, sK17) ),
    inference(extension, [status(thm), parent(t6:2)], [f_51_9])  ).

cnf(t9, plain,            $false,
    inference(connection, [status(thm), parent(t8:1)], [t8:1,t6:2])  ).

cnf(t10, plain,            ( in(sK14(sK15, sK17), set_intersection2(sK15, sK17)) | disjoint(sK15, sK17) ),
    inference(extension, [status(thm), parent(t4:3)], [f_49_6])  ).

cnf(t11, plain,            $false,
    inference(connection, [status(thm), parent(t10:1)], [t10:1,t4:3])  ).

cnf(t12, plain,            ( ~disjoint(sK15, sK17) ),
    inference(extension, [status(thm), parent(t10:2)], [f_51_10])  ).

cnf(t13, plain,            $false,
    inference(connection, [status(thm), parent(t12:1)], [t12:1,t10:2])  ).

% SZS output end Proof for SEU140+2

Solution for NLP042+1

No output

Solution for SWV017+1

No output

CSI++ 1.0

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name /home/ars01/Desktop/dist/problems/SEU140+2.p from annotated formula t63_xboole_1
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'c_0_29' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture t63_xboole_1 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start Proof
fof(t63_xboole_1, conjecture, ![X1, X2, X3]:(((subset(X1,X2)&disjoint(X2,X3))=>disjoint(X1,X3))), file('/home/ars01/Desktop/dist/problems/SEU140+2.p', t63_xboole_1)).
fof(d3_xboole_0, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:((X3=set_intersection2(X1,X2)<=>![X4]:((in(X4,X3)<=>(in(X4,X1)&in(X4,X2)))))), file('/home/ars01/Desktop/dist/problems/SEU140+2.p', d3_xboole_0)).
fof(t28_xboole_1, lemma, ![X1, X2]:((subset(X1,X2)=>set_intersection2(X1,X2)=X1)), file('/home/ars01/Desktop/dist/problems/SEU140+2.p', t28_xboole_1)).
fof(t3_xboole_0, lemma, ![X1, X2]:((~((~(disjoint(X1,X2))&![X3]:(~((in(X3,X1)&in(X3,X2))))))&~((?[X3]:((in(X3,X1)&in(X3,X2)))&disjoint(X1,X2))))), file('/home/ars01/Desktop/dist/problems/SEU140+2.p', t3_xboole_0)).
fof(symmetry_r1_xboole_0, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((disjoint(X1,X2)=>disjoint(X2,X1))), file('/home/ars01/Desktop/dist/problems/SEU140+2.p', symmetry_r1_xboole_0)).
fof(c_0_5, negated_conjecture, ~(![X1, X2, X3]:(((subset(X1,X2)&disjoint(X2,X3))=>disjoint(X1,X3)))), inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[t63_xboole_1])).
fof(c_0_6, plain, ![X47, X48, X49, X50, X51, X52, X53, X54]:(((((in(X50,X47)|~in(X50,X49)|X49!=set_intersection2(X47,X48))&(in(X50,X48)|~in(X50,X49)|X49!=set_intersection2(X47,X48)))&(~in(X51,X47)|~in(X51,X48)|in(X51,X49)|X49!=set_intersection2(X47,X48)))&((~in(esk7_3(X52,X53,X54),X54)|(~in(esk7_3(X52,X53,X54),X52)|~in(esk7_3(X52,X53,X54),X53))|X54=set_intersection2(X52,X53))&((in(esk7_3(X52,X53,X54),X52)|in(esk7_3(X52,X53,X54),X54)|X54=set_intersection2(X52,X53))&(in(esk7_3(X52,X53,X54),X53)|in(esk7_3(X52,X53,X54),X54)|X54=set_intersection2(X52,X53)))))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(skolemize,[status(esa)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[d3_xboole_0])])])])])])).
fof(c_0_7, lemma, ![X65, X66]:((~subset(X65,X66)|set_intersection2(X65,X66)=X65)), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[t28_xboole_1])])).
fof(c_0_8, negated_conjecture, ((subset(esk1_0,esk2_0)&disjoint(esk2_0,esk3_0))&~disjoint(esk1_0,esk3_0)), inference(skolemize,[status(esa)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_5])])])).
fof(c_0_9, lemma, ![X1, X2]:((~((~disjoint(X1,X2)&![X3]:(~((in(X3,X1)&in(X3,X2))))))&~((?[X3]:((in(X3,X1)&in(X3,X2)))&disjoint(X1,X2))))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[t3_xboole_0])).
fof(c_0_10, plain, ![X10, X11]:((~disjoint(X10,X11)|disjoint(X11,X10))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[symmetry_r1_xboole_0])])).
cnf(c_0_11, plain, (in(X1,X2)|~in(X1,X3)|X3!=set_intersection2(X4,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_6])).
cnf(c_0_12, lemma, (set_intersection2(X1,X2)=X1|~subset(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_7])).
cnf(c_0_13, negated_conjecture, (subset(esk1_0,esk2_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_8])).
fof(c_0_14, lemma, ![X12, X13, X15, X16, X17]:((((in(esk4_2(X12,X13),X12)|disjoint(X12,X13))&(in(esk4_2(X12,X13),X13)|disjoint(X12,X13)))&(~in(X17,X15)|~in(X17,X16)|~disjoint(X15,X16)))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(skolemize,[status(esa)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_9])])])])])])).
cnf(c_0_15, plain, (disjoint(X2,X1)|~disjoint(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_10])).
cnf(c_0_16, negated_conjecture, (disjoint(esk2_0,esk3_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_8])).
cnf(c_0_17, plain, (in(X1,X2)|~in(X1,set_intersection2(X3,X2))), inference(er,[status(thm)],[c_0_11])).
cnf(c_0_18, negated_conjecture, (set_intersection2(esk1_0,esk2_0)=esk1_0), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_12, c_0_13])).
cnf(c_0_19, negated_conjecture, (~disjoint(esk1_0,esk3_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_8])).
cnf(c_0_20, lemma, (in(esk4_2(X1,X2),X1)|disjoint(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14])).
cnf(c_0_21, lemma, (~in(X1,X2)|~in(X1,X3)|~disjoint(X2,X3)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14])).
cnf(c_0_22, negated_conjecture, (disjoint(esk3_0,esk2_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_15, c_0_16])).
cnf(c_0_23, negated_conjecture, (in(X1,esk2_0)|~in(X1,esk1_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_17, c_0_18])).
cnf(c_0_24, negated_conjecture, (in(esk4_2(esk1_0,esk3_0),esk1_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_19, c_0_20])).
cnf(c_0_25, lemma, (in(esk4_2(X1,X2),X2)|disjoint(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14])).
cnf(c_0_26, negated_conjecture, (~in(X1,esk2_0)|~in(X1,esk3_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_21, c_0_22])).
cnf(c_0_27, negated_conjecture, (in(esk4_2(esk1_0,esk3_0),esk2_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_23, c_0_24])).
cnf(c_0_28, negated_conjecture, (in(esk4_2(esk1_0,esk3_0),esk3_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_19, c_0_25])).
cnf(c_0_29, negated_conjecture, ($false), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26, c_0_27]), c_0_28])]), ['proof']).
% SZS output end Proof

Solution for BOO001-1

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file BOO001-1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name /home/ars01/Desktop/dist/problems/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax from annotated formula associativity
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'c_0_16' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the negated conjecture prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start Proof
cnf(associativity, axiom, (multiply(multiply(X1,X2,X3),X4,multiply(X1,X2,X5))=multiply(X1,X2,multiply(X3,X4,X5))), file('/home/ars01/Desktop/dist/problems/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax', associativity)).
cnf(ternary_multiply_1, axiom, (multiply(X1,X2,X2)=X2), file('/home/ars01/Desktop/dist/problems/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax', ternary_multiply_1)).
cnf(right_inverse, axiom, (X1=multiply(X1,X2,inverse(X2))), file('/home/ars01/Desktop/dist/problems/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax', right_inverse)).
cnf(ternary_multiply_2, axiom, (multiply(X1,X1,X2)=X1), file('/home/ars01/Desktop/dist/problems/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax', ternary_multiply_2)).
cnf(left_inverse, axiom, (multiply(inverse(X1),X1,X2)=X2), file('/home/ars01/Desktop/dist/problems/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax', left_inverse)).
cnf(prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling, negated_conjecture, (inverse(inverse(a))!=a), file('/home/ars01/Desktop/dist/problems/BOO001-1.p', prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling)).
cnf(c_0_6, axiom, (multiply(multiply(X1,X2,X3),X4,multiply(X1,X2,X5))=multiply(X1,X2,multiply(X3,X4,X5))), associativity).
cnf(c_0_7, axiom, (multiply(X1,X2,X2)=X2), ternary_multiply_1).
cnf(c_0_8, plain, (multiply(multiply(X1,X2,X3),X4,X2)=multiply(X1,X2,multiply(X3,X4,X2))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_6, c_0_7])).
cnf(c_0_9, axiom, (X1=multiply(X1,X2,inverse(X2))), right_inverse).
cnf(c_0_10, plain, (multiply(X1,X2,multiply(inverse(X2),X3,X2))=multiply(X1,X3,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_8, c_0_9])).
cnf(c_0_11, axiom, (multiply(X1,X1,X2)=X1), ternary_multiply_2).
cnf(c_0_12, axiom, (multiply(inverse(X1),X1,X2)=X2), left_inverse).
cnf(c_0_13, plain, (multiply(X1,inverse(X2),X2)=X1), inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_10, c_0_11]), c_0_9])).
cnf(c_0_14, negated_conjecture, (inverse(inverse(a))!=a), prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling).
cnf(c_0_15, plain, (inverse(inverse(X1))=X1), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_12, c_0_13])).
cnf(c_0_16, negated_conjecture, ($false), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_14, c_0_15])]), ['proof']).
% SZS output end Proof

Drodi 4.1.1

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name /run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/SEU140+2.p from annotated formula f4
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'f3138' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture f51 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation for SEU140+2
fof(f4,axiom,(
  (! [A,B] : set_intersection2(A,B) = set_intersection2(B,A) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/SEU140+2.p')).
fof(f5,axiom,(
  (! [A,B] :( A = B<=> ( subset(A,B)& subset(B,A) ) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/SEU140+2.p')).
fof(f11,axiom,(
  (! [A,B] :( disjoint(A,B)<=> set_intersection2(A,B) = empty_set ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/SEU140+2.p')).
fof(f33,lemma,(
  (! [A,B,C] :( subset(A,B)=> subset(set_intersection2(A,C),set_intersection2(B,C)) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/SEU140+2.p')).
fof(f37,lemma,(
  (! [A] : subset(empty_set,A) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/SEU140+2.p')).
fof(f51,conjecture,(
  (! [A,B,C] :( ( subset(A,B)& disjoint(B,C) )=> disjoint(A,C) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/SEU140+2.p')).
fof(f52,negated_conjecture,(
  ~((! [A,B,C] :( ( subset(A,B)& disjoint(B,C) )=> disjoint(A,C) ) ))),
  inference(negated_conjecture,[status(cth)],[f51])).
fof(f63,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (set_intersection2(X0,X1)=set_intersection2(X1,X0))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f4])).
fof(f64,plain,(
  ![A,B]: ((~A=B|(subset(A,B)&subset(B,A)))&(A=B|(~subset(A,B)|~subset(B,A))))),
  inference(NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f5])).
fof(f65,plain,(
  (![A,B]: (~A=B|(subset(A,B)&subset(B,A))))&(![A,B]: (A=B|(~subset(A,B)|~subset(B,A))))),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f64])).
fof(f68,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (X0=X1|~subset(X0,X1)|~subset(X1,X0))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f65])).
fof(f108,plain,(
  ![A,B]: ((~disjoint(A,B)|set_intersection2(A,B)=empty_set)&(disjoint(A,B)|~set_intersection2(A,B)=empty_set))),
  inference(NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f11])).
fof(f109,plain,(
  (![A,B]: (~disjoint(A,B)|set_intersection2(A,B)=empty_set))&(![A,B]: (disjoint(A,B)|~set_intersection2(A,B)=empty_set))),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f108])).
fof(f110,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~disjoint(X0,X1)|set_intersection2(X0,X1)=empty_set)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f109])).
fof(f111,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (disjoint(X0,X1)|~set_intersection2(X0,X1)=empty_set)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f109])).
fof(f151,plain,(
  ![A,B,C]: (~subset(A,B)|subset(set_intersection2(A,C),set_intersection2(B,C)))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f33])).
fof(f152,plain,(
  ![A,B]: (~subset(A,B)|(![C]: subset(set_intersection2(A,C),set_intersection2(B,C))))),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f151])).
fof(f153,plain,(
  ![X0,X1,X2]: (~subset(X0,X1)|subset(set_intersection2(X0,X2),set_intersection2(X1,X2)))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f152])).
fof(f162,plain,(
  ![X0]: (subset(empty_set,X0))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f37])).
fof(f193,plain,(
  (?[A,B,C]: ((subset(A,B)&disjoint(B,C))&~disjoint(A,C)))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f52])).
fof(f194,plain,(
  ?[A,C]: ((?[B]: (subset(A,B)&disjoint(B,C)))&~disjoint(A,C))),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f193])).
fof(f195,plain,(
  ((subset(sK10_skl,sK12_skl)&disjoint(sK12_skl,sK11_skl))&~disjoint(sK10_skl,sK11_skl))),
  inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK10_skl,sK11_skl,sK12_skl]),skolemize(A,sK10_skl),skolemize(C,sK11_skl),skolemize(B,sK12_skl)],[f194])).
fof(f196,plain,(
  subset(sK10_skl,sK12_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f195])).
fof(f197,plain,(
  disjoint(sK12_skl,sK11_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f195])).
fof(f198,plain,(
  ~disjoint(sK10_skl,sK11_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f195])).
fof(f242,plain,(
  ![X0]: (X0=empty_set|~subset(X0,empty_set))),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f162,f68])).
fof(f260,plain,(
  ~set_intersection2(sK10_skl,sK11_skl)=empty_set),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f111,f198])).
fof(f345,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~disjoint(X0,X1)|set_intersection2(X1,X0)=empty_set)),
  inference(paramodulation,[status(thm)],[f63,f110])).
fof(f407,plain,(
  set_intersection2(sK11_skl,sK12_skl)=empty_set),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f345,f197])).
fof(f410,plain,(
  set_intersection2(sK12_skl,sK11_skl)=empty_set),
  inference(paramodulation,[status(thm)],[f63,f407])).
fof(f1706,plain,(
  ![X0]: (subset(set_intersection2(sK10_skl,X0),set_intersection2(sK12_skl,X0)))),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f153,f196])).
fof(f2286,plain,(
  subset(set_intersection2(sK10_skl,sK11_skl),empty_set)),
  inference(paramodulation,[status(thm)],[f410,f1706])).
fof(f3123,plain,(
  set_intersection2(sK10_skl,sK11_skl)=empty_set),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f2286,f242])).
fof(f3138,plain,(
  $false),
  inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f3123,f260])).
% SZS output end CNFRefutation for SEU140+2.p

Solution for NLP042+1

% SZS output start Saturation for NLP042+1
fof(f1,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( woman(U,V)=> female(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f2,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( human_person(U,V)=> animate(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f3,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( human_person(U,V)=> human(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f4,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( organism(U,V)=> living(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f5,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( organism(U,V)=> impartial(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f6,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( organism(U,V)=> entity(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f7,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( human_person(U,V)=> organism(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f8,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( woman(U,V)=> human_person(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f9,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( mia_forename(U,V)=> forename(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f10,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( abstraction(U,V)=> unisex(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f11,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( abstraction(U,V)=> general(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f12,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( abstraction(U,V)=> nonhuman(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f13,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( abstraction(U,V)=> thing(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f14,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( relation(U,V)=> abstraction(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f15,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( relname(U,V)=> relation(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f16,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( forename(U,V)=> relname(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f17,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( object(U,V)=> unisex(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f18,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( object(U,V)=> impartial(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f19,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( object(U,V)=> nonliving(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f20,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( entity(U,V)=> existent(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f21,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( entity(U,V)=> specific(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f22,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( entity(U,V)=> thing(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f23,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( object(U,V)=> entity(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f24,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( substance_matter(U,V)=> object(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f25,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( food(U,V)=> substance_matter(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f26,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( beverage(U,V)=> food(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f27,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( shake_beverage(U,V)=> beverage(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f28,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( order(U,V)=> event(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f29,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( eventuality(U,V)=> unisex(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f30,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( eventuality(U,V)=> nonexistent(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f31,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( eventuality(U,V)=> specific(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f32,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( thing(U,V)=> singleton(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f33,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( eventuality(U,V)=> thing(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f34,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( event(U,V)=> eventuality(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f35,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( act(U,V)=> event(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f36,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( order(U,V)=> act(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f37,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( animate(U,V)=> ~ nonliving(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f38,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( existent(U,V)=> ~ nonexistent(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f39,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( nonhuman(U,V)=> ~ human(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f40,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( nonliving(U,V)=> ~ living(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f41,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( specific(U,V)=> ~ general(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f42,axiom,(
  (! [U,V] :( unisex(U,V)=> ~ female(U,V) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f43,axiom,(
  (! [U,V,W] :( ( entity(U,V)& forename(U,W)& of(U,W,V) )=> ~ (? [X] :( forename(U,X)& X != W& of(U,X,V) ) )) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f44,axiom,(
  (! [U,V,W,X] :( ( nonreflexive(U,V)& agent(U,V,W)& patient(U,V,X) )=> W != X ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f45,conjecture,(
  ~ (? [U] :( actual_world(U)& (? [V,W,X,Y] :( of(U,W,V)& woman(U,V)& mia_forename(U,W)& forename(U,W)& shake_beverage(U,X)& event(U,Y)& agent(U,Y,V)& patient(U,Y,X)& past(U,Y)& nonreflexive(U,Y)& order(U,Y) ) )) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/NLP042+1.p')).
fof(f46,negated_conjecture,(
  ~(~ (? [U] :( actual_world(U)& (? [V,W,X,Y] :( of(U,W,V)& woman(U,V)& mia_forename(U,W)& forename(U,W)& shake_beverage(U,X)& event(U,Y)& agent(U,Y,V)& patient(U,Y,X)& past(U,Y)& nonreflexive(U,Y)& order(U,Y) ) )) ))),
  inference(negated_conjecture,[status(cth)],[f45])).
fof(f47,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~woman(U,V)|female(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f1])).
fof(f48,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~woman(X0,X1)|female(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f47])).
fof(f49,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~human_person(U,V)|animate(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f2])).
fof(f50,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~human_person(X0,X1)|animate(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f49])).
fof(f51,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~human_person(U,V)|human(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f3])).
fof(f52,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~human_person(X0,X1)|human(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f51])).
fof(f53,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~organism(U,V)|living(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f4])).
fof(f54,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~organism(X0,X1)|living(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f53])).
fof(f55,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~organism(U,V)|impartial(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f5])).
fof(f56,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~organism(X0,X1)|impartial(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f55])).
fof(f57,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~organism(U,V)|entity(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f6])).
fof(f58,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~organism(X0,X1)|entity(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f57])).
fof(f59,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~human_person(U,V)|organism(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f7])).
fof(f60,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~human_person(X0,X1)|organism(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f59])).
fof(f61,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~woman(U,V)|human_person(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f8])).
fof(f62,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~woman(X0,X1)|human_person(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f61])).
fof(f63,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~mia_forename(U,V)|forename(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f9])).
fof(f64,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~mia_forename(X0,X1)|forename(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f63])).
fof(f65,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~abstraction(U,V)|unisex(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f10])).
fof(f66,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~abstraction(X0,X1)|unisex(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f65])).
fof(f67,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~abstraction(U,V)|general(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f11])).
fof(f68,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~abstraction(X0,X1)|general(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f67])).
fof(f69,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~abstraction(U,V)|nonhuman(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f12])).
fof(f70,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~abstraction(X0,X1)|nonhuman(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f69])).
fof(f71,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~abstraction(U,V)|thing(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f13])).
fof(f72,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~abstraction(X0,X1)|thing(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f71])).
fof(f73,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~relation(U,V)|abstraction(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f14])).
fof(f74,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~relation(X0,X1)|abstraction(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f73])).
fof(f75,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~relname(U,V)|relation(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f15])).
fof(f76,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~relname(X0,X1)|relation(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f75])).
fof(f77,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~forename(U,V)|relname(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f16])).
fof(f78,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~forename(X0,X1)|relname(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f77])).
fof(f79,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~object(U,V)|unisex(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f17])).
fof(f80,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~object(X0,X1)|unisex(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f79])).
fof(f81,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~object(U,V)|impartial(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f18])).
fof(f82,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~object(X0,X1)|impartial(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f81])).
fof(f83,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~object(U,V)|nonliving(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f19])).
fof(f84,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~object(X0,X1)|nonliving(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f83])).
fof(f85,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~entity(U,V)|existent(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f20])).
fof(f86,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~entity(X0,X1)|existent(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f85])).
fof(f87,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~entity(U,V)|specific(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f21])).
fof(f88,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~entity(X0,X1)|specific(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f87])).
fof(f89,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~entity(U,V)|thing(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f22])).
fof(f90,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~entity(X0,X1)|thing(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f89])).
fof(f91,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~object(U,V)|entity(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f23])).
fof(f92,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~object(X0,X1)|entity(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f91])).
fof(f93,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~substance_matter(U,V)|object(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f24])).
fof(f94,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~substance_matter(X0,X1)|object(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f93])).
fof(f95,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~food(U,V)|substance_matter(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f25])).
fof(f96,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~food(X0,X1)|substance_matter(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f95])).
fof(f97,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~beverage(U,V)|food(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f26])).
fof(f98,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~beverage(X0,X1)|food(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f97])).
fof(f99,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~shake_beverage(U,V)|beverage(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f27])).
fof(f100,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~shake_beverage(X0,X1)|beverage(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f99])).
fof(f101,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~order(U,V)|event(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f28])).
fof(f102,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~order(X0,X1)|event(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f101])).
fof(f103,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~eventuality(U,V)|unisex(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f29])).
fof(f104,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~eventuality(X0,X1)|unisex(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f103])).
fof(f105,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~eventuality(U,V)|nonexistent(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f30])).
fof(f106,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~eventuality(X0,X1)|nonexistent(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f105])).
fof(f107,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~eventuality(U,V)|specific(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f31])).
fof(f108,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~eventuality(X0,X1)|specific(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f107])).
fof(f109,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~thing(U,V)|singleton(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f32])).
fof(f110,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~thing(X0,X1)|singleton(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f109])).
fof(f111,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~eventuality(U,V)|thing(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f33])).
fof(f112,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~eventuality(X0,X1)|thing(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f111])).
fof(f113,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~event(U,V)|eventuality(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f34])).
fof(f114,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~event(X0,X1)|eventuality(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f113])).
fof(f115,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~act(U,V)|event(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f35])).
fof(f116,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~act(X0,X1)|event(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f115])).
fof(f117,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~order(U,V)|act(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f36])).
fof(f118,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~order(X0,X1)|act(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f117])).
fof(f119,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~animate(U,V)|~nonliving(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f37])).
fof(f120,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~animate(X0,X1)|~nonliving(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f119])).
fof(f121,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~existent(U,V)|~nonexistent(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f38])).
fof(f122,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~existent(X0,X1)|~nonexistent(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f121])).
fof(f123,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~nonhuman(U,V)|~human(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f39])).
fof(f124,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~nonhuman(X0,X1)|~human(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f123])).
fof(f125,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~nonliving(U,V)|~living(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f40])).
fof(f126,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~nonliving(X0,X1)|~living(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f125])).
fof(f127,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~specific(U,V)|~general(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f41])).
fof(f128,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~specific(X0,X1)|~general(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f127])).
fof(f129,plain,(
  ![U,V]: (~unisex(U,V)|~female(U,V))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f42])).
fof(f130,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~unisex(X0,X1)|~female(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f129])).
fof(f131,plain,(
  ![U,V,W]: (((~entity(U,V)|~forename(U,W))|~of(U,W,V))|(![X]: ((~forename(U,X)|X=W)|~of(U,X,V))))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f43])).
fof(f132,plain,(
  ![X0,X1,X2,X3]: (~entity(X0,X1)|~forename(X0,X2)|~of(X0,X2,X1)|~forename(X0,X3)|X3=X2|~of(X0,X3,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f131])).
fof(f133,plain,(
  ![U,V,W,X]: (((~nonreflexive(U,V)|~agent(U,V,W))|~patient(U,V,X))|~W=X)),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f44])).
fof(f134,plain,(
  ![W,X]: ((![U,V]: ((~nonreflexive(U,V)|~agent(U,V,W))|~patient(U,V,X)))|~W=X)),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f133])).
fof(f135,plain,(
  ![X0,X1,X2,X3]: (~nonreflexive(X0,X1)|~agent(X0,X1,X2)|~patient(X0,X1,X3)|~X2=X3)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f134])).
fof(f136,plain,(
  ?[U]: (actual_world(U)&(?[Y]: ((((?[X]: ((?[V]: ((((?[W]: (((of(U,W,V)&woman(U,V))&mia_forename(U,W))&forename(U,W)))&shake_beverage(U,X))&event(U,Y))&agent(U,Y,V)))&patient(U,Y,X)))&past(U,Y))&nonreflexive(U,Y))&order(U,Y))))),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f46])).
fof(f137,plain,(
  (actual_world(sK0_skl)&((((((((((of(sK0_skl,sK4_skl,sK3_skl)&woman(sK0_skl,sK3_skl))&mia_forename(sK0_skl,sK4_skl))&forename(sK0_skl,sK4_skl))&shake_beverage(sK0_skl,sK2_skl))&event(sK0_skl,sK1_skl))&agent(sK0_skl,sK1_skl,sK3_skl))&patient(sK0_skl,sK1_skl,sK2_skl))&past(sK0_skl,sK1_skl))&nonreflexive(sK0_skl,sK1_skl))&order(sK0_skl,sK1_skl)))),
  inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK0_skl,sK1_skl,sK2_skl,sK3_skl,sK4_skl]),skolemize(U,sK0_skl),skolemize(Y,sK1_skl),skolemize(X,sK2_skl),skolemize(V,sK3_skl),skolemize(W,sK4_skl)],[f136])).
fof(f138,plain,(
  actual_world(sK0_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f137])).
fof(f139,plain,(
  of(sK0_skl,sK4_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f137])).
fof(f140,plain,(
  woman(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f137])).
fof(f141,plain,(
  mia_forename(sK0_skl,sK4_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f137])).
fof(f142,plain,(
  forename(sK0_skl,sK4_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f137])).
fof(f143,plain,(
  shake_beverage(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f137])).
fof(f144,plain,(
  event(sK0_skl,sK1_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f137])).
fof(f145,plain,(
  agent(sK0_skl,sK1_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f137])).
fof(f146,plain,(
  patient(sK0_skl,sK1_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f137])).
fof(f147,plain,(
  past(sK0_skl,sK1_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f137])).
fof(f148,plain,(
  nonreflexive(sK0_skl,sK1_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f137])).
fof(f149,plain,(
  order(sK0_skl,sK1_skl)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f137])).
fof(f150,plain,(
  ![X0,X1,X2]: (~nonreflexive(X0,X1)|~agent(X0,X1,X2)|~patient(X0,X1,X2))),
  inference(destructive_equality_resolution,[status(thm)],[f135])).
fof(f151,plain,(
  human_person(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f62,f140])).
fof(f153,plain,(
  beverage(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f100,f143])).
fof(f155,plain,(
  eventuality(sK0_skl,sK1_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f114,f144])).
fof(f156,plain,(
  ![X0]: (~agent(sK0_skl,sK1_skl,X0)|~patient(sK0_skl,sK1_skl,X0))),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f150,f148])).
fof(f157,plain,(
  female(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f48,f140])).
fof(f158,plain,(
  animate(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f50,f151])).
fof(f159,plain,(
  human(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f52,f151])).
fof(f160,plain,(
  organism(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f60,f151])).
fof(f161,plain,(
  entity(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f160,f58])).
fof(f162,plain,(
  impartial(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f160,f56])).
fof(f163,plain,(
  living(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f160,f54])).
fof(f164,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~forename(sK0_skl,X0)|~of(sK0_skl,X0,sK3_skl)|~forename(sK0_skl,X1)|X1=X0|~of(sK0_skl,X1,sK3_skl))),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f161,f132])).
fof(f165,plain,(
  relname(sK0_skl,sK4_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f78,f142])).
fof(f166,plain,(
  relation(sK0_skl,sK4_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f165,f76])).
fof(f167,plain,(
  abstraction(sK0_skl,sK4_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f166,f74])).
fof(f168,plain,(
  thing(sK0_skl,sK4_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f167,f72])).
fof(f169,plain,(
  nonhuman(sK0_skl,sK4_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f167,f70])).
fof(f170,plain,(
  general(sK0_skl,sK4_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f167,f68])).
fof(f171,plain,(
  unisex(sK0_skl,sK4_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f167,f66])).
fof(f172,plain,(
  ~patient(sK0_skl,sK1_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f156,f145])).
fof(f173,plain,(
  ![X0]: (~forename(sK0_skl,X0)|~of(sK0_skl,X0,sK3_skl)|~forename(sK0_skl,sK4_skl)|sK4_skl=X0)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f164,f139])).
fof(f174,plain,(
  ![X0]: (~forename(sK0_skl,X0)|~of(sK0_skl,X0,sK3_skl)|sK4_skl=X0)),
  inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f173,f142])).
fof(f176,plain,(
  existent(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f86,f161])).
fof(f177,plain,(
  specific(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f88,f161])).
fof(f178,plain,(
  thing(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f90,f161])).
fof(f179,plain,(
  food(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f98,f153])).
fof(f180,plain,(
  substance_matter(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f179,f96])).
fof(f181,plain,(
  object(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f180,f94])).
fof(f182,plain,(
  entity(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f181,f92])).
fof(f183,plain,(
  nonliving(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f181,f84])).
fof(f184,plain,(
  impartial(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f181,f82])).
fof(f185,plain,(
  unisex(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f181,f80])).
fof(f186,plain,(
  thing(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f182,f90])).
fof(f187,plain,(
  specific(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f182,f88])).
fof(f188,plain,(
  existent(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f182,f86])).
fof(f189,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~forename(sK0_skl,X0)|~of(sK0_skl,X0,sK2_skl)|~forename(sK0_skl,X1)|X1=X0|~of(sK0_skl,X1,sK2_skl))),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f182,f132])).
fof(f190,plain,(
  unisex(sK0_skl,sK1_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f104,f155])).
fof(f191,plain,(
  nonexistent(sK0_skl,sK1_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f106,f155])).
fof(f192,plain,(
  specific(sK0_skl,sK1_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f108,f155])).
fof(f193,plain,(
  singleton(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f110,f186])).
fof(f194,plain,(
  singleton(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f110,f178])).
fof(f195,plain,(
  singleton(sK0_skl,sK4_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f110,f168])).
fof(f196,plain,(
  thing(sK0_skl,sK1_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f112,f155])).
fof(f197,plain,(
  singleton(sK0_skl,sK1_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f196,f110])).
fof(f198,plain,(
  act(sK0_skl,sK1_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f118,f149])).
fof(f200,plain,(
  ~nonliving(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f120,f158])).
fof(f201,plain,(
  ~nonexistent(sK0_skl,sK2_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f122,f188])).
fof(f202,plain,(
  ~nonexistent(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f122,f176])).
fof(f203,plain,(
  ~nonhuman(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f124,f159])).
fof(f205,plain,(
  ~specific(sK0_skl,sK4_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f128,f170])).
fof(f206,plain,(
  ~unisex(sK0_skl,sK3_skl)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f130,f157])).
% SZS output end Saturation for NLP042+1.p

Solution for KRS030+1

% SZS output start Saturation for KRS030+1
fof(f19,axiom,(
  (! [X] :( cowlThing(X)& ~ cowlNothing(X) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/KRS030+1.p')).
fof(f20,axiom,(
  (! [X] :( xsd_string(X)<=> ~ xsd_integer(X) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/KRS030+1.p')).
fof(f21,axiom,(
  (! [X] :( cSatisfiable(X)<=> ( (? [Y] :( rf1(X,Y)& ~ cp(Y) ))& (? [Y] :( rf(X,Y)& cp(Y) ) )) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/KRS030+1.p')).
fof(f22,axiom,(
  (! [X,Y,Z] :( ( rf(X,Y)& rf(X,Z) )=> Y = Z ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/KRS030+1.p')).
fof(f23,axiom,(
  (! [X,Y,Z] :( ( rf1(X,Y)& rf1(X,Z) )=> Y = Z ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/KRS030+1.p')).
fof(f24,axiom,(
  (! [X,Y] :( rinvF(X,Y)<=> rf(Y,X) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/KRS030+1.p')).
fof(f25,axiom,(
  (! [X,Y] :( rinvF1(X,Y)<=> rf1(Y,X) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/KRS030+1.p')).
fof(f26,axiom,(
  (! [X,Y] :( rinvS(X,Y)<=> rs(Y,X) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/KRS030+1.p')).
fof(f27,axiom,(
  (! [X,Y,Z] :( ( rs(X,Y)& rs(X,Z) )=> Y = Z ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/KRS030+1.p')).
fof(f28,axiom,(
  cSatisfiable(i2003_11_14_17_15_26245) ),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/KRS030+1.p')).
fof(f29,axiom,(
  (! [X,Y] :( rs(X,Y)=> rf(X,Y) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/KRS030+1.p')).
fof(f30,axiom,(
  (! [X,Y] :( rs(X,Y)=> rf1(X,Y) ) )),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/KRS030+1.p')).
fof(f85,plain,(
  (![X]: cowlThing(X))&(![X]: ~cowlNothing(X))),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f19])).
fof(f86,plain,(
  ![X0]: (cowlThing(X0))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f85])).
fof(f87,plain,(
  ![X0]: (~cowlNothing(X0))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f85])).
fof(f88,plain,(
  ![X]: ((~xsd_string(X)|~xsd_integer(X))&(xsd_string(X)|xsd_integer(X)))),
  inference(NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f20])).
fof(f89,plain,(
  (![X]: (~xsd_string(X)|~xsd_integer(X)))&(![X]: (xsd_string(X)|xsd_integer(X)))),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f88])).
fof(f90,plain,(
  ![X0]: (~xsd_string(X0)|~xsd_integer(X0))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f89])).
fof(f91,plain,(
  ![X0]: (xsd_string(X0)|xsd_integer(X0))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f89])).
fof(f92,plain,(
  ![X]: ((~cSatisfiable(X)|((?[Y]: (rf1(X,Y)&~cp(Y)))&(?[Y]: (rf(X,Y)&cp(Y)))))&(cSatisfiable(X)|((![Y]: (~rf1(X,Y)|cp(Y)))|(![Y]: (~rf(X,Y)|~cp(Y))))))),
  inference(NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f21])).
fof(f93,plain,(
  (![X]: (~cSatisfiable(X)|((?[Y]: (rf1(X,Y)&~cp(Y)))&(?[Y]: (rf(X,Y)&cp(Y))))))&(![X]: (cSatisfiable(X)|((![Y]: (~rf1(X,Y)|cp(Y)))|(![Y]: (~rf(X,Y)|~cp(Y))))))),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f92])).
fof(f94,plain,(
  (![X]: (~cSatisfiable(X)|((rf1(X,sK0_skl(X))&~cp(sK0_skl(X)))&(rf(X,sK1_skl(X))&cp(sK1_skl(X))))))&(![X]: (cSatisfiable(X)|((![Y]: (~rf1(X,Y)|cp(Y)))|(![Y]: (~rf(X,Y)|~cp(Y))))))),
  inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK0_skl,sK1_skl]),skolemize(Y,sK0_skl(X)),skolemize(Y,sK1_skl(X))],[f93])).
fof(f95,plain,(
  ![X0]: (~cSatisfiable(X0)|rf1(X0,sK0_skl(X0)))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f94])).
fof(f96,plain,(
  ![X0]: (~cSatisfiable(X0)|~cp(sK0_skl(X0)))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f94])).
fof(f97,plain,(
  ![X0]: (~cSatisfiable(X0)|rf(X0,sK1_skl(X0)))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f94])).
fof(f98,plain,(
  ![X0]: (~cSatisfiable(X0)|cp(sK1_skl(X0)))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f94])).
fof(f99,plain,(
  ![X0,X1,X2]: (cSatisfiable(X0)|~rf1(X0,X1)|cp(X1)|~rf(X0,X2)|~cp(X2))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f94])).
fof(f100,plain,(
  ![X,Y,Z]: ((~rf(X,Y)|~rf(X,Z))|Y=Z)),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f22])).
fof(f101,plain,(
  ![Y,Z]: ((![X]: (~rf(X,Y)|~rf(X,Z)))|Y=Z)),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f100])).
fof(f102,plain,(
  ![X0,X1,X2]: (~rf(X0,X1)|~rf(X0,X2)|X1=X2)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f101])).
fof(f103,plain,(
  ![X,Y,Z]: ((~rf1(X,Y)|~rf1(X,Z))|Y=Z)),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f23])).
fof(f104,plain,(
  ![Y,Z]: ((![X]: (~rf1(X,Y)|~rf1(X,Z)))|Y=Z)),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f103])).
fof(f105,plain,(
  ![X0,X1,X2]: (~rf1(X0,X1)|~rf1(X0,X2)|X1=X2)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f104])).
fof(f106,plain,(
  ![X,Y]: ((~rinvF(X,Y)|rf(Y,X))&(rinvF(X,Y)|~rf(Y,X)))),
  inference(NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f24])).
fof(f107,plain,(
  (![X,Y]: (~rinvF(X,Y)|rf(Y,X)))&(![X,Y]: (rinvF(X,Y)|~rf(Y,X)))),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f106])).
fof(f108,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~rinvF(X0,X1)|rf(X1,X0))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f107])).
fof(f109,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (rinvF(X0,X1)|~rf(X1,X0))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f107])).
fof(f110,plain,(
  ![X,Y]: ((~rinvF1(X,Y)|rf1(Y,X))&(rinvF1(X,Y)|~rf1(Y,X)))),
  inference(NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f25])).
fof(f111,plain,(
  (![X,Y]: (~rinvF1(X,Y)|rf1(Y,X)))&(![X,Y]: (rinvF1(X,Y)|~rf1(Y,X)))),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f110])).
fof(f112,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~rinvF1(X0,X1)|rf1(X1,X0))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f111])).
fof(f113,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (rinvF1(X0,X1)|~rf1(X1,X0))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f111])).
fof(f114,plain,(
  ![X,Y]: ((~rinvS(X,Y)|rs(Y,X))&(rinvS(X,Y)|~rs(Y,X)))),
  inference(NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f26])).
fof(f115,plain,(
  (![X,Y]: (~rinvS(X,Y)|rs(Y,X)))&(![X,Y]: (rinvS(X,Y)|~rs(Y,X)))),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f114])).
fof(f116,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~rinvS(X0,X1)|rs(X1,X0))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f115])).
fof(f117,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (rinvS(X0,X1)|~rs(X1,X0))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f115])).
fof(f118,plain,(
  ![X,Y,Z]: ((~rs(X,Y)|~rs(X,Z))|Y=Z)),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f27])).
fof(f119,plain,(
  ![Y,Z]: ((![X]: (~rs(X,Y)|~rs(X,Z)))|Y=Z)),
  inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f118])).
fof(f120,plain,(
  ![X0,X1,X2]: (~rs(X0,X1)|~rs(X0,X2)|X1=X2)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f119])).
fof(f121,plain,(
  cSatisfiable(i2003_11_14_17_15_26245)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f28])).
fof(f122,plain,(
  ![X,Y]: (~rs(X,Y)|rf(X,Y))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f29])).
fof(f123,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~rs(X0,X1)|rf(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f122])).
fof(f124,plain,(
  ![X,Y]: (~rs(X,Y)|rf1(X,Y))),
  inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f30])).
fof(f125,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (~rs(X0,X1)|rf1(X0,X1))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f124])).
fof(f127,plain,(
  rf1(i2003_11_14_17_15_26245,sK0_skl(i2003_11_14_17_15_26245))),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f95,f121])).
fof(f128,plain,(
  rf(i2003_11_14_17_15_26245,sK1_skl(i2003_11_14_17_15_26245))),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f97,f121])).
fof(f129,plain,(
  cp(sK1_skl(i2003_11_14_17_15_26245))),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f98,f121])).
fof(f130,plain,(
  rinvF1(sK0_skl(i2003_11_14_17_15_26245),i2003_11_14_17_15_26245)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f127,f113])).
fof(f131,plain,(
  ![X0]: (~rf1(i2003_11_14_17_15_26245,X0)|X0=sK0_skl(i2003_11_14_17_15_26245))),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f127,f105])).
fof(f133,plain,(
  rinvF(sK1_skl(i2003_11_14_17_15_26245),i2003_11_14_17_15_26245)),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f128,f109])).
fof(f134,plain,(
  ![X0]: (~rf(i2003_11_14_17_15_26245,X0)|X0=sK1_skl(i2003_11_14_17_15_26245))),
  inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f128,f102])).
% SZS output end Saturation for KRS030+1.p

Solution for BOO001-1

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file BOO001-1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name /run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/BOO001-1.p from annotated formula f1
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'f205' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the negated conjecture f6 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation for BOO001-1
fof(f1,axiom,(
  (![V,W,X,Y,Z]: (multiply(multiply(V,W,X),Y,multiply(V,W,Z)) = multiply(V,W,multiply(X,Y,Z)) ))),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/BOO001-1.p')).
fof(f2,axiom,(
  (![Y,X]: (multiply(Y,X,X) = X ))),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/BOO001-1.p')).
fof(f3,axiom,(
  (![X,Y]: (multiply(X,X,Y) = X ))),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/BOO001-1.p')).
fof(f4,axiom,(
  (![Y,X]: (multiply(inverse(Y),Y,X) = X ))),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/BOO001-1.p')).
fof(f5,axiom,(
  (![X,Y]: (multiply(X,Y,inverse(Y)) = X ))),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/BOO001-1.p')).
fof(f6,negated_conjecture,(
  inverse(inverse(a)) != a ),
  file('/run/media/oscar/Elements/temp/TPTP-v8.1.2/Problems/BOO001-1.p')).
fof(f7,plain,(
  ![X0,X1,X2,X3,X4]: (multiply(multiply(X0,X1,X2),X3,multiply(X0,X1,X4))=multiply(X0,X1,multiply(X2,X3,X4)))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f1])).
fof(f8,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (multiply(X0,X1,X1)=X1)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f2])).
fof(f9,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (multiply(X0,X0,X1)=X0)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f3])).
fof(f10,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (multiply(inverse(X0),X0,X1)=X1)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f4])).
fof(f11,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (multiply(X0,X1,inverse(X1))=X0)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f5])).
fof(f12,plain,(
  ~inverse(inverse(a))=a),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f6])).
fof(f28,plain,(
  ![X0,X1,X2,X3]: (multiply(X0,X1,multiply(X0,X2,X3))=multiply(X0,X2,multiply(inverse(X2),X1,X3)))),
  inference(paramodulation,[status(thm)],[f11,f7])).
fof(f63,plain,(
  ![X0,X1,X2]: (multiply(X0,inverse(X1),multiply(X0,X1,X2))=multiply(X0,X1,inverse(X1)))),
  inference(paramodulation,[status(thm)],[f9,f28])).
fof(f79,plain,(
  ![X0,X1,X2]: (multiply(X0,inverse(X1),multiply(X0,X1,X2))=X0)),
  inference(forward_demodulation,[status(thm)],[f11,f63])).
fof(f159,plain,(
  ![X0,X1]: (multiply(X0,inverse(X1),X1)=X0)),
  inference(paramodulation,[status(thm)],[f8,f79])).
fof(f178,plain,(
  ![X0]: (X0=inverse(inverse(X0)))),
  inference(paramodulation,[status(thm)],[f10,f159])).
fof(f196,plain,(
  ~a=a),
  inference(backward_demodulation,[status(thm)],[f178,f12])).
fof(f205,plain,(
  $false),
  inference(trivial_equality_resolution,[status(thm)],[f196])).
% SZS output end CNFRefutation for BOO001-1.p

E 3.5.1

Solution for SET014^4

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
 RESULT: SOT_P5971l - E---3.5.1 says Unknown - CPU = 0.01
WARNING: Leaf axiom(_like) formulae not (un)satisfiable
SUCCESS: Generated trusted ASked formulae
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'c_0_13' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture thm as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation
thf(decl_28, type, union: ($i > $o) > ($i > $o) > $i > $o).
thf(decl_34, type, subset: ($i > $o) > ($i > $o) > $o).
thf(decl_37, type, epred1_0: $i > $o).
thf(decl_38, type, epred2_0: $i > $o).
thf(decl_39, type, epred3_0: $i > $o).
thf(decl_40, type, esk1_0: $i).
thf(thm, conjecture, ![X22:$i > $o, X23:$i > $o, X24:$i > $o]:((((subset @ X22 @ X24)&(subset @ X23 @ X24))=>(subset @ (union @ X22 @ X23) @ X24))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SET014^4.p', thm)).
thf(union, axiom, ((union)=(^[X5:$i > $o, X6:$i > $o, X4:$i]:((((X5 @ X4))|((X6 @ X4)))))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/Axioms/SET008^0.ax', union)).
thf(subset, axiom, ((subset)=(^[X16:$i > $o, X17:$i > $o]:(![X4:$i]:((((X16 @ X4))=>((X17 @ X4))))))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/Axioms/SET008^0.ax', subset)).
thf(c_0_3, negated_conjecture, ~(![X22:$i > $o, X23:$i > $o, X24:$i > $o]:((((subset @ X22 @ X24)&(subset @ X23 @ X24))=>(subset @ (union @ X22 @ X23) @ X24)))), inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[thm])).
thf(c_0_4, plain, ((union)=(^[Z0:$i > $o, Z1:$i > $o, Z2:$i]:((((Z0 @ Z2))|((Z1 @ Z2)))))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[union])).
thf(c_0_5, plain, ((subset)=(^[Z0:$i > $o, Z1:$i > $o]:(![X4:$i]:((((Z0 @ X4))=>((Z1 @ X4))))))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[subset])).
thf(c_0_6, negated_conjecture, ~(![X22:$i > $o, X23:$i > $o, X24:$i > $o]:(((![X28:$i]:(((X22 @ X28)=>(X24 @ X28)))&![X29:$i]:(((X23 @ X29)=>(X24 @ X29))))=>![X30:$i]:((((X22 @ X30)|(X23 @ X30))=>(X24 @ X30)))))), inference(apply_def,[status(thm)],[inference(apply_def,[status(thm)],[c_0_3, c_0_4]), c_0_5])).
thf(c_0_7, negated_conjecture, ![X34:$i, X35:$i]:((((~(epred1_0 @ X34)|(epred3_0 @ X34))&(~(epred2_0 @ X35)|(epred3_0 @ X35)))&(((epred1_0 @ esk1_0)|(epred2_0 @ esk1_0))&~(epred3_0 @ esk1_0)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(skolemize,[status(esa)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_6])])])])])).
thf(c_0_8, negated_conjecture, ![X1:$i]:(((epred3_0 @ X1)|~((epred2_0 @ X1)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_7])).
thf(c_0_9, negated_conjecture, ((epred1_0 @ esk1_0)|(epred2_0 @ esk1_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_7])).
thf(c_0_10, negated_conjecture, ~((epred3_0 @ esk1_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_7])).
thf(c_0_11, negated_conjecture, ![X1:$i]:(((epred3_0 @ X1)|~((epred1_0 @ X1)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_7])).
thf(c_0_12, negated_conjecture, (epred1_0 @ esk1_0), inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_8, c_0_9]), c_0_10])).
thf(c_0_13, negated_conjecture, ($false), inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_11, c_0_12]), c_0_10]), ['proof']).
% SZS output end CNFRefutation

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name /Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SEU140+2.p from annotated formula t63_xboole_1
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'c_0_41' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture t63_xboole_1 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation
fof(t63_xboole_1, conjecture, ![X1, X2, X3]:(((subset(X1,X2)&disjoint(X2,X3))=>disjoint(X1,X3))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SEU140+2.p', t63_xboole_1)).
fof(symmetry_r1_xboole_0, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((disjoint(X1,X2)=>disjoint(X2,X1))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SEU140+2.p', symmetry_r1_xboole_0)).
fof(fc2_xboole_0, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((~(empty(X1))=>~(empty(set_union2(X1,X2))))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SEU140+2.p', fc2_xboole_0)).
fof(d7_xboole_0, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((disjoint(X1,X2)<=>set_intersection2(X1,X2)=empty_set)), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SEU140+2.p', d7_xboole_0)).
fof(commutativity_k3_xboole_0, axiom, ![X1, X2]:(set_intersection2(X1,X2)=set_intersection2(X2,X1)), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SEU140+2.p', commutativity_k3_xboole_0)).
fof(t4_xboole_0, lemma, ![X1, X2]:((~((~(disjoint(X1,X2))&![X3]:(~(in(X3,set_intersection2(X1,X2))))))&~((?[X3]:(in(X3,set_intersection2(X1,X2)))&disjoint(X1,X2))))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SEU140+2.p', t4_xboole_0)).
fof(t12_xboole_1, lemma, ![X1, X2]:((subset(X1,X2)=>set_union2(X1,X2)=X2)), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SEU140+2.p', t12_xboole_1)).
fof(t26_xboole_1, lemma, ![X1, X2, X3]:((subset(X1,X2)=>subset(set_intersection2(X1,X3),set_intersection2(X2,X3)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SEU140+2.p', t26_xboole_1)).
fof(t7_boole, axiom, ![X1, X2]:(~((in(X1,X2)&empty(X2)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SEU140+2.p', t7_boole)).
fof(fc1_xboole_0, axiom, empty(empty_set), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SEU140+2.p', fc1_xboole_0)).
fof(c_0_10, negated_conjecture, ~(![X1, X2, X3]:(((subset(X1,X2)&disjoint(X2,X3))=>disjoint(X1,X3)))), inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[t63_xboole_1])).
fof(c_0_11, plain, ![X10, X11]:((~disjoint(X10,X11)|disjoint(X11,X10))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[symmetry_r1_xboole_0])])])).
fof(c_0_12, negated_conjecture, ((subset(esk1_0,esk2_0)&disjoint(esk2_0,esk3_0))&~disjoint(esk1_0,esk3_0)), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(skolemize,[status(esa)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_10])])])])).
fof(c_0_13, plain, ![X1, X2]:((~empty(X1)=>~empty(set_union2(X1,X2)))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[fc2_xboole_0])).
fof(c_0_14, plain, ![X8, X9]:(((~disjoint(X8,X9)|set_intersection2(X8,X9)=empty_set)&(set_intersection2(X8,X9)!=empty_set|disjoint(X8,X9)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[d7_xboole_0])])])).
cnf(c_0_15, plain, (disjoint(X2,X1)|~disjoint(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_11])).
cnf(c_0_16, negated_conjecture, (disjoint(esk2_0,esk3_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_12])).
fof(c_0_17, plain, ![X45, X46]:(set_intersection2(X45,X46)=set_intersection2(X46,X45)), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[commutativity_k3_xboole_0])).
fof(c_0_18, lemma, ![X1, X2]:((~((~disjoint(X1,X2)&![X3]:(~in(X3,set_intersection2(X1,X2)))))&~((?[X3]:(in(X3,set_intersection2(X1,X2)))&disjoint(X1,X2))))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[t4_xboole_0])).
fof(c_0_19, plain, ![X82, X83]:((empty(X82)|~empty(set_union2(X82,X83)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_13])])])).
fof(c_0_20, lemma, ![X104, X105]:((~subset(X104,X105)|set_union2(X104,X105)=X105)), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[t12_xboole_1])])])).
fof(c_0_21, lemma, ![X56, X57, X58]:((~subset(X56,X57)|subset(set_intersection2(X56,X58),set_intersection2(X57,X58)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[t26_xboole_1])])])).
cnf(c_0_22, plain, (set_intersection2(X1,X2)=empty_set|~disjoint(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14])).
cnf(c_0_23, negated_conjecture, (disjoint(esk3_0,esk2_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_15, c_0_16])).
cnf(c_0_24, plain, (set_intersection2(X1,X2)=set_intersection2(X2,X1)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_17])).
fof(c_0_25, plain, ![X80, X81]:((~in(X80,X81)|~empty(X81))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[t7_boole])])])).
fof(c_0_26, lemma, ![X18, X19, X21, X22, X23]:(((disjoint(X18,X19)|in(esk5_2(X18,X19),set_intersection2(X18,X19)))&(~in(X23,set_intersection2(X21,X22))|~disjoint(X21,X22)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(skolemize,[status(esa)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_18])])])])])])).
cnf(c_0_27, plain, (empty(X1)|~empty(set_union2(X1,X2))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_19])).
cnf(c_0_28, lemma, (set_union2(X1,X2)=X2|~subset(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_20])).
cnf(c_0_29, lemma, (subset(set_intersection2(X1,X3),set_intersection2(X2,X3))|~subset(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_21])).
cnf(c_0_30, negated_conjecture, (set_intersection2(esk2_0,esk3_0)=empty_set), inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_22, c_0_23]), c_0_24])).
cnf(c_0_31, plain, (~in(X1,X2)|~empty(X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_25])).
cnf(c_0_32, lemma, (disjoint(X1,X2)|in(esk5_2(X1,X2),set_intersection2(X1,X2))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_26])).
cnf(c_0_33, lemma, (empty(X1)|~empty(X2)|~subset(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_27, c_0_28])).
cnf(c_0_34, negated_conjecture, (subset(set_intersection2(X1,esk3_0),empty_set)|~subset(X1,esk2_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_29, c_0_30])).
cnf(c_0_35, plain, (empty(empty_set)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[fc1_xboole_0])).
cnf(c_0_36, lemma, (disjoint(X1,X2)|~empty(set_intersection2(X1,X2))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_31, c_0_32])).
cnf(c_0_37, lemma, (empty(set_intersection2(X1,esk3_0))|~subset(X1,esk2_0)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_33, c_0_34]), c_0_35])])).
cnf(c_0_38, negated_conjecture, (~disjoint(esk1_0,esk3_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_12])).
cnf(c_0_39, lemma, (disjoint(X1,esk3_0)|~subset(X1,esk2_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_36, c_0_37])).
cnf(c_0_40, negated_conjecture, (subset(esk1_0,esk2_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_12])).
cnf(c_0_41, negated_conjecture, ($false), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_38, c_0_39]), c_0_40])]), ['proof']).
% SZS output end CNFRefutation

Solution for NLP042+1

% SZS output start Saturation
fof(ax41, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((specific(X1,X2)=>~(general(X1,X2)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax41)).
fof(ax42, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((unisex(X1,X2)=>~(female(X1,X2)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax42)).
fof(ax26, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((beverage(X1,X2)=>food(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax26)).
fof(ax27, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((shake_beverage(X1,X2)=>beverage(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax27)).
fof(co1, conjecture, ~(?[X1]:((actual_world(X1)&?[X2, X3, X4, X5]:(((((((((((of(X1,X3,X2)&woman(X1,X2))&mia_forename(X1,X3))&forename(X1,X3))&shake_beverage(X1,X4))&event(X1,X5))&agent(X1,X5,X2))&patient(X1,X5,X4))&past(X1,X5))&nonreflexive(X1,X5))&order(X1,X5)))))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', co1)).
fof(ax11, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((abstraction(X1,X2)=>general(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax11)).
fof(ax15, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((relname(X1,X2)=>relation(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax15)).
fof(ax16, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((forename(X1,X2)=>relname(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax16)).
fof(ax38, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((existent(X1,X2)=>~(nonexistent(X1,X2)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax38)).
fof(ax1, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((woman(X1,X2)=>female(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax1)).
fof(ax25, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((food(X1,X2)=>substance_matter(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax25)).
fof(ax6, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((organism(X1,X2)=>entity(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax6)).
fof(ax7, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((human_person(X1,X2)=>organism(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax7)).
fof(ax8, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((woman(X1,X2)=>human_person(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax8)).
fof(ax40, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((nonliving(X1,X2)=>~(living(X1,X2)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax40)).
fof(ax39, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((nonhuman(X1,X2)=>~(human(X1,X2)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax39)).
fof(ax37, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((animate(X1,X2)=>~(nonliving(X1,X2)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax37)).
fof(ax21, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((entity(X1,X2)=>specific(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax21)).
fof(ax14, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((relation(X1,X2)=>abstraction(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax14)).
fof(ax44, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3, X4]:((((nonreflexive(X1,X2)&agent(X1,X2,X3))&patient(X1,X2,X4))=>X3!=X4)), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax44)).
fof(ax30, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((eventuality(X1,X2)=>nonexistent(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax30)).
fof(ax31, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((eventuality(X1,X2)=>specific(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax31)).
fof(ax34, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((event(X1,X2)=>eventuality(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax34)).
fof(ax24, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((substance_matter(X1,X2)=>object(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax24)).
fof(ax43, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:((((entity(X1,X2)&forename(X1,X3))&of(X1,X3,X2))=>~(?[X4]:(((forename(X1,X4)&X4!=X3)&of(X1,X4,X2)))))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax43)).
fof(ax4, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((organism(X1,X2)=>living(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax4)).
fof(ax12, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((abstraction(X1,X2)=>nonhuman(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax12)).
fof(ax2, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((human_person(X1,X2)=>animate(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax2)).
fof(ax20, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((entity(X1,X2)=>existent(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax20)).
fof(ax10, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((abstraction(X1,X2)=>unisex(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax10)).
fof(ax19, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((object(X1,X2)=>nonliving(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax19)).
fof(ax3, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((human_person(X1,X2)=>human(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax3)).
fof(ax29, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((eventuality(X1,X2)=>unisex(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax29)).
fof(ax17, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((object(X1,X2)=>unisex(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax17)).
fof(ax23, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((object(X1,X2)=>entity(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax23)).
fof(ax36, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((order(X1,X2)=>act(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax36)).
fof(ax32, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((thing(X1,X2)=>singleton(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax32)).
fof(ax35, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((act(X1,X2)=>event(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax35)).
fof(ax28, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((order(X1,X2)=>event(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax28)).
fof(ax33, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((eventuality(X1,X2)=>thing(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax33)).
fof(ax13, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((abstraction(X1,X2)=>thing(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax13)).
fof(ax22, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((entity(X1,X2)=>thing(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax22)).
fof(ax9, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((mia_forename(X1,X2)=>forename(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax9)).
fof(ax18, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((object(X1,X2)=>impartial(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax18)).
fof(ax5, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((organism(X1,X2)=>impartial(X1,X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/NLP042+1.p', ax5)).
fof(c_0_45, plain, ![X1, X2]:((specific(X1,X2)=>~general(X1,X2))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax41])).
fof(c_0_46, plain, ![X1, X2]:((unisex(X1,X2)=>~female(X1,X2))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax42])).
fof(c_0_47, plain, ![X45, X46]:((~beverage(X45,X46)|food(X45,X46))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax26])])])).
fof(c_0_48, plain, ![X23, X24]:((~shake_beverage(X23,X24)|beverage(X23,X24))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax27])])])).
fof(c_0_49, negated_conjecture, ~(~(?[X1]:((actual_world(X1)&?[X2, X3, X4, X5]:(((((((((((of(X1,X3,X2)&woman(X1,X2))&mia_forename(X1,X3))&forename(X1,X3))&shake_beverage(X1,X4))&event(X1,X5))&agent(X1,X5,X2))&patient(X1,X5,X4))&past(X1,X5))&nonreflexive(X1,X5))&order(X1,X5))))))), inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[co1])).
fof(c_0_50, plain, ![X73, X74]:((~specific(X73,X74)|~general(X73,X74))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_45])])])).
fof(c_0_51, plain, ![X97, X98]:((~abstraction(X97,X98)|general(X97,X98))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax11])])])).
fof(c_0_52, plain, ![X47, X48]:((~relname(X47,X48)|relation(X47,X48))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax15])])])).
fof(c_0_53, plain, ![X27, X28]:((~forename(X27,X28)|relname(X27,X28))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax16])])])).
fof(c_0_54, plain, ![X1, X2]:((existent(X1,X2)=>~nonexistent(X1,X2))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax38])).
fof(c_0_55, plain, ![X59, X60]:((~unisex(X59,X60)|~female(X59,X60))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_46])])])).
fof(c_0_56, plain, ![X33, X34]:((~woman(X33,X34)|female(X33,X34))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax1])])])).
fof(c_0_57, plain, ![X79, X80]:((~food(X79,X80)|substance_matter(X79,X80))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax25])])])).
cnf(c_0_58, plain, (food(X1,X2)|~beverage(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_47]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_59, plain, (beverage(X1,X2)|~shake_beverage(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_48]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_60, plain, ![X49, X50]:((~organism(X49,X50)|entity(X49,X50))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax6])])])).
fof(c_0_61, plain, ![X65, X66]:((~human_person(X65,X66)|organism(X65,X66))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax7])])])).
fof(c_0_62, plain, ![X35, X36]:((~woman(X35,X36)|human_person(X35,X36))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax8])])])).
fof(c_0_63, negated_conjecture, (actual_world(esk1_0)&((((((((((of(esk1_0,esk3_0,esk2_0)&woman(esk1_0,esk2_0))&mia_forename(esk1_0,esk3_0))&forename(esk1_0,esk3_0))&shake_beverage(esk1_0,esk4_0))&event(esk1_0,esk5_0))&agent(esk1_0,esk5_0,esk2_0))&patient(esk1_0,esk5_0,esk4_0))&past(esk1_0,esk5_0))&nonreflexive(esk1_0,esk5_0))&order(esk1_0,esk5_0))), inference(skolemize,[status(esa)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_49])])])).
fof(c_0_64, plain, ![X1, X2]:((nonliving(X1,X2)=>~living(X1,X2))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax40])).
fof(c_0_65, plain, ![X1, X2]:((nonhuman(X1,X2)=>~human(X1,X2))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax39])).
fof(c_0_66, plain, ![X1, X2]:((animate(X1,X2)=>~nonliving(X1,X2))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax37])).
cnf(c_0_67, plain, (~specific(X1,X2)|~general(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_50]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_68, plain, (general(X1,X2)|~abstraction(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_51]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_69, plain, ![X53, X54]:((~entity(X53,X54)|specific(X53,X54))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax21])])])).
fof(c_0_70, plain, ![X81, X82]:((~relation(X81,X82)|abstraction(X81,X82))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax14])])])).
cnf(c_0_71, plain, (relation(X1,X2)|~relname(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_52]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_72, plain, (relname(X1,X2)|~forename(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_53]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_73, plain, ![X1, X2, X3, X4]:((((nonreflexive(X1,X2)&agent(X1,X2,X3))&patient(X1,X2,X4))=>X3!=X4)), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax44])).
fof(c_0_74, plain, ![X71, X72]:((~existent(X71,X72)|~nonexistent(X71,X72))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_54])])])).
fof(c_0_75, plain, ![X39, X40]:((~eventuality(X39,X40)|nonexistent(X39,X40))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax30])])])).
fof(c_0_76, plain, ![X41, X42]:((~eventuality(X41,X42)|specific(X41,X42))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax31])])])).
fof(c_0_77, plain, ![X19, X20]:((~event(X19,X20)|eventuality(X19,X20))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax34])])])).
cnf(c_0_78, plain, (~unisex(X1,X2)|~female(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_55]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_79, plain, (female(X1,X2)|~woman(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_56]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_80, plain, ![X91, X92]:((~substance_matter(X91,X92)|object(X91,X92))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax24])])])).
cnf(c_0_81, plain, (substance_matter(X1,X2)|~food(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_57]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_82, plain, (food(X1,X2)|~shake_beverage(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_58, c_0_59]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_83, plain, ![X1, X2, X3]:((((entity(X1,X2)&forename(X1,X3))&of(X1,X3,X2))=>~(?[X4]:(((forename(X1,X4)&X4!=X3)&of(X1,X4,X2)))))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax43])).
cnf(c_0_84, plain, (entity(X1,X2)|~organism(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_60]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_85, plain, (organism(X1,X2)|~human_person(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_61]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_86, plain, (human_person(X1,X2)|~woman(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_62]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_87, negated_conjecture, (woman(esk1_0,esk2_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_88, plain, ![X101, X102]:((~nonliving(X101,X102)|~living(X101,X102))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_64])])])).
fof(c_0_89, plain, ![X83, X84]:((~organism(X83,X84)|living(X83,X84))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax4])])])).
fof(c_0_90, plain, ![X95, X96]:((~nonhuman(X95,X96)|~human(X95,X96))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_65])])])).
fof(c_0_91, plain, ![X99, X100]:((~abstraction(X99,X100)|nonhuman(X99,X100))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax12])])])).
fof(c_0_92, plain, ![X93, X94]:((~animate(X93,X94)|~nonliving(X93,X94))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_66])])])).
fof(c_0_93, plain, ![X61, X62]:((~human_person(X61,X62)|animate(X61,X62))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax2])])])).
cnf(c_0_94, plain, (~specific(X1,X2)|~abstraction(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67, c_0_68]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_95, plain, (specific(X1,X2)|~entity(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_69]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_96, plain, (abstraction(X1,X2)|~relation(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_70]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_97, plain, (relation(X1,X2)|~forename(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_71, c_0_72]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_98, plain, ![X15, X16, X17, X18]:((~nonreflexive(X15,X16)|~agent(X15,X16,X17)|~patient(X15,X16,X18)|X17!=X18)), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_73])])])).
cnf(c_0_99, plain, (~existent(X1,X2)|~nonexistent(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_74]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_100, plain, (nonexistent(X1,X2)|~eventuality(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_75]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_101, plain, ![X51, X52]:((~entity(X51,X52)|existent(X51,X52))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax20])])])).
cnf(c_0_102, plain, (specific(X1,X2)|~eventuality(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_76]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_103, plain, (eventuality(X1,X2)|~event(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_77]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_104, negated_conjecture, (event(esk1_0,esk5_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_105, plain, (~unisex(X1,X2)|~woman(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_78, c_0_79]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_106, plain, ![X67, X68]:((~abstraction(X67,X68)|unisex(X67,X68))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax10])])])).
cnf(c_0_107, plain, (object(X1,X2)|~substance_matter(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_80]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_108, plain, (substance_matter(X1,X2)|~shake_beverage(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_81, c_0_82]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_109, plain, ![X29, X30, X31, X32]:((~entity(X29,X30)|~forename(X29,X31)|~of(X29,X31,X30)|(~forename(X29,X32)|X32=X31|~of(X29,X32,X30)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_83])])])])).
cnf(c_0_110, plain, (entity(X1,X2)|~human_person(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84, c_0_85]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_111, negated_conjecture, (human_person(esk1_0,esk2_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_86, c_0_87]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_112, plain, (~nonliving(X1,X2)|~living(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_88]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_113, plain, (living(X1,X2)|~organism(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_89]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_114, plain, ![X89, X90]:((~object(X89,X90)|nonliving(X89,X90))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax19])])])).
cnf(c_0_115, plain, (~nonhuman(X1,X2)|~human(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_90]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_116, plain, (nonhuman(X1,X2)|~abstraction(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_91]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_117, plain, ![X63, X64]:((~human_person(X63,X64)|human(X63,X64))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax3])])])).
cnf(c_0_118, plain, (~animate(X1,X2)|~nonliving(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_92]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_119, plain, (animate(X1,X2)|~human_person(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_93]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_120, plain, (~abstraction(X1,X2)|~entity(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_94, c_0_95]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_121, plain, (abstraction(X1,X2)|~forename(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_96, c_0_97]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_122, plain, (~nonreflexive(X1,X2)|~agent(X1,X2,X3)|~patient(X1,X2,X4)|X3!=X4), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_98])).
cnf(c_0_123, plain, (~eventuality(X1,X2)|~existent(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_99, c_0_100]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_124, plain, (existent(X1,X2)|~entity(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_101]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_125, plain, (~eventuality(X1,X2)|~abstraction(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_94, c_0_102]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_126, negated_conjecture, (eventuality(esk1_0,esk5_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_103, c_0_104]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_127, negated_conjecture, (~unisex(esk1_0,esk2_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_105, c_0_87]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_128, plain, (unisex(X1,X2)|~abstraction(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_106]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_129, plain, ![X37, X38]:((~eventuality(X37,X38)|unisex(X37,X38))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax29])])])).
fof(c_0_130, plain, ![X69, X70]:((~object(X69,X70)|unisex(X69,X70))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax17])])])).
fof(c_0_131, plain, ![X57, X58]:((~object(X57,X58)|entity(X57,X58))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax23])])])).
cnf(c_0_132, plain, (object(X1,X2)|~shake_beverage(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_107, c_0_108]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_133, negated_conjecture, (shake_beverage(esk1_0,esk4_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_134, plain, (X4=X3|~entity(X1,X2)|~forename(X1,X3)|~of(X1,X3,X2)|~forename(X1,X4)|~of(X1,X4,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_109]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_135, negated_conjecture, (of(esk1_0,esk3_0,esk2_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_136, negated_conjecture, (forename(esk1_0,esk3_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_137, negated_conjecture, (entity(esk1_0,esk2_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_110, c_0_111]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_138, plain, (~nonliving(X1,X2)|~organism(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_112, c_0_113]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_139, plain, (nonliving(X1,X2)|~object(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_114]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_140, plain, (~abstraction(X1,X2)|~human(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_115, c_0_116]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_141, plain, (human(X1,X2)|~human_person(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_117]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_142, plain, (~nonliving(X1,X2)|~human_person(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_118, c_0_119]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_143, plain, ![X13, X14]:((~order(X13,X14)|act(X13,X14))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax36])])])).
fof(c_0_144, plain, ![X77, X78]:((~thing(X77,X78)|singleton(X77,X78))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax32])])])).
fof(c_0_145, plain, ![X21, X22]:((~act(X21,X22)|event(X21,X22))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax35])])])).
fof(c_0_146, plain, ![X11, X12]:((~order(X11,X12)|event(X11,X12))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax28])])])).
fof(c_0_147, plain, ![X43, X44]:((~eventuality(X43,X44)|thing(X43,X44))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax33])])])).
fof(c_0_148, plain, ![X75, X76]:((~abstraction(X75,X76)|thing(X75,X76))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax13])])])).
fof(c_0_149, plain, ![X55, X56]:((~entity(X55,X56)|thing(X55,X56))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax22])])])).
fof(c_0_150, plain, ![X25, X26]:((~mia_forename(X25,X26)|forename(X25,X26))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax9])])])).
fof(c_0_151, plain, ![X87, X88]:((~object(X87,X88)|impartial(X87,X88))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax18])])])).
fof(c_0_152, plain, ![X85, X86]:((~organism(X85,X86)|impartial(X85,X86))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[ax5])])])).
cnf(c_0_153, plain, (~forename(X1,X2)|~entity(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_120, c_0_121]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_154, plain, (~patient(X1,X2,X3)|~agent(X1,X2,X3)|~nonreflexive(X1,X2)), inference(er,[status(thm)],[c_0_122]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_155, negated_conjecture, (patient(esk1_0,esk5_0,esk4_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_156, negated_conjecture, (nonreflexive(esk1_0,esk5_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_157, plain, (~eventuality(X1,X2)|~entity(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_123, c_0_124]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_158, negated_conjecture, (~abstraction(esk1_0,esk5_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_125, c_0_126]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_159, negated_conjecture, (~abstraction(esk1_0,esk2_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_127, c_0_128]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_160, plain, (unisex(X1,X2)|~eventuality(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_129]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_161, plain, (unisex(X1,X2)|~object(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_130]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_162, plain, (entity(X1,X2)|~object(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_131]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_163, negated_conjecture, (object(esk1_0,esk4_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_132, c_0_133]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_164, negated_conjecture, (X1=esk3_0|~of(esk1_0,X1,esk2_0)|~forename(esk1_0,X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_134, c_0_135]), c_0_136]), c_0_137])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_165, plain, (~object(X1,X2)|~organism(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_138, c_0_139]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_166, plain, (~abstraction(X1,X2)|~human_person(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_140, c_0_141]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_167, plain, (~object(X1,X2)|~human_person(X1,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_142, c_0_139]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_168, plain, (act(X1,X2)|~order(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_143]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_169, plain, (singleton(X1,X2)|~thing(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_144]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_170, plain, (event(X1,X2)|~act(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_145]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_171, plain, (event(X1,X2)|~order(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_146]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_172, plain, (thing(X1,X2)|~eventuality(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_147]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_173, plain, (thing(X1,X2)|~abstraction(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_148]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_174, plain, (thing(X1,X2)|~entity(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_149]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_175, plain, (forename(X1,X2)|~mia_forename(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_150]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_176, plain, (impartial(X1,X2)|~object(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_151]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_177, plain, (impartial(X1,X2)|~organism(X1,X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_152]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_178, negated_conjecture, (~entity(esk1_0,esk3_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_153, c_0_136]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_179, negated_conjecture, (~agent(esk1_0,esk5_0,esk4_0)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_154, c_0_155]), c_0_156])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_180, negated_conjecture, (~entity(esk1_0,esk5_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_157, c_0_126]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_181, negated_conjecture, (~forename(esk1_0,esk5_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_158, c_0_121]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_182, negated_conjecture, (~forename(esk1_0,esk2_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_159, c_0_121]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_183, negated_conjecture, (~eventuality(esk1_0,esk2_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_127, c_0_160]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_184, negated_conjecture, (~object(esk1_0,esk2_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_127, c_0_161]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_185, negated_conjecture, (entity(esk1_0,esk4_0)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_162, c_0_163]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_186, negated_conjecture, (agent(esk1_0,esk5_0,esk2_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_187, negated_conjecture, (past(esk1_0,esk5_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_188, negated_conjecture, (order(esk1_0,esk5_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_189, negated_conjecture, (mia_forename(esk1_0,esk3_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_190, negated_conjecture, (actual_world(esk1_0)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]), ['final']).
% SZS output end Saturation

Solution for SWV017+1

% SZS output start Saturation
fof(server_t_generates_key, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7]:(((((message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X2,encrypt(triple(X3,X4,X5),X6))))&t_holds(key(X6,X1)))&t_holds(key(X7,X3)))&a_nonce(X4))=>message(sent(t,X3,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X4,generate_key(X4),X5),X7),encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X4),X5),X6),X2))))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', server_t_generates_key)).
fof(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time, axiom, ![X1, X2]:(((message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2)))&fresh_to_b(X2))=>(message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X2),encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))))&b_stored(pair(X1,X2))))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time)).
fof(intruder_message_sent, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:((((intruder_message(X1)&party_of_protocol(X2))&party_of_protocol(X3))=>message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', intruder_message_sent)).
fof(t_holds_key_at_for_a, axiom, t_holds(key(at,a)), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', t_holds_key_at_for_a)).
fof(intruder_can_record, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:((message(sent(X1,X2,X3))=>intruder_message(X3))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', intruder_can_record)).
fof(a_sent_message_i_to_b, axiom, message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', a_sent_message_i_to_b)).
fof(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b, axiom, fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b)).
fof(t_holds_key_bt_for_b, axiom, t_holds(key(bt,b)), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', t_holds_key_bt_for_b)).
fof(b_is_party_of_protocol, axiom, party_of_protocol(b), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', b_is_party_of_protocol)).
fof(intruder_composes_pairs, axiom, ![X1, X2]:(((intruder_message(X1)&intruder_message(X2))=>intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', intruder_composes_pairs)).
fof(a_forwards_secure, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6]:(((message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X5,X6,X3,X2),at),X4,X1)))&a_stored(pair(X5,X6)))=>(message(sent(a,X5,pair(X4,encrypt(X1,X3))))&a_holds(key(X3,X5))))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', a_forwards_secure)).
fof(intruder_decomposes_triples, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:((intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))=>((intruder_message(X1)&intruder_message(X2))&intruder_message(X3)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', intruder_decomposes_triples)).
fof(a_stored_message_i, axiom, a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', a_stored_message_i)).
fof(an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce, axiom, a_nonce(an_a_nonce), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce)).
fof(t_is_party_of_protocol, axiom, party_of_protocol(t), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', t_is_party_of_protocol)).
fof(intruder_composes_triples, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:((((intruder_message(X1)&intruder_message(X2))&intruder_message(X3))=>intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', intruder_composes_triples)).
fof(b_accepts_secure_session_key, axiom, ![X2, X4, X5]:((((message(sent(X4,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X4,X2,generate_expiration_time(X5)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X5),X2))))&a_key(X2))&b_stored(pair(X4,X5)))=>b_holds(key(X2,X4)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', b_accepts_secure_session_key)).
fof(a_is_party_of_protocol, axiom, party_of_protocol(a), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', a_is_party_of_protocol)).
fof(intruder_key_encrypts, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:((((intruder_message(X1)&intruder_holds(key(X2,X3)))&party_of_protocol(X3))=>intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', intruder_key_encrypts)).
fof(intruder_holds_key, axiom, ![X2, X3]:(((intruder_message(X2)&party_of_protocol(X3))=>intruder_holds(key(X2,X3)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', intruder_holds_key)).
fof(intruder_decomposes_pairs, axiom, ![X1, X2]:((intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))=>(intruder_message(X1)&intruder_message(X2)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', intruder_decomposes_pairs)).
fof(generated_keys_are_keys, axiom, ![X1]:(a_key(generate_key(X1))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', generated_keys_are_keys)).
fof(fresh_intruder_nonces_are_fresh_to_b, axiom, ![X1]:((fresh_intruder_nonce(X1)=>(fresh_to_b(X1)&intruder_message(X1)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', fresh_intruder_nonces_are_fresh_to_b)).
fof(can_generate_more_fresh_intruder_nonces, axiom, ![X1]:((fresh_intruder_nonce(X1)=>fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_intruder_nonce(X1)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', can_generate_more_fresh_intruder_nonces)).
fof(generated_keys_are_not_nonces, axiom, ![X1]:(~(a_nonce(generate_key(X1)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', generated_keys_are_not_nonces)).
fof(intruder_composes_quadruples, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3, X4]:(((((intruder_message(X1)&intruder_message(X2))&intruder_message(X3))&intruder_message(X4))=>intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', intruder_composes_quadruples)).
fof(intruder_interception, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:((((intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))&intruder_holds(key(X2,X3)))&party_of_protocol(X3))=>intruder_message(X2))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', intruder_interception)).
fof(intruder_decomposes_quadruples, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3, X4]:((intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))=>(((intruder_message(X1)&intruder_message(X2))&intruder_message(X3))&intruder_message(X4)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', intruder_decomposes_quadruples)).
fof(nothing_is_a_nonce_and_a_key, axiom, ![X1]:(~((a_key(X1)&a_nonce(X1)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', nothing_is_a_nonce_and_a_key)).
fof(generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces, axiom, ![X1]:((a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1))&a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces)).
fof(an_intruder_nonce_is_a_fresh_intruder_nonce, axiom, fresh_intruder_nonce(an_intruder_nonce), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', an_intruder_nonce_is_a_fresh_intruder_nonce)).
fof(b_hold_key_bt_for_t, axiom, b_holds(key(bt,t)), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', b_hold_key_bt_for_t)).
fof(a_holds_key_at_for_t, axiom, a_holds(key(at,t)), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/SWV017+1.p', a_holds_key_at_for_t)).
fof(c_0_33, plain, ![X19, X20, X21, X22, X23, X24, X25]:((~message(sent(X19,t,triple(X19,X20,encrypt(triple(X21,X22,X23),X24))))|~t_holds(key(X24,X19))|~t_holds(key(X25,X21))|~a_nonce(X22)|message(sent(t,X21,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X19,X22,generate_key(X22),X23),X25),encrypt(triple(X21,generate_key(X22),X23),X24),X20))))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[server_t_generates_key])])])).
fof(c_0_34, plain, ![X14, X15]:(((message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X15),encrypt(triple(X14,X15,generate_expiration_time(X15)),bt))))|(~message(sent(X14,b,pair(X14,X15)))|~fresh_to_b(X15)))&(b_stored(pair(X14,X15))|(~message(sent(X14,b,pair(X14,X15)))|~fresh_to_b(X15))))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time])])])])).
fof(c_0_35, plain, ![X50, X51, X52]:((~intruder_message(X50)|~party_of_protocol(X51)|~party_of_protocol(X52)|message(sent(X51,X52,X50)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_message_sent])])])).
cnf(c_0_36, plain, (message(sent(t,X3,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X4,generate_key(X4),X5),X7),encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X4),X5),X6),X2)))|~message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X2,encrypt(triple(X3,X4,X5),X6))))|~t_holds(key(X6,X1))|~t_holds(key(X7,X3))|~a_nonce(X4)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_33]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_37, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_holds_key_at_for_a]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_38, plain, ![X26, X27, X28]:((~message(sent(X26,X27,X28))|intruder_message(X28))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_can_record])])])).
cnf(c_0_39, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1)))|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_34]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_40, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_41, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_42, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_holds_key_bt_for_b]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_43, plain, (message(sent(X2,X3,X1))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X3)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_35]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_44, plain, (party_of_protocol(b)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_is_party_of_protocol]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_45, plain, ![X38, X39]:((~intruder_message(X38)|~intruder_message(X39)|intruder_message(pair(X38,X39)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_composes_pairs])])])).
fof(c_0_46, plain, ![X8, X9, X10, X11, X12, X13]:(((message(sent(a,X12,pair(X11,encrypt(X8,X10))))|(~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X12,X13,X10,X9),at),X11,X8)))|~a_stored(pair(X12,X13))))&(a_holds(key(X10,X12))|(~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X12,X13,X10,X9),at),X11,X8)))|~a_stored(pair(X12,X13)))))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[a_forwards_secure])])])])).
cnf(c_0_47, plain, (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),X5)))|~a_nonce(X2)|~t_holds(key(X4,X1))|~message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X5,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4))))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_36, c_0_37]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_48, plain, ![X31, X32, X33]:((((intruder_message(X31)|~intruder_message(triple(X31,X32,X33)))&(intruder_message(X32)|~intruder_message(triple(X31,X32,X33))))&(intruder_message(X33)|~intruder_message(triple(X31,X32,X33))))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_triples])])])])).
cnf(c_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X3)|~message(sent(X1,X2,X3))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_38]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_50, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39, c_0_40]), c_0_41])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_51, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2)))|~fresh_to_b(X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_34]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_52, plain, (message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),X5)))|~a_nonce(X2)|~t_holds(key(X4,X1))|~message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X5,encrypt(triple(b,X2,X3),X4))))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_36, c_0_42]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_53, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39, c_0_43]), c_0_44])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_45]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_55, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3)))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_46]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_56, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_stored_message_i]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_57, plain, (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))|~a_nonce(X1)|~message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt))))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_47, c_0_42]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_58, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_59, plain, (party_of_protocol(t)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_is_party_of_protocol]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_60, plain, ![X40, X41, X42]:((~intruder_message(X40)|~intruder_message(X41)|~intruder_message(X42)|intruder_message(triple(X40,X41,X42)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_composes_triples])])])).
cnf(c_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_48]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_62, plain, (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49, c_0_50]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_63, plain, ![X16, X17, X18]:((~message(sent(X17,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X17,X16,generate_expiration_time(X18)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X18),X16))))|~a_key(X16)|~b_stored(pair(X17,X18))|b_holds(key(X16,X17)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[b_accepts_secure_session_key])])])).
cnf(c_0_64, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_51, c_0_43]), c_0_44])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_65, plain, (message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))|~a_nonce(X1)|~message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt))))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_52, c_0_42]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_66, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53, c_0_54]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_67, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2)))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55, c_0_56]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_68, plain, (party_of_protocol(a)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_is_party_of_protocol]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_69, plain, (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57, c_0_50]), c_0_58])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_70, plain, (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))|~intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt)))|~a_nonce(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57, c_0_43]), c_0_59]), c_0_44])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_71, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_60]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_72, plain, (intruder_message(b)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61, c_0_62]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_73, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_48]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_74, plain, (b_holds(key(X2,X1))|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X2))))|~a_key(X2)|~b_stored(pair(X1,X3))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_75, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64, c_0_54]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_76, plain, ![X55, X56, X57]:((~intruder_message(X55)|~intruder_holds(key(X56,X57))|~party_of_protocol(X57)|intruder_message(encrypt(X55,X56)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_key_encrypts])])])).
fof(c_0_77, plain, ![X53, X54]:((~intruder_message(X53)|~party_of_protocol(X54)|intruder_holds(key(X53,X54)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_holds_key])])])).
fof(c_0_78, plain, ![X29, X30]:(((intruder_message(X29)|~intruder_message(pair(X29,X30)))&(intruder_message(X30)|~intruder_message(pair(X29,X30))))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_pairs])])])])).
cnf(c_0_79, plain, (message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))|~intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt)))|~a_nonce(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65, c_0_43]), c_0_59]), c_0_44])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_80, plain, (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49, c_0_66]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_81, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))|~intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67, c_0_43]), c_0_68]), c_0_59])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_82, plain, (intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49, c_0_69]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_83, plain, (b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_51, c_0_40]), c_0_41])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_84, plain, (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt))|~intruder_message(X3)|~a_nonce(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_70, c_0_71]), c_0_72])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_85, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_73, c_0_62]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_86, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~a_key(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X3)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))))|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74, c_0_75]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_87, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X3)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_76]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_88, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_77]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_89, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_78]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_90, plain, (intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49, c_0_40]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_91, plain, (message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt))|~intruder_message(X3)|~a_nonce(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_79, c_0_71]), c_0_72])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_92, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_73, c_0_80]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_93, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))|~intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_81, c_0_71]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_94, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61, c_0_82]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_95, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~a_key(X1)|~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74, c_0_83]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_96, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67, c_0_69]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_97, plain, (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1)))|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84, c_0_85]), c_0_58])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_98, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~a_key(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_86, c_0_43]), c_0_44])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_99, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X3)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_87, c_0_88])).
cnf(c_0_100, plain, (message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65, c_0_66]), c_0_72]), c_0_44])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_101, plain, (intruder_message(a)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_89, c_0_90]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_102, plain, (message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_91, c_0_92]), c_0_72]), c_0_44])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_103, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_93, c_0_94]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_104, plain, ![X61]:(a_key(generate_key(X61))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[generated_keys_are_keys])).
cnf(c_0_105, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_48]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_106, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))|~a_key(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_95, c_0_43]), c_0_44]), c_0_68])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_107, plain, (a_holds(key(X1,X2))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4),at),X5,X6)))|~a_stored(pair(X2,X3))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_46]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_108, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_78]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_109, plain, (intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49, c_0_96]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_110, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67, c_0_97]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_111, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))|~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~a_key(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_98, c_0_54]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_112, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_99, c_0_44]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_113, plain, (intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49, c_0_100]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_114, plain, (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57, c_0_66]), c_0_101]), c_0_68])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_115, plain, (intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49, c_0_102]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_116, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49, c_0_103]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_117, plain, (a_key(generate_key(X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_104]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_118, plain, (intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_105, c_0_80]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_119, plain, (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))|~a_nonce(X1)|~message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at))))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_47, c_0_37]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_120, plain, (message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))|~a_nonce(X1)|~message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at))))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_52, c_0_37]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_121, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))|~a_key(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_106, c_0_54]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_122, plain, (a_holds(key(X1,b))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2),at),X3,X4)))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_107, c_0_56]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_123, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_108, c_0_109]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_124, plain, (intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_108, c_0_90]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_125, plain, ![X63]:(((fresh_to_b(X63)|~fresh_intruder_nonce(X63))&(intruder_message(X63)|~fresh_intruder_nonce(X63)))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[fresh_intruder_nonces_are_fresh_to_b])])])])).
cnf(c_0_126, plain, (intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49, c_0_110]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_127, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_key(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_111, c_0_112]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_128, plain, (intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_73, c_0_113]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_129, plain, (intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49, c_0_114]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_130, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_105, c_0_115])).
cnf(c_0_131, plain, (b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1)), inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_98, c_0_116]), c_0_117])]), c_0_118]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_132, plain, (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))|~intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at)))|~a_nonce(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_119, c_0_43]), c_0_59]), c_0_68])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_133, plain, (message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))|~intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at)))|~a_nonce(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_120, c_0_43]), c_0_59]), c_0_68])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_134, plain, (intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_105, c_0_62]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_135, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_key(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_121, c_0_112])).
cnf(c_0_136, plain, (a_holds(key(X1,b))|~intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2),at),X3,X4))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_122, c_0_43]), c_0_68]), c_0_59])]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_137, plain, ![X62]:((~fresh_intruder_nonce(X62)|fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_intruder_nonce(X62)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[can_generate_more_fresh_intruder_nonces])])])).
fof(c_0_138, plain, ![X1]:(~a_nonce(generate_key(X1))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[generated_keys_are_not_nonces])).
cnf(c_0_139, plain, (b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_111, c_0_123]), c_0_124]), c_0_117]), c_0_41])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_140, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53, c_0_109]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_141, plain, (fresh_to_b(X1)|~fresh_intruder_nonce(X1)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_125]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_142, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))|~intruder_message(X1)|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53, c_0_126]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_143, plain, (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84, c_0_92]), c_0_101]), c_0_68])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_144, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X3)|~a_key(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_127, c_0_128]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_145, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_105, c_0_129]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_146, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_130, c_0_82]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_147, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61, c_0_115])).
cnf(c_0_148, plain, (b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~intruder_message(X1)|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64, c_0_126]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_149, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53, c_0_116]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_150, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))|~intruder_message(X1)|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39, c_0_103]), c_0_101])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_151, plain, (b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64, c_0_109]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_152, plain, (b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))|~intruder_message(generate_key(an_a_nonce))|~intruder_message(X1)|~fresh_to_b(generate_key(an_a_nonce))|~party_of_protocol(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_131, c_0_92]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_153, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~fresh_intruder_nonce(X1)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_125]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_154, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~party_of_protocol(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64, c_0_116]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_155, plain, (b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~intruder_message(X1)|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_51, c_0_103]), c_0_101])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_156, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_108, c_0_116])).
cnf(c_0_157, plain, (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at))|~intruder_message(X3)|~a_nonce(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_132, c_0_71]), c_0_101])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_158, plain, (message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at))|~intruder_message(X3)|~a_nonce(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_133, c_0_71]), c_0_101])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_159, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X4)|~a_key(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X4)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_127, c_0_118]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_160, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_key(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_127, c_0_134]), c_0_124]), c_0_41])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_161, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_key(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_135, c_0_134])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_162, plain, (a_holds(key(X1,b))|~intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2),at))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_136, c_0_71]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_163, plain, ![X43, X44, X45, X46]:((~intruder_message(X43)|~intruder_message(X44)|~intruder_message(X45)|~intruder_message(X46)|intruder_message(quadruple(X43,X44,X45,X46)))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_composes_quadruples])])])).
fof(c_0_164, plain, ![X47, X48, X49]:((~intruder_message(encrypt(X47,X48))|~intruder_holds(key(X48,X49))|~party_of_protocol(X49)|intruder_message(X48))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_interception])])])).
fof(c_0_165, plain, ![X34, X35, X36, X37]:(((((intruder_message(X34)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X34,X35,X36,X37)))&(intruder_message(X35)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X34,X35,X36,X37))))&(intruder_message(X36)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X34,X35,X36,X37))))&(intruder_message(X37)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X34,X35,X36,X37))))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_quadruples])])])])).
cnf(c_0_166, plain, (fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_intruder_nonce(X1))|~fresh_intruder_nonce(X1)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_137]), ['final']).
fof(c_0_167, plain, ![X60]:((~a_key(X60)|~a_nonce(X60))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[nothing_is_a_nonce_and_a_key])])])).
fof(c_0_168, plain, ![X58]:(~a_nonce(generate_key(X58))), inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[c_0_138])])).
cnf(c_0_169, plain, (b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b))|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_139, c_0_130]), c_0_72]), c_0_44]), c_0_124]), c_0_58]), c_0_41])])).
fof(c_0_170, plain, ![X59]:((a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X59))&a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X59)))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces])).
cnf(c_0_171, plain, (fresh_intruder_nonce(an_intruder_nonce)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[an_intruder_nonce_is_a_fresh_intruder_nonce]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_172, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))|~fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_140, c_0_141]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_173, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))|~fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_142, c_0_141]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_174, plain, (intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49, c_0_143]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_175, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61, c_0_129]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_176, plain, (b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),a))|~intruder_message(generate_key(X1))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_144, c_0_145]), c_0_101]), c_0_117]), c_0_68])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_177, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)))|~intruder_message(bt)|~intruder_message(X3)|~a_nonce(X3)|~a_key(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_144, c_0_112]), c_0_105]), c_0_61]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_178, plain, (b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),b))|~intruder_message(generate_key(X1))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_144, c_0_146]), c_0_72]), c_0_117]), c_0_44])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_179, plain, (intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1))|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49, c_0_97]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_180, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_147, c_0_82]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_181, plain, (b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_148, c_0_141]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_182, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))|~fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_149, c_0_141]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_183, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))|~fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_150, c_0_141]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_184, plain, (b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_151, c_0_141]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_185, plain, (b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))|~intruder_message(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X2)))|~intruder_message(bt)|~intruder_message(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1)), inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_131, c_0_112]), c_0_61]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_186, plain, (b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))|~fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_key(an_a_nonce))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X1)), inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_152, c_0_141]), c_0_153]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_187, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_154, c_0_141]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_188, plain, (b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_155, c_0_141]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_189, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_156, c_0_82]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_190, plain, (b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))|~intruder_message(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(bt)|~party_of_protocol(X1)), inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_139, c_0_112]), c_0_61]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_191, plain, (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))|~intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))|~intruder_message(at)|~intruder_message(X3)|~a_nonce(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_157, c_0_112]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_192, plain, (message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))|~intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))|~intruder_message(bt)|~intruder_message(X3)|~a_nonce(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84, c_0_112]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_193, plain, (message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))|~intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))|~intruder_message(at)|~intruder_message(X3)|~a_nonce(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_158, c_0_112]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_194, plain, (message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))|~intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))|~intruder_message(bt)|~intruder_message(X3)|~a_nonce(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_91, c_0_112]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_195, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)))|~intruder_message(bt)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|~a_key(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X4)), inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_159, c_0_112]), c_0_105]), c_0_61]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_196, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|~a_key(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X3)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_159, c_0_92]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_197, plain, (b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,X1))|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_key(an_a_nonce)|~party_of_protocol(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_160, c_0_92]), c_0_124]), c_0_41])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_198, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(bt)|~a_key(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)), inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_160, c_0_112]), c_0_105]), c_0_61]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_199, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(bt)|~a_key(X1)), inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_161, c_0_112]), c_0_105]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_200, plain, (b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))|~a_key(an_a_nonce)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_161, c_0_85]), c_0_124])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_201, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))|~intruder_message(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(at)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_93, c_0_112]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_202, plain, (a_holds(key(X1,b))|~intruder_message(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2))|~intruder_message(at)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_162, c_0_112]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_203, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_163]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_204, plain, (intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X3)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_164]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_205, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_165]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_206, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_165]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_207, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_165]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_208, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_165]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_209, plain, (intruder_message(generate_intruder_nonce(X1))|~fresh_intruder_nonce(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_153, c_0_166]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_210, plain, (~a_key(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_167]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_211, plain, (~a_nonce(generate_key(X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_168]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_212, plain, (b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_169, c_0_82]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_213, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_89, c_0_109]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_214, plain, (b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),a))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_86, c_0_96]), c_0_124]), c_0_101]), c_0_117]), c_0_41]), c_0_68])]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_215, plain, (a_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_122, c_0_69]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_216, plain, (b_holds(key(bt,t))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_hold_key_bt_for_t]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_217, plain, (a_holds(key(at,t))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_holds_key_at_for_t]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_218, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_170]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_219, plain, (intruder_message(an_intruder_nonce)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_153, c_0_171]), ['final']).
cnf(c_0_220, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_170]), ['final']).
% SZS output end Saturation

Solution for BOO001-1

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file BOO001-1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name /Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax from annotated formula associativity
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'c_0_17' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the negated conjecture prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation
cnf(associativity, axiom, (multiply(multiply(X1,X2,X3),X4,multiply(X1,X2,X5))=multiply(X1,X2,multiply(X3,X4,X5))), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax', associativity)).
cnf(ternary_multiply_1, axiom, (multiply(X1,X2,X2)=X2), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax', ternary_multiply_1)).
cnf(right_inverse, axiom, (multiply(X1,X2,inverse(X2))=X1), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax', right_inverse)).
cnf(ternary_multiply_2, axiom, (multiply(X1,X1,X2)=X1), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax', ternary_multiply_2)).
cnf(prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling, negated_conjecture, (inverse(inverse(a))!=a), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/BOO001-1.p', prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling)).
cnf(left_inverse, axiom, (multiply(inverse(X1),X1,X2)=X2), file('/Users/schulz/EPROVER/TPTP_9.2.1_FLAT/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax', left_inverse)).
cnf(c_0_6, axiom, (multiply(multiply(X1,X2,X3),X4,multiply(X1,X2,X5))=multiply(X1,X2,multiply(X3,X4,X5))), associativity).
cnf(c_0_7, axiom, (multiply(X1,X2,X2)=X2), ternary_multiply_1).
cnf(c_0_8, plain, (multiply(multiply(X1,X2,X3),X4,X2)=multiply(X1,X2,multiply(X3,X4,X2))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_6, c_0_7])).
cnf(c_0_9, axiom, (multiply(X1,X2,inverse(X2))=X1), right_inverse).
cnf(c_0_10, plain, (multiply(X1,X2,multiply(inverse(X2),X3,X2))=multiply(X1,X3,X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_8, c_0_9])).
cnf(c_0_11, axiom, (multiply(X1,X1,X2)=X1), ternary_multiply_2).
cnf(c_0_12, negated_conjecture, (inverse(inverse(a))!=a), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling])).
cnf(c_0_13, axiom, (multiply(inverse(X1),X1,X2)=X2), left_inverse).
cnf(c_0_14, plain, (multiply(X1,inverse(X2),X2)=X1), inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_10, c_0_11]), c_0_9])).
cnf(c_0_15, negated_conjecture, (inverse(inverse(a))!=a), c_0_12).
cnf(c_0_16, plain, (inverse(inverse(X1))=X1), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_13, c_0_14])).
cnf(c_0_17, negated_conjecture, ($false), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_15, c_0_16])]), ['proof']).
% SZS output end CNFRefutation

FindProof 0.1

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name SEU140+2.p from annotated formula f10
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'p495' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture f50 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start Proof for SEU140+2.p
fof(f10, axiom, ! [A,B] : ( disjoint(A,B) <=> set_intersection2(A,B) = empty_set ), file('SEU140+2.p', d7_xboole_0)).
fof(f10_nnf, plain, ! [A,B] : (((~(disjoint(A,B)) | set_intersection2(A,B) = empty_set) & (disjoint(A,B) | set_intersection2(A,B) != empty_set))), inference(nnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [f10])).
fof(f10_sk, plain, ! [A,B] : (((~(disjoint(A,B)) | set_intersection2(A,B) = empty_set) & (disjoint(A,B) | set_intersection2(A,B) != empty_set))), inference(skolemisation, [status(esa)], [f10_nnf])).
cnf(c39, plain, ~disjoint(X0,X1) | set_intersection2(X0,X1) = empty_set, inference(cnf_transformation, [status(esa)], [f10_sk])).
fof(f50, conjecture, ! [A,B,C] : ( ( subset(A,B) & disjoint(B,C) ) => disjoint(A,C) ), file('SEU140+2.p', t63_xboole_1)).
fof(f50_neg, negated_conjecture, ~(! [A,B,C] : ( ( subset(A,B) & disjoint(B,C) ) => disjoint(A,C) )), inference(negated_conjecture, [status(cth)], [f50])).
fof(f50_nnf, plain, ? [A,B,C] : (((subset(A,B) & disjoint(B,C)) & ~(disjoint(A,C)))), inference(nnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [f50_neg])).
fof(f50_sk, plain, ((subset(sk10,sk11) & disjoint(sk11,sk12)) & ~(disjoint(sk10,sk12))), inference(skolemisation, [status(esa), new_symbols(skolem, [sk10,sk11,sk12])], [f50_nnf])).
cnf(c91, plain, disjoint(sk11,sk12), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(esa)], [f50_sk])).
cnf(p147, plain, set_intersection2(sk11,sk12) = empty_set, inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c39, c91])).
fof(f32, lemma, ! [A,B,C] : ( subset(A,B) => subset(set_intersection2(A,C),set_intersection2(B,C)) ), file('SEU140+2.p', t26_xboole_1)).
fof(f32_nnf, plain, ! [A,B,C] : ((~(subset(A,B)) | subset(set_intersection2(A,C),set_intersection2(B,C)))), inference(nnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [f32])).
fof(f32_sk, plain, ! [A,B,C] : ((~(subset(A,B)) | subset(set_intersection2(A,C),set_intersection2(B,C)))), inference(skolemisation, [status(esa)], [f32_nnf])).
cnf(c65, plain, ~subset(X0,X1) | subset(set_intersection2(X0,X2),set_intersection2(X1,X2)), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(esa)], [f32_sk])).
cnf(c90, plain, subset(sk10,sk11), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(esa)], [f50_sk])).
cnf(p409, plain, subset(set_intersection2(sk10,X0),set_intersection2(sk11,X0)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c65, c90])).
cnf(p472, plain, subset(set_intersection2(sk10,sk12),empty_set), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [p147, p409])).
fof(f43, lemma, ! [A] : ( subset(A,empty_set) => A = empty_set ), file('SEU140+2.p', t3_xboole_1)).
fof(f43_nnf, plain, ! [A] : ((~(subset(A,empty_set)) | A = empty_set)), inference(nnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [f43])).
fof(f43_sk, plain, ! [A] : ((~(subset(A,empty_set)) | A = empty_set)), inference(skolemisation, [status(esa)], [f43_nnf])).
cnf(c82, plain, ~subset(X0,empty_set) | X0 = empty_set, inference(cnf_transformation, [status(esa)], [f43_sk])).
cnf(p482, plain, set_intersection2(sk10,sk12) = empty_set, inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [p472, c82])).
cnf(c40, plain, disjoint(X0,X1) | set_intersection2(X0,X1) != empty_set, inference(cnf_transformation, [status(esa)], [f10_sk])).
cnf(p483, plain, disjoint(sk10,sk12), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [p482, c40])).
cnf(c92, plain, ~disjoint(sk10,sk12), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(esa)], [f50_sk])).
cnf(p495, plain, $false, inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [p483, c92])).
% SZS output end Proof for SEU140+2.p

Solution for BOO001-1

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file BOO001-1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name BOO001-1.p from annotated formula t0
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'contradiction_0' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the negated conjecture goal_0 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation for BOO001-1.p
cnf(t0, axiom, multiply(multiply(V,W,X),Y,multiply(V,W,Z)) = multiply(V,W,multiply(X,Y,Z)), file('BOO001-1.p')).
cnf(t8, plain, multiply(multiply(V,W,X),Y,multiply(V,W,Z)) = multiply(V,W,multiply(X,Y,Z)), inference(orient, [status(thm)], [t0])).
cnf(t1, axiom, multiply(V,W,W) = W, file('BOO001-1.p')).
cnf(t5, plain, multiply(V,W,W) = W, inference(orient, [status(thm)], [t1])).
cnf(t13, plain, multiply(V,W,multiply(X,Y,W)) = multiply(multiply(V,W,X),Y,W), inference(cp, [status(thm)], [t8, t5])).
cnf(t23, plain, multiply(multiply(V,W,X),Y,W) = multiply(V,W,multiply(X,Y,W)), inference(orient, [status(thm)], [t13])).
cnf(t4, axiom, multiply(V,W,inverse(W)) = V, file('BOO001-1.p')).
cnf(t17, plain, multiply(V,W,inverse(W)) = V, inference(orient, [status(thm)], [t4])).
cnf(t26, plain, multiply(V,W,multiply(inverse(W),X,W)) = multiply(V,X,W), inference(cp, [status(thm)], [t23, t17])).
cnf(t36, plain, multiply(V,W,multiply(inverse(W),X,W)) = multiply(V,X,W), inference(orient, [status(thm)], [t26])).
cnf(t2, axiom, multiply(V,V,W) = V, file('BOO001-1.p')).
cnf(t7, plain, multiply(V,V,W) = V, inference(orient, [status(thm)], [t2])).
cnf(t40, plain, multiply(V,inverse(W),W) = multiply(V,W,inverse(W)), inference(cp, [status(thm)], [t36, t7])).
cnf(t57, plain, multiply(V,inverse(W),W) = V, inference(step, [status(thm)], [t40, t17])).
cnf(t46, plain, multiply(V,inverse(W),W) = V, inference(orient, [status(thm)], [t57])).
cnf(t3, axiom, multiply(inverse(V),V,W) = W, file('BOO001-1.p')).
cnf(t6, plain, multiply(inverse(V),V,W) = W, inference(orient, [status(thm)], [t3])).
cnf(t48, plain, inverse(inverse(V)) = V, inference(cp, [status(thm)], [t46, t6])).
cnf(t52, plain, inverse(inverse(V)) = V, inference(orient, [status(thm)], [t48])).
cnf(goal_0, negated_conjecture, inverse(inverse(a)) != a, file('BOO001-1.p')).
cnf(g0_0, plain, a != a, inference(rw, [status(thm)], [goal_0, t52])).
cnf(contradiction_0, plain, $false, inference(trivial_inequality_removal, [status(thm)], [g0_0])).
% SZS output end CNFRefutation for BOO001-1.p

FMB4J 0.1

Solution for NLP042+1

% SZS output start FiniteModel for NLP042+1
fof(domain, interpretation-domains,
    ![X]: (X = "d0" | X = "d1" | X = "d2" | X = "d3")
).

fof(mappings, interpretation-mappings,
).

fof(predicate_mappings, interpretation-mappings,
      ~human("d2", "d0")
    & ~human("d3", "d1")
    & ~human("d0", "d2")
    & ~human("d1", "d3")
    & ~human("d3", "d0")
    &  human("d2", "d1")
    & ~human("d1", "d2")
    & ~human("d0", "d3")
    & ~human("d0", "d0")
    & ~human("d1", "d1")
    & ~human("d2", "d2")
    & ~human("d3", "d3")
    & ~human("d1", "d0")
    & ~human("d0", "d1")
    & ~human("d3", "d2")
    & ~human("d2", "d3")
    & ~living("d0", "d0")
    & ~living("d1", "d1")
    & ~living("d2", "d2")
    & ~living("d3", "d3")
    & ~living("d1", "d0")
    & ~living("d0", "d1")
    & ~living("d3", "d2")
    & ~living("d2", "d3")
    & ~living("d2", "d0")
    & ~living("d3", "d1")
    & ~living("d0", "d2")
    & ~living("d1", "d3")
    & ~living("d3", "d0")
    &  living("d2", "d1")
    & ~living("d1", "d2")
    & ~living("d0", "d3")
    &  nonexistent("d0", "d0")
    & ~nonexistent("d1", "d1")
    & ~nonexistent("d2", "d2")
    & ~nonexistent("d3", "d3")
    & ~female("d3", "d0")
    &  female("d2", "d1")
    & ~female("d1", "d2")
    & ~female("d0", "d3")
    &  nonexistent("d1", "d0")
    & ~nonexistent("d0", "d1")
    & ~nonexistent("d3", "d2")
    & ~nonexistent("d2", "d3")
    & ~female("d2", "d0")
    & ~female("d3", "d1")
    & ~female("d0", "d2")
    & ~female("d1", "d3")
    &  nonexistent("d2", "d0")
    & ~nonexistent("d3", "d1")
    & ~nonexistent("d0", "d2")
    & ~nonexistent("d1", "d3")
    & ~female("d1", "d0")
    & ~female("d0", "d1")
    & ~female("d3", "d2")
    & ~female("d2", "d3")
    &  nonexistent("d3", "d0")
    & ~nonexistent("d2", "d1")
    & ~nonexistent("d1", "d2")
    & ~nonexistent("d0", "d3")
    & ~female("d0", "d0")
    & ~female("d1", "d1")
    & ~female("d2", "d2")
    & ~female("d3", "d3")
    &  act("d0", "d0")
    & ~act("d1", "d1")
    & ~act("d2", "d2")
    & ~act("d3", "d3")
    &  unisex("d3", "d0")
    & ~unisex("d2", "d1")
    & ~unisex("d1", "d2")
    & ~unisex("d0", "d3")
    &  act("d1", "d0")
    & ~act("d0", "d1")
    & ~act("d3", "d2")
    & ~act("d2", "d3")
    &  unisex("d2", "d0")
    & ~unisex("d3", "d1")
    & ~unisex("d0", "d2")
    & ~unisex("d1", "d3")
    &  act("d2", "d0")
    & ~act("d3", "d1")
    & ~act("d0", "d2")
    & ~act("d1", "d3")
    &  unisex("d1", "d0")
    & ~unisex("d0", "d1")
    & ~unisex("d3", "d2")
    &  unisex("d2", "d3")
    &  act("d3", "d0")
    & ~act("d2", "d1")
    & ~act("d1", "d2")
    & ~act("d0", "d3")
    &  unisex("d0", "d0")
    & ~unisex("d1", "d1")
    &  unisex("d2", "d2")
    & ~unisex("d3", "d3")
    & ~human_person("d0", "d0")
    & ~human_person("d1", "d1")
    & ~human_person("d2", "d2")
    & ~human_person("d3", "d3")
    & ~human_person("d1", "d0")
    & ~human_person("d0", "d1")
    & ~human_person("d3", "d2")
    & ~human_person("d2", "d3")
    & ~human_person("d2", "d0")
    & ~human_person("d3", "d1")
    & ~human_person("d0", "d2")
    & ~human_person("d1", "d3")
    & ~human_person("d3", "d0")
    &  human_person("d2", "d1")
    & ~human_person("d1", "d2")
    & ~human_person("d0", "d3")
    & ~food("d1", "d0")
    & ~food("d0", "d1")
    & ~food("d3", "d2")
    & ~food("d2", "d3")
    & ~food("d0", "d0")
    & ~food("d1", "d1")
    &  food("d2", "d2")
    & ~food("d3", "d3")
    & ~food("d3", "d0")
    & ~food("d2", "d1")
    & ~food("d1", "d2")
    & ~food("d0", "d3")
    & ~food("d2", "d0")
    & ~food("d3", "d1")
    & ~food("d0", "d2")
    & ~food("d1", "d3")
    & ~object("d0", "d0")
    & ~object("d1", "d1")
    &  object("d2", "d2")
    & ~object("d3", "d3")
    & ~object("d1", "d0")
    & ~object("d0", "d1")
    & ~object("d3", "d2")
    & ~object("d2", "d3")
    & ~object("d2", "d0")
    & ~object("d3", "d1")
    & ~object("d0", "d2")
    & ~object("d1", "d3")
    & ~object("d3", "d0")
    & ~object("d2", "d1")
    & ~object("d1", "d2")
    & ~object("d0", "d3")
    &  specific("d3", "d0")
    &  specific("d2", "d1")
    & ~specific("d1", "d2")
    & ~specific("d0", "d3")
    &  specific("d2", "d0")
    & ~specific("d3", "d1")
    & ~specific("d0", "d2")
    & ~specific("d1", "d3")
    &  specific("d1", "d0")
    & ~specific("d0", "d1")
    & ~specific("d3", "d2")
    & ~specific("d2", "d3")
    &  specific("d0", "d0")
    & ~specific("d1", "d1")
    &  specific("d2", "d2")
    & ~specific("d3", "d3")
    & ~abstraction("d0", "d0")
    & ~abstraction("d1", "d1")
    & ~abstraction("d2", "d2")
    & ~abstraction("d3", "d3")
    & ~abstraction("d1", "d0")
    & ~abstraction("d0", "d1")
    & ~abstraction("d3", "d2")
    &  abstraction("d2", "d3")
    & ~abstraction("d2", "d0")
    & ~abstraction("d3", "d1")
    & ~abstraction("d0", "d2")
    & ~abstraction("d1", "d3")
    & ~abstraction("d3", "d0")
    & ~abstraction("d2", "d1")
    & ~abstraction("d1", "d2")
    & ~abstraction("d0", "d3")
    & ~of("d0", "d1", "d1")
    & ~of("d0", "d0", "d0")
    & ~of("d3", "d3", "d0")
    & ~of("d2", "d1", "d3")
    & ~of("d1", "d3", "d2")
    & ~of("d1", "d2", "d3")
    & ~of("d3", "d1", "d2")
    & ~of("d2", "d2", "d0")
    & ~of("d2", "d0", "d2")
    & ~of("d3", "d0", "d3")
    & ~of("d0", "d3", "d3")
    &  of("d2", "d3", "d1")
    & ~of("d1", "d0", "d1")
    & ~of("d0", "d2", "d2")
    & ~of("d3", "d2", "d1")
    & ~of("d1", "d1", "d0")
    & ~of("d3", "d1", "d3")
    & ~of("d1", "d0", "d0")
    & ~of("d0", "d0", "d1")
    & ~of("d2", "d2", "d1")
    & ~of("d0", "d2", "d3")
    & ~of("d1", "d3", "d3")
    & ~of("d3", "d3", "d1")
    & ~of("d3", "d0", "d2")
    & ~of("d2", "d0", "d3")
    & ~of("d0", "d3", "d2")
    & ~of("d0", "d1", "d0")
    & ~of("d1", "d1", "d1")
    & ~of("d1", "d2", "d2")
    & ~of("d2", "d3", "d0")
    & ~of("d2", "d1", "d2")
    & ~of("d3", "d2", "d0")
    & ~of("d2", "d3", "d3")
    & ~of("d2", "d0", "d0")
    & ~of("d0", "d2", "d0")
    & ~of("d0", "d0", "d2")
    & ~of("d0", "d3", "d1")
    & ~of("d3", "d2", "d3")
    & ~of("d1", "d3", "d0")
    & ~of("d1", "d2", "d1")
    & ~of("d3", "d1", "d0")
    & ~of("d3", "d3", "d2")
    & ~of("d3", "d0", "d1")
    & ~of("d0", "d1", "d3")
    & ~of("d1", "d0", "d3")
    & ~of("d1", "d1", "d2")
    & ~of("d2", "d2", "d2")
    & ~of("d2", "d1", "d1")
    & ~of("d3", "d0", "d0")
    & ~of("d1", "d2", "d0")
    & ~of("d1", "d3", "d1")
    & ~of("d1", "d1", "d3")
    & ~of("d0", "d2", "d1")
    & ~of("d2", "d1", "d0")
    & ~of("d0", "d1", "d2")
    & ~of("d2", "d3", "d2")
    & ~of("d2", "d2", "d3")
    & ~of("d3", "d1", "d1")
    & ~of("d3", "d2", "d2")
    & ~of("d0", "d0", "d3")
    & ~of("d1", "d0", "d2")
    & ~of("d0", "d3", "d0")
    & ~of("d3", "d3", "d3")
    & ~of("d2", "d0", "d1")
    & ~woman("d0", "d0")
    & ~woman("d1", "d1")
    & ~woman("d2", "d2")
    & ~woman("d3", "d3")
    & ~woman("d1", "d0")
    & ~woman("d0", "d1")
    & ~woman("d3", "d2")
    & ~woman("d2", "d3")
    & ~woman("d2", "d0")
    & ~woman("d3", "d1")
    & ~woman("d0", "d2")
    & ~woman("d1", "d3")
    & ~woman("d3", "d0")
    &  woman("d2", "d1")
    & ~woman("d1", "d2")
    & ~woman("d0", "d3")
    &  nonreflexive("d3", "d0")
    & ~nonreflexive("d2", "d1")
    & ~nonreflexive("d1", "d2")
    & ~nonreflexive("d0", "d3")
    &  nonreflexive("d2", "d0")
    & ~nonreflexive("d3", "d1")
    & ~nonreflexive("d0", "d2")
    & ~nonreflexive("d1", "d3")
    &  nonreflexive("d1", "d0")
    & ~nonreflexive("d0", "d1")
    & ~nonreflexive("d3", "d2")
    & ~nonreflexive("d2", "d3")
    &  nonreflexive("d0", "d0")
    & ~nonreflexive("d1", "d1")
    & ~nonreflexive("d2", "d2")
    & ~nonreflexive("d3", "d3")
    & ~entity("d1", "d0")
    & ~entity("d0", "d1")
    & ~entity("d3", "d2")
    & ~entity("d2", "d3")
    & ~entity("d0", "d0")
    & ~entity("d1", "d1")
    &  entity("d2", "d2")
    & ~entity("d3", "d3")
    & ~entity("d3", "d0")
    &  entity("d2", "d1")
    & ~entity("d1", "d2")
    & ~entity("d0", "d3")
    & ~entity("d2", "d0")
    & ~entity("d3", "d1")
    & ~entity("d0", "d2")
    & ~entity("d1", "d3")
    &  order("d0", "d0")
    & ~order("d1", "d1")
    & ~order("d2", "d2")
    & ~order("d3", "d3")
    &  order("d1", "d0")
    & ~order("d0", "d1")
    & ~order("d3", "d2")
    & ~order("d2", "d3")
    &  order("d2", "d0")
    & ~order("d3", "d1")
    & ~order("d0", "d2")
    & ~order("d1", "d3")
    &  order("d3", "d0")
    & ~order("d2", "d1")
    & ~order("d1", "d2")
    & ~order("d0", "d3")
    & ~agent("d2", "d2", "d1")
    & ~agent("d3", "d2", "d0")
    & ~agent("d1", "d0", "d0")
    & ~agent("d3", "d1", "d3")
    & ~agent("d0", "d1", "d0")
    & ~agent("d1", "d2", "d2")
    & ~agent("d1", "d3", "d3")
    & ~agent("d0", "d2", "d3")
    & ~agent("d2", "d1", "d2")
    & ~agent("d2", "d3", "d0")
    & ~agent("d0", "d0", "d1")
    & ~agent("d1", "d1", "d1")
    & ~agent("d3", "d3", "d1")
    & ~agent("d3", "d0", "d2")
    & ~agent("d2", "d0", "d3")
    & ~agent("d0", "d3", "d2")
    & ~agent("d1", "d1", "d0")
    & ~agent("d0", "d0", "d0")
    & ~agent("d3", "d1", "d2")
    & ~agent("d0", "d3", "d3")
    & ~agent("d2", "d2", "d0")
    & ~agent("d1", "d3", "d2")
    & ~agent("d1", "d2", "d3")
    & ~agent("d3", "d3", "d0")
    & ~agent("d1", "d0", "d1")
    & ~agent("d3", "d0", "d3")
    & ~agent("d0", "d1", "d1")
    & ~agent("d3", "d2", "d1")
    & ~agent("d2", "d3", "d1")
    & ~agent("d2", "d1", "d3")
    & ~agent("d2", "d0", "d2")
    & ~agent("d0", "d2", "d2")
    & ~agent("d3", "d0", "d0")
    & ~agent("d2", "d1", "d0")
    & ~agent("d1", "d2", "d0")
    & ~agent("d0", "d3", "d0")
    & ~agent("d3", "d3", "d3")
    & ~agent("d0", "d1", "d2")
    &  agent("d2", "d0", "d1")
    & ~agent("d2", "d2", "d3")
    & ~agent("d3", "d1", "d1")
    & ~agent("d0", "d2", "d1")
    & ~agent("d0", "d0", "d3")
    & ~agent("d1", "d3", "d1")
    & ~agent("d1", "d0", "d2")
    & ~agent("d1", "d1", "d3")
    & ~agent("d3", "d2", "d2")
    & ~agent("d2", "d3", "d2")
    & ~agent("d2", "d0", "d0")
    & ~agent("d3", "d1", "d0")
    & ~agent("d3", "d2", "d3")
    & ~agent("d0", "d2", "d0")
    & ~agent("d1", "d3", "d0")
    & ~agent("d2", "d2", "d2")
    & ~agent("d1", "d0", "d3")
    & ~agent("d3", "d0", "d1")
    & ~agent("d2", "d1", "d1")
    & ~agent("d2", "d3", "d3")
    & ~agent("d1", "d2", "d1")
    & ~agent("d0", "d3", "d1")
    & ~agent("d3", "d3", "d2")
    & ~agent("d0", "d1", "d3")
    & ~agent("d0", "d0", "d2")
    & ~agent("d1", "d1", "d2")
    & ~nonliving("d0", "d0")
    & ~nonliving("d1", "d1")
    &  nonliving("d2", "d2")
    & ~nonliving("d3", "d3")
    & ~nonliving("d1", "d0")
    & ~nonliving("d0", "d1")
    & ~nonliving("d3", "d2")
    & ~nonliving("d2", "d3")
    & ~nonliving("d2", "d0")
    & ~nonliving("d3", "d1")
    & ~nonliving("d0", "d2")
    & ~nonliving("d1", "d3")
    & ~nonliving("d3", "d0")
    & ~nonliving("d2", "d1")
    & ~nonliving("d1", "d2")
    & ~nonliving("d0", "d3")
    & ~forename("d2", "d0")
    & ~forename("d3", "d1")
    & ~forename("d0", "d2")
    & ~forename("d1", "d3")
    & ~forename("d3", "d0")
    & ~forename("d2", "d1")
    & ~forename("d1", "d2")
    & ~forename("d0", "d3")
    & ~forename("d0", "d0")
    & ~forename("d1", "d1")
    & ~forename("d2", "d2")
    & ~forename("d3", "d3")
    & ~forename("d1", "d0")
    & ~forename("d0", "d1")
    & ~forename("d3", "d2")
    &  forename("d2", "d3")
    & ~organism("d3", "d0")
    &  organism("d2", "d1")
    & ~organism("d1", "d2")
    & ~organism("d0", "d3")
    & ~organism("d2", "d0")
    & ~organism("d3", "d1")
    & ~organism("d0", "d2")
    & ~organism("d1", "d3")
    & ~organism("d1", "d0")
    & ~organism("d0", "d1")
    & ~organism("d3", "d2")
    & ~organism("d2", "d3")
    & ~organism("d0", "d0")
    & ~organism("d1", "d1")
    & ~organism("d2", "d2")
    & ~organism("d3", "d3")
    & ~nonhuman("d1", "d0")
    & ~nonhuman("d0", "d1")
    & ~nonhuman("d3", "d2")
    &  nonhuman("d2", "d3")
    & ~nonhuman("d0", "d0")
    & ~nonhuman("d1", "d1")
    & ~nonhuman("d2", "d2")
    & ~nonhuman("d3", "d3")
    & ~nonhuman("d3", "d0")
    & ~nonhuman("d2", "d1")
    & ~nonhuman("d1", "d2")
    & ~nonhuman("d0", "d3")
    & ~nonhuman("d2", "d0")
    & ~nonhuman("d3", "d1")
    & ~nonhuman("d0", "d2")
    & ~nonhuman("d1", "d3")
    & ~beverage("d0", "d0")
    & ~beverage("d1", "d1")
    &  beverage("d2", "d2")
    & ~beverage("d3", "d3")
    & ~beverage("d1", "d0")
    & ~beverage("d0", "d1")
    & ~beverage("d3", "d2")
    & ~beverage("d2", "d3")
    & ~beverage("d2", "d0")
    & ~beverage("d3", "d1")
    & ~beverage("d0", "d2")
    & ~beverage("d1", "d3")
    & ~beverage("d3", "d0")
    & ~beverage("d2", "d1")
    & ~beverage("d1", "d2")
    & ~beverage("d0", "d3")
    & ~animate("d2", "d0")
    & ~animate("d3", "d1")
    & ~animate("d0", "d2")
    & ~animate("d1", "d3")
    & ~animate("d3", "d0")
    &  animate("d2", "d1")
    & ~animate("d1", "d2")
    & ~animate("d0", "d3")
    & ~animate("d0", "d0")
    & ~animate("d1", "d1")
    & ~animate("d2", "d2")
    & ~animate("d3", "d3")
    & ~animate("d1", "d0")
    & ~animate("d0", "d1")
    & ~animate("d3", "d2")
    & ~animate("d2", "d3")
    & ~shake_beverage("d1", "d0")
    & ~shake_beverage("d0", "d1")
    & ~shake_beverage("d3", "d2")
    & ~shake_beverage("d2", "d3")
    & ~general("d2", "d0")
    & ~general("d3", "d1")
    & ~general("d0", "d2")
    & ~general("d1", "d3")
    & ~shake_beverage("d0", "d0")
    & ~shake_beverage("d1", "d1")
    &  shake_beverage("d2", "d2")
    & ~shake_beverage("d3", "d3")
    & ~general("d3", "d0")
    & ~general("d2", "d1")
    & ~general("d1", "d2")
    & ~general("d0", "d3")
    & ~shake_beverage("d3", "d0")
    & ~shake_beverage("d2", "d1")
    & ~shake_beverage("d1", "d2")
    & ~shake_beverage("d0", "d3")
    & ~general("d0", "d0")
    & ~general("d1", "d1")
    & ~general("d2", "d2")
    & ~general("d3", "d3")
    & ~shake_beverage("d2", "d0")
    & ~shake_beverage("d3", "d1")
    & ~shake_beverage("d0", "d2")
    & ~shake_beverage("d1", "d3")
    & ~general("d1", "d0")
    & ~general("d0", "d1")
    & ~general("d3", "d2")
    &  general("d2", "d3")
    & ~existent("d1", "d0")
    & ~existent("d0", "d1")
    & ~existent("d3", "d2")
    & ~existent("d2", "d3")
    & ~existent("d0", "d0")
    & ~existent("d1", "d1")
    &  existent("d2", "d2")
    & ~existent("d3", "d3")
    & ~existent("d3", "d0")
    &  existent("d2", "d1")
    & ~existent("d1", "d2")
    & ~existent("d0", "d3")
    & ~existent("d2", "d0")
    & ~existent("d3", "d1")
    & ~existent("d0", "d2")
    & ~existent("d1", "d3")
    & ~substance_matter("d2", "d0")
    & ~substance_matter("d3", "d1")
    & ~substance_matter("d0", "d2")
    & ~substance_matter("d1", "d3")
    & ~substance_matter("d3", "d0")
    & ~substance_matter("d2", "d1")
    & ~substance_matter("d1", "d2")
    & ~substance_matter("d0", "d3")
    & ~substance_matter("d0", "d0")
    & ~substance_matter("d1", "d1")
    &  substance_matter("d2", "d2")
    & ~substance_matter("d3", "d3")
    & ~substance_matter("d1", "d0")
    & ~substance_matter("d0", "d1")
    & ~substance_matter("d3", "d2")
    & ~substance_matter("d2", "d3")
    & ~mia_forename("d2", "d0")
    & ~mia_forename("d3", "d1")
    & ~mia_forename("d0", "d2")
    & ~mia_forename("d1", "d3")
    & ~mia_forename("d3", "d0")
    & ~mia_forename("d2", "d1")
    & ~mia_forename("d1", "d2")
    & ~mia_forename("d0", "d3")
    & ~mia_forename("d0", "d0")
    & ~mia_forename("d1", "d1")
    & ~mia_forename("d2", "d2")
    & ~mia_forename("d3", "d3")
    & ~mia_forename("d1", "d0")
    & ~mia_forename("d0", "d1")
    & ~mia_forename("d3", "d2")
    &  mia_forename("d2", "d3")
    & ~patient("d3", "d2", "d0")
    & ~patient("d2", "d2", "d1")
    &  patient("d1", "d0", "d0")
    & ~patient("d2", "d1", "d2")
    & ~patient("d1", "d2", "d2")
    & ~patient("d3", "d1", "d3")
    & ~patient("d0", "d1", "d0")
    & ~patient("d2", "d3", "d0")
    & ~patient("d0", "d0", "d1")
    & ~patient("d1", "d1", "d1")
    & ~patient("d1", "d3", "d3")
    & ~patient("d3", "d3", "d1")
    & ~patient("d0", "d2", "d3")
    & ~patient("d3", "d0", "d2")
    & ~patient("d2", "d0", "d3")
    & ~patient("d0", "d3", "d2")
    & ~patient("d3", "d3", "d0")
    &  patient("d2", "d0", "d2")
    & ~patient("d1", "d1", "d0")
    &  patient("d0", "d0", "d0")
    & ~patient("d2", "d1", "d3")
    & ~patient("d1", "d3", "d2")
    & ~patient("d2", "d2", "d0")
    & ~patient("d0", "d3", "d3")
    & ~patient("d0", "d2", "d2")
    & ~patient("d1", "d0", "d1")
    & ~patient("d0", "d1", "d1")
    & ~patient("d3", "d1", "d2")
    & ~patient("d3", "d0", "d3")
    & ~patient("d3", "d2", "d1")
    & ~patient("d2", "d3", "d1")
    & ~patient("d1", "d2", "d3")
    &  patient("d3", "d0", "d0")
    & ~patient("d3", "d1", "d1")
    & ~patient("d2", "d1", "d0")
    & ~patient("d1", "d2", "d0")
    & ~patient("d0", "d3", "d0")
    & ~patient("d0", "d1", "d2")
    & ~patient("d2", "d3", "d2")
    & ~patient("d3", "d3", "d3")
    & ~patient("d2", "d0", "d1")
    & ~patient("d2", "d2", "d3")
    & ~patient("d0", "d2", "d1")
    & ~patient("d3", "d2", "d2")
    & ~patient("d0", "d0", "d3")
    & ~patient("d1", "d3", "d1")
    & ~patient("d1", "d0", "d2")
    & ~patient("d1", "d1", "d3")
    & ~patient("d3", "d0", "d1")
    & ~patient("d1", "d3", "d0")
    &  patient("d2", "d0", "d0")
    & ~patient("d3", "d2", "d3")
    & ~patient("d2", "d3", "d3")
    & ~patient("d3", "d1", "d0")
    & ~patient("d0", "d2", "d0")
    & ~patient("d3", "d3", "d2")
    & ~patient("d2", "d1", "d1")
    & ~patient("d2", "d2", "d2")
    & ~patient("d1", "d2", "d1")
    & ~patient("d0", "d3", "d1")
    & ~patient("d1", "d1", "d2")
    & ~patient("d0", "d1", "d3")
    & ~patient("d0", "d0", "d2")
    & ~patient("d1", "d0", "d3")
    & ~relname("d2", "d0")
    & ~relname("d3", "d1")
    & ~relname("d0", "d2")
    & ~relname("d1", "d3")
    & ~relname("d3", "d0")
    & ~relname("d2", "d1")
    & ~relname("d1", "d2")
    & ~relname("d0", "d3")
    & ~relname("d0", "d0")
    & ~relname("d1", "d1")
    & ~relname("d2", "d2")
    & ~relname("d3", "d3")
    & ~relname("d1", "d0")
    & ~relname("d0", "d1")
    & ~relname("d3", "d2")
    &  relname("d2", "d3")
    &  event("d3", "d0")
    & ~event("d2", "d1")
    & ~event("d1", "d2")
    & ~event("d0", "d3")
    &  event("d2", "d0")
    & ~event("d3", "d1")
    & ~event("d0", "d2")
    & ~event("d1", "d3")
    &  event("d1", "d0")
    & ~event("d0", "d1")
    & ~event("d3", "d2")
    & ~event("d2", "d3")
    &  event("d0", "d0")
    & ~event("d1", "d1")
    & ~event("d2", "d2")
    & ~event("d3", "d3")
    & ~relation("d0", "d0")
    & ~relation("d1", "d1")
    & ~relation("d2", "d2")
    & ~relation("d3", "d3")
    & ~relation("d1", "d0")
    & ~relation("d0", "d1")
    & ~relation("d3", "d2")
    &  relation("d2", "d3")
    & ~relation("d2", "d0")
    & ~relation("d3", "d1")
    & ~relation("d0", "d2")
    & ~relation("d1", "d3")
    & ~relation("d3", "d0")
    & ~relation("d2", "d1")
    & ~relation("d1", "d2")
    & ~relation("d0", "d3")
    &  eventuality("d2", "d0")
    & ~eventuality("d3", "d1")
    & ~eventuality("d0", "d2")
    & ~eventuality("d1", "d3")
    &  eventuality("d3", "d0")
    & ~eventuality("d2", "d1")
    & ~eventuality("d1", "d2")
    & ~eventuality("d0", "d3")
    &  eventuality("d0", "d0")
    & ~eventuality("d1", "d1")
    & ~eventuality("d2", "d2")
    & ~eventuality("d3", "d3")
    &  eventuality("d1", "d0")
    & ~eventuality("d0", "d1")
    & ~eventuality("d3", "d2")
    & ~eventuality("d2", "d3")
).
% SZS output end FiniteModel for NLP042+1

Solution for SWV017+1

% SZS output start FiniteModel for SWV017+1
fof(domain, interpretation-domains,
        ![X]: (X = "d0" | X = "d1")
).

fof(mappings, interpretation-mappings,
          sent("d0", "d0", "d0") = "d1"
        & sent("d1", "d1", "d0") = "d1"
        & sent("d0", "d0", "d1") = "d0"
        & sent("d1", "d1", "d1") = "d0"
        & sent("d0", "d1", "d1") = "d0"
        & sent("d0", "d1", "d0") = "d1"
        & sent("d1", "d0", "d0") = "d1"
        & sent("d1", "d0", "d1") = "d0"
        & pair("d0", "d0") = "d0"
        & pair("d0", "d1") = "d0"
        & pair("d1", "d0") = "d0"
        & pair("d1", "d1") = "d1"
        & quadruple("d0", "d0", "d1", "d0") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d0", "d0", "d0", "d1") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d1", "d0", "d0", "d0") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d1", "d1", "d1", "d1") = "d1"
        & quadruple("d1", "d1", "d0", "d1") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d0", "d1", "d1", "d1") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d1", "d1", "d1", "d0") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d1", "d0", "d1", "d1") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d0", "d1", "d0", "d0") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d0", "d0", "d0", "d0") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d0", "d1", "d0", "d1") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d0", "d1", "d1", "d0") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d0", "d0", "d1", "d1") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d1", "d0", "d0", "d1") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d1", "d0", "d1", "d0") = "d0"
        & quadruple("d1", "d1", "d0", "d0") = "d0"
        & generate_key("d0") = "d0"
        & generate_key("d1") = "d0"
        & t = "d0"
        & triple("d0", "d0", "d0") = "d0"
        & triple("d1", "d0", "d1") = "d0"
        & triple("d1", "d1", "d0") = "d0"
        & triple("d0", "d1", "d1") = "d0"
        & triple("d1", "d1", "d1") = "d1"
        & triple("d1", "d0", "d0") = "d0"
        & triple("d0", "d0", "d1") = "d0"
        & triple("d0", "d1", "d0") = "d0"
        & an_intruder_nonce = "d1"
        & a = "d1"
        & b = "d1"
        & encrypt("d1", "d0") = "d1"
        & encrypt("d0", "d1") = "d1"
        & encrypt("d0", "d0") = "d1"
        & encrypt("d1", "d1") = "d1"
        & generate_intruder_nonce("d0") = "d0"
        & generate_intruder_nonce("d1") = "d1"
        & bt = "d1"
        & key("d0", "d1") = "d1"
        & key("d1", "d1") = "d0"
        & key("d0", "d0") = "d1"
        & key("d1", "d0") = "d0"
        & generate_expiration_time("d1") = "d1"
        & generate_expiration_time("d0") = "d1"
        & at = "d1"
        & generate_b_nonce("d1") = "d1"
        & generate_b_nonce("d0") = "d1"
        & an_a_nonce = "d1"
).

fof(predicate_mappings, interpretation-mappings,
           party_of_protocol("d1")
        &  party_of_protocol("d0")
        & ~fresh_intruder_nonce("d0")
        &  fresh_intruder_nonce("d1")
        &  a_stored("d0")
        &  a_stored("d1")
        & ~fresh_to_b("d0")
        &  fresh_to_b("d1")
        & ~message("d1")
        &  message("d0")
        & ~intruder_holds("d1")
        &  intruder_holds("d0")
        & ~a_key("d1")
        &  a_key("d0")
        &  a_nonce("d1")
        & ~a_nonce("d0")
        & ~intruder_message("d0")
        &  intruder_message("d1")
        &  t_holds("d0")
        & ~t_holds("d1")
).
% SZS output end FiniteModel for SWV017+1

iProver 3.9.4

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name /tmp/SystemOnTPTP3960645/SEU140+2.tptp from annotated formula f8
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'c_8036' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture f51 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation for SEU140+2.tptp

fof(f8,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (subset(X0,X1) <=> ! [X2] : (in(X2,X0) => in(X2,X1)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3960645/SEU140+2.tptp',d3_tarski)).

fof(f43,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (~(~disjoint(X0,X1) & ! [X2] : ~(in(X2,X0) & in(X2,X1))) & ~(? [X2] : (in(X2,X0) & in(X2,X1)) & disjoint(X0,X1)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3960645/SEU140+2.tptp',t3_xboole_0)).

fof(f51,conjecture,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ((subset(X0,X1) & disjoint(X1,X2)) => disjoint(X0,X2))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3960645/SEU140+2.tptp',t63_xboole_1)).

fof(f52,negated_conjecture,(
  ~ ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ((subset(X0,X1) & disjoint(X1,X2)) => disjoint(X0,X2))),
  inference(negated_conjecture,[status(cth)],[f51])).

fof(f64,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (subset(X0,X1) <=> ! [X2] : (in(X2,X0) => in(X2,X1)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f8])).

fof(f88,plain,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (~(~disjoint(X0,X1) & ! [X2] : ~(in(X2,X0) & in(X2,X1))) & ~(? [X3] : (in(X3,X0) & in(X3,X1)) & disjoint(X0,X1)))),
  inference(rectify,[],[f43])).

fof(f89,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (~(~disjoint(X0,X1) & ! [X2] : ~(in(X2,X0) & in(X2,X1))) & ~(? [X3] : (in(X3,X0) & in(X3,X1)) & disjoint(X0,X1)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f88])).

fof(f96,plain,(
  ~ ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((subset(X0,X1) & disjoint(X1,X2)) => disjoint(X0,X2))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f52])).

fof(f104,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (subset(X0,X1) <=> ! [X2] : (in(X2,X1) | ~in(X2,X0)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f64])).

fof(f119,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((disjoint(X0,X1) | ? [X2] : (in(X2,X0) & in(X2,X1))) & (! [X3] : (~in(X3,X0) | ~in(X3,X1)) | ~disjoint(X0,X1)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f89])).

fof(f124,plain,(
  ? [X0,X1,X2] : (~disjoint(X0,X2) & (subset(X0,X1) & disjoint(X1,X2)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f96])).

fof(f125,plain,(
  ? [X0,X1,X2] : (~disjoint(X0,X2) & subset(X0,X1) & disjoint(X1,X2))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f124])).

fof(f140,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((subset(X0,X1) | ? [X2] : (~in(X2,X1) & in(X2,X0))) & (! [X2] : (in(X2,X1) | ~in(X2,X0)) | ~subset(X0,X1)))),
  inference(nnf_transformation,[],[f104])).

fof(f141,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((subset(X0,X1) | ? [X2] : (~in(X2,X1) & in(X2,X0))) & (! [X3] : (in(X3,X1) | ~in(X3,X0)) | ~subset(X0,X1)))),
  inference(rectify,[],[f140])).

fof(f142,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((subset(X0,X1) | (~in(sK2(X0,X1),X1) & in(sK2(X0,X1),X0))) & (! [X3] : (in(X3,X1) | ~in(X3,X0)) | ~subset(X0,X1)))),
  inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK2]),skolemize(X2,sK2(X0,X1))],[f141])).

fof(f158,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((disjoint(X0,X1) | (in(sK8(X0,X1),X0) & in(sK8(X0,X1),X1))) & (! [X3] : (~in(X3,X0) | ~in(X3,X1)) | ~disjoint(X0,X1)))),
  inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK8]),skolemize(X2,sK8(X0,X1))],[f119])).

fof(f160,plain,(
  ~disjoint(sK10,sK12) & subset(sK10,sK11) & disjoint(sK11,sK12)),
  inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK10,sK11,sK12]),skolemize(X0,sK10),skolemize(X1,sK11),skolemize(X2,sK12)],[f125])).

fof(f176,plain,(
  ( ! [X3,X0,X1] : (in(X3,X1) | ~in(X3,X0) | ~subset(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f142])).

fof(f223,plain,(
  ( ! [X3,X0,X1] : (~in(X3,X0) | ~in(X3,X1) | ~disjoint(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f158])).

fof(f224,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (disjoint(X0,X1) | in(sK8(X0,X1),X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f158])).

fof(f225,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (disjoint(X0,X1) | in(sK8(X0,X1),X0)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f158])).

fof(f234,plain,(
  disjoint(sK11,sK12)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f160])).

fof(f235,plain,(
  subset(sK10,sK11)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f160])).

fof(f236,plain,(
  ~disjoint(sK10,sK12)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f160])).

tcf(c_66,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~in(X0,X1)|~subset(X1,X2)|in(X0,X2)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f176])).

tcf(c_111,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (in(sK8(X0,X1),X0)|disjoint(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f225])).

tcf(c_112,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (in(sK8(X0,X1),X1)|disjoint(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f224])).

tcf(c_113,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~in(X0,X1)|~in(X0,X2)|~disjoint(X2,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f223])).

tcf(c_121,negated_conjecture,
    (~disjoint(sK10,sK12)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f236])).

tcf(c_122,negated_conjecture,
    (subset(sK10,sK11)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f235])).

tcf(c_123,negated_conjecture,
    (disjoint(sK11,sK12)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f234])).

tcf(c_3342,plain,
    (in(sK8(sK10,sK12),sK10)|disjoint(sK10,sK12)),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_111])).

tcf(c_3343,plain,
    (in(sK8(sK10,sK12),sK12)|disjoint(sK10,sK12)),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_112])).

tcf(c_3628,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~in(sK8(sK10,sK12),sK10)|~subset(sK10,X0)|in(sK8(sK10,sK12),X0)),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_66])).

tcf(c_3702,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~in(sK8(sK10,sK12),X0)|~in(sK8(sK10,sK12),sK12)|~disjoint(X0,sK12)),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_113])).

tcf(c_7700,plain,
    (~in(sK8(sK10,sK12),sK10)|~subset(sK10,sK11)|in(sK8(sK10,sK12),sK11)),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_3628])).

tcf(c_8035,plain,
    (~in(sK8(sK10,sK12),sK12)|~in(sK8(sK10,sK12),sK11)|~disjoint(sK11,sK12)),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_3702])).

tcf(c_8036,plain,
    ($false),
    inference(prop_impl_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_8035,c_7700,c_3343,c_3342,c_121,c_122,c_123])).


% SZS output end CNFRefutation for SEU140+2.tptp

Solution for NLP042+1

% SZS output start Saturation for NLP042+1.tptp

fof(f1,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (woman(X0,X1) => female(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax1)).

fof(f2,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (human_person(X0,X1) => animate(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax2)).

fof(f3,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (human_person(X0,X1) => human(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax3)).

fof(f4,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (organism(X0,X1) => living(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax4)).

fof(f5,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (organism(X0,X1) => impartial(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax5)).

fof(f6,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (organism(X0,X1) => entity(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax6)).

fof(f7,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (human_person(X0,X1) => organism(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax7)).

fof(f8,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (woman(X0,X1) => human_person(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax8)).

fof(f9,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (mia_forename(X0,X1) => forename(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax9)).

fof(f10,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (abstraction(X0,X1) => unisex(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax10)).

fof(f11,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (abstraction(X0,X1) => general(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax11)).

fof(f12,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (abstraction(X0,X1) => nonhuman(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax12)).

fof(f13,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (abstraction(X0,X1) => thing(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax13)).

fof(f14,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (relation(X0,X1) => abstraction(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax14)).

fof(f15,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (relname(X0,X1) => relation(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax15)).

fof(f16,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (forename(X0,X1) => relname(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax16)).

fof(f17,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (object(X0,X1) => unisex(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax17)).

fof(f18,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (object(X0,X1) => impartial(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax18)).

fof(f19,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (object(X0,X1) => nonliving(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax19)).

fof(f20,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (entity(X0,X1) => existent(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax20)).

fof(f21,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (entity(X0,X1) => specific(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax21)).

fof(f22,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (entity(X0,X1) => thing(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax22)).

fof(f23,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (object(X0,X1) => entity(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax23)).

fof(f24,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (substance_matter(X0,X1) => object(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax24)).

fof(f25,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (food(X0,X1) => substance_matter(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax25)).

fof(f26,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (beverage(X0,X1) => food(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax26)).

fof(f27,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (shake_beverage(X0,X1) => beverage(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax27)).

fof(f28,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (order(X0,X1) => event(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax28)).

fof(f29,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (eventuality(X0,X1) => unisex(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax29)).

fof(f30,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (eventuality(X0,X1) => nonexistent(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax30)).

fof(f31,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (eventuality(X0,X1) => specific(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax31)).

fof(f32,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (thing(X0,X1) => singleton(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax32)).

fof(f33,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (eventuality(X0,X1) => thing(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax33)).

fof(f34,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (event(X0,X1) => eventuality(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax34)).

fof(f35,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (act(X0,X1) => event(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax35)).

fof(f36,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (order(X0,X1) => act(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax36)).

fof(f37,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (animate(X0,X1) => ~nonliving(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax37)).

fof(f38,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (existent(X0,X1) => ~nonexistent(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax38)).

fof(f39,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (nonhuman(X0,X1) => ~human(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax39)).

fof(f40,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (nonliving(X0,X1) => ~living(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax40)).

fof(f41,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (specific(X0,X1) => ~general(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax41)).

fof(f42,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (unisex(X0,X1) => ~female(X0,X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax42)).

fof(f43,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ((entity(X0,X1) & forename(X0,X2) & of(X0,X2,X1)) => ~ ? [X3] : (forename(X0,X3) & X3 != X2 & of(X0,X3,X1)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax43)).

fof(f44,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ! [X3] : ((nonreflexive(X0,X1) & agent(X0,X1,X2) & patient(X0,X1,X3)) => X2 != X3)),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',ax44)).

fof(f45,conjecture,(
  ~ ? [X0] : (actual_world(X0) & ? [X1] : ? [X2] : ? [X3] : ? [X4] : (of(X0,X2,X1) & woman(X0,X1) & mia_forename(X0,X2) & forename(X0,X2) & shake_beverage(X0,X3) & event(X0,X4) & agent(X0,X4,X1) & patient(X0,X4,X3) & past(X0,X4) & nonreflexive(X0,X4) & order(X0,X4)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3962688/NLP042+1.tptp',co1)).

fof(f46,negated_conjecture,(
  ~ ~ ? [X0] : (actual_world(X0) & ? [X1] : ? [X2] : ? [X3] : ? [X4] : (of(X0,X2,X1) & woman(X0,X1) & mia_forename(X0,X2) & forename(X0,X2) & shake_beverage(X0,X3) & event(X0,X4) & agent(X0,X4,X1) & patient(X0,X4,X3) & past(X0,X4) & nonreflexive(X0,X4) & order(X0,X4)))),
  inference(negated_conjecture,[status(cth)],[f45])).

fof(f47,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (woman(X0,X1) => female(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f1])).

fof(f48,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (human_person(X0,X1) => animate(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f2])).

fof(f49,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (human_person(X0,X1) => human(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f3])).

fof(f50,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (organism(X0,X1) => living(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f4])).

fof(f51,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (organism(X0,X1) => impartial(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f5])).

fof(f52,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (organism(X0,X1) => entity(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f6])).

fof(f53,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (human_person(X0,X1) => organism(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f7])).

fof(f54,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (woman(X0,X1) => human_person(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f8])).

fof(f55,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (mia_forename(X0,X1) => forename(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f9])).

fof(f56,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (abstraction(X0,X1) => unisex(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f10])).

fof(f57,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (abstraction(X0,X1) => general(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f11])).

fof(f58,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (abstraction(X0,X1) => nonhuman(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f12])).

fof(f59,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (abstraction(X0,X1) => thing(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f13])).

fof(f60,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (relation(X0,X1) => abstraction(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f14])).

fof(f61,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (relname(X0,X1) => relation(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f15])).

fof(f62,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (forename(X0,X1) => relname(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f16])).

fof(f63,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (object(X0,X1) => unisex(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f17])).

fof(f64,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (object(X0,X1) => impartial(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f18])).

fof(f65,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (object(X0,X1) => nonliving(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f19])).

fof(f66,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (entity(X0,X1) => existent(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f20])).

fof(f67,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (entity(X0,X1) => specific(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f21])).

fof(f68,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (entity(X0,X1) => thing(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f22])).

fof(f69,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (object(X0,X1) => entity(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f23])).

fof(f70,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (substance_matter(X0,X1) => object(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f24])).

fof(f71,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (food(X0,X1) => substance_matter(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f25])).

fof(f72,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (beverage(X0,X1) => food(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f26])).

fof(f73,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (shake_beverage(X0,X1) => beverage(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f27])).

fof(f74,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (order(X0,X1) => event(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f28])).

fof(f75,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (eventuality(X0,X1) => unisex(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f29])).

fof(f76,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (eventuality(X0,X1) => nonexistent(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f30])).

fof(f77,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (eventuality(X0,X1) => specific(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f31])).

fof(f78,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (thing(X0,X1) => singleton(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f32])).

fof(f79,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (eventuality(X0,X1) => thing(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f33])).

fof(f80,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (event(X0,X1) => eventuality(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f34])).

fof(f81,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (act(X0,X1) => event(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f35])).

fof(f82,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (order(X0,X1) => act(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f36])).

fof(f83,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (animate(X0,X1) => ~nonliving(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f37])).

fof(f84,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (existent(X0,X1) => ~nonexistent(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f38])).

fof(f85,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (nonhuman(X0,X1) => ~human(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f39])).

fof(f86,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (nonliving(X0,X1) => ~living(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f40])).

fof(f87,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (specific(X0,X1) => ~general(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f41])).

fof(f88,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (unisex(X0,X1) => ~female(X0,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f42])).

fof(f89,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((entity(X0,X1) & forename(X0,X2) & of(X0,X2,X1)) => ~ ? [X3] : (forename(X0,X3) & X3 != X2 & of(X0,X3,X1)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f43])).

fof(f90,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3] : ((nonreflexive(X0,X1) & agent(X0,X1,X2) & patient(X0,X1,X3)) => X2 != X3)),
  inference(flattening,[],[f44])).

fof(f91,plain,(
  ? [X0] : (actual_world(X0) & ? [X1,X2,X3,X4] : (of(X0,X2,X1) & woman(X0,X1) & mia_forename(X0,X2) & forename(X0,X2) & shake_beverage(X0,X3) & event(X0,X4) & agent(X0,X4,X1) & patient(X0,X4,X3) & past(X0,X4) & nonreflexive(X0,X4) & order(X0,X4)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f46])).

fof(f92,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (female(X0,X1) | ~woman(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f47])).

fof(f93,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (animate(X0,X1) | ~human_person(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f48])).

fof(f94,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (human(X0,X1) | ~human_person(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f49])).

fof(f95,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (living(X0,X1) | ~organism(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f50])).

fof(f96,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (impartial(X0,X1) | ~organism(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f51])).

fof(f97,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (entity(X0,X1) | ~organism(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f52])).

fof(f98,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (organism(X0,X1) | ~human_person(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f53])).

fof(f99,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (human_person(X0,X1) | ~woman(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f54])).

fof(f100,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (forename(X0,X1) | ~mia_forename(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f55])).

fof(f101,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (unisex(X0,X1) | ~abstraction(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f56])).

fof(f102,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (general(X0,X1) | ~abstraction(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f57])).

fof(f103,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (nonhuman(X0,X1) | ~abstraction(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f58])).

fof(f104,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (thing(X0,X1) | ~abstraction(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f59])).

fof(f105,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (abstraction(X0,X1) | ~relation(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f60])).

fof(f106,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (relation(X0,X1) | ~relname(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f61])).

fof(f107,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (relname(X0,X1) | ~forename(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f62])).

fof(f108,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (unisex(X0,X1) | ~object(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f63])).

fof(f109,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (impartial(X0,X1) | ~object(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f64])).

fof(f110,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (nonliving(X0,X1) | ~object(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f65])).

fof(f111,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (existent(X0,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f66])).

fof(f112,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (specific(X0,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f67])).

fof(f113,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (thing(X0,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f68])).

fof(f114,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (entity(X0,X1) | ~object(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f69])).

fof(f115,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (object(X0,X1) | ~substance_matter(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f70])).

fof(f116,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (substance_matter(X0,X1) | ~food(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f71])).

fof(f117,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (food(X0,X1) | ~beverage(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f72])).

fof(f118,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (beverage(X0,X1) | ~shake_beverage(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f73])).

fof(f119,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (event(X0,X1) | ~order(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f74])).

fof(f120,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (unisex(X0,X1) | ~eventuality(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f75])).

fof(f121,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (nonexistent(X0,X1) | ~eventuality(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f76])).

fof(f122,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (specific(X0,X1) | ~eventuality(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f77])).

fof(f123,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (singleton(X0,X1) | ~thing(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f78])).

fof(f124,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (thing(X0,X1) | ~eventuality(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f79])).

fof(f125,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (eventuality(X0,X1) | ~event(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f80])).

fof(f126,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (event(X0,X1) | ~act(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f81])).

fof(f127,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (act(X0,X1) | ~order(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f82])).

fof(f128,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (~nonliving(X0,X1) | ~animate(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f83])).

fof(f129,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (~nonexistent(X0,X1) | ~existent(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f84])).

fof(f130,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (~human(X0,X1) | ~nonhuman(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f85])).

fof(f131,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (~living(X0,X1) | ~nonliving(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f86])).

fof(f132,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (~general(X0,X1) | ~specific(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f87])).

fof(f133,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (~female(X0,X1) | ~unisex(X0,X1))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f88])).

fof(f134,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (! [X3] : (~forename(X0,X3) | X2 = X3 | ~of(X0,X3,X1)) | (~entity(X0,X1) | ~forename(X0,X2) | ~of(X0,X2,X1)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f89])).

fof(f135,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (! [X3] : (~forename(X0,X3) | X2 = X3 | ~of(X0,X3,X1)) | ~entity(X0,X1) | ~forename(X0,X2) | ~of(X0,X2,X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f134])).

fof(f136,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3] : (X2 != X3 | (~nonreflexive(X0,X1) | ~agent(X0,X1,X2) | ~patient(X0,X1,X3)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f90])).

fof(f137,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3] : (X2 != X3 | ~nonreflexive(X0,X1) | ~agent(X0,X1,X2) | ~patient(X0,X1,X3))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f136])).

fof(f138,plain,(
  actual_world(sK0) & (of(sK0,sK2,sK1) & woman(sK0,sK1) & mia_forename(sK0,sK2) & forename(sK0,sK2) & shake_beverage(sK0,sK3) & event(sK0,sK4) & agent(sK0,sK4,sK1) & patient(sK0,sK4,sK3) & past(sK0,sK4) & nonreflexive(sK0,sK4) & order(sK0,sK4))),
  inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK0,sK1,sK2,sK3,sK4]),skolemize(X0,sK0),skolemize(X1,sK1),skolemize(X2,sK2),skolemize(X3,sK3),skolemize(X4,sK4)],[f91])).

fof(f139,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (female(X0,X1) | ~woman(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f92])).

fof(f140,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (animate(X0,X1) | ~human_person(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f93])).

fof(f141,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (human(X0,X1) | ~human_person(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f94])).

fof(f142,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (living(X0,X1) | ~organism(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f95])).

fof(f143,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (impartial(X0,X1) | ~organism(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f96])).

fof(f144,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (entity(X0,X1) | ~organism(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f97])).

fof(f145,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (organism(X0,X1) | ~human_person(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f98])).

fof(f146,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (human_person(X0,X1) | ~woman(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f99])).

fof(f147,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (forename(X0,X1) | ~mia_forename(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f100])).

fof(f148,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (unisex(X0,X1) | ~abstraction(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f101])).

fof(f149,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (general(X0,X1) | ~abstraction(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f102])).

fof(f150,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (nonhuman(X0,X1) | ~abstraction(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f103])).

fof(f151,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (thing(X0,X1) | ~abstraction(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f104])).

fof(f152,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (abstraction(X0,X1) | ~relation(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f105])).

fof(f153,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (relation(X0,X1) | ~relname(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f106])).

fof(f154,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (relname(X0,X1) | ~forename(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f107])).

fof(f155,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (unisex(X0,X1) | ~object(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f108])).

fof(f156,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (impartial(X0,X1) | ~object(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f109])).

fof(f157,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (nonliving(X0,X1) | ~object(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f110])).

fof(f158,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (existent(X0,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f111])).

fof(f159,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (specific(X0,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f112])).

fof(f160,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (thing(X0,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f113])).

fof(f161,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (entity(X0,X1) | ~object(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f114])).

fof(f162,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (object(X0,X1) | ~substance_matter(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f115])).

fof(f163,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (substance_matter(X0,X1) | ~food(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f116])).

fof(f164,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (food(X0,X1) | ~beverage(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f117])).

fof(f165,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (beverage(X0,X1) | ~shake_beverage(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f118])).

fof(f166,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (event(X0,X1) | ~order(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f119])).

fof(f167,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (unisex(X0,X1) | ~eventuality(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f120])).

fof(f168,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (nonexistent(X0,X1) | ~eventuality(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f121])).

fof(f169,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (specific(X0,X1) | ~eventuality(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f122])).

fof(f170,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (singleton(X0,X1) | ~thing(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f123])).

fof(f171,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (thing(X0,X1) | ~eventuality(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f124])).

fof(f172,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (eventuality(X0,X1) | ~event(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f125])).

fof(f173,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (event(X0,X1) | ~act(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f126])).

fof(f174,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (act(X0,X1) | ~order(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f127])).

fof(f175,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (~nonliving(X0,X1) | ~animate(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f128])).

fof(f176,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (~nonexistent(X0,X1) | ~existent(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f129])).

fof(f177,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (~human(X0,X1) | ~nonhuman(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f130])).

fof(f178,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (~living(X0,X1) | ~nonliving(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f131])).

fof(f179,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (~general(X0,X1) | ~specific(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f132])).

fof(f180,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (~female(X0,X1) | ~unisex(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f133])).

fof(f181,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X3,X0,X1] : (~forename(X0,X3) | X2 = X3 | ~of(X0,X3,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1) | ~forename(X0,X2) | ~of(X0,X2,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f135])).

fof(f182,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X3,X0,X1] : (X2 != X3 | ~nonreflexive(X0,X1) | ~agent(X0,X1,X2) | ~patient(X0,X1,X3)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f137])).

fof(f183,plain,(
  order(sK0,sK4)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f138])).

fof(f184,plain,(
  nonreflexive(sK0,sK4)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f138])).

fof(f185,plain,(
  past(sK0,sK4)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f138])).

fof(f186,plain,(
  patient(sK0,sK4,sK3)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f138])).

fof(f187,plain,(
  agent(sK0,sK4,sK1)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f138])).

fof(f188,plain,(
  event(sK0,sK4)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f138])).

fof(f189,plain,(
  shake_beverage(sK0,sK3)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f138])).

fof(f190,plain,(
  forename(sK0,sK2)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f138])).

fof(f191,plain,(
  mia_forename(sK0,sK2)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f138])).

fof(f192,plain,(
  woman(sK0,sK1)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f138])).

fof(f193,plain,(
  of(sK0,sK2,sK1)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f138])).

fof(f194,plain,(
  actual_world(sK0)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f138])).

fof(f195,plain,(
  ( ! [X3,X0,X1] : (~nonreflexive(X0,X1) | ~agent(X0,X1,X3) | ~patient(X0,X1,X3)) )),
  inference(equality_resolution,[],[f182])).

tcf(c_49,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~woman(X0,X1)|female(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f139])).

tcf(c_50,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~human_person(X0,X1)|animate(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f140])).

tcf(c_51,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~human_person(X0,X1)|human(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f141])).

tcf(c_52,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~organism(X0,X1)|living(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f142])).

tcf(c_53,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~organism(X0,X1)|impartial(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f143])).

tcf(c_54,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~organism(X0,X1)|entity(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f144])).

tcf(c_55,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~human_person(X0,X1)|organism(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f145])).

tcf(c_56,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~woman(X0,X1)|human_person(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f146])).

tcf(c_57,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~mia_forename(X0,X1)|forename(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f147])).

tcf(c_58,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~abstraction(X0,X1)|unisex(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f148])).

tcf(c_59,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~abstraction(X0,X1)|general(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f149])).

tcf(c_60,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~abstraction(X0,X1)|nonhuman(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f150])).

tcf(c_61,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~abstraction(X0,X1)|thing(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f151])).

tcf(c_62,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~relation(X0,X1)|abstraction(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f152])).

tcf(c_63,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~relname(X0,X1)|relation(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f153])).

tcf(c_64,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~forename(X0,X1)|relname(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f154])).

tcf(c_65,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~object(X0,X1)|unisex(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f155])).

tcf(c_66,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~object(X0,X1)|impartial(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f156])).

tcf(c_67,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~object(X0,X1)|nonliving(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f157])).

tcf(c_68,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~entity(X0,X1)|existent(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f158])).

tcf(c_69,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~entity(X0,X1)|specific(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f159])).

tcf(c_70,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~entity(X0,X1)|thing(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f160])).

tcf(c_71,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~object(X0,X1)|entity(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f161])).

tcf(c_72,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~substance_matter(X0,X1)|object(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f162])).

tcf(c_73,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~food(X0,X1)|substance_matter(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f163])).

tcf(c_74,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~beverage(X0,X1)|food(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f164])).

tcf(c_75,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~shake_beverage(X0,X1)|beverage(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f165])).

tcf(c_76,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~order(X0,X1)|event(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f166])).

tcf(c_77,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~eventuality(X0,X1)|unisex(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f167])).

tcf(c_78,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~eventuality(X0,X1)|nonexistent(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f168])).

tcf(c_79,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~eventuality(X0,X1)|specific(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f169])).

tcf(c_80,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~thing(X0,X1)|singleton(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f170])).

tcf(c_81,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~eventuality(X0,X1)|thing(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f171])).

tcf(c_82,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~event(X0,X1)|eventuality(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f172])).

tcf(c_83,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~act(X0,X1)|event(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f173])).

tcf(c_84,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~order(X0,X1)|act(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f174])).

tcf(c_85,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~animate(X0,X1)|~nonliving(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f175])).

tcf(c_86,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~existent(X0,X1)|~nonexistent(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f176])).

tcf(c_87,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~human(X0,X1)|~nonhuman(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f177])).

tcf(c_88,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~living(X0,X1)|~nonliving(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f178])).

tcf(c_89,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~general(X0,X1)|~specific(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f179])).

tcf(c_90,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~female(X0,X1)|~unisex(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f180])).

tcf(c_91,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~of(X0,X1,X2)|~of(X0,X3,X2)|~entity(X0,X2)|~forename(X0,X1)|~forename(X0,X3)|
    X1 = X3),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f181])).

tcf(c_92,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~agent(X0,X1,X2)|~patient(X0,X1,X2)|~nonreflexive(X0,X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f195])).

tcf(c_93,negated_conjecture,
    (actual_world(sK0)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f194])).

tcf(c_94,negated_conjecture,
    (of(sK0,sK2,sK1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f193])).

tcf(c_95,negated_conjecture,
    (woman(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f192])).

tcf(c_96,negated_conjecture,
    (mia_forename(sK0,sK2)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f191])).

tcf(c_97,negated_conjecture,
    (forename(sK0,sK2)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f190])).

tcf(c_98,negated_conjecture,
    (shake_beverage(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f189])).

tcf(c_99,negated_conjecture,
    (event(sK0,sK4)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f188])).

tcf(c_100,negated_conjecture,
    (agent(sK0,sK4,sK1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f187])).

tcf(c_101,negated_conjecture,
    (patient(sK0,sK4,sK3)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f186])).

tcf(c_102,negated_conjecture,
    (past(sK0,sK4)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f185])).

tcf(c_103,negated_conjecture,
    (nonreflexive(sK0,sK4)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f184])).

tcf(c_104,negated_conjecture,
    (order(sK0,sK4)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f183])).

tcf(c_167,plain,
    (female(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_95,c_49])).

tcf(c_196,plain,
    (human_person(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_95,c_56])).

tcf(c_197,plain,
    (organism(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_196,c_55])).

tcf(c_198,plain,
    (human(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_196,c_51])).

tcf(c_199,plain,
    (animate(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_196,c_50])).

tcf(c_200,plain,
    (entity(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_197,c_54])).

tcf(c_201,plain,
    (impartial(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_197,c_53])).

tcf(c_202,plain,
    (living(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_197,c_52])).

tcf(c_240,plain,
    (relname(sK0,sK2)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_97,c_64])).

tcf(c_241,plain,
    (relation(sK0,sK2)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_240,c_63])).

tcf(c_242,plain,
    (abstraction(sK0,sK2)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_241,c_62])).

tcf(c_243,plain,
    (thing(sK0,sK2)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_242,c_61])).

tcf(c_244,plain,
    (nonhuman(sK0,sK2)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_242,c_60])).

tcf(c_245,plain,
    (general(sK0,sK2)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_242,c_59])).

tcf(c_246,plain,
    (unisex(sK0,sK2)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_242,c_58])).

tcf(c_251,plain,
    (~nonhuman(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_198,c_87])).

tcf(c_268,plain,
    (existent(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_200,c_68])).

tcf(c_273,plain,
    (specific(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_200,c_69])).

tcf(c_278,plain,
    (thing(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_200,c_70])).

tcf(c_307,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~of(sK0,X0,sK1)|~forename(sK0,X0)|~entity(sK0,sK1)|~forename(sK0,sK2)|
    X0 = sK2),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_94,c_91])).

tcf(c_308,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~of(sK0,X0,sK1)|~forename(sK0,X0)|X0 = sK2),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_307,c_97,c_200])).

tcf(c_317,plain,
    (beverage(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_98,c_75])).

tcf(c_331,plain,
    (food(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_317,c_74])).

tcf(c_332,plain,
    (substance_matter(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_331,c_73])).

tcf(c_333,plain,
    (object(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_332,c_72])).

tcf(c_334,plain,
    (entity(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_333,c_71])).

tcf(c_335,plain,
    (nonliving(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_333,c_67])).

tcf(c_336,plain,
    (impartial(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_333,c_66])).

tcf(c_337,plain,
    (unisex(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_333,c_65])).

tcf(c_345,plain,
    (thing(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_334,c_70])).

tcf(c_346,plain,
    (specific(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_334,c_69])).

tcf(c_347,plain,
    (existent(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_334,c_68])).

tcf(c_348,plain,
    (~animate(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_335,c_85])).

tcf(c_357,plain,
    (singleton(sK0,sK2)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_243,c_80])).

tcf(c_358,plain,
    (singleton(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_278,c_80])).

tcf(c_359,plain,
    (singleton(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_345,c_80])).

tcf(c_368,plain,
    (eventuality(sK0,sK4)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_99,c_82])).

tcf(c_369,plain,
    (thing(sK0,sK4)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_368,c_81])).

tcf(c_370,plain,
    (specific(sK0,sK4)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_368,c_79])).

tcf(c_371,plain,
    (nonexistent(sK0,sK4)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_368,c_78])).

tcf(c_372,plain,
    (unisex(sK0,sK4)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_368,c_77])).

tcf(c_373,plain,
    (singleton(sK0,sK4)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_369,c_80])).

tcf(c_382,plain,
    (act(sK0,sK4)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_104,c_84])).

tcf(c_388,plain,
    (~unisex(sK0,sK1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_167,c_90])).

tcf(c_393,plain,
    (~existent(sK0,sK4)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_371,c_86])).

tcf(c_398,plain,
    (~living(sK0,sK3)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_335,c_88])).

tcf(c_403,plain,
    (~specific(sK0,sK2)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_245,c_89])).

tcf(c_410,plain,
    (~patient(sK0,sK4,sK1)|~nonreflexive(sK0,sK4)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_100,c_92])).

tcf(c_411,plain,
    (~patient(sK0,sK4,sK1)),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_410,c_103])).


% SZS output end Saturation for NLP042+1.tptp

Solution for SWV017+1

% SZS output start Saturation for SWV017+1.tptp

fof(f1,axiom,(
  a_holds(key(at,t))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',a_holds_key_at_for_t)).

fof(f2,axiom,(
  party_of_protocol(a)),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',a_is_party_of_protocol)).

fof(f3,axiom,(
  message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',a_sent_message_i_to_b)).

fof(f4,axiom,(
  a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',a_stored_message_i)).

fof(f5,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ! [X3] : ! [X4] : ! [X5] : ((message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X4,X5,X2,X1),at),X3,X0))) & a_stored(pair(X4,X5))) => (message(sent(a,X4,pair(X3,encrypt(X0,X2)))) & a_holds(key(X2,X4))))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',a_forwards_secure)).

fof(f6,axiom,(
  b_holds(key(bt,t))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',b_hold_key_bt_for_t)).

fof(f7,axiom,(
  party_of_protocol(b)),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',b_is_party_of_protocol)).

fof(f8,axiom,(
  fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b)).

fof(f9,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ((message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) & fresh_to_b(X1)) => (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) & b_stored(pair(X0,X1))))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time)).

fof(f10,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ((message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) & a_key(X0) & b_stored(pair(X1,X2))) => b_holds(key(X0,X1)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',b_accepts_secure_session_key)).

fof(f11,axiom,(
  t_holds(key(at,a))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',t_holds_key_at_for_a)).

fof(f12,axiom,(
  t_holds(key(bt,b))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',t_holds_key_bt_for_b)).

fof(f13,axiom,(
  party_of_protocol(t)),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',t_is_party_of_protocol)).

fof(f14,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ! [X3] : ! [X4] : ! [X5] : ! [X6] : ((message(sent(X0,t,triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))) & t_holds(key(X5,X0)) & t_holds(key(X6,X2)) & a_nonce(X3)) => message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1))))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',server_t_generates_key)).

fof(f15,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : (message(sent(X0,X1,X2)) => intruder_message(X2))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',intruder_can_record)).

fof(f16,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) => (intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',intruder_decomposes_pairs)).

fof(f17,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : (intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) => (intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X2)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',intruder_decomposes_triples)).

fof(f18,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ! [X3] : (intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3)) => (intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X2) & intruder_message(X3)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',intruder_decomposes_quadruples)).

fof(f19,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ((intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1)) => intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',intruder_composes_pairs)).

fof(f20,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ((intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X2)) => intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',intruder_composes_triples)).

fof(f21,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ! [X3] : ((intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X2) & intruder_message(X3)) => intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',intruder_composes_quadruples)).

fof(f22,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ((intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) & intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) & party_of_protocol(X2)) => intruder_message(X1))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',intruder_interception)).

fof(f23,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ((intruder_message(X0) & party_of_protocol(X1) & party_of_protocol(X2)) => message(sent(X1,X2,X0)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',intruder_message_sent)).

fof(f24,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ((intruder_message(X0) & party_of_protocol(X1)) => intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',intruder_holds_key)).

fof(f25,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ((intruder_message(X0) & intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) & party_of_protocol(X2)) => intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',intruder_key_encrypts)).

fof(f26,axiom,(
  a_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce)).

fof(f27,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ~a_nonce(generate_key(X0))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',generated_keys_are_not_nonces)).

fof(f28,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X0)) & a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X0)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces)).

fof(f29,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : ~(a_key(X0) & a_nonce(X0))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',nothing_is_a_nonce_and_a_key)).

fof(f30,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : a_key(generate_key(X0))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',generated_keys_are_keys)).

fof(f31,axiom,(
  fresh_intruder_nonce(an_intruder_nonce)),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',an_intruder_nonce_is_a_fresh_intruder_nonce)).

fof(f32,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : (fresh_intruder_nonce(X0) => fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_intruder_nonce(X0)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',can_generate_more_fresh_intruder_nonces)).

fof(f33,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : (fresh_intruder_nonce(X0) => (fresh_to_b(X0) & intruder_message(X0)))),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3964657/SWV017+1.tptp',fresh_intruder_nonces_are_fresh_to_b)).

fof(f34,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4,X5] : ((message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X4,X5,X2,X1),at),X3,X0))) & a_stored(pair(X4,X5))) => (message(sent(a,X4,pair(X3,encrypt(X0,X2)))) & a_holds(key(X2,X4))))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f5])).

fof(f35,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) & fresh_to_b(X1)) => (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) & b_stored(pair(X0,X1))))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f9])).

fof(f36,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) & a_key(X0) & b_stored(pair(X1,X2))) => b_holds(key(X0,X1)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f10])).

fof(f37,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4,X5,X6] : ((message(sent(X0,t,triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))) & t_holds(key(X5,X0)) & t_holds(key(X6,X2)) & a_nonce(X3)) => message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1))))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f14])).

fof(f38,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (message(sent(X0,X1,X2)) => intruder_message(X2))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f15])).

fof(f39,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) => (intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f16])).

fof(f40,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) => (intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X2)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f17])).

fof(f41,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3] : (intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3)) => (intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X2) & intruder_message(X3)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f18])).

fof(f42,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1)) => intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f19])).

fof(f43,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X2)) => intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f20])).

fof(f44,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3] : ((intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X2) & intruder_message(X3)) => intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f21])).

fof(f45,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) & intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) & party_of_protocol(X2)) => intruder_message(X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f22])).

fof(f46,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((intruder_message(X0) & party_of_protocol(X1) & party_of_protocol(X2)) => message(sent(X1,X2,X0)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f23])).

fof(f47,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((intruder_message(X0) & party_of_protocol(X1)) => intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f24])).

fof(f48,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((intruder_message(X0) & intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) & party_of_protocol(X2)) => intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f25])).

fof(f49,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4,X5] : ((message(sent(a,X4,pair(X3,encrypt(X0,X2)))) & a_holds(key(X2,X4))) | (~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X4,X5,X2,X1),at),X3,X0))) | ~a_stored(pair(X4,X5))))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f34])).

fof(f50,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4,X5] : ((message(sent(a,X4,pair(X3,encrypt(X0,X2)))) & a_holds(key(X2,X4))) | ~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X4,X5,X2,X1),at),X3,X0))) | ~a_stored(pair(X4,X5)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f49])).

fof(f51,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) & b_stored(pair(X0,X1))) | (~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) | ~fresh_to_b(X1)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f35])).

fof(f52,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) & b_stored(pair(X0,X1))) | ~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) | ~fresh_to_b(X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f51])).

fof(f53,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (b_holds(key(X0,X1)) | (~message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) | ~a_key(X0) | ~b_stored(pair(X1,X2))))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f36])).

fof(f54,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (b_holds(key(X0,X1)) | ~message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) | ~a_key(X0) | ~b_stored(pair(X1,X2)))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f53])).

fof(f55,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4,X5,X6] : (message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1))) | (~message(sent(X0,t,triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))) | ~t_holds(key(X5,X0)) | ~t_holds(key(X6,X2)) | ~a_nonce(X3)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f37])).

fof(f56,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4,X5,X6] : (message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1))) | ~message(sent(X0,t,triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))) | ~t_holds(key(X5,X0)) | ~t_holds(key(X6,X2)) | ~a_nonce(X3))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f55])).

fof(f57,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (intruder_message(X2) | ~message(sent(X0,X1,X2)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f38])).

fof(f58,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1)) | ~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f39])).

fof(f59,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X2)) | ~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f40])).

fof(f60,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3] : ((intruder_message(X0) & intruder_message(X1) & intruder_message(X2) & intruder_message(X3)) | ~intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f41])).

fof(f61,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) | (~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f42])).

fof(f62,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f61])).

fof(f63,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) | (~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1) | ~intruder_message(X2)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f43])).

fof(f64,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1) | ~intruder_message(X2))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f63])).

fof(f65,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3] : (intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3)) | (~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1) | ~intruder_message(X2) | ~intruder_message(X3)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f44])).

fof(f66,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2,X3] : (intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1) | ~intruder_message(X2) | ~intruder_message(X3))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f65])).

fof(f67,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (intruder_message(X1) | (~intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) | ~party_of_protocol(X2)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f45])).

fof(f68,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (intruder_message(X1) | ~intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) | ~party_of_protocol(X2))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f67])).

fof(f69,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) | (~intruder_message(X0) | ~party_of_protocol(X1) | ~party_of_protocol(X2)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f46])).

fof(f70,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~party_of_protocol(X1) | ~party_of_protocol(X2))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f69])).

fof(f71,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) | (~intruder_message(X0) | ~party_of_protocol(X1)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f47])).

fof(f72,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~party_of_protocol(X1))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f71])).

fof(f73,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) | (~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) | ~party_of_protocol(X2)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f48])).

fof(f74,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) | ~party_of_protocol(X2))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f73])).

fof(f75,plain,(
  ! [X0] : (~a_key(X0) | ~a_nonce(X0))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f29])).

fof(f76,plain,(
  ! [X0] : (fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_intruder_nonce(X0)) | ~fresh_intruder_nonce(X0))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f32])).

fof(f77,plain,(
  ! [X0] : ((fresh_to_b(X0) & intruder_message(X0)) | ~fresh_intruder_nonce(X0))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f33])).

fof(f78,plain,(
  a_holds(key(at,t))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f1])).

fof(f79,plain,(
  party_of_protocol(a)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f2])).

fof(f80,plain,(
  message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f3])).

fof(f81,plain,(
  a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f4])).

fof(f82,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X3,X0,X1,X4,X5] : (a_holds(key(X2,X4)) | ~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X4,X5,X2,X1),at),X3,X0))) | ~a_stored(pair(X4,X5))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f50])).

fof(f83,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X3,X0,X1,X4,X5] : (message(sent(a,X4,pair(X3,encrypt(X0,X2)))) | ~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X4,X5,X2,X1),at),X3,X0))) | ~a_stored(pair(X4,X5))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f50])).

fof(f84,plain,(
  b_holds(key(bt,t))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f6])).

fof(f85,plain,(
  party_of_protocol(b)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f7])).

fof(f86,plain,(
  fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f8])).

fof(f87,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) | ~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) | ~fresh_to_b(X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f52])).

fof(f88,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) | ~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) | ~fresh_to_b(X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f52])).

fof(f89,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (b_holds(key(X0,X1)) | ~message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) | ~a_key(X0) | ~b_stored(pair(X1,X2))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f54])).

fof(f90,plain,(
  t_holds(key(at,a))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f11])).

fof(f91,plain,(
  t_holds(key(bt,b))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f12])).

fof(f92,plain,(
  party_of_protocol(t)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f13])).

fof(f93,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X3,X0,X1,X6,X4,X5] : (message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1))) | ~message(sent(X0,t,triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))) | ~t_holds(key(X5,X0)) | ~t_holds(key(X6,X2)) | ~a_nonce(X3)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f56])).

fof(f94,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(X2) | ~message(sent(X0,X1,X2))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f57])).

fof(f95,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_message(X1) | ~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f58])).

fof(f96,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f58])).

fof(f97,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(X2) | ~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f59])).

fof(f98,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(X1) | ~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f59])).

fof(f99,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f59])).

fof(f100,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X3,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(X3) | ~intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f60])).

fof(f101,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X3,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(X2) | ~intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f60])).

fof(f102,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X3,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(X1) | ~intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f60])).

fof(f103,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X3,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f60])).

fof(f104,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f62])).

fof(f105,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1) | ~intruder_message(X2)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f64])).

fof(f106,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X3,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_message(X1) | ~intruder_message(X2) | ~intruder_message(X3)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f66])).

fof(f107,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(X1) | ~intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) | ~party_of_protocol(X2)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f68])).

fof(f108,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~party_of_protocol(X1) | ~party_of_protocol(X2)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f70])).

fof(f109,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~party_of_protocol(X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f72])).

fof(f110,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) | ~intruder_message(X0) | ~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) | ~party_of_protocol(X2)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f74])).

fof(f111,plain,(
  a_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f26])).

fof(f112,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (~a_nonce(generate_key(X0))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f27])).

fof(f113,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X0))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f28])).

fof(f114,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X0))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f28])).

fof(f115,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (~a_key(X0) | ~a_nonce(X0)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f75])).

fof(f116,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (a_key(generate_key(X0))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f30])).

fof(f117,plain,(
  fresh_intruder_nonce(an_intruder_nonce)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f31])).

fof(f118,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_intruder_nonce(X0)) | ~fresh_intruder_nonce(X0)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f76])).

fof(f119,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (intruder_message(X0) | ~fresh_intruder_nonce(X0)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f77])).

fof(f120,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (fresh_to_b(X0) | ~fresh_intruder_nonce(X0)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f77])).

tcf(c_49,plain, (a_holds(key(at,t))),inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f78])).

tcf(c_50,plain,
    (party_of_protocol(a)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f79])).

tcf(c_51,plain,
    (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f80])).

tcf(c_52,plain,
    (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f81])).

tcf(c_53,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3),at),X4,X5)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|message(sent(a,X0,pair(X4,encrypt(X5,X2))))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f83])).

tcf(c_54,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3),at),X4,X5)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|a_holds(key(X2,X0))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f82])).

tcf(c_55,plain, (b_holds(key(bt,t))),inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f84])).

tcf(c_56,plain,
    (party_of_protocol(b)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f85])).

tcf(c_57,plain,
    (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f86])).

tcf(c_58,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f88])).

tcf(c_59,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|b_stored(pair(X0,X1))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f87])).

tcf(c_60,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~message(sent(X0,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1))))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~a_key(X1)|b_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f89])).

tcf(c_61,plain, (t_holds(key(at,a))),inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f90])).

tcf(c_62,plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b))),inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f91])).

tcf(c_63,plain,
    (party_of_protocol(t)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f92])).

tcf(c_64,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~message(sent(X0,t,triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5))))|
    ~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~a_nonce(X3)|message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1)))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f93])).

tcf(c_65,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~message(sent(X0,X1,X2))|intruder_message(X2)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f94])).

tcf(c_66,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|intruder_message(X0)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f96])).

tcf(c_67,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|intruder_message(X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f95])).

tcf(c_68,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|intruder_message(X0)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f99])).

tcf(c_69,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|intruder_message(X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f98])).

tcf(c_70,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|intruder_message(X2)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f97])).

tcf(c_71,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3))|intruder_message(X0)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f103])).

tcf(c_72,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3))|intruder_message(X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f102])).

tcf(c_73,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3))|intruder_message(X2)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f101])).

tcf(c_74,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3))|intruder_message(X3)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f100])).

tcf(c_75,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f104])).

tcf(c_76,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    intruder_message(triple(X0,X2,X1))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f105])).

tcf(c_77,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X3,X2,X0))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f106])).

tcf(c_78,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X2)|
    intruder_message(X1)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f107])).

tcf(c_79,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    message(sent(X1,X0,X2))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f108])).

tcf(c_80,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f109])).

tcf(c_81,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X0))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f110])).

tcf(c_82,plain,
    (a_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f111])).

tcf(c_83,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(generate_key(X0))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f112])).

tcf(c_84,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X0))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f114])).

tcf(c_85,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X0))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f113])).

tcf(c_86,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_key(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f115])).

tcf(c_87,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (a_key(generate_key(X0))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f116])).

tcf(c_88,plain,
    (fresh_intruder_nonce(an_intruder_nonce)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f117])).

tcf(c_89,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_intruder_nonce(X0)|fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_intruder_nonce(X0))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f118])).

tcf(c_90,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_intruder_nonce(X0)|fresh_to_b(X0)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f120])).

tcf(c_91,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_intruder_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(X0)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f119])).

tcf(c_121,plain,
    (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))|intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_65])).

tcf(c_122,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,an_a_nonce)))|~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)|
    b_stored(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_59])).

tcf(c_123,plain,
    (~message(sent(b,b,pair(b,an_a_nonce)))|~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)|b_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_122])).

tcf(c_124,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,an_a_nonce)))|~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)|
    message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_58])).

tcf(c_145,plain,
    (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))|intruder_message(an_a_nonce)),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_67])).

tcf(c_146,plain,
    (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))|intruder_message(a)),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_66])).

tcf(c_191,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)|intruder_message(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_75])).

tcf(c_192,plain,
    (~intruder_message(b)|~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)|intruder_message(pair(b,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_191])).

tcf(c_222,plain,
    (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))|~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_124])).

tcf(c_482,plain,
    (fresh_to_b(an_intruder_nonce)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_90,c_88])).

tcf(c_487,plain,
    (intruder_message(an_intruder_nonce)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_91,c_88])).

tcf(c_526,plain,
    (~a_key(an_a_nonce)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_86,c_82])).

tcf(c_527,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_key(generate_expiration_time(X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_86,c_84])).

tcf(c_529,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_key(generate_b_nonce(X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_86,c_85])).

tcf(c_635,plain,
    (intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_51,c_65])).

tcf(c_640,plain,
    (intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_51,c_65])).

tcf(c_653,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_intruder_nonce(X0)|fresh_to_b(generate_intruder_nonce(X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_89,c_90])).

tcf(c_654,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_intruder_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(generate_intruder_nonce(X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_89,c_91])).

tcf(c_664,plain,
    (intruder_message(a)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_635,c_66])).

tcf(c_666,plain,
    (intruder_message(a)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_640,c_66])).

tcf(c_817,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3),at),X4,X5))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(t)|~party_of_protocol(a)|
    message(sent(a,X0,pair(X4,encrypt(X5,X2))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_79,c_53])).

tcf(c_819,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3),at),X4,X5))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|message(sent(a,X0,pair(X4,encrypt(X5,X2))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_817,c_50,c_63])).

tcf(c_842,plain,
    (intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_65,c_51])).

tcf(c_849,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3),at),X4,X5))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(t)|~party_of_protocol(a)|
    a_holds(key(X2,X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_79,c_54])).

tcf(c_850,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3),at),X4,X5))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|a_holds(key(X2,X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_849,c_50,c_63])).


tcf(c_872,plain,
    (intruder_message(a)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_66,c_842])).

tcf(c_879,plain,
    (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)|b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_51,c_59])).

tcf(c_880,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    ~party_of_protocol(b)|b_stored(pair(X0,X1))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_79,c_59])).

tcf(c_881,plain,
    (b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_879,c_57])).

tcf(c_882,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    b_stored(pair(X0,X1))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_880,c_56])).

tcf(c_932,plain,
    (intruder_message(an_a_nonce)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_67,c_842])).

tcf(c_1015,plain,
    (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)|b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_59,c_51])).

tcf(c_1016,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    ~party_of_protocol(b)|b_stored(pair(X0,X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_59,c_79])).

tcf(c_1041,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X1))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_80,c_81])).

tcf(c_1055,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X1))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_80,c_81])).

tcf(c_1088,plain,
    (b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_1015,c_881])).

tcf(c_1102,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_50,c_1041])).

tcf(c_1120,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_50,c_1055])).

tcf(c_1159,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_81,c_80])).

tcf(c_1168,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    b_stored(pair(X0,X1))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_75,c_882])).

tcf(c_1243,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1159,c_50])).

tcf(c_1351,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|
    b_stored(pair(X0,X1))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_1016,c_882])).

tcf(c_1352,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    b_stored(pair(X0,X1))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_1351])).

tcf(c_1369,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    b_stored(pair(X0,X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1352,c_75])).

tcf(c_1387,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3),at),X4,X5))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(t)|~party_of_protocol(a)|
    a_holds(key(X2,X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_54,c_79])).

tcf(c_1439,plain,
    (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_58,c_51])).

tcf(c_1440,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    ~party_of_protocol(b)|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_58,c_79])).

tcf(c_1470,plain,
    (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_51,c_58])).

tcf(c_1471,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    ~party_of_protocol(b)|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_79,c_58])).

tcf(c_1472,plain,
    (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1470,c_57])).

tcf(c_1473,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1471,c_56])).

tcf(c_1484,plain,
    (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_51,c_58])).

tcf(c_1486,plain,
    (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1484,c_57])).

tcf(c_1492,plain,
    (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_1439,c_57,c_51,c_222])).

tcf(c_1498,plain,
    (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1492,c_65])).

tcf(c_1499,plain,
    (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1472,c_65])).

tcf(c_1503,plain,
    (intruder_message(b)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1498,c_68])).

tcf(c_1504,plain,
    (intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1498,c_69])).

tcf(c_1505,plain,
    (intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1498,c_70])).

tcf(c_1513,plain,
    (intruder_message(b)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1499,c_68])).

tcf(c_1539,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3),at),X4,X5))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|a_holds(key(X2,X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_1387,c_850])).

tcf(c_1553,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3),at))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|a_holds(key(X2,X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1539,c_76])).

tcf(c_1560,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3),at),X4,X5))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(t)|~party_of_protocol(a)|
    message(sent(a,X0,pair(X4,encrypt(X5,X2))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_53,c_79])).

tcf(c_1569,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_key(X1)|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    b_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_79,c_60])).

tcf(c_1570,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_key(X1)|b_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1569,c_56])).

tcf(c_1607,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))|~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X3)|~party_of_protocol(t)|
    message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1)))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_79,c_64])).

tcf(c_1608,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|~t_holds(key(bt,b))|~a_nonce(an_a_nonce)|message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1472,c_64])).


tcf(c_1609,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_1608,c_82,c_62])).

tcf(c_1612,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))|~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X3)|message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1)))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1607,c_63])).

tcf(c_1631,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))|~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X3)|~party_of_protocol(t)|
    message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1)))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_79,c_64])).

tcf(c_1632,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|~t_holds(key(bt,b))|~a_nonce(an_a_nonce)|message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1486,c_64])).

tcf(c_1633,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_1632,c_82,c_62])).

tcf(c_1636,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))|~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X3)|message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1)))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1631,c_63])).

tcf(c_1651,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_key(X1)|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    b_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_60,c_79])).

tcf(c_1678,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))|~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X3)|~party_of_protocol(t)|
    message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_64,c_79])).

tcf(c_1680,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|~t_holds(key(bt,b))|~a_nonce(an_a_nonce)|message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_64,c_1492])).

tcf(c_1704,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|
    message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_1440,c_1473])).

tcf(c_1705,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_1704])).

tcf(c_1720,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3),at))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|message(sent(a,X0,pair(X5,encrypt(X4,X2))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_76,c_819])).

tcf(c_1739,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3),at),X4,X5))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|message(sent(a,X0,pair(X4,encrypt(X5,X2))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_1560,c_819])).

tcf(c_1757,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|~intruder_message(at)|
    a_holds(key(X2,X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1553,c_1243])).

tcf(c_1791,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(bt,b))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),X0),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X2))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1473,c_64])).

tcf(c_1792,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1473,c_65])).

tcf(c_1797,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),X0),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X2))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1791,c_62])).

tcf(c_1847,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(bt,b))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),X0),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X2))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1705,c_64])).

tcf(c_1849,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1705,c_65])).

tcf(c_1858,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1792,c_70])).

tcf(c_1859,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1792,c_69])).

tcf(c_1899,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1849,c_69])).

tcf(c_1900,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1849,c_70])).

tcf(c_1934,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_75,c_1859])).

tcf(c_1965,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1899,c_75])).

tcf(c_1978,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(b)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_56,c_1934])).

tcf(c_1984,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1978,c_1513])).

tcf(c_2030,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~party_of_protocol(b)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1965,c_1503])).

tcf(c_2112,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1))|~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_key(X1)|b_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_75,c_1570])).

tcf(c_2141,plain,
    (~a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|a_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1609,c_54])).

tcf(c_2142,plain,
    (~a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1609,c_53])).

tcf(c_2143,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1609,c_65])).

tcf(c_2144,plain,
    (a_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_2141,c_61,c_52])).

tcf(c_2147,plain,
    (message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_2142,c_61,c_52])).

tcf(c_2154,plain,
    (~a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1633,c_53])).

tcf(c_2159,plain,
    (message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_2154,c_61,c_52])).

tcf(c_2164,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_79])).

tcf(c_2165,plain,
    (~intruder_message(pair(b,an_a_nonce))|~party_of_protocol(b)|message(sent(b,b,pair(b,an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_2164])).

tcf(c_2180,plain,
    (~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))|~a_key(generate_key(an_a_nonce))|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),a))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2147,c_60])).

tcf(c_2181,plain,
    (intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2147,c_65])).

tcf(c_2182,plain,
    (b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),a))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_2180,c_87,c_881])).

tcf(c_2184,plain,
    (intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2159,c_65])).

tcf(c_2234,plain,
    (intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2181,c_66])).

tcf(c_2350,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2143,c_68])).

tcf(c_2416,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2350,c_1720])).

tcf(c_2417,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_2416,c_61,c_52])).

tcf(c_2451,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_2030,c_1984])).

tcf(c_2452,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_2451])).

tcf(c_2471,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3),at))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|message(sent(a,X0,pair(X5,encrypt(X4,X2))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1739,c_76])).

tcf(c_2472,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_key(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1)))|
    b_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_1651,c_1570])).

tcf(c_2473,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_key(X1)|b_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_2472])).

tcf(c_2484,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|
    ~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))|message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1)))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_1678,c_1612])).

tcf(c_2485,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))|~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X3)|message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1)))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_2484])).

tcf(c_2508,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(quadruple(X0,X1,X2,X3))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|~intruder_message(at)|
    message(sent(a,X0,pair(X5,encrypt(X4,X2))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2471,c_1243])).

tcf(c_2519,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1))|~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_key(X1)|b_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2473,c_75])).

tcf(c_2552,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)))|~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_key(X1)|~intruder_message(bt)|
    b_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2519,c_1243])).

tcf(c_2555,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),X0))|~b_stored(pair(X1,X0))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(X1,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_key(X0)|b_holds(key(X0,X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2519,c_1900])).

tcf(c_2564,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),X0))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_key(X0)|b_holds(key(X0,X1))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2555,c_1352])).

tcf(c_2584,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_key(X1)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    b_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2564,c_1243])).

tcf(c_2586,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_key(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|
    b_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_2584,c_67,c_1859,c_2584])).

tcf(c_2587,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    ~a_key(X1)|b_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_2586])).

tcf(c_2609,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_key(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|b_holds(key(X1,X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2587,c_75])).

tcf(c_2638,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_1680,c_1609])).

tcf(c_2648,plain,
    (~a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|a_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2638,c_54])).

tcf(c_2649,plain,
    (~a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2638,c_53])).

tcf(c_2650,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2638,c_65])).

tcf(c_2663,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4)))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X2))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,X0))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X2),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2485,c_54])).

tcf(c_2664,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4)))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X2))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,X0))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|
    message(sent(a,X0,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),encrypt(X1,generate_key(X2)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2485,c_53])).

tcf(c_2667,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))|~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X3)|intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2485,c_65])).

tcf(c_2669,plain,
    (a_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_2648,c_2144])).

tcf(c_2679,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2650,c_68])).

tcf(c_2680,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2650,c_69])).

tcf(c_2684,plain,
    (intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_2680,c_2234])).

tcf(c_2690,plain,
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))|~a_key(generate_key(an_a_nonce))|~party_of_protocol(a)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),a))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2684,c_2519])).

tcf(c_2697,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(a)|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2417,c_58])).

tcf(c_2698,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(a)|b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2417,c_59])).

tcf(c_2700,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(pair(X1,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2417,c_65])).

tcf(c_2704,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2698,c_664])).

tcf(c_2708,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2697,c_664])).

tcf(c_2741,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2679,c_2471])).

tcf(c_2779,plain,
    (b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),a))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_2690,c_2182])).

tcf(c_2785,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_2741,c_2417])).

tcf(c_2799,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(a)|b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2785,c_59])).

tcf(c_2800,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(a)|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2785,c_58])).

tcf(c_2804,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(pair(X1,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2785,c_65])).

tcf(c_2811,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2700,c_1859])).

tcf(c_2813,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2700,c_67])).

tcf(c_2815,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~a_key(generate_key(an_a_nonce))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2700,c_1570])).

tcf(c_2829,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2815,c_87])).

tcf(c_2944,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2804,c_67])).

tcf(c_2945,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|b_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2804,c_1352])).

tcf(c_2946,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2804,c_1899])).

tcf(c_2947,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~a_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    b_holds(key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2804,c_2587])).

tcf(c_2949,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~a_key(generate_key(an_a_nonce))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2804,c_2473])).

tcf(c_2998,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2181,c_2813])).

tcf(c_3055,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(b)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_56,c_2811])).

tcf(c_3061,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3055,c_1513])).

tcf(c_3170,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_2944,c_2998])).

tcf(c_3190,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),X0))|~b_stored(pair(X1,X0))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(X1,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_key(X0)|b_holds(key(X0,X1))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1858,c_2112])).

tcf(c_3230,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_2799,c_2704])).

tcf(c_3231,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_3230])).

tcf(c_3244,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_2946,c_3061])).

tcf(c_3245,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_3244])).

tcf(c_3258,plain,
    (message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_2649,c_2147])).

tcf(c_3265,plain,
    (intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3258,c_65])).

tcf(c_3276,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X4,X0))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X2),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_2663,c_61,c_2663])).

tcf(c_3277,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4)))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X2))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X2),X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_3276])).

tcf(c_3309,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))|~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X3)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X6))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2667,c_68])).

tcf(c_3310,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))|~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X3)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2667,c_69])).

tcf(c_3314,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X3))|
    ~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|~t_holds(key(at,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X3)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X3),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2667,c_1539])).

tcf(c_3315,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X3))|
    ~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|~t_holds(key(at,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X3)|message(sent(a,X0,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(X1,generate_key(X3)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_2667,c_1739])).

tcf(c_3574,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),X0),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X2))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_1847,c_1797])).

tcf(c_3575,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),X0),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X2))))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_3574])).

tcf(c_3594,plain,
    (intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3265,c_67])).

tcf(c_3595,plain,
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3265,c_1352])).

tcf(c_3596,plain,
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3265,c_1899])).

tcf(c_3597,plain,
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    b_holds(key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3265,c_2587])).

tcf(c_3656,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),X0))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_key(X0)|b_holds(key(X0,X1))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_3190,c_2564])).

tcf(c_3671,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~fresh_to_b(generate_key(an_a_nonce))|~a_key(generate_key(an_a_nonce))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2998,c_3656])).

tcf(c_3679,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~fresh_to_b(generate_key(an_a_nonce))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3671,c_87])).

tcf(c_3883,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~b_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_2949,c_2829])).

tcf(c_3884,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_3883])).

tcf(c_3905,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X1)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(bt)|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3884,c_1243])).

tcf(c_3906,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~b_stored(pair(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(pair(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~fresh_to_b(generate_key(an_a_nonce))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3884,c_1900])).

tcf(c_3966,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~fresh_to_b(generate_key(an_a_nonce))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_3906,c_3679])).

tcf(c_3973,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~fresh_to_b(generate_key(an_a_nonce))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3966,c_1899])).

tcf(c_3999,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),X2))|~a_stored(pair(X3,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(X2,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X3)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),X3))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3277,c_76])).

tcf(c_4002,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~t_holds(key(bt,b))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~party_of_protocol(a)|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3277,c_1849])).

tcf(c_4004,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i,X7:$i,X8:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),X3),encrypt(triple(X4,X5,X6),X7)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X5,generate_key(X5),X6),X8),X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(X3,encrypt(quadruple(X0,X5,generate_key(X5),X6),X8)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X5,generate_key(X5),X6),X8))|
    ~t_holds(key(X7,X0))|~t_holds(key(X8,X4))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~a_nonce(X5)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),encrypt(quadruple(X0,X5,generate_key(X5),X6),X8)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3277,c_2667])).

tcf(c_4083,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_4002,c_56,c_50,c_62,c_4002])).

tcf(c_4084,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_4083])).

tcf(c_4106,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X4,X0))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|message(sent(a,X0,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),encrypt(X1,generate_key(X2)))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_2664,c_61,c_2664])).

tcf(c_4107,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4)))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X2))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|message(sent(a,X0,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),encrypt(X1,generate_key(X2)))))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_4106])).

tcf(c_4133,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),X3))|~t_holds(key(X3,X4))|
    ~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X4)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X4)|
    ~intruder_message(X6)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),X3))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3310,c_76])).

tcf(c_4136,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(bt,b))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3310,c_1849])).

tcf(c_4138,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i,X7:$i,X8:$i,X9:$i,X10:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,encrypt(triple(X1,X2,X3),X4),encrypt(triple(X5,X6,X7),X8)))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,encrypt(quadruple(X0,X6,generate_key(X6),X7),X9)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X6,generate_key(X6),X7),X9))|
    ~t_holds(key(X8,X0))|~t_holds(key(X9,X5))|~t_holds(key(X10,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X2)|~a_nonce(X6)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),X3),X4))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3310,c_2667])).

tcf(c_4259,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),X3))|~t_holds(key(X3,X5))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X5)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X5)|
    ~intruder_message(X6)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X5,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),X4))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3309,c_76])).

tcf(c_4262,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(bt,b))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3309,c_1849])).

tcf(c_4264,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i,X7:$i,X8:$i,X9:$i,X10:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,encrypt(triple(X1,X2,X3),X4),encrypt(triple(X5,X6,X7),X8)))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,encrypt(quadruple(X0,X6,generate_key(X6),X7),X9)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X6,generate_key(X6),X7),X9))|
    ~t_holds(key(X8,X0))|~t_holds(key(X9,X5))|~t_holds(key(X10,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X2)|~a_nonce(X6)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X6,generate_key(X6),X7),X9),X2,generate_key(X2),X3),X10))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3309,c_2667])).

tcf(c_4305,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt)))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2708,c_65])).

tcf(c_4345,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_4305,c_70])).

tcf(c_4454,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),X3))|~a_stored(pair(X4,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(X3,X4))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X4)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X4))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3314,c_76])).

tcf(c_4457,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(bt,b))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|
    ~party_of_protocol(b)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3314,c_1849])).

tcf(c_4459,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i,X7:$i,X8:$i,X9:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,encrypt(triple(X1,X2,X3),X4),encrypt(triple(X5,X6,X7),X8)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X6,generate_key(X6),X7),X9),X2))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,encrypt(quadruple(X0,X6,generate_key(X6),X7),X9)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X6,generate_key(X6),X7),X9))|
    ~t_holds(key(X8,X0))|~t_holds(key(X9,X5))|~t_holds(key(at,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X2)|~a_nonce(X6)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X2),encrypt(quadruple(X0,X6,generate_key(X6),X7),X9)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3314,c_2667])).

tcf(c_4689,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~party_of_protocol(a)|message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3575,c_53])).

tcf(c_4691,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),X0),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X2)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3575,c_65])).

tcf(c_4833,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(a,X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(X2,X0))|~t_holds(key(X3,X2))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X2)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3999,c_1243])).

tcf(c_4835,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(an_a_nonce)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3999,c_1505])).

tcf(c_4836,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(a)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3999,c_1900])).

tcf(c_4839,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(a,X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X2))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X2,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3999,c_3170])).

tcf(c_4965,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~a_stored(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))|a_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_4835,c_82,c_4835])).

tcf(c_4966,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|a_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_4965])).

tcf(c_4995,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|a_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4966,c_1503])).

tcf(c_5266,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_2800,c_2708])).

tcf(c_5267,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_5266])).

tcf(c_5280,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_4136,c_56,c_62,c_4136])).

tcf(c_5281,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_5280])).

tcf(c_5307,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~party_of_protocol(a)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5281,c_61])).

tcf(c_5309,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5281,c_62])).

tcf(c_5323,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|~t_holds(key(bt,b))|~a_key(generate_key(X1))|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~party_of_protocol(b)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),a))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4107,c_60])).

tcf(c_5325,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4)))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X2))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),encrypt(X1,generate_key(X2))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4107,c_65])).

tcf(c_5343,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X3,X4),X5)))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X3))|
    ~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|~t_holds(key(at,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X3)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(X1,generate_key(X3))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3315,c_65])).

tcf(c_5393,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_4262,c_56,c_62,c_4262])).

tcf(c_5394,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_5393])).

tcf(c_5420,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4)))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X2))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,X0))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X2),X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1612,c_54])).

tcf(c_5423,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4)))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X2))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X2),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5420,c_61])).

tcf(c_5443,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),b))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_4457,c_56,c_62,c_4457])).

tcf(c_5444,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),b))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_5443])).

tcf(c_5476,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),X2))|~t_holds(key(X2,X3))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X3)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4133,c_61])).

tcf(c_5478,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X0,X1),X2))|~t_holds(key(X2,X3))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X3)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X0),X1),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4133,c_62])).

tcf(c_5535,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_5307,c_50,c_5307])).

tcf(c_5536,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_5535])).

tcf(c_5554,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~a_key(generate_key(X0))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~party_of_protocol(a)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5536,c_2519])).

tcf(c_5570,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),X2))|~a_stored(pair(X3,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(X2,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X3)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),X3))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_76,c_5423])).

tcf(c_5573,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~t_holds(key(bt,b))|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~party_of_protocol(b)|a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),b))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_4305,c_5423])).

tcf(c_5588,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),b))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_5573,c_56,c_62])).

tcf(c_5685,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_5309,c_56,c_5309])).

tcf(c_5686,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_5685])).

tcf(c_5704,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|~a_key(generate_key(X0))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~party_of_protocol(b)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5686,c_2519])).

tcf(c_5706,plain,
    (~b_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))|~intruder_message(pair(b,an_a_nonce))|
    ~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    ~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)|~a_nonce(an_a_nonce)|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5686,c_3884])).

tcf(c_5723,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(a,X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(X2,X0))|~t_holds(key(X3,X2))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X2)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),X2))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1102,c_5570])).

tcf(c_5725,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(a)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1858,c_5570])).

tcf(c_5728,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_4345,c_5570])).

tcf(c_5753,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5725,c_50])).

tcf(c_5772,plain,
    (b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_5706,c_82,c_57,c_56,c_51,c_121,c_123,c_145,c_192,c_1504,
               c_1503,c_2165,c_5706])).

tcf(c_5790,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5394,c_75])).

tcf(c_5793,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5394,c_3265])).

tcf(c_5795,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~t_holds(key(X1,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5394,c_2804])).

tcf(c_6003,plain,
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5444,c_3265])).

tcf(c_6004,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~t_holds(key(at,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5444,c_2804])).

tcf(c_6019,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~party_of_protocol(a)|message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1797,c_53])).

tcf(c_6020,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),X0),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X2)))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1797,c_65])).

tcf(c_6028,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_6019,c_50,c_61])).

tcf(c_6047,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4)))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X2))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,X0))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X2),X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1636,c_54])).

tcf(c_6050,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4)))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X2))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X2),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6047,c_61])).

tcf(c_6084,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~party_of_protocol(a)|
    ~intruder_message(a)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X0,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),at))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5790,c_61])).

tcf(c_6086,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    ~intruder_message(b)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X0,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5790,c_62])).

tcf(c_6098,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|
    ~a_key(generate_key(X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6028,c_60])).

tcf(c_6099,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0))))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6028,c_65])).

tcf(c_6100,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6098,c_87])).

tcf(c_6114,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X0,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),at))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_6084,c_50,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_6084])).

tcf(c_6133,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6114,c_1553])).

tcf(c_6134,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|message(sent(a,b,pair(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(X0)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6114,c_2471])).

tcf(c_6248,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X0,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_6086,c_56,c_1503,c_6086])).

tcf(c_6285,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6133,c_1503])).

tcf(c_6373,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),X2))|~a_stored(pair(X3,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(X2,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X3)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),X3))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_76,c_6050])).

tcf(c_6413,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(X3,X4))|~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X4)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|
    ~intruder_message(X6)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X4,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),X5))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4259,c_1243])).

tcf(c_6415,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|~t_holds(key(bt,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~a_nonce(an_a_nonce)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4259,c_1505])).

tcf(c_6416,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(bt,X3))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3)|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X3,X2,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4259,c_1900])).

tcf(c_6420,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X3))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X3)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X5)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X3,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),X4))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4259,c_3170])).

tcf(c_6801,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|~a_stored(pair(X3,X1))|~t_holds(key(X4,X3))|
    ~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X3)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X3))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4454,c_1243])).

tcf(c_6804,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X2))|
    ~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4454,c_1900])).

tcf(c_6808,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X3))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X3,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X3)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X3))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4454,c_3170])).

tcf(c_6923,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6099,c_66])).

tcf(c_7290,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4691,c_1739])).

tcf(c_7334,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_6923,c_50,c_5307])).

tcf(c_7345,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~a_key(generate_key(X0))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~party_of_protocol(a)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_7334,c_2112])).

tcf(c_7354,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_7345,c_50,c_87])).

tcf(c_7375,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),X2))|~a_stored(pair(X3,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(X2,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X3)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),X2),encrypt(X4,generate_key(X0))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5325,c_76])).

tcf(c_7379,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i,X7:$i,X8:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),X3),encrypt(triple(X4,X5,X6),X7)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X5,generate_key(X5),X6),X8),X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(X3,encrypt(quadruple(X0,X5,generate_key(X5),X6),X8)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X5,generate_key(X5),X6),X8))|
    ~t_holds(key(X7,X0))|~t_holds(key(X8,X4))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~a_nonce(X5)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),X3),encrypt(encrypt(triple(X4,generate_key(X5),X6),X7),generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5325,c_2667])).

tcf(c_7589,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|
    message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_4689,c_6028])).

tcf(c_7590,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_7589])).

tcf(c_7672,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6285,c_1503])).

tcf(c_7697,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(a)|b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6134,c_59])).

tcf(c_7698,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(a)|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))),bt))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6134,c_58])).

tcf(c_7701,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(a,X1))|~a_key(generate_key(X0))|
    ~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6134,c_60])).

tcf(c_7703,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(pair(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(X0))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6134,c_65])).

tcf(c_7720,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(X0)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7703,c_67])).

tcf(c_7721,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|b_stored(pair(X2,encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7703,c_1352])).

tcf(c_7722,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7703,c_1899])).

tcf(c_7723,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~a_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    b_holds(key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7703,c_2587])).

tcf(c_7724,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X2))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7703,c_5444])).

tcf(c_7730,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~a_key(generate_key(X1))|
    ~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X1)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7703,c_2473])).

tcf(c_7732,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~t_holds(key(X2,X3))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X3)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)),generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7703,c_5394])).

tcf(c_7823,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(X0)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7720,c_1503])).

tcf(c_7989,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(generate_key(X3),X4))|
    ~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|~a_stored(pair(b,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X4)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X3)|~a_nonce(X1)|~a_nonce(X3)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|
    ~intruder_message(X6)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X4,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),X5))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7823,c_4259])).

tcf(c_7990,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(generate_key(X3),X4))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X4,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X3))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X4)|~fresh_to_b(X3)|~a_nonce(X1)|~a_nonce(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X4))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7823,c_4454])).

tcf(c_7993,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(generate_key(X0),X1))|~intruder_message(triple(a,X2,X3))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X2),X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7823,c_3999])).

tcf(c_7994,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~t_holds(key(bt,X1))|~t_holds(key(X0,a))|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_6415,c_82,c_6415])).

tcf(c_7995,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|~t_holds(key(bt,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_7994])).

tcf(c_8024,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,a))|~t_holds(key(bt,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7995,c_1503])).

tcf(c_8273,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~t_holds(key(at,a))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|message(sent(a,X0,pair(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8024,c_2471])).

tcf(c_8274,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X1)|~a_key(generate_key(X1))|~intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),a))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_5323,c_56,c_62,c_5323])).

tcf(c_8275,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|~a_key(generate_key(X1))|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),a))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_8274])).

tcf(c_8283,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|~a_nonce(X1)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),a))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8275,c_87])).

tcf(c_8304,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),X3))|~a_stored(pair(X4,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(X3,X4))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X4)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),X3),encrypt(X5,generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5343,c_76])).

tcf(c_8309,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i,X7:$i,X8:$i,X9:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,encrypt(triple(X1,X2,X3),X4),encrypt(triple(X5,X6,X7),X8)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X6,generate_key(X6),X7),X9),X2))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,encrypt(quadruple(X0,X6,generate_key(X6),X7),X9)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X6,generate_key(X6),X7),X9))|
    ~t_holds(key(X8,X0))|~t_holds(key(X9,X5))|~t_holds(key(at,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X2)|~a_nonce(X6)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),encrypt(encrypt(triple(X5,generate_key(X6),X7),X8),generate_key(X2))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5343,c_2667])).

tcf(c_8390,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(a,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(b)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8283,c_76])).

tcf(c_8393,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~party_of_protocol(a)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8283,c_1849])).

tcf(c_8434,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_8393,c_6100])).

tcf(c_8435,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_8434])).

tcf(c_8478,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),at))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~party_of_protocol(a)|~intruder_message(a)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),at))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5476,c_61])).

tcf(c_8480,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),bt))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~party_of_protocol(b)|~intruder_message(b)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5476,c_62])).

tcf(c_8482,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),at))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),at))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_8478,c_50,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_8478])).

tcf(c_8505,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),at))|~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),at))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8482,c_1503])).

tcf(c_8775,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),bt))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_8480,c_56,c_1503,c_8480])).

tcf(c_8798,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),bt))|~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8775,c_1503])).

tcf(c_8806,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(a,X1))|~a_key(generate_key(X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~party_of_protocol(a)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8798,c_2519])).

tcf(c_8868,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X0,X1),at))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~party_of_protocol(a)|~intruder_message(a)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X0),X1),at))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5478,c_61])).

tcf(c_8870,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X0,X1),bt))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~party_of_protocol(b)|~intruder_message(b)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X0),X1),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5478,c_62])).

tcf(c_8883,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7590,c_65])).

tcf(c_8971,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X0,X1),at))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X0),X1),at))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_8868,c_50,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_8868])).

tcf(c_8994,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X0,X1),at))|~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X0),X1),at))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8971,c_1503])).

tcf(c_9028,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(a,X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(X2,X0))|~t_holds(key(X3,X2))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X2)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),X2))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1120,c_6373])).

tcf(c_9122,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X0,X1),bt))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X0),X1),bt))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_8870,c_56,c_1503,c_8870])).

tcf(c_9145,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X0,X1),bt))|~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X0),X1),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_9122,c_1503])).

tcf(c_9153,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(b,X1))|~a_key(generate_key(X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_9145,c_2519])).


tcf(c_9180,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(a)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_4833,c_76])).

tcf(c_9182,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X0)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(pair(a,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_4836,c_5753])).

tcf(c_9183,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_9182])).

tcf(c_9220,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~a_nonce(X4)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|~intruder_message(X6)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X4,generate_key(X4),X6),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6413,c_76])).

tcf(c_9222,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,b))|~a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6413,c_1498])).

tcf(c_9224,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X3))|~t_holds(key(X4,b))|
    ~a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X3))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X3)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X5)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,generate_b_nonce(X3),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(X3)),encrypt(triple(X2,X3,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt)),X4))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6413,c_1849])).

tcf(c_9226,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X1)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|
    ~t_holds(key(X2,X3))|~t_holds(key(X1,a))|~party_of_protocol(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X3,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_key(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6413,c_2650])).

tcf(c_9228,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i,X7:$i,X8:$i,X9:$i,X10:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),X4)))|
    ~intruder_message(triple(X1,X5,encrypt(triple(X6,X2,X3),X7)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(triple(X6,generate_key(X2),X3),X7))|
    ~t_holds(key(X4,X6))|~t_holds(key(X7,X1))|~t_holds(key(X8,X9))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~party_of_protocol(X9)|~a_nonce(X2)|~intruder_message(X8)|~intruder_message(X9)|
    ~intruder_message(X10)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X9,encrypt(triple(X6,generate_key(X2),X3),X7),generate_key(encrypt(triple(X6,generate_key(X2),X3),X7)),X5),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6413,c_2667])).

tcf(c_9230,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),X2)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~t_holds(key(X2,X3))|~t_holds(key(X4,X5))|~intruder_message(pair(X3,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X5)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|~intruder_message(X6)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X5,encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_key(encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)),generate_b_nonce(X1)),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6413,c_4691])).

tcf(c_9281,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2181,c_5753])).

tcf(c_9412,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(a)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_76,c_5723])).

tcf(c_9413,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_9412,c_664])).

tcf(c_9446,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)))|~t_holds(key(X1,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(at,b))|~a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6801,c_1498])).

tcf(c_9448,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,generate_b_nonce(X1)))|~t_holds(key(X2,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(X3,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(at,b))|~a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~party_of_protocol(X3)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|a_holds(key(generate_key(generate_b_nonce(X1)),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6801,c_1849])).

tcf(c_9450,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X0)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|
    ~t_holds(key(X2,X1))|~t_holds(key(X0,a))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6801,c_2650])).

tcf(c_9452,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i,X7:$i,X8:$i,X9:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),X3)))|
    ~intruder_message(triple(X0,X4,encrypt(triple(X5,X1,X2),X6)))|~a_stored(pair(X7,encrypt(triple(X5,generate_key(X1),X2),X6)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(triple(X5,generate_key(X1),X2),X6))|~t_holds(key(X3,X5))|
    ~t_holds(key(X6,X0))|~t_holds(key(X8,X7))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~party_of_protocol(X7)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X7)|~intruder_message(X8)|
    ~intruder_message(X9)|a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(triple(X5,generate_key(X1),X2),X6)),X7))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6801,c_2667])).

tcf(c_9454,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(quadruple(b,X0,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),X1)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X2,encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))|
    ~t_holds(key(X1,X3))|~t_holds(key(X4,X2))|~intruder_message(pair(X3,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X3)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6801,c_4691])).

tcf(c_9561,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(a,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(a)|~intruder_message(at)|
    ~intruder_message(a)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_61,c_9413])).

tcf(c_9562,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(b)|~intruder_message(b)|
    ~intruder_message(bt)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_62,c_9413])).

tcf(c_9563,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(bt)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_9562,c_1513,c_56])).

tcf(c_9571,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(a,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(at)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_9561,c_664,c_50])).

tcf(c_9624,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(bt)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2181,c_9563])).

tcf(c_9708,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(bt)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2181,c_9624])).

tcf(c_9863,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(a,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(at)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2181,c_9571])).

tcf(c_9922,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6020,c_69])).

tcf(c_9987,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8883,c_67])).

tcf(c_9988,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8883,c_1352])).

tcf(c_9989,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8883,c_1899])).

tcf(c_9990,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|~a_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|b_holds(key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8883,c_2587])).

tcf(c_9991,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0))),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8883,c_5444])).

tcf(c_9994,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X1))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)),generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8883,c_5394])).

tcf(c_10014,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(a)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_76,c_9028])).

tcf(c_10015,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10014,c_666])).

tcf(c_10168,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(a,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(a)|~intruder_message(at)|
    ~intruder_message(a)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_61,c_10015])).

tcf(c_10178,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(a,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(at)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_10168,c_666,c_50])).

tcf(c_10295,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_62,c_9922])).

tcf(c_10296,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10295,c_56])).

tcf(c_10333,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|~a_key(generate_key(X0))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~party_of_protocol(b)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_10296,c_2112])).

tcf(c_10345,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_10333,c_56,c_87])).

tcf(c_10386,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_7697,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_7697])).

tcf(c_10387,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_10386])).

tcf(c_10419,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~b_stored(pair(a,X1))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_8390,c_1503,c_8390])).

tcf(c_10420,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(a,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_10419])).

tcf(c_10446,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|
    ~b_stored(pair(a,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~a_nonce(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(bt)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10420,c_1243])).

tcf(c_10454,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~a_stored(pair(a,X0))|
    ~intruder_message(at)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_10178,c_9863])).

tcf(c_10455,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(a,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(at)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_10454])).

tcf(c_10485,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(a,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(at)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_2184,c_10455])).

tcf(c_10580,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_5554,c_7354])).

tcf(c_10581,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_10580])).

tcf(c_10609,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7290,c_65])).

tcf(c_10631,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~party_of_protocol(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X3)|~a_nonce(X3)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),generate_expiration_time(X3)),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6416,c_75])).

tcf(c_10634,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~t_holds(key(bt,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6416,c_3265])).

tcf(c_10635,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~t_holds(key(X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(bt,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X2)|
    ~party_of_protocol(X3)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X3,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6416,c_2804])).

tcf(c_10637,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X2))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X2,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)),generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6416,c_8883])).

tcf(c_10638,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~t_holds(key(X2,X3))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X4))|~party_of_protocol(X3)|
    ~party_of_protocol(X4)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|
    ~intruder_message(X5)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X4,encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)),generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6416,c_7703])).

tcf(c_11282,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X2))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6804,c_75])).

tcf(c_11284,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6804,c_3265])).

tcf(c_11285,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~t_holds(key(at,X2))|
    ~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6804,c_2804])).

tcf(c_11287,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~t_holds(key(bt,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0))),X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6804,c_8883])).

tcf(c_11288,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,encrypt(X1,generate_key(X2))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(X2)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(X2)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X2))|~t_holds(key(at,X3))|
    ~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~party_of_protocol(X3)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X1,generate_key(X2))),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6804,c_7703])).

tcf(c_11458,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),at))|~a_stored(pair(a,X0))|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(a)|~intruder_message(a)|
    intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),at),encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7375,c_61])).

tcf(c_11460,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),bt))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(b)|~intruder_message(b)|
    intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt),encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7375,c_62])).

tcf(c_11564,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X0))|
    ~intruder_message(generate_key(X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10581,c_1243])).

tcf(c_11679,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_5704,c_10345])).

tcf(c_11680,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_11679])).

tcf(c_11705,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~b_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X0))|
    ~intruder_message(generate_key(X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_11680,c_1243])).

tcf(c_11709,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|
    ~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_11680,c_7823])).

tcf(c_12221,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_11709,c_1984,c_11709])).

tcf(c_12222,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_12221])).

tcf(c_12231,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(b,X0))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_12222,c_67])).

tcf(c_12269,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(pair(a,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_9183,c_9281])).

tcf(c_12270,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_12269])).

tcf(c_12321,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(a,X1))|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_8806,c_50,c_87,c_8806])).

tcf(c_12322,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(a,X1))|~a_nonce(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_12321])).

tcf(c_12354,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),at))|~a_stored(pair(a,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(a)|
    ~intruder_message(a)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8304,c_61])).

tcf(c_12356,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),bt))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    ~intruder_message(b)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_8304,c_62])).

tcf(c_12409,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)))|~t_holds(key(X1,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(at,b))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_9446,c_85])).

tcf(c_12429,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X1)))|
    ~intruder_message(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(X0)))|~b_stored(pair(a,X0))|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(bt)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),a))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_12322,c_1243])).

tcf(c_12558,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(b,X1))|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_9153,c_56,c_87,c_9153])).

tcf(c_12559,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(b,X1))|~a_nonce(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_12558])).

tcf(c_12581,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X1)))|
    ~intruder_message(triple(b,X1,generate_expiration_time(X0)))|~b_stored(pair(b,X0))|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(bt)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_12559,c_1243])).

tcf(c_12600,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~a_stored(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    message(sent(a,X0,pair(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_8273,c_61,c_8273])).

tcf(c_12601,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    message(sent(a,X0,pair(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_12600])).

tcf(c_12722,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),at))|~a_stored(pair(a,X0))|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),at),encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_11458,c_50,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_11458])).

tcf(c_12745,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),bt))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt),encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_11460,c_56,c_1503,c_11460])).

tcf(c_12769,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),bt))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_12745,c_67])).

tcf(c_12770,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt),encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_12745,c_1352])).

tcf(c_12771,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_12745,c_1899])).

tcf(c_12772,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))|~a_key(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|b_holds(key(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_12745,c_2587])).

tcf(c_12773,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0))))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0))),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_12745,c_5444])).

tcf(c_12781,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~a_nonce(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)),generate_key(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_12745,c_5394])).

tcf(c_12782,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X4))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X4)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|
    ~intruder_message(X5)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X4,encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)),generate_key(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_12745,c_6416])).

tcf(c_12785,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X2,encrypt(X3,generate_key(X0))))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X0)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X0)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~t_holds(key(bt,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X2)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X0))),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_12745,c_6804])).

tcf(c_13090,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(a,X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(bt)|intruder_message(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_12769,c_1243])).

tcf(c_13093,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(a)|intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(X0)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_12769,c_1900])).

tcf(c_13176,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X1)|~a_nonce(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(X0)))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_13093,c_50,c_13093])).

tcf(c_13177,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(X0)))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_13176])).

tcf(c_13202,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(generate_key(X3),X4))|
    ~t_holds(key(X5,X0))|~a_stored(pair(b,X3))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X3))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X4)|~fresh_to_b(X3)|~a_nonce(X1)|~a_nonce(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X6)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X4,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),X5))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13177,c_4259])).

tcf(c_13203,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|~t_holds(key(generate_key(X3),X4))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X4,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X3))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(a,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X4)|~fresh_to_b(X3)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~a_nonce(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X4))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13177,c_4454])).

tcf(c_13206,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(generate_key(X0),X1))|~intruder_message(triple(a,X2,X3))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X4)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X2),X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13177,c_3999])).

tcf(c_13318,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~a_nonce(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~t_holds(key(X2,X0))|~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_9180,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_9180])).

tcf(c_13319,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_13318])).

tcf(c_13355,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10609,c_67])).

tcf(c_13356,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10609,c_1352])).

tcf(c_13357,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10609,c_1899])).

tcf(c_13358,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|~a_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|b_holds(key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)),encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10609,c_2587])).

tcf(c_13359,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1))),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10609,c_5444])).

tcf(c_13366,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~b_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~a_key(generate_key(X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10609,c_2473])).

tcf(c_13368,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),generate_key(X2)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),generate_key(X2)))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~a_stored(pair(b,X2))|~t_holds(key(at,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),generate_key(X2)),generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),generate_key(X2))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),generate_key(X2)))),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10609,c_5394])).

tcf(c_13369,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),generate_key(X2)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),generate_key(X2)))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~a_stored(pair(b,X2))|~t_holds(key(at,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(bt,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X2)|~a_nonce(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X3,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),generate_key(X2)),generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),generate_key(X2))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),generate_key(X2)))),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10609,c_6416])).

tcf(c_13372,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X2,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~t_holds(key(bt,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1))),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10609,c_6804])).

tcf(c_13894,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),b))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_6004,c_5588])).

tcf(c_13895,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~intruder_message(X0)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),b))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_13894])).

tcf(c_13928,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~a_nonce(X2)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(a)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X4),at))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_9220,c_61])).

tcf(c_13930,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~a_nonce(X2)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(b)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X4),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_9220,c_62])).

tcf(c_13940,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,b))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),X2))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_9222,c_85])).

tcf(c_13963,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,b))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(a)|
    ~intruder_message(at)|~intruder_message(a)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(a,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13940,c_61])).

tcf(c_13965,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,b))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    ~intruder_message(b)|~intruder_message(bt)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13940,c_62])).

tcf(c_13981,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~t_holds(key(at,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13355,c_75])).

tcf(c_13984,plain,
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13355,c_3265])).

tcf(c_13985,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~t_holds(key(at,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13355,c_2804])).

tcf(c_13987,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0))),generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13355,c_8883])).

tcf(c_13989,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X2))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))),generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13355,c_7703])).

tcf(c_13991,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1))),generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13355,c_10609])).

tcf(c_13993,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0))))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0))),generate_key(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13355,c_12745])).

tcf(c_14357,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~party_of_protocol(a)|~intruder_message(a)|intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13981,c_61])).

tcf(c_14459,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_14357,c_50,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_14357])).

tcf(c_14500,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(at)|~t_holds(key(X0,b))|~intruder_message(X1)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(a,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_13963,c_50,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_13963])).

tcf(c_14501,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,b))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(at)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(a,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_14500])).

tcf(c_14519,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,b))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(bt)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_13965,c_56,c_1503,c_13965])).

tcf(c_14558,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(a,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(a)|~intruder_message(at)|
    ~intruder_message(a)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13319,c_61])).

tcf(c_14560,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(b)|~intruder_message(b)|
    ~intruder_message(bt)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_13319,c_62])).

tcf(c_14561,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(at)|~a_stored(pair(a,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_14558,c_10485])).

tcf(c_14562,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(a,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(at)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_14561])).

tcf(c_14583,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),at))|~a_stored(pair(a,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_12354,c_50,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_12354])).

tcf(c_14610,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),bt))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_12356,c_56,c_1503,c_12356])).

tcf(c_14637,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),bt))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14610,c_66])).

tcf(c_14638,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),bt))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|intruder_message(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14610,c_67])).

tcf(c_14639,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14610,c_1352])).

tcf(c_14640,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14610,c_1899])).

tcf(c_14641,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|~a_key(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    b_holds(key(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)),encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14610,c_2587])).

tcf(c_14642,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),bt))|~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1))),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14610,c_5444])).

tcf(c_14643,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),bt))|~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1))),generate_key(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14610,c_13355])).

tcf(c_14651,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~a_key(generate_key(X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X2))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X1)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14610,c_2473])).

tcf(c_14653,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),X3),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),X3),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,X3),bt))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X4,generate_key(X2)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X4,generate_key(X2)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X2))|~t_holds(key(at,X1))|
    ~a_nonce(X2)|~intruder_message(X4)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,encrypt(X4,generate_key(X2)),generate_key(encrypt(X4,generate_key(X2))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X4,generate_key(X2)))),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14610,c_5394])).

tcf(c_14654,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i,X6:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),X3),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),X3),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,X3),bt))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X4,generate_key(X2)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X4,generate_key(X2)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X2))|~t_holds(key(at,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(bt,X5))|~party_of_protocol(X5)|~a_nonce(X2)|~intruder_message(X4)|
    ~intruder_message(X5)|~intruder_message(X6)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X5,encrypt(X4,generate_key(X2)),generate_key(encrypt(X4,generate_key(X2))),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X4,generate_key(X2)))),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14610,c_6416])).

tcf(c_14657,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X3,encrypt(X4,generate_key(X1))))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X4,generate_key(X1)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(X4,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~t_holds(key(bt,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X3)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X5)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X4,generate_key(X1))),X3))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14610,c_6804])).

tcf(c_15364,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(bt)|intruder_message(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14638,c_1243])).

tcf(c_15367,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X1)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14638,c_1900])).

tcf(c_15416,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(bt)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_14560,c_9708])).

tcf(c_15454,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),bt))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~a_nonce(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14637,c_1503])).

tcf(c_15533,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),generate_key(X1)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~a_key(generate_key(X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X1)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_15454,c_2519])).

tcf(c_15537,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))|
    ~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(an_a_nonce)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_15454,c_3884])).

tcf(c_15675,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|intruder_message(encrypt(X0,generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_15367,c_3265])).

tcf(c_15677,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~t_holds(key(at,X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(X2,generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_15367,c_2804])).

tcf(c_15679,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(a,X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),generate_key(X0)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_15367,c_8883])).

tcf(c_15681,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X2))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(X3,generate_key(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_15367,c_7703])).

tcf(c_15683,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))|
    ~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(X2,generate_key(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(X1)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_15367,c_10609])).

tcf(c_15685,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),X1),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0))))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,X1),bt))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(X3,generate_key(encrypt(X2,generate_key(X0)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_15367,c_12745])).

tcf(c_15687,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),X2),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,X2),bt))|~a_stored(pair(b,encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1))))|
    ~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|~a_nonce(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|intruder_message(encrypt(X4,generate_key(encrypt(X3,generate_key(X1)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_15367,c_14610])).

tcf(c_16135,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~a_key(generate_key(X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_13366,c_67,c_66,c_1168,c_13366])).

tcf(c_16146,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_16135,c_87])).

tcf(c_16169,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X4),at))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_13928,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_13928])).

tcf(c_16170,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~a_nonce(X2)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X4),at))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_16169])).

tcf(c_16212,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~party_of_protocol(a)|~intruder_message(a)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10631,c_61])).

tcf(c_16214,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~party_of_protocol(b)|~intruder_message(b)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_10631,c_62])).

tcf(c_16239,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(a)|~intruder_message(a)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_11282,c_61])).

tcf(c_16267,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,generate_b_nonce(X1)))|~t_holds(key(X2,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(X3,X1))|
    ~t_holds(key(at,b))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~party_of_protocol(X3)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X4)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(generate_b_nonce(X1)),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_9448,c_85])).

tcf(c_16320,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~party_of_protocol(a)|~intruder_message(at)|~intruder_message(a)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(a,X0,generate_key(X0),X2),at))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_16170,c_61])).

tcf(c_16322,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~party_of_protocol(b)|~intruder_message(b)|~intruder_message(bt)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X0,generate_key(X0),X2),at))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_16170,c_62])).

tcf(c_16420,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(at)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(a,X0,generate_key(X0),X2),at))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_16320,c_50,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_16320])).

tcf(c_16421,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(at)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(a,X0,generate_key(X0),X2),at))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_16420])).

tcf(c_16579,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(bt)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X0,generate_key(X0),X2),at))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_16322,c_56,c_1503,c_16322])).

tcf(c_16606,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~a_nonce(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1)|
    ~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X4),bt))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_13930,c_1503,c_13930])).

tcf(c_16607,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~a_nonce(X2)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|
    ~intruder_message(X4)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X4),bt))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_16606])).

tcf(c_16644,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~party_of_protocol(a)|~intruder_message(at)|~intruder_message(a)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(a,X0,generate_key(X0),X2),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_16607,c_61])).

tcf(c_16646,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~party_of_protocol(b)|~intruder_message(b)|~intruder_message(bt)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X0,generate_key(X0),X2),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_16607,c_62])).

tcf(c_16728,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(at)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(a,X0,generate_key(X0),X2),bt))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_16644,c_50,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_16644])).

tcf(c_16729,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(at)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(a,X0,generate_key(X0),X2),bt))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_16728])).

tcf(c_16815,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    ~intruder_message(bt)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X0,generate_key(X0),X2),bt))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_16646,c_56,c_1503,c_16646])).

tcf(c_16842,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_15537,c_82,c_52,c_15537])).

tcf(c_16843,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_16842])).

tcf(c_16868,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(X1)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(bt)|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_16843,c_1243])).

tcf(c_16870,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~b_stored(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))|
    ~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)|b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_16843,c_1900])).

tcf(c_16871,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_16870,c_57,c_56,c_122,c_1504,c_2164,c_16870])).

tcf(c_16872,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~intruder_message(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_16871])).

tcf(c_16904,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i,X5:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(X0,X1))|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X3))|~t_holds(key(X4,b))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~fresh_to_b(X3)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X5)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X1,generate_b_nonce(X3),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(X3)),encrypt(triple(X2,X3,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt)),X4))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_9224,c_85])).

tcf(c_16936,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,b))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(a)|~intruder_message(at)|
    ~intruder_message(a)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(a,generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(X1)),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_16904,c_61])).

tcf(c_16938,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,b))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(b)|~intruder_message(b)|
    ~intruder_message(bt)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(X1)),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)),X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_16904,c_62])).

tcf(c_17022,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_11285,c_5728])).

tcf(c_17023,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|
    ~a_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_17022])).

tcf(c_17074,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_16212,c_50,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_16212])).

tcf(c_17112,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_17074,c_1503])).

tcf(c_17199,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_17112,c_1553])).

tcf(c_17200,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|message(sent(a,X0,pair(X3,encrypt(X2,generate_key(X1)))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_17112,c_2471])).

tcf(c_17297,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|
    ~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_17199,c_50,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_16239])).

tcf(c_17298,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_17297])).

tcf(c_17339,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    a_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_17298,c_1503])).

tcf(c_17356,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_16214,c_56,c_1503,c_16214])).

tcf(c_17394,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(X0,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_17356,c_1503])).

tcf(c_17558,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~a_stored(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(bt,X0))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|intruder_message(pair(X3,encrypt(X2,generate_key(X1))))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_17200,c_65])).

tcf(c_17582,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~b_stored(pair(a,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|
    ~intruder_message(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_7701,c_87,c_7701])).

tcf(c_17583,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(a,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_17582])).

tcf(c_17617,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(a,generate_key(X0),generate_expiration_time(X1)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(a,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(bt)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_17583,c_1243])).

tcf(c_17619,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~b_stored(pair(a,generate_key(X0)))|~intruder_message(pair(a,generate_key(X0)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(generate_key(X0)))|
    ~fresh_to_b(generate_key(X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    ~party_of_protocol(a)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_17583,c_1900])).


tcf(c_17807,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X2))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X1)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_14651,c_87])).

tcf(c_17833,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)))|~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X2))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(bt)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_17807,c_1243])).

tcf(c_17947,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~fresh_to_b(generate_key(X0))|
    ~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(generate_key(X0)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|
    ~intruder_message(pair(a,generate_key(X0)))|~b_stored(pair(a,generate_key(X0)))|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_17619,c_50,c_17619])).

tcf(c_17948,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (~b_stored(pair(a,generate_key(X0)))|~intruder_message(pair(a,generate_key(X0)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(generate_key(X0)))|
    ~fresh_to_b(generate_key(X0))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),a))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_17947])).

tcf(c_17998,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X2))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_7730,c_87])).

tcf(c_18027,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X2)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X2))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    ~intruder_message(bt)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_17998,c_1243])).

tcf(c_18029,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~b_stored(pair(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~intruder_message(pair(X0,generate_key(X1)))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(generate_key(X1)))|
    ~fresh_to_b(generate_key(X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X1)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_17998,c_1900])).

tcf(c_18035,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(b,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~party_of_protocol(b)|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_17998,c_9145])).

tcf(c_18116,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(at)|~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,b))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(a,generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(X1)),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)),X2))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_16936,c_50,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_16936])).

tcf(c_18117,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,b))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(at)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(a,generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(X1)),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)),X2))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_18116])).

tcf(c_18133,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|~t_holds(key(X2,b))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(bt)|intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),generate_key(generate_b_nonce(X1)),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)),X2))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_16938,c_56,c_1503,c_16938])).

tcf(c_18199,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X0)|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|
    ~b_stored(pair(b,X1))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_18035,c_56,c_18035])).

tcf(c_18200,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|~b_stored(pair(b,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X0)|~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_18199])).

tcf(c_18234,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(b,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|
    ~b_stored(pair(b,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(bt)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_18200,c_1243])).

tcf(c_18249,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(b,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X0))|
    ~b_stored(pair(b,X1))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))|~fresh_to_b(X0)|
    ~a_nonce(X0)|~intruder_message(bt)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X0),b))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_18234,c_69])).

tcf(c_18305,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(pair(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|
    ~fresh_to_b(generate_key(X1))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    ~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X1)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_18029,c_1899,c_1352])).

tcf(c_18456,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))|
    ~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),generate_key(X1)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X1)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_15533,c_87])).

tcf(c_18482,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)))|~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),generate_key(X1)))|
    ~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~t_holds(key(at,X0))|
    ~party_of_protocol(X0)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(bt)|b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_18456,c_1243])).

tcf(c_18537,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~a_nonce(X1)|~fresh_to_b(X1)|
    ~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))),bt))))),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,
              [status(thm)],
              [c_7698,c_51,c_121,c_146,c_7698])).

tcf(c_18538,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (~fresh_to_b(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))|~a_stored(pair(b,X1))|
    ~fresh_to_b(X1)|~a_nonce(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|
    message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X0,generate_key(X1)))),bt))))),
    inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_18537])).


% SZS output end Saturation for SWV017+1.tptp

Solution for BOO001-1

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file BOO001-1.s
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'c_310' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the negated conjecture f6 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation for BOO001-1.tptp

fof(f1,axiom,(
  ( ! [X2,X3,X0,X1,X4] : (multiply(multiply(X0,X1,X2),X3,multiply(X0,X1,X4)) = multiply(X0,X1,multiply(X2,X3,X4))) )),
  file('/home/tptp/TPTP/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax',associativity)).

fof(f2,axiom,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (multiply(X0,X1,X1) = X1) )),
  file('/home/tptp/TPTP/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax',ternary_multiply_1)).

fof(f5,axiom,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (multiply(X0,X1,inverse(X1)) = X0) )),
  file('/home/tptp/TPTP/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax',right_inverse)).

fof(f6,negated_conjecture,(
  inverse(inverse(a)) != a),
  file('/tmp/SystemOnTPTP3965996/BOO001-1.tptp',prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling)).

fof(f7,plain,(
  a != inverse(inverse(a))),
  inference(reorient_equations,[],[f6])).

tcf(c_55,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i,X4:$i]:
    (multiply(multiply(X0,X1,X2),X3,multiply(X0,X1,X4)) = multiply(X0,X1,multiply(X2,X3,X4))),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f1])).

tcf(c_56,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (multiply(X0,X1,X1) = X1),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f2])).

tcf(c_59,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (multiply(X0,X1,inverse(X1)) = X0),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f5])).

tcf(c_60,negated_conjecture,
    (inverse(inverse(a)) != a),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f7])).

tcf(c_121,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i,X3:$i]:
    (multiply(X0,X1,multiply(X1,X2,X3)) = multiply(X1,X2,multiply(X0,X1,X3))),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_56,c_55])).

tcf(c_156,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i,X2:$i]:
    (multiply(X0,X1,multiply(X2,X0,X1)) = multiply(X2,X0,X1)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_56,c_121])).

tcf(c_279,plain,![X0:$i,X1:$i]:
    (multiply(X0,inverse(X0),X1) = X1),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_59,c_156])).

tcf(c_304,plain,![X0:$i]:
    (inverse(inverse(X0)) = X0),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_279,c_59])).

tcf(c_310,plain,
    ($false),
    inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_60,c_304])).


% SZS output end CNFRefutation for BOO001-1.tptp

LEO-II 1.7.0

Solution for SET014^4

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SET014^4.s
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root '29' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture 1 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation
thf(tp_complement,type,(complement: (($i>$o)>($i>$o)))).
thf(tp_disjoint,type,(disjoint: (($i>$o)>(($i>$o)>$o)))).
thf(tp_emptyset,type,(emptyset: ($i>$o))).
thf(tp_excl_union,type,(excl_union: (($i>$o)>(($i>$o)>($i>$o))))).
thf(tp_in,type,(in: ($i>(($i>$o)>$o)))).
thf(tp_intersection,type,(intersection: (($i>$o)>(($i>$o)>($i>$o))))).
thf(tp_is_a,type,(is_a: ($i>(($i>$o)>$o)))).
thf(tp_meets,type,(meets: (($i>$o)>(($i>$o)>$o)))).
thf(tp_misses,type,(misses: (($i>$o)>(($i>$o)>$o)))).
thf(tp_sK1_X,type,(sK1_X: ($i>$o))).
thf(tp_sK2_SY0,type,(sK2_SY0: ($i>$o))).
thf(tp_sK3_SY2,type,(sK3_SY2: ($i>$o))).
thf(tp_sK4_SX0,type,(sK4_SX0: $i)).
thf(tp_setminus,type,(setminus: (($i>$o)>(($i>$o)>($i>$o))))).
thf(tp_singleton,type,(singleton: ($i>($i>$o)))).
thf(tp_subset,type,(subset: (($i>$o)>(($i>$o)>$o)))).
thf(tp_union,type,(union: (($i>$o)>(($i>$o)>($i>$o))))).
thf(tp_unord_pair,type,(unord_pair: ($i>($i>($i>$o))))).
thf(complement,definition,(complement = (^[X:($i>$o),U:$i]: (~ (X@U)))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',complement)).
thf(disjoint,definition,(disjoint = (^[X:($i>$o),Y:($i>$o)]: (((intersection@X)@Y) = emptyset))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',disjoint)).
thf(emptyset,definition,(emptyset = (^[X:$i]: $false)), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',emptyset)).
thf(excl_union,definition,(excl_union = (^[X:($i>$o),Y:($i>$o),U:$i]: (((X@U) & (~ (Y@U))) | ((~ (X@U)) & (Y@U))))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',excl_union)).
thf(in,definition,(in = (^[X:$i,M:($i>$o)]: (M@X))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',in)).
thf(intersection,definition,(intersection = (^[X:($i>$o),Y:($i>$o),U:$i]: ((X@U) & (Y@U)))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',intersection)).
thf(is_a,definition,(is_a = (^[X:$i,M:($i>$o)]: (M@X))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',is_a)).
thf(meets,definition,(meets = (^[X:($i>$o),Y:($i>$o)]: (?[U:$i]: ((X@U) & (Y@U))))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',meets)).
thf(misses,definition,(misses = (^[X:($i>$o),Y:($i>$o)]: (~ (?[U:$i]: ((X@U) & (Y@U)))))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',misses)).
thf(setminus,definition,(setminus = (^[X:($i>$o),Y:($i>$o),U:$i]: ((X@U) & (~ (Y@U))))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',setminus)).
thf(singleton,definition,(singleton = (^[X:$i,U:$i]: (U = X))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',singleton)).
thf(subset,definition,(subset = (^[X:($i>$o),Y:($i>$o)]: (![U:$i]: ((X@U) => (Y@U))))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',subset)).
thf(union,definition,(union = (^[X:($i>$o),Y:($i>$o),U:$i]: ((X@U) | (Y@U)))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',union)).
thf(unord_pair,definition,(unord_pair = (^[X:$i,Y:$i,U:$i]: ((U = X) | (U = Y)))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',unord_pair)).
thf(1,conjecture,(![X:($i>$o),Y:($i>$o),A:($i>$o)]: ((((subset@X)@A) & ((subset@Y)@A)) => ((subset@((union@X)@Y))@A))), file('/home/mwisnie/Downloads/TPTP-v6.3.0/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',thm)).
thf(2,negated_conjecture,(((![X:($i>$o),Y:($i>$o),A:($i>$o)]: ((((subset@X)@A) & ((subset@Y)@A)) => ((subset@((union@X)@Y))@A)))=$false)), inference(negate_conjecture,[status(cth)],[1])).
thf(3,plain,(((![SY0:($i>$o),SY1:($i>$o)]: ((((subset@sK1_X)@SY1) & ((subset@SY0)@SY1)) => ((subset@((union@sK1_X)@SY0))@SY1)))=$false)), inference(extcnf_forall_neg,[status(esa)],[2])).
thf(4,plain,(((![SY2:($i>$o)]: ((((subset@sK1_X)@SY2) & ((subset@sK2_SY0)@SY2)) => ((subset@((union@sK1_X)@sK2_SY0))@SY2)))=$false)), inference(extcnf_forall_neg,[status(esa)],[3])).
thf(5,plain,((((((subset@sK1_X)@sK3_SY2) & ((subset@sK2_SY0)@sK3_SY2)) => ((subset@((union@sK1_X)@sK2_SY0))@sK3_SY2))=$false)), inference(extcnf_forall_neg,[status(esa)],[4])).
thf(6,plain,((((subset@sK1_X)@sK3_SY2)=$true)), inference(standard_cnf,[status(thm)],[5])).
thf(7,plain,((((subset@sK2_SY0)@sK3_SY2)=$true)), inference(standard_cnf,[status(thm)],[5])).
thf(8,plain,((((subset@((union@sK1_X)@sK2_SY0))@sK3_SY2)=$false)), inference(standard_cnf,[status(thm)],[5])).
thf(9,plain,(((~ ((subset@((union@sK1_X)@sK2_SY0))@sK3_SY2))=$true)), inference(polarity_switch,[status(thm)],[8])).
thf(10,plain,((((subset@sK2_SY0)@sK3_SY2)=$true)), inference(copy,[status(thm)],[7])).
thf(11,plain,((((subset@sK1_X)@sK3_SY2)=$true)), inference(copy,[status(thm)],[6])).
thf(12,plain,(((~ ((subset@((union@sK1_X)@sK2_SY0))@sK3_SY2))=$true)), inference(copy,[status(thm)],[9])).
thf(13,plain,(((~ (![SX0:$i]: ((~ ((sK1_X@SX0) | (sK2_SY0@SX0))) | (sK3_SY2@SX0))))=$true)), inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[12,complement,disjoint,emptyset,excl_union,in,intersection,is_a,meets,misses,setminus,singleton,subset,union,unord_pair])).
thf(14,plain,(((![SX0:$i]: ((~ (sK1_X@SX0)) | (sK3_SY2@SX0)))=$true)), inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[11,complement,disjoint,emptyset,excl_union,in,intersection,is_a,meets,misses,setminus,singleton,subset,union,unord_pair])).
thf(15,plain,(((![SX0:$i]: ((~ (sK2_SY0@SX0)) | (sK3_SY2@SX0)))=$true)), inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[10,complement,disjoint,emptyset,excl_union,in,intersection,is_a,meets,misses,setminus,singleton,subset,union,unord_pair])).
thf(16,plain,(((![SX0:$i]: ((~ ((sK1_X@SX0) | (sK2_SY0@SX0))) | (sK3_SY2@SX0)))=$false)), inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[13])).
thf(17,plain,(![SV1:$i]: ((((~ (sK1_X@SV1)) | (sK3_SY2@SV1))=$true))), inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[14])).
thf(18,plain,(![SV2:$i]: ((((~ (sK2_SY0@SV2)) | (sK3_SY2@SV2))=$true))), inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[15])).
thf(19,plain,((((~ ((sK1_X@sK4_SX0) | (sK2_SY0@sK4_SX0))) | (sK3_SY2@sK4_SX0))=$false)), inference(extcnf_forall_neg,[status(esa)],[16])).
thf(20,plain,(![SV1:$i]: (((~ (sK1_X@SV1))=$true) | ((sK3_SY2@SV1)=$true))), inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[17])).
thf(21,plain,(![SV2:$i]: (((~ (sK2_SY0@SV2))=$true) | ((sK3_SY2@SV2)=$true))), inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[18])).
thf(22,plain,(((~ ((sK1_X@sK4_SX0) | (sK2_SY0@sK4_SX0)))=$false)), inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[19])).
thf(23,plain,(((sK3_SY2@sK4_SX0)=$false)), inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[19])).
thf(24,plain,(![SV1:$i]: (((sK1_X@SV1)=$false) | ((sK3_SY2@SV1)=$true))), inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[20])).
thf(25,plain,(![SV2:$i]: (((sK2_SY0@SV2)=$false) | ((sK3_SY2@SV2)=$true))), inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[21])).
thf(26,plain,((((sK1_X@sK4_SX0) | (sK2_SY0@sK4_SX0))=$true)), inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[22])).
thf(27,plain,(((sK1_X@sK4_SX0)=$true) | ((sK2_SY0@sK4_SX0)=$true)), inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[26])).
thf(28,plain,((($false)=$true)), inference(fo_atp_e,[status(thm)],[23,27,25,24])).
thf(29,plain,($false), inference(solved_all_splits,[solved_all_splits(join,[])],[28])).
% SZS output end CNFRefutation

Leo-III 1.8.0

Solution for SET014^4

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SET014^4.s
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root '16' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
WARNING: Refutation has non-false root 'union_def'
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture 1 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start Refutation for -
thf(union_type, type, union: (($i > $o) > (($i > $o) > ($i > $o)))).
thf(subset_type, type, subset: (($i > $o) > (($i > $o) > $o))).
thf(sk1_type, type, sk1: ($i > $o)).
thf(sk2_type, type, sk2: ($i > $o)).
thf(sk3_type, type, sk3: ($i > $o)).
thf(sk4_type, type, sk4: $i).
thf(union_def, definition, (union = (^ [A:($i > $o),B:($i > $o),C:$i]: ((A @ C) | (B @ C))))).
thf(subset_def, definition, (subset = (^ [A:($i > $o),B:($i > $o)]: ! [C:$i]: ((A @ C) => (B @ C))))).
thf(1,conjecture,((! [A:($i > $o),B:($i > $o),C:($i > $o)]: (((subset @ A @ C) & (subset @ B @ C)) => (subset @ (union @ A @ B) @ C)))),file('-',thm)).
thf(2,negated_conjecture,((~ (! [A:($i > $o),B:($i > $o),C:($i > $o)]: (((subset @ A @ C) & (subset @ B @ C)) => (subset @ (union @ A @ B) @ C))))),inference(neg_conjecture,[status(cth)],[1])).
thf(3,plain,((~ (! [A:($i > $o),B:($i > $o),C:($i > $o)]: ((! [D:$i]: ((A @ D) => (C @ D)) & ! [D:$i]: ((B @ D) => (C @ D))) => (! [D:$i]: (((A @ D) | (B @ D)) => (C @ D))))))),inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[2])).
thf(5,plain,((sk1 @ sk4) | (sk2 @ sk4)),inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[3])).
thf(7,plain,(! [A:$i] : ((~ (sk1 @ A)) | (sk3 @ A))),inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[3])).
thf(4,plain,((~ (sk3 @ sk4))),inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[3])).
thf(9,plain,(! [A:$i] : ((~ (sk1 @ A)) | ((sk3 @ A) != (sk3 @ sk4)))),inference(paramod_ordered,[status(thm)],[7,4])).
thf(10,plain,((~ (sk1 @ sk4))),inference(pattern_uni,[status(thm)],[9:[bind(A, $thf(sk4))]])).
thf(11,plain,(($false) | (sk2 @ sk4)),inference(rewrite,[status(thm)],[5,10])).
thf(12,plain,((sk2 @ sk4)),inference(simp,[status(thm)],[11])).
thf(6,plain,(! [A:$i] : ((~ (sk2 @ A)) | (sk3 @ A))),inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[3])).
thf(8,plain,(! [A:$i] : ((~ (sk2 @ A)) | (sk3 @ A))),inference(simp,[status(thm)],[6])).
thf(13,plain,(! [A:$i] : ((~ (sk2 @ A)) | ((sk3 @ A) != (sk3 @ sk4)))),inference(paramod_ordered,[status(thm)],[8,4])).
thf(14,plain,((~ (sk2 @ sk4))),inference(pattern_uni,[status(thm)],[13:[bind(A, $thf(sk4))]])).
thf(15,plain,(($false)),inference(rewrite,[status(thm)],[12,14])).
thf(16,plain,(($false)),inference(simp,[status(thm)],[15])).
% SZS output end Refutation for -

LisaST 0.9

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'd7' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture t63_xboole_1 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS status Theorem for SEU140+2.p
% SZS output start CNFRefutation for SEU140+2.p
fof(d3_tarski, axiom, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ((subset(X0,X1) <=> ! [X2] : ((in(X2,X0) => in(X2,X1)))))).
fof(symmetry_r1_xboole_0, axiom, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ((disjoint(X0,X1) => disjoint(X1,X0)))).
fof(t3_xboole_0, lemma, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ((~((~disjoint(X0,X1) & ! [X2] : ~((in(X2,X0) & in(X2,X1))))) & ~((? [X2] : ((in(X2,X0) & in(X2,X1))) & disjoint(X0,X1)))))).
fof(t63_xboole_1, conjecture, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : (((subset(X0,X1) & disjoint(X1,X2)) => disjoint(X0,X2)))).
fof(negated_conjecture, negated_conjecture, ~! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : (((subset(X0,X1) & disjoint(X1,X2)) => disjoint(X0,X2))), inference(negate_conjecture, [status(cth)], [t63_xboole_1])).
cnf(c20, plain, ~subset(X0,X1) | ~in(X2,X0) | in(X2,X1), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [d3_tarski])).
cnf(c61, plain, ~disjoint(X0,X1) | disjoint(X1,X0), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [symmetry_r1_xboole_0])).
cnf(c81, plain, disjoint(X0,X1) | in(sK90(X0,X1),X0), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [t3_xboole_0])).
cnf(c82, plain, disjoint(X0,X1) | in(sK90(X0,X1),X1), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [t3_xboole_0])).
cnf(c83, plain, ~in(X0,X1) | ~in(X0,X2) | ~disjoint(X1,X2), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [t3_xboole_0])).
cnf(c97, plain, subset(sK116,sK117), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [negated_conjecture])).
cnf(c98, plain, disjoint(sK117,sK118), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [negated_conjecture])).
cnf(c99, plain, ~disjoint(sK116,sK118), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [negated_conjecture])).
cnf(d0, plain, in(X0,sK117) | ~in(X0,sK116), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c20,c97])).
cnf(d1, plain, disjoint(X0,sK116) | in(sK90(X0,sK116),sK117), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c82,d0])).
cnf(d2, plain, disjoint(sK118,sK117), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c61,c98])).
cnf(d3, plain, ~in(X0,sK118) | ~in(X0,sK117), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c83,d2])).
cnf(d4, plain, ~in(sK90(sK118,X0),sK117) | disjoint(sK118,X0), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d3,c81])).
cnf(d5, plain, disjoint(sK118,sK116) | disjoint(sK118,sK116), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d4,d1])).
cnf(d6, plain, disjoint(sK116,sK118), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d5,c61])).
cnf(d7, plain, $false, inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c99,d6])).
% SZS output end CNFRefutation for SEU140+2.p

Mace4 2026-6A

Solution for NLP042+1

% SZS output start FiniteModel for NLP042+1
fof(interp_domain, interpretation-domains,
    ! [X] : ( X = "d0" | X = "d1" | X = "d2" | X = "d3" )).

fof(interp_functions, interpretation-mappings, (
    c1 = "d0" &
    c2 = "d0" &
    c3 = "d1" &
    c4 = "d2" &
    c5 = "d3" )).

fof(interp_relations, interpretation-mappings, (
    actual_world("d0") &
    ~actual_world("d1") &
    ~actual_world("d2") &
    ~actual_world("d3") &
    ~abstraction("d0","d0") &
    abstraction("d0","d1") &
    ~abstraction("d0","d2") &
    ~abstraction("d0","d3") &
    ~abstraction("d1","d0") &
    ~abstraction("d1","d1") &
    ~abstraction("d1","d2") &
    ~abstraction("d1","d3") &
    ~abstraction("d2","d0") &
    ~abstraction("d2","d1") &
    ~abstraction("d2","d2") &
    ~abstraction("d2","d3") &
    ~abstraction("d3","d0") &
    ~abstraction("d3","d1") &
    ~abstraction("d3","d2") &
    ~abstraction("d3","d3") &
    ~act("d0","d0") &
    ~act("d0","d1") &
    ~act("d0","d2") &
    act("d0","d3") &
    ~act("d1","d0") &
    ~act("d1","d1") &
    ~act("d1","d2") &
    ~act("d1","d3") &
    ~act("d2","d0") &
    ~act("d2","d1") &
    ~act("d2","d2") &
    ~act("d2","d3") &
    ~act("d3","d0") &
    ~act("d3","d1") &
    ~act("d3","d2") &
    ~act("d3","d3") &
    animate("d0","d0") &
    ~animate("d0","d1") &
    ~animate("d0","d2") &
    ~animate("d0","d3") &
    ~animate("d1","d0") &
    ~animate("d1","d1") &
    ~animate("d1","d2") &
    ~animate("d1","d3") &
    ~animate("d2","d0") &
    ~animate("d2","d1") &
    ~animate("d2","d2") &
    ~animate("d2","d3") &
    ~animate("d3","d0") &
    ~animate("d3","d1") &
    ~animate("d3","d2") &
    ~animate("d3","d3") &
    ~beverage("d0","d0") &
    ~beverage("d0","d1") &
    beverage("d0","d2") &
    ~beverage("d0","d3") &
    ~beverage("d1","d0") &
    ~beverage("d1","d1") &
    ~beverage("d1","d2") &
    ~beverage("d1","d3") &
    ~beverage("d2","d0") &
    ~beverage("d2","d1") &
    ~beverage("d2","d2") &
    ~beverage("d2","d3") &
    ~beverage("d3","d0") &
    ~beverage("d3","d1") &
    ~beverage("d3","d2") &
    ~beverage("d3","d3") &
    entity("d0","d0") &
    ~entity("d0","d1") &
    entity("d0","d2") &
    ~entity("d0","d3") &
    ~entity("d1","d0") &
    ~entity("d1","d1") &
    ~entity("d1","d2") &
    ~entity("d1","d3") &
    ~entity("d2","d0") &
    ~entity("d2","d1") &
    ~entity("d2","d2") &
    ~entity("d2","d3") &
    ~entity("d3","d0") &
    ~entity("d3","d1") &
    ~entity("d3","d2") &
    ~entity("d3","d3") &
    ~event("d0","d0") &
    ~event("d0","d1") &
    ~event("d0","d2") &
    event("d0","d3") &
    ~event("d1","d0") &
    ~event("d1","d1") &
    ~event("d1","d2") &
    ~event("d1","d3") &
    ~event("d2","d0") &
    ~event("d2","d1") &
    ~event("d2","d2") &
    ~event("d2","d3") &
    ~event("d3","d0") &
    ~event("d3","d1") &
    ~event("d3","d2") &
    ~event("d3","d3") &
    ~eventuality("d0","d0") &
    ~eventuality("d0","d1") &
    ~eventuality("d0","d2") &
    eventuality("d0","d3") &
    ~eventuality("d1","d0") &
    ~eventuality("d1","d1") &
    ~eventuality("d1","d2") &
    ~eventuality("d1","d3") &
    ~eventuality("d2","d0") &
    ~eventuality("d2","d1") &
    ~eventuality("d2","d2") &
    ~eventuality("d2","d3") &
    ~eventuality("d3","d0") &
    ~eventuality("d3","d1") &
    ~eventuality("d3","d2") &
    ~eventuality("d3","d3") &
    existent("d0","d0") &
    ~existent("d0","d1") &
    existent("d0","d2") &
    ~existent("d0","d3") &
    ~existent("d1","d0") &
    ~existent("d1","d1") &
    ~existent("d1","d2") &
    ~existent("d1","d3") &
    ~existent("d2","d0") &
    ~existent("d2","d1") &
    ~existent("d2","d2") &
    ~existent("d2","d3") &
    ~existent("d3","d0") &
    ~existent("d3","d1") &
    ~existent("d3","d2") &
    ~existent("d3","d3") &
    female("d0","d0") &
    ~female("d0","d1") &
    ~female("d0","d2") &
    ~female("d0","d3") &
    ~female("d1","d0") &
    ~female("d1","d1") &
    ~female("d1","d2") &
    ~female("d1","d3") &
    ~female("d2","d0") &
    ~female("d2","d1") &
    ~female("d2","d2") &
    ~female("d2","d3") &
    ~female("d3","d0") &
    ~female("d3","d1") &
    ~female("d3","d2") &
    ~female("d3","d3") &
    ~food("d0","d0") &
    ~food("d0","d1") &
    food("d0","d2") &
    ~food("d0","d3") &
    ~food("d1","d0") &
    ~food("d1","d1") &
    ~food("d1","d2") &
    ~food("d1","d3") &
    ~food("d2","d0") &
    ~food("d2","d1") &
    ~food("d2","d2") &
    ~food("d2","d3") &
    ~food("d3","d0") &
    ~food("d3","d1") &
    ~food("d3","d2") &
    ~food("d3","d3") &
    ~forename("d0","d0") &
    forename("d0","d1") &
    ~forename("d0","d2") &
    ~forename("d0","d3") &
    ~forename("d1","d0") &
    ~forename("d1","d1") &
    ~forename("d1","d2") &
    ~forename("d1","d3") &
    ~forename("d2","d0") &
    ~forename("d2","d1") &
    ~forename("d2","d2") &
    ~forename("d2","d3") &
    ~forename("d3","d0") &
    ~forename("d3","d1") &
    ~forename("d3","d2") &
    ~forename("d3","d3") &
    ~general("d0","d0") &
    general("d0","d1") &
    ~general("d0","d2") &
    ~general("d0","d3") &
    ~general("d1","d0") &
    ~general("d1","d1") &
    ~general("d1","d2") &
    ~general("d1","d3") &
    ~general("d2","d0") &
    ~general("d2","d1") &
    ~general("d2","d2") &
    ~general("d2","d3") &
    ~general("d3","d0") &
    ~general("d3","d1") &
    ~general("d3","d2") &
    ~general("d3","d3") &
    human("d0","d0") &
    ~human("d0","d1") &
    ~human("d0","d2") &
    ~human("d0","d3") &
    ~human("d1","d0") &
    ~human("d1","d1") &
    ~human("d1","d2") &
    ~human("d1","d3") &
    ~human("d2","d0") &
    ~human("d2","d1") &
    ~human("d2","d2") &
    ~human("d2","d3") &
    ~human("d3","d0") &
    ~human("d3","d1") &
    ~human("d3","d2") &
    ~human("d3","d3") &
    human_person("d0","d0") &
    ~human_person("d0","d1") &
    ~human_person("d0","d2") &
    ~human_person("d0","d3") &
    ~human_person("d1","d0") &
    ~human_person("d1","d1") &
    ~human_person("d1","d2") &
    ~human_person("d1","d3") &
    ~human_person("d2","d0") &
    ~human_person("d2","d1") &
    ~human_person("d2","d2") &
    ~human_person("d2","d3") &
    ~human_person("d3","d0") &
    ~human_person("d3","d1") &
    ~human_person("d3","d2") &
    ~human_person("d3","d3") &
    impartial("d0","d0") &
    ~impartial("d0","d1") &
    impartial("d0","d2") &
    ~impartial("d0","d3") &
    ~impartial("d1","d0") &
    ~impartial("d1","d1") &
    ~impartial("d1","d2") &
    ~impartial("d1","d3") &
    ~impartial("d2","d0") &
    ~impartial("d2","d1") &
    ~impartial("d2","d2") &
    ~impartial("d2","d3") &
    ~impartial("d3","d0") &
    ~impartial("d3","d1") &
    ~impartial("d3","d2") &
    ~impartial("d3","d3") &
    living("d0","d0") &
    ~living("d0","d1") &
    ~living("d0","d2") &
    ~living("d0","d3") &
    ~living("d1","d0") &
    ~living("d1","d1") &
    ~living("d1","d2") &
    ~living("d1","d3") &
    ~living("d2","d0") &
    ~living("d2","d1") &
    ~living("d2","d2") &
    ~living("d2","d3") &
    ~living("d3","d0") &
    ~living("d3","d1") &
    ~living("d3","d2") &
    ~living("d3","d3") &
    ~mia_forename("d0","d0") &
    mia_forename("d0","d1") &
    ~mia_forename("d0","d2") &
    ~mia_forename("d0","d3") &
    ~mia_forename("d1","d0") &
    ~mia_forename("d1","d1") &
    ~mia_forename("d1","d2") &
    ~mia_forename("d1","d3") &
    ~mia_forename("d2","d0") &
    ~mia_forename("d2","d1") &
    ~mia_forename("d2","d2") &
    ~mia_forename("d2","d3") &
    ~mia_forename("d3","d0") &
    ~mia_forename("d3","d1") &
    ~mia_forename("d3","d2") &
    ~mia_forename("d3","d3") &
    ~nonexistent("d0","d0") &
    ~nonexistent("d0","d1") &
    ~nonexistent("d0","d2") &
    nonexistent("d0","d3") &
    ~nonexistent("d1","d0") &
    ~nonexistent("d1","d1") &
    ~nonexistent("d1","d2") &
    ~nonexistent("d1","d3") &
    ~nonexistent("d2","d0") &
    ~nonexistent("d2","d1") &
    ~nonexistent("d2","d2") &
    ~nonexistent("d2","d3") &
    ~nonexistent("d3","d0") &
    ~nonexistent("d3","d1") &
    ~nonexistent("d3","d2") &
    ~nonexistent("d3","d3") &
    ~nonhuman("d0","d0") &
    nonhuman("d0","d1") &
    ~nonhuman("d0","d2") &
    ~nonhuman("d0","d3") &
    ~nonhuman("d1","d0") &
    ~nonhuman("d1","d1") &
    ~nonhuman("d1","d2") &
    ~nonhuman("d1","d3") &
    ~nonhuman("d2","d0") &
    ~nonhuman("d2","d1") &
    ~nonhuman("d2","d2") &
    ~nonhuman("d2","d3") &
    ~nonhuman("d3","d0") &
    ~nonhuman("d3","d1") &
    ~nonhuman("d3","d2") &
    ~nonhuman("d3","d3") &
    ~nonliving("d0","d0") &
    ~nonliving("d0","d1") &
    nonliving("d0","d2") &
    ~nonliving("d0","d3") &
    ~nonliving("d1","d0") &
    ~nonliving("d1","d1") &
    ~nonliving("d1","d2") &
    ~nonliving("d1","d3") &
    ~nonliving("d2","d0") &
    ~nonliving("d2","d1") &
    ~nonliving("d2","d2") &
    ~nonliving("d2","d3") &
    ~nonliving("d3","d0") &
    ~nonliving("d3","d1") &
    ~nonliving("d3","d2") &
    ~nonliving("d3","d3") &
    ~nonreflexive("d0","d0") &
    ~nonreflexive("d0","d1") &
    ~nonreflexive("d0","d2") &
    nonreflexive("d0","d3") &
    ~nonreflexive("d1","d0") &
    ~nonreflexive("d1","d1") &
    ~nonreflexive("d1","d2") &
    ~nonreflexive("d1","d3") &
    ~nonreflexive("d2","d0") &
    ~nonreflexive("d2","d1") &
    ~nonreflexive("d2","d2") &
    ~nonreflexive("d2","d3") &
    ~nonreflexive("d3","d0") &
    ~nonreflexive("d3","d1") &
    ~nonreflexive("d3","d2") &
    ~nonreflexive("d3","d3") &
    ~object("d0","d0") &
    ~object("d0","d1") &
    object("d0","d2") &
    ~object("d0","d3") &
    ~object("d1","d0") &
    ~object("d1","d1") &
    ~object("d1","d2") &
    ~object("d1","d3") &
    ~object("d2","d0") &
    ~object("d2","d1") &
    ~object("d2","d2") &
    ~object("d2","d3") &
    ~object("d3","d0") &
    ~object("d3","d1") &
    ~object("d3","d2") &
    ~object("d3","d3") &
    ~order("d0","d0") &
    ~order("d0","d1") &
    ~order("d0","d2") &
    order("d0","d3") &
    ~order("d1","d0") &
    ~order("d1","d1") &
    ~order("d1","d2") &
    ~order("d1","d3") &
    ~order("d2","d0") &
    ~order("d2","d1") &
    ~order("d2","d2") &
    ~order("d2","d3") &
    ~order("d3","d0") &
    ~order("d3","d1") &
    ~order("d3","d2") &
    ~order("d3","d3") &
    organism("d0","d0") &
    ~organism("d0","d1") &
    ~organism("d0","d2") &
    ~organism("d0","d3") &
    ~organism("d1","d0") &
    ~organism("d1","d1") &
    ~organism("d1","d2") &
    ~organism("d1","d3") &
    ~organism("d2","d0") &
    ~organism("d2","d1") &
    ~organism("d2","d2") &
    ~organism("d2","d3") &
    ~organism("d3","d0") &
    ~organism("d3","d1") &
    ~organism("d3","d2") &
    ~organism("d3","d3") &
    ~past("d0","d0") &
    ~past("d0","d1") &
    ~past("d0","d2") &
    past("d0","d3") &
    ~past("d1","d0") &
    ~past("d1","d1") &
    ~past("d1","d2") &
    ~past("d1","d3") &
    ~past("d2","d0") &
    ~past("d2","d1") &
    ~past("d2","d2") &
    ~past("d2","d3") &
    ~past("d3","d0") &
    ~past("d3","d1") &
    ~past("d3","d2") &
    ~past("d3","d3") &
    ~relation("d0","d0") &
    relation("d0","d1") &
    ~relation("d0","d2") &
    ~relation("d0","d3") &
    ~relation("d1","d0") &
    ~relation("d1","d1") &
    ~relation("d1","d2") &
    ~relation("d1","d3") &
    ~relation("d2","d0") &
    ~relation("d2","d1") &
    ~relation("d2","d2") &
    ~relation("d2","d3") &
    ~relation("d3","d0") &
    ~relation("d3","d1") &
    ~relation("d3","d2") &
    ~relation("d3","d3") &
    ~relname("d0","d0") &
    relname("d0","d1") &
    ~relname("d0","d2") &
    ~relname("d0","d3") &
    ~relname("d1","d0") &
    ~relname("d1","d1") &
    ~relname("d1","d2") &
    ~relname("d1","d3") &
    ~relname("d2","d0") &
    ~relname("d2","d1") &
    ~relname("d2","d2") &
    ~relname("d2","d3") &
    ~relname("d3","d0") &
    ~relname("d3","d1") &
    ~relname("d3","d2") &
    ~relname("d3","d3") &
    ~shake_beverage("d0","d0") &
    ~shake_beverage("d0","d1") &
    shake_beverage("d0","d2") &
    ~shake_beverage("d0","d3") &
    ~shake_beverage("d1","d0") &
    ~shake_beverage("d1","d1") &
    ~shake_beverage("d1","d2") &
    ~shake_beverage("d1","d3") &
    ~shake_beverage("d2","d0") &
    ~shake_beverage("d2","d1") &
    ~shake_beverage("d2","d2") &
    ~shake_beverage("d2","d3") &
    ~shake_beverage("d3","d0") &
    ~shake_beverage("d3","d1") &
    ~shake_beverage("d3","d2") &
    ~shake_beverage("d3","d3") &
    singleton("d0","d0") &
    singleton("d0","d1") &
    singleton("d0","d2") &
    singleton("d0","d3") &
    ~singleton("d1","d0") &
    ~singleton("d1","d1") &
    ~singleton("d1","d2") &
    ~singleton("d1","d3") &
    ~singleton("d2","d0") &
    ~singleton("d2","d1") &
    ~singleton("d2","d2") &
    ~singleton("d2","d3") &
    ~singleton("d3","d0") &
    ~singleton("d3","d1") &
    ~singleton("d3","d2") &
    ~singleton("d3","d3") &
    specific("d0","d0") &
    ~specific("d0","d1") &
    specific("d0","d2") &
    specific("d0","d3") &
    ~specific("d1","d0") &
    ~specific("d1","d1") &
    ~specific("d1","d2") &
    ~specific("d1","d3") &
    ~specific("d2","d0") &
    ~specific("d2","d1") &
    ~specific("d2","d2") &
    ~specific("d2","d3") &
    ~specific("d3","d0") &
    ~specific("d3","d1") &
    ~specific("d3","d2") &
    ~specific("d3","d3") &
    ~substance_matter("d0","d0") &
    ~substance_matter("d0","d1") &
    substance_matter("d0","d2") &
    ~substance_matter("d0","d3") &
    ~substance_matter("d1","d0") &
    ~substance_matter("d1","d1") &
    ~substance_matter("d1","d2") &
    ~substance_matter("d1","d3") &
    ~substance_matter("d2","d0") &
    ~substance_matter("d2","d1") &
    ~substance_matter("d2","d2") &
    ~substance_matter("d2","d3") &
    ~substance_matter("d3","d0") &
    ~substance_matter("d3","d1") &
    ~substance_matter("d3","d2") &
    ~substance_matter("d3","d3") &
    thing("d0","d0") &
    thing("d0","d1") &
    thing("d0","d2") &
    thing("d0","d3") &
    ~thing("d1","d0") &
    ~thing("d1","d1") &
    ~thing("d1","d2") &
    ~thing("d1","d3") &
    ~thing("d2","d0") &
    ~thing("d2","d1") &
    ~thing("d2","d2") &
    ~thing("d2","d3") &
    ~thing("d3","d0") &
    ~thing("d3","d1") &
    ~thing("d3","d2") &
    ~thing("d3","d3") &
    ~unisex("d0","d0") &
    unisex("d0","d1") &
    unisex("d0","d2") &
    unisex("d0","d3") &
    ~unisex("d1","d0") &
    ~unisex("d1","d1") &
    ~unisex("d1","d2") &
    ~unisex("d1","d3") &
    ~unisex("d2","d0") &
    ~unisex("d2","d1") &
    ~unisex("d2","d2") &
    ~unisex("d2","d3") &
    ~unisex("d3","d0") &
    ~unisex("d3","d1") &
    ~unisex("d3","d2") &
    ~unisex("d3","d3") &
    woman("d0","d0") &
    ~woman("d0","d1") &
    ~woman("d0","d2") &
    ~woman("d0","d3") &
    ~woman("d1","d0") &
    ~woman("d1","d1") &
    ~woman("d1","d2") &
    ~woman("d1","d3") &
    ~woman("d2","d0") &
    ~woman("d2","d1") &
    ~woman("d2","d2") &
    ~woman("d2","d3") &
    ~woman("d3","d0") &
    ~woman("d3","d1") &
    ~woman("d3","d2") &
    ~woman("d3","d3") &
    ~agent("d0","d0","d0") &
    ~agent("d0","d0","d1") &
    ~agent("d0","d0","d2") &
    ~agent("d0","d0","d3") &
    ~agent("d0","d1","d0") &
    ~agent("d0","d1","d1") &
    ~agent("d0","d1","d2") &
    ~agent("d0","d1","d3") &
    ~agent("d0","d2","d0") &
    ~agent("d0","d2","d1") &
    ~agent("d0","d2","d2") &
    ~agent("d0","d2","d3") &
    agent("d0","d3","d0") &
    ~agent("d0","d3","d1") &
    ~agent("d0","d3","d2") &
    ~agent("d0","d3","d3") &
    ~agent("d1","d0","d0") &
    ~agent("d1","d0","d1") &
    ~agent("d1","d0","d2") &
    ~agent("d1","d0","d3") &
    ~agent("d1","d1","d0") &
    ~agent("d1","d1","d1") &
    ~agent("d1","d1","d2") &
    ~agent("d1","d1","d3") &
    ~agent("d1","d2","d0") &
    ~agent("d1","d2","d1") &
    ~agent("d1","d2","d2") &
    ~agent("d1","d2","d3") &
    ~agent("d1","d3","d0") &
    ~agent("d1","d3","d1") &
    ~agent("d1","d3","d2") &
    ~agent("d1","d3","d3") &
    ~agent("d2","d0","d0") &
    ~agent("d2","d0","d1") &
    ~agent("d2","d0","d2") &
    ~agent("d2","d0","d3") &
    ~agent("d2","d1","d0") &
    ~agent("d2","d1","d1") &
    ~agent("d2","d1","d2") &
    ~agent("d2","d1","d3") &
    ~agent("d2","d2","d0") &
    ~agent("d2","d2","d1") &
    ~agent("d2","d2","d2") &
    ~agent("d2","d2","d3") &
    ~agent("d2","d3","d0") &
    ~agent("d2","d3","d1") &
    ~agent("d2","d3","d2") &
    ~agent("d2","d3","d3") &
    ~agent("d3","d0","d0") &
    ~agent("d3","d0","d1") &
    ~agent("d3","d0","d2") &
    ~agent("d3","d0","d3") &
    ~agent("d3","d1","d0") &
    ~agent("d3","d1","d1") &
    ~agent("d3","d1","d2") &
    ~agent("d3","d1","d3") &
    ~agent("d3","d2","d0") &
    ~agent("d3","d2","d1") &
    ~agent("d3","d2","d2") &
    ~agent("d3","d2","d3") &
    ~agent("d3","d3","d0") &
    ~agent("d3","d3","d1") &
    ~agent("d3","d3","d2") &
    ~agent("d3","d3","d3") &
    ~of("d0","d0","d0") &
    ~of("d0","d0","d1") &
    ~of("d0","d0","d2") &
    ~of("d0","d0","d3") &
    of("d0","d1","d0") &
    ~of("d0","d1","d1") &
    ~of("d0","d1","d2") &
    ~of("d0","d1","d3") &
    ~of("d0","d2","d0") &
    ~of("d0","d2","d1") &
    ~of("d0","d2","d2") &
    ~of("d0","d2","d3") &
    ~of("d0","d3","d0") &
    ~of("d0","d3","d1") &
    ~of("d0","d3","d2") &
    ~of("d0","d3","d3") &
    ~of("d1","d0","d0") &
    ~of("d1","d0","d1") &
    ~of("d1","d0","d2") &
    ~of("d1","d0","d3") &
    ~of("d1","d1","d0") &
    ~of("d1","d1","d1") &
    ~of("d1","d1","d2") &
    ~of("d1","d1","d3") &
    ~of("d1","d2","d0") &
    ~of("d1","d2","d1") &
    ~of("d1","d2","d2") &
    ~of("d1","d2","d3") &
    ~of("d1","d3","d0") &
    ~of("d1","d3","d1") &
    ~of("d1","d3","d2") &
    ~of("d1","d3","d3") &
    ~of("d2","d0","d0") &
    ~of("d2","d0","d1") &
    ~of("d2","d0","d2") &
    ~of("d2","d0","d3") &
    ~of("d2","d1","d0") &
    ~of("d2","d1","d1") &
    ~of("d2","d1","d2") &
    ~of("d2","d1","d3") &
    ~of("d2","d2","d0") &
    ~of("d2","d2","d1") &
    ~of("d2","d2","d2") &
    ~of("d2","d2","d3") &
    ~of("d2","d3","d0") &
    ~of("d2","d3","d1") &
    ~of("d2","d3","d2") &
    ~of("d2","d3","d3") &
    ~of("d3","d0","d0") &
    ~of("d3","d0","d1") &
    ~of("d3","d0","d2") &
    ~of("d3","d0","d3") &
    ~of("d3","d1","d0") &
    ~of("d3","d1","d1") &
    ~of("d3","d1","d2") &
    ~of("d3","d1","d3") &
    ~of("d3","d2","d0") &
    ~of("d3","d2","d1") &
    ~of("d3","d2","d2") &
    ~of("d3","d2","d3") &
    ~of("d3","d3","d0") &
    ~of("d3","d3","d1") &
    ~of("d3","d3","d2") &
    ~of("d3","d3","d3") &
    ~patient("d0","d0","d0") &
    ~patient("d0","d0","d1") &
    ~patient("d0","d0","d2") &
    ~patient("d0","d0","d3") &
    ~patient("d0","d1","d0") &
    ~patient("d0","d1","d1") &
    ~patient("d0","d1","d2") &
    ~patient("d0","d1","d3") &
    ~patient("d0","d2","d0") &
    ~patient("d0","d2","d1") &
    ~patient("d0","d2","d2") &
    ~patient("d0","d2","d3") &
    ~patient("d0","d3","d0") &
    ~patient("d0","d3","d1") &
    patient("d0","d3","d2") &
    ~patient("d0","d3","d3") &
    ~patient("d1","d0","d0") &
    ~patient("d1","d0","d1") &
    ~patient("d1","d0","d2") &
    ~patient("d1","d0","d3") &
    ~patient("d1","d1","d0") &
    ~patient("d1","d1","d1") &
    ~patient("d1","d1","d2") &
    ~patient("d1","d1","d3") &
    ~patient("d1","d2","d0") &
    ~patient("d1","d2","d1") &
    ~patient("d1","d2","d2") &
    ~patient("d1","d2","d3") &
    ~patient("d1","d3","d0") &
    ~patient("d1","d3","d1") &
    ~patient("d1","d3","d2") &
    ~patient("d1","d3","d3") &
    ~patient("d2","d0","d0") &
    ~patient("d2","d0","d1") &
    ~patient("d2","d0","d2") &
    ~patient("d2","d0","d3") &
    ~patient("d2","d1","d0") &
    ~patient("d2","d1","d1") &
    ~patient("d2","d1","d2") &
    ~patient("d2","d1","d3") &
    ~patient("d2","d2","d0") &
    ~patient("d2","d2","d1") &
    ~patient("d2","d2","d2") &
    ~patient("d2","d2","d3") &
    ~patient("d2","d3","d0") &
    ~patient("d2","d3","d1") &
    ~patient("d2","d3","d2") &
    ~patient("d2","d3","d3") &
    ~patient("d3","d0","d0") &
    ~patient("d3","d0","d1") &
    ~patient("d3","d0","d2") &
    ~patient("d3","d0","d3") &
    ~patient("d3","d1","d0") &
    ~patient("d3","d1","d1") &
    ~patient("d3","d1","d2") &
    ~patient("d3","d1","d3") &
    ~patient("d3","d2","d0") &
    ~patient("d3","d2","d1") &
    ~patient("d3","d2","d2") &
    ~patient("d3","d2","d3") &
    ~patient("d3","d3","d0") &
    ~patient("d3","d3","d1") &
    ~patient("d3","d3","d2") &
    ~patient("d3","d3","d3") )).

% SZS output end FiniteModel for NLP042+1

Solution for SWV017+1

% SZS output start FiniteModel for SWV017+1
fof(interp_domain, interpretation-domains,
    ! [X] : ( X = "d0" | X = "d1" )).

fof(interp_functions, interpretation-mappings, (
    a = "d0" &
    an_a_nonce = "d0" &
    an_intruder_nonce = "d0" &
    at = "d0" &
    b = "d0" &
    bt = "d0" &
    t = "d0" &
    generate_b_nonce("d0") = "d0" &
    generate_b_nonce("d1") = "d0" &
    generate_expiration_time("d0") = "d0" &
    generate_expiration_time("d1") = "d0" &
    generate_intruder_nonce("d0") = "d0" &
    generate_intruder_nonce("d1") = "d0" &
    generate_key("d0") = "d1" &
    generate_key("d1") = "d1" &
    encrypt("d0","d0") = "d0" &
    encrypt("d0","d1") = "d0" &
    encrypt("d1","d0") = "d0" &
    encrypt("d1","d1") = "d0" &
    key("d0","d0") = "d1" &
    key("d0","d1") = "d0" &
    key("d1","d0") = "d1" &
    key("d1","d1") = "d0" &
    pair("d0","d0") = "d1" &
    pair("d0","d1") = "d0" &
    pair("d1","d0") = "d0" &
    pair("d1","d1") = "d0" &
    sent("d0","d0","d0") = "d1" &
    sent("d0","d0","d1") = "d1" &
    sent("d0","d1","d0") = "d0" &
    sent("d0","d1","d1") = "d0" &
    sent("d1","d0","d0") = "d0" &
    sent("d1","d0","d1") = "d0" &
    sent("d1","d1","d0") = "d0" &
    sent("d1","d1","d1") = "d0" &
    triple("d0","d0","d0") = "d0" &
    triple("d0","d0","d1") = "d0" &
    triple("d0","d1","d0") = "d0" &
    triple("d0","d1","d1") = "d0" &
    triple("d1","d0","d0") = "d0" &
    triple("d1","d0","d1") = "d0" &
    triple("d1","d1","d0") = "d0" &
    triple("d1","d1","d1") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d0","d0","d0","d0") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d0","d0","d0","d1") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d0","d0","d1","d0") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d0","d0","d1","d1") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d0","d1","d0","d0") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d0","d1","d0","d1") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d0","d1","d1","d0") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d0","d1","d1","d1") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d1","d0","d0","d0") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d1","d0","d0","d1") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d1","d0","d1","d0") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d1","d0","d1","d1") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d1","d1","d0","d0") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d1","d1","d0","d1") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d1","d1","d1","d0") = "d0" &
    quadruple("d1","d1","d1","d1") = "d0" )).

fof(interp_relations, interpretation-mappings, (
    ~a_holds("d0") &
    a_holds("d1") &
    ~a_key("d0") &
    a_key("d1") &
    a_nonce("d0") &
    ~a_nonce("d1") &
    ~a_stored("d0") &
    a_stored("d1") &
    ~b_holds("d0") &
    b_holds("d1") &
    ~b_stored("d0") &
    b_stored("d1") &
    fresh_intruder_nonce("d0") &
    ~fresh_intruder_nonce("d1") &
    fresh_to_b("d0") &
    ~fresh_to_b("d1") &
    ~intruder_holds("d0") &
    intruder_holds("d1") &
    intruder_message("d0") &
    intruder_message("d1") &
    ~message("d0") &
    message("d1") &
    party_of_protocol("d0") &
    ~party_of_protocol("d1") &
    ~t_holds("d0") &
    t_holds("d1") )).

% SZS output end FiniteModel for SWV017+1

mrs 0.2.0

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name /home/fr22192/pve/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p from annotated formula c47
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'c261559' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture c285 as the proved formula
SUCCESS: 'c231' is a symbol definition of 'def_t3_xboole_0_0'
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start Proof for SEU140+2
fof(c47, axiom, ![X0]: (![X1]: ((subset(X0, X1) <=> ![X2]: ((in(X2, X0) => in(X2, X1)))))), file('/home/fr22192/pve/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p', d3_tarski)).
fof(c285, conjecture, ![X0]: (![X1]: (![X2]: (((subset(X0, X1) & disjoint(X1, X2)) => disjoint(X0, X2))))), file('/home/fr22192/pve/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p', t63_xboole_1)).
fof(c48, plain, ![X0]: (![X1]: (((~(subset(X0, X1)) | ![X2]: ((~(in(X2, X0)) | in(X2, X1)))) & (subset(X0, X1) | ?[X2]: ((in(X2, X0) & ~(in(X2, X1)))))))), inference(fof_nnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [c47])).
fof(c286, negated_conjecture, ~(![X0]: (![X1]: (![X2]: (((subset(X0, X1) & disjoint(X1, X2)) => disjoint(X0, X2)))))), inference(negated_conjecture, [status(cth)], [c285])).
fof(c228, lemma, ![X0]: (![X1]: ((~((~(disjoint(X0, X1)) & ![X2]: (~((in(X2, X0) & in(X2, X1)))))) & ~((?[X3]: ((in(X3, X0) & in(X3, X1))) & disjoint(X0, X1)))))), file('/home/fr22192/pve/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p', t3_xboole_0)).
fof(c49, plain, (![X0]: (![X1]: ((~(subset(X0, X1)) | ![X2]: ((~(in(X2, X0)) | in(X2, X1)))))) & ![X0]: (![X1]: ((subset(X0, X1) | (in(sk_d3_tarski_0(X0, X1), X0) & ~(in(sk_d3_tarski_0(X0, X1), X1))))))), inference(skolemisation, [status(esa)], [c48])).
fof(c287, plain, ?[X0]: (?[X1]: (?[X2]: (((subset(X0, X1) & disjoint(X1, X2)) & ~(disjoint(X0, X2)))))), inference(fof_nnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [c286])).
fof(c229, plain, ![X0]: (![X1]: (((disjoint(X0, X1) | ?[X2]: ((in(X2, X0) & in(X2, X1)))) & (![X3]: ((~(in(X3, X0)) | ~(in(X3, X1)))) | ~(disjoint(X0, X1)))))), inference(fof_nnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [c228])).
cnf(c232, plain, ~def_t3_xboole_0_0(X0, X1) | in(sk_t3_xboole_0_0(X0, X1), X0), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [c230, c231])).
cnf(c289, plain, subset(sk_t63_xboole_1_0, sk_t63_xboole_1_1), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [c288])).
cnf(c53, plain, ~subset(X0, X1) | ~in(X2, X0) | in(X2, X1), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [c49])).
fof(c288, plain, ((subset(sk_t63_xboole_1_0, sk_t63_xboole_1_1) & disjoint(sk_t63_xboole_1_1, sk_t63_xboole_1_2)) & ~(disjoint(sk_t63_xboole_1_0, sk_t63_xboole_1_2))), inference(skolemisation, [status(esa)], [c287])).
cnf(c291, plain, ~disjoint(sk_t63_xboole_1_0, sk_t63_xboole_1_2), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [c288])).
cnf(c234, plain, disjoint(X0, X1) | def_t3_xboole_0_0(X0, X1), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [c230, c231])).
fof(c231, definition, ![X0]: (![X1]: ((def_t3_xboole_0_0(X0, X1) <=> (in(sk_t3_xboole_0_0(X0, X1), X0) & in(sk_t3_xboole_0_0(X0, X1), X1))))), introduced(definition, [new_symbols(definition, [def_t3_xboole_0_0])])).
fof(c230, plain, (![X0]: (![X1]: ((disjoint(X0, X1) | (in(sk_t3_xboole_0_0(X0, X1), X0) & in(sk_t3_xboole_0_0(X0, X1), X1))))) & ![X0]: (![X1]: ((![X3]: ((~(in(X3, X0)) | ~(in(X3, X1)))) | ~(disjoint(X0, X1)))))), inference(skolemisation, [status(esa)], [c229])).
cnf(c82331, plain, in(sk_t3_xboole_0_0(sk_t63_xboole_1_0, sk_t63_xboole_1_2), sk_t63_xboole_1_0), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c232, c1039])).
cnf(c238447, plain, ~in(X2, sk_t63_xboole_1_0) | in(X2, sk_t63_xboole_1_1), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c53, c289])).
cnf(c290, plain, disjoint(sk_t63_xboole_1_1, sk_t63_xboole_1_2), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [c288])).
cnf(c235, plain, ~in(X3, X0) | ~in(X3, X1) | ~disjoint(X0, X1), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [c230])).
cnf(c1039, plain, def_t3_xboole_0_0(sk_t63_xboole_1_0, sk_t63_xboole_1_2), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c234, c291])).
cnf(c233, plain, ~def_t3_xboole_0_0(X0, X1) | in(sk_t3_xboole_0_0(X0, X1), X1), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [c230, c231])).
cnf(c238534, plain, in(sk_t3_xboole_0_0(sk_t63_xboole_1_0, sk_t63_xboole_1_2), sk_t63_xboole_1_1), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c238447, c82331])).
cnf(c261227, plain, ~in(X3, sk_t63_xboole_1_1) | ~in(X3, sk_t63_xboole_1_2), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c235, c290])).
cnf(c84107, plain, in(sk_t3_xboole_0_0(sk_t63_xboole_1_0, sk_t63_xboole_1_2), sk_t63_xboole_1_2), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c233, c1039])).
cnf(c261347, plain, ~in(sk_t3_xboole_0_0(sk_t63_xboole_1_0, sk_t63_xboole_1_2), sk_t63_xboole_1_2), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c261227, c238534])).
cnf(c261559, plain, $false, inference(subsumption_resolution, [status(thm)], [c261347, c84107])).
% SZS output end Proof for SEU140+2

Solution for BOO001-1

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file BOO001-1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name /mnt/wsl/CUsersfr22192WSLDatafastdatavhdx/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/BOO/BOO001-1.p from annotated formula c2147
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'c2716' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the negated conjecture c0 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start Proof for BOO001-1
cnf(c2147, axiom, multiply(X0, X0, X1) = X0, file('/mnt/wsl/CUsersfr22192WSLDatafastdatavhdx/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/BOO/BOO001-1.p', ternary_multiply_2)).
cnf(c2148, axiom, multiply(multiply(X0, X1, X2), X3, multiply(X0, X1, X4)) = multiply(X0, X1, multiply(X2, X3, X4)), file('/mnt/wsl/CUsersfr22192WSLDatafastdatavhdx/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/BOO/BOO001-1.p', associativity)).
cnf(c2149, plain, multiply(X0, X1, multiply(X2, multiply(X0, X1, X2), X4)) = multiply(X0, X1, X2), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c2148, c2147])).
cnf(c2150, axiom, multiply(X0, X1, inverse(X1)) = X0, file('/mnt/wsl/CUsersfr22192WSLDatafastdatavhdx/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/BOO/BOO001-1.p', right_inverse)).
cnf(c2151, plain, multiply(X2, X3, multiply(inverse(X3), X2, X6)) = multiply(X2, X3, inverse(X3)), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c2150, c2149])).
cnf(c2152, axiom, multiply(multiply(X0, X1, X2), X3, multiply(X0, X1, X4)) = multiply(X0, X1, multiply(X2, X3, X4)), file('/mnt/wsl/CUsersfr22192WSLDatafastdatavhdx/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/BOO/BOO001-1.p', associativity)).
cnf(c2153, axiom, multiply(X0, X1, X1) = X1, file('/mnt/wsl/CUsersfr22192WSLDatafastdatavhdx/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/BOO/BOO001-1.p', ternary_multiply_1)).
cnf(c2154, plain, multiply(X2, X3, multiply(inverse(X3), X2, X6)) = X2, inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [c2151, c2150])).
cnf(c2155, plain, multiply(X4, X5, multiply(X2, X4, X6)) = multiply(X2, X4, multiply(X4, X5, X6)), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c2153, c2152])).
cnf(c2156, plain, multiply(inverse(X10), X9, multiply(X9, X10, X13)) = X9, inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c2155, c2154])).
cnf(c2, axiom, multiply(X0, X1, X1) = X1, file('/mnt/wsl/CUsersfr22192WSLDatafastdatavhdx/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/BOO/BOO001-1.p', ternary_multiply_1)).
cnf(c5, axiom, multiply(X0, X1, inverse(X1)) = X0, file('/mnt/wsl/CUsersfr22192WSLDatafastdatavhdx/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/BOO/BOO001-1.p', right_inverse)).
cnf(c2266, plain, multiply(inverse(X15), X11, X15) = X11, inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c2, c2156])).
cnf(c2524, plain, X17 = inverse(inverse(X17)), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c2266, c5])).
cnf(c0, negated_conjecture, inverse(inverse(a)) != a, file('/mnt/wsl/CUsersfr22192WSLDatafastdatavhdx/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/BOO/BOO001-1.p', prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling)).
cnf(c2715, plain, a != a, inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [c0, c2524])).
cnf(c2716, plain, $false, inference(equality_resolution, [status(thm)], [c2715])).
% SZS output end Proof for BOO001-1

Prover9 1109a

Solution for SEU140+2

8 (all A all B (subset(A,B) <-> (all C (in(C,A) -> in(C,B))))) # label(d3_tarski) # label(axiom) # label(non_clause).  [assumption].
26 (all A all B (disjoint(A,B) -> disjoint(B,A))) # label(symmetry_r1_xboole_0) # label(axiom) # label(non_clause).  [assumption].
42 (all A all B (-(-disjoint(A,B) & (all C -(in(C,A) & in(C,B)))) & -((exists C (in(C,A) & in(C,B))) & disjoint(A,B)))) # label(t3_xboole_0) # label(lemma) # label(non_clause).  [assumption].
55 -(all A all B all C (subset(A,B) & disjoint(B,C) -> disjoint(A,C))) # label(t63_xboole_1) # label(negated_conjecture) # label(non_clause).  [assumption].
60 subset(c3,c4) # label(t63_xboole_1) # label(negated_conjecture).  [clausify(55)].
61 disjoint(c4,c5) # label(t63_xboole_1) # label(negated_conjecture).  [clausify(55)].
75 disjoint(A,B) | in(f7(A,B),A) # label(t3_xboole_0) # label(lemma).  [clausify(42)].
76 disjoint(A,B) | in(f7(A,B),B) # label(t3_xboole_0) # label(lemma).  [clausify(42)].
92 -disjoint(c3,c5) # label(t63_xboole_1) # label(negated_conjecture).  [clausify(55)].
101 -in(A,B) | -in(A,C) | -disjoint(B,C) # label(t3_xboole_0) # label(lemma).  [clausify(42)].
109 -disjoint(A,B) | disjoint(B,A) # label(symmetry_r1_xboole_0) # label(axiom).  [clausify(26)].
123 -subset(A,B) | -in(C,A) | in(C,B) # label(d3_tarski) # label(axiom).  [clausify(8)].
273 -disjoint(c5,c3).  [ur(109,b,92,a)].
300 -in(A,c3) | in(A,c4).  [resolve(123,a,60,a)].
959 in(f7(c5,c3),c3).  [resolve(273,a,76,a)].
960 in(f7(c5,c3),c5).  [resolve(273,a,75,a)].
1084 -in(f7(c5,c3),c4).  [ur(101,b,960,a,c,61,a)].
1292 $F.  [resolve(300,a,959,a),unit_del(a,1084)].

Prover9 2026-6A

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name SEU140+2.p from annotated formula d3_tarski
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'c_1320' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture t63_xboole_1 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation for SEU140+2
fof(d3_tarski, axiom, ! [A,B] : (subset(A,B) <=> ! [C] : (in(C,A) => in(C,B))), file('SEU140+2.p',d3_tarski)).
fof(t3_xboole_0, axiom, ! [A,B] : (~ ((~ (disjoint(A,B)) & ! [C] : ~ ((in(C,A) & in(C,B))))) & ~ ((? [C] : (in(C,A) & in(C,B)) & disjoint(A,B)))), file('SEU140+2.p',t3_xboole_0)).
fof(t63_xboole_1, conjecture, ! [A,B,C] : ((subset(A,B) & disjoint(B,C)) => disjoint(A,C)), file('SEU140+2.p',t63_xboole_1)).
fof(t63_xboole_1_neg, negated_conjecture, ~(! [A,B,C] : ((subset(A,B) & disjoint(B,C)) => disjoint(A,C))), inference(assume_negation, [status(cth)], [t63_xboole_1])).
cnf(c_71, plain, ~subset(A,B) | ~in(C,A) | in(C,B), inference(clausify, [status(thm)], [d3_tarski])).
fof(nnf_42, plain, ! [A,B] : ((disjoint(A,B) | ? [X0] : (in(X0,A) & in(X0,B))) & (! [C] : (~ (in(C,A)) | ~ (in(C,B))) | ~ (disjoint(A,B)))), inference(fof_nnf, [status(thm)], [t3_xboole_0])).
fof(sk_t3_xboole_0_sk, plain, ! [A,B] : ((disjoint(A,B) | (in(sK0(A,B),A) & in(sK0(A,B),B))) & (! [C] : (~ (in(C,A)) | ~ (in(C,B))) | ~ (disjoint(A,B)))), inference(skolemize, [status(esa), new_symbols(skolem, [sK0]), skolemize(X0,sK0(A,B))], [nnf_42])).
fof(sk_t3_xboole_0, plain, (! [VAR_0,VAR_1] : (disjoint(VAR_0,VAR_1) | in(sK0(VAR_0,VAR_1),VAR_0)) & ! [VAR_0,VAR_1] : (disjoint(VAR_0,VAR_1) | in(sK0(VAR_0,VAR_1),VAR_1)) & ! [VAR_0,VAR_1,VAR_2] : (~ (in(VAR_0,VAR_1)) | ~ (in(VAR_0,VAR_2)) | ~ (disjoint(VAR_1,VAR_2)))), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(thm)], [sk_t3_xboole_0_sk])).
cnf(c_118, plain, disjoint(A,B) | in(sK0(A,B),A), inference(split_conjunct, [status(thm)], [sk_t3_xboole_0])).
cnf(c_119, plain, disjoint(A,B) | in(sK0(A,B),B), inference(split_conjunct, [status(thm)], [sk_t3_xboole_0])).
cnf(c_120, plain, ~in(A,B) | ~in(A,C) | ~disjoint(B,C), inference(split_conjunct, [status(thm)], [sk_t3_xboole_0])).
fof(nnf_55, plain, ? [A,B,C] : (subset(A,B) & disjoint(B,C) & ~ (disjoint(A,C))), inference(fof_nnf, [status(thm)], [t63_xboole_1_neg])).
fof(sk_t63_xboole_1_neg, plain, (subset(sK1,sK2) & disjoint(sK2,sK3) & ~ (disjoint(sK1,sK3))), inference(skolemize, [status(esa), new_symbols(skolem, [sK1,sK2,sK3]), skolemize(A,sK1), skolemize(B,sK2), skolemize(C,sK3)], [nnf_55])).
cnf(c_137, negated_conjecture, subset(sK1,sK2), inference(split_conjunct, [status(thm)], [sk_t63_xboole_1_neg])).
cnf(c_138, negated_conjecture, disjoint(sK2,sK3), inference(split_conjunct, [status(thm)], [sk_t63_xboole_1_neg])).
cnf(c_139, negated_conjecture, ~disjoint(sK1,sK3), inference(split_conjunct, [status(thm)], [sk_t63_xboole_1_neg])).
cnf(c_568, plain, ~in(A,sK1) | in(A,sK2),
    inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [c_137, c_71])).
cnf(c_571, plain, ~in(A,sK2) | ~in(A,sK3),
    inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [c_138, c_120])).
cnf(c_574, plain, in(sK0(sK1,sK3),sK3),
    inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [c_139, c_119])).
cnf(c_575, plain, in(sK0(sK1,sK3),sK1),
    inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [c_139, c_118])).
cnf(c_1262, plain, ~in(sK0(sK1,sK3),sK2),
    inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [c_574, c_571])).
cnf(c_1321, plain, in(sK0(sK1,sK3),sK2),
    inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [c_575, c_568])).
cnf(c_1320, plain, $false,
    inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [c_1262, c_1321])).
% SZS output end CNFRefutation for SEU140+2

Solution for BOO001-1

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file BOO001-1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name BOO001-1.p from annotated formula associativity
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'c_130' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the derivation root c_130 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation for BOO001-1
fof(associativity, axiom, ! [VAR_0,VAR_1,VAR_2,VAR_3,VAR_4] : (multiply(multiply(VAR_0,VAR_1,VAR_2),VAR_3,multiply(VAR_0,VAR_1,VAR_4)) = multiply(VAR_0,VAR_1,multiply(VAR_2,VAR_3,VAR_4))), file('BOO001-1.p',associativity)).
cnf(c_1, plain, multiply(multiply(A,B,C),D,multiply(A,B,E)) = multiply(A,B,multiply(C,D,E)), inference(clausify, [status(thm)], [associativity])).
fof(ternary_multiply_1, axiom, ! [VAR_0,VAR_1] : (multiply(VAR_0,VAR_1,VAR_1) = VAR_1), file('BOO001-1.p',ternary_multiply_1)).
cnf(c_2, plain, multiply(A,B,B) = B, inference(clausify, [status(thm)], [ternary_multiply_1])).
fof(right_inverse, axiom, ! [VAR_0,VAR_1] : (multiply(VAR_0,VAR_1,inverse(VAR_1)) = VAR_0), file('BOO001-1.p',right_inverse)).
cnf(c_5, plain, multiply(A,B,inverse(B)) = A, inference(clausify, [status(thm)], [right_inverse])).
fof(prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling, axiom, (~ (inverse(inverse(a)) = a)), file('BOO001-1.p',prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling)).
cnf(c_6, plain, inverse(inverse(a)) != a, inference(clausify, [status(thm)], [prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling])).
cnf(c_9, plain, multiply(A,B,multiply(C,A,D)) = multiply(C,A,multiply(A,B,D)),
    inference(paramod, [status(thm)], [c_2, c_1])).
cnf(c_46, plain, multiply(A,B,multiply(C,A,B)) = multiply(C,A,B),
    inference(paramod, [status(thm)], [c_2, c_9])).
cnf(c_131, plain, multiply(A,inverse(A),B) = multiply(B,A,inverse(A)),
    inference(paramod, [status(thm)], [c_5, c_46])).
cnf(c_77, plain, multiply(A,inverse(A),B) = B,
    inference(paramod, [status(thm)], [c_5, c_131])).
cnf(c_129, plain, inverse(inverse(A)) = A,
    inference(paramod, [status(thm)], [c_77, c_5])).
cnf(c_130, plain, $false,
    inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [c_129, c_6])).
% SZS output end CNFRefutation for BOO001-1

SATResetCoP 1.0

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name SEU140+2.p from annotated formula satresetcop_input_1
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'satresetcop_false' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
WARNING: Refutation has non-false root 'satresetcop_matrix_4'
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture satresetcop_input_51 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation for SEU140+2
fof(satresetcop_input_1,axiom,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( in(A,B)
     => ~ in(B,A) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',antisymmetry_r2_hidden)).
fof(satresetcop_input_2,axiom,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( proper_subset(A,B)
     => ~ proper_subset(B,A) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',antisymmetry_r2_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_3,axiom,
    ! [A,B] : set_union2(A,B) = set_union2(B,A),
    file('SEU140+2.p',commutativity_k2_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_4,axiom,
    ! [A,B] : set_intersection2(A,B) = set_intersection2(B,A),
    file('SEU140+2.p',commutativity_k3_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_5,axiom,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( A = B
    <=> ( subset(A,B)
        & subset(B,A) ) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',d10_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_6,axiom,
    ! [A] :
      ( A = empty_set
    <=> ! [B] : ~ in(B,A) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',d1_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_7,axiom,
    ! [A,B,C] :
      ( C = set_union2(A,B)
    <=> ! [D] :
          ( in(D,C)
        <=> ( in(D,A)
            | in(D,B) ) ) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',d2_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_8,axiom,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( subset(A,B)
    <=> ! [C] :
          ( in(C,A)
         => in(C,B) ) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',d3_tarski)).
fof(satresetcop_input_9,axiom,
    ! [A,B,C] :
      ( C = set_intersection2(A,B)
    <=> ! [D] :
          ( in(D,C)
        <=> ( in(D,A)
            & in(D,B) ) ) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',d3_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_10,axiom,
    ! [A,B,C] :
      ( C = set_difference(A,B)
    <=> ! [D] :
          ( in(D,C)
        <=> ( in(D,A)
            & ~ in(D,B) ) ) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',d4_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_11,axiom,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( disjoint(A,B)
    <=> set_intersection2(A,B) = empty_set ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',d7_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_12,axiom,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( proper_subset(A,B)
    <=> ( subset(A,B)
        & A != B ) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',d8_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_13,axiom,
    $true,
    file('SEU140+2.p',dt_k1_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_14,axiom,
    $true,
    file('SEU140+2.p',dt_k2_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_15,axiom,
    $true,
    file('SEU140+2.p',dt_k3_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_16,axiom,
    $true,
    file('SEU140+2.p',dt_k4_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_17,axiom,
    empty(empty_set),
    file('SEU140+2.p',fc1_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_18,axiom,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( ~ empty(A)
     => ~ empty(set_union2(A,B)) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',fc2_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_19,axiom,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( ~ empty(A)
     => ~ empty(set_union2(B,A)) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',fc3_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_20,axiom,
    ! [A,B] : set_union2(A,A) = A,
    file('SEU140+2.p',idempotence_k2_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_21,axiom,
    ! [A,B] : set_intersection2(A,A) = A,
    file('SEU140+2.p',idempotence_k3_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_22,axiom,
    ! [A,B] : ~ proper_subset(A,A),
    file('SEU140+2.p',irreflexivity_r2_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_23,lemma,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( set_difference(A,B) = empty_set
    <=> subset(A,B) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',l32_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_24,axiom,
    ? [A] : empty(A),
    file('SEU140+2.p',rc1_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_25,axiom,
    ? [A] : ~ empty(A),
    file('SEU140+2.p',rc2_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_26,axiom,
    ! [A,B] : subset(A,A),
    file('SEU140+2.p',reflexivity_r1_tarski)).
fof(satresetcop_input_27,axiom,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( disjoint(A,B)
     => disjoint(B,A) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',symmetry_r1_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_28,lemma,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( subset(A,B)
     => set_union2(A,B) = B ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t12_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_29,lemma,
    ! [A,B] : subset(set_intersection2(A,B),A),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t17_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_30,lemma,
    ! [A,B,C] :
      ( ( subset(A,B)
        & subset(A,C) )
     => subset(A,set_intersection2(B,C)) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t19_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_31,axiom,
    ! [A] : set_union2(A,empty_set) = A,
    file('SEU140+2.p',t1_boole)).
fof(satresetcop_input_32,lemma,
    ! [A,B,C] :
      ( ( subset(A,B)
        & subset(B,C) )
     => subset(A,C) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t1_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_33,lemma,
    ! [A,B,C] :
      ( subset(A,B)
     => subset(set_intersection2(A,C),set_intersection2(B,C)) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t26_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_34,lemma,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( subset(A,B)
     => set_intersection2(A,B) = A ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t28_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_35,axiom,
    ! [A] : set_intersection2(A,empty_set) = empty_set,
    file('SEU140+2.p',t2_boole)).
fof(satresetcop_input_36,axiom,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( ! [C] :
          ( in(C,A)
        <=> in(C,B) )
     => A = B ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t2_tarski)).
fof(satresetcop_input_37,lemma,
    ! [A] : subset(empty_set,A),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t2_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_38,lemma,
    ! [A,B,C] :
      ( subset(A,B)
     => subset(set_difference(A,C),set_difference(B,C)) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t33_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_39,lemma,
    ! [A,B] : subset(set_difference(A,B),A),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t36_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_40,lemma,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( set_difference(A,B) = empty_set
    <=> subset(A,B) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t37_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_41,lemma,
    ! [A,B] : set_union2(A,set_difference(B,A)) = set_union2(A,B),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t39_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_42,axiom,
    ! [A] : set_difference(A,empty_set) = A,
    file('SEU140+2.p',t3_boole)).
fof(satresetcop_input_43,lemma,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( ~ ( ~ disjoint(A,B)
          & ! [C] :
              ~ ( in(C,A)
                & in(C,B) ) )
      & ~ ( ? [C] :
              ( in(C,A)
              & in(C,B) )
          & disjoint(A,B) ) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t3_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_44,lemma,
    ! [A] :
      ( subset(A,empty_set)
     => A = empty_set ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t3_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_45,lemma,
    ! [A,B] : set_difference(set_union2(A,B),B) = set_difference(A,B),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t40_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_46,lemma,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( subset(A,B)
     => B = set_union2(A,set_difference(B,A)) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t45_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_47,lemma,
    ! [A,B] : set_difference(A,set_difference(A,B)) = set_intersection2(A,B),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t48_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_48,axiom,
    ! [A] : set_difference(empty_set,A) = empty_set,
    file('SEU140+2.p',t4_boole)).
fof(satresetcop_input_49,lemma,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( ~ ( ~ disjoint(A,B)
          & ! [C] : ~ in(C,set_intersection2(A,B)) )
      & ~ ( ? [C] : in(C,set_intersection2(A,B))
          & disjoint(A,B) ) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t4_xboole_0)).
fof(satresetcop_input_50,lemma,
    ! [A,B] :
      ~ ( subset(A,B)
        & proper_subset(B,A) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t60_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_51,conjecture,
    ! [A,B,C] :
      ( ( subset(A,B)
        & disjoint(B,C) )
     => disjoint(A,C) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t63_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_negated_conjecture_51,negated_conjecture,
    ~ (! [A,B,C] :
      ( ( subset(A,B)
        & disjoint(B,C) )
     => disjoint(A,C) )),
    inference(negate,[status(cth)],[satresetcop_input_51])).
fof(satresetcop_input_52,axiom,
    ! [A] :
      ( empty(A)
     => A = empty_set ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t6_boole)).
fof(satresetcop_input_53,axiom,
    ! [A,B] :
      ~ ( in(A,B)
        & empty(B) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t7_boole)).
fof(satresetcop_input_54,lemma,
    ! [A,B] : subset(A,set_union2(A,B)),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t7_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_input_55,axiom,
    ! [A,B] :
      ~ ( empty(A)
        & A != B
        & empty(B) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t8_boole)).
fof(satresetcop_input_56,lemma,
    ! [A,B,C] :
      ( ( subset(A,B)
        & subset(C,B) )
     => subset(set_union2(A,C),B) ),
    file('SEU140+2.p',t8_xboole_1)).
fof(satresetcop_cnf_matrix,plain,
    ! [X1,X2,X3,X4] :
    ( (( subset(f_skolem_11,f_skolem_12) ))
    & (( disjoint(f_skolem_12,f_skolem_13) ))
    & (( ~ disjoint(f_skolem_11,f_skolem_13) ))
    & (( equal___(set_difference(X1,X2),set_difference(X3,X4)) | ~ equal___(X1,X3) | ~ equal___(X2,X4) ))
    & (( equal___(set_intersection2(X1,X2),set_intersection2(X3,X4)) | ~ equal___(X1,X3) | ~ equal___(X2,X4) ))
    & (( equal___(set_union2(X1,X2),set_union2(X3,X4)) | ~ equal___(X1,X3) | ~ equal___(X2,X4) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,X1) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(X1,X2) | equal___(X2,X1) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,X2) | ~ equal___(X1,X3) | ~ equal___(X3,X2) ))
    & (( proper_subset(X1,X2) | ~ proper_subset(X3,X4) | ~ equal___(X3,X1) | ~ equal___(X4,X2) ))
    & (( in(X1,X2) | ~ in(X3,X4) | ~ equal___(X3,X1) | ~ equal___(X4,X2) ))
    & (( empty(X1) | ~ equal___(X2,X1) | ~ empty(X2) ))
    & (( subset(X1,X2) | ~ subset(X3,X4) | ~ equal___(X3,X1) | ~ equal___(X4,X2) ))
    & (( disjoint(X1,X2) | ~ disjoint(X3,X4) | ~ equal___(X3,X1) | ~ equal___(X4,X2) ))
    & (( ~ in(X1,X2) | ~ in(X2,X1) ))
    & (( ~ proper_subset(X1,X2) | ~ proper_subset(X2,X1) ))
    & (( equal___(set_union2(X1,X2),set_union2(X2,X1)) ))
    & (( equal___(set_intersection2(X1,X2),set_intersection2(X2,X1)) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(X1,X2) | subset(X1,X2) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(X1,X2) | subset(X2,X1) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,X2) | ~ subset(X1,X2) | ~ subset(X2,X1) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(X1,empty_set) | ~ in(X2,X1) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,empty_set) | in(f_skolem_1(X1),X1) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(X1,set_union2(X2,X3)) | in(X4,X1) | ~ in(X4,X2) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(X1,set_union2(X2,X3)) | in(X4,X1) | ~ in(X4,X3) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(X1,set_union2(X2,X3)) | ~ in(X4,X1) | in(X4,X2) | in(X4,X3) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,set_union2(X2,X3)) | ~ in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X1) | ~ in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X2) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,set_union2(X2,X3)) | ~ in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X1) | ~ in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X3) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,set_union2(X2,X3)) | in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X1) | in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X2) | in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X3) ))
    & (( subset(X1,X2) | in(f_skolem_3(X2,X1),X1) ))
    & (( subset(X1,X2) | ~ in(f_skolem_3(X2,X1),X2) ))
    & (( ~ subset(X1,X2) | ~ in(X3,X1) | in(X3,X2) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | ~ in(X4,X1) | in(X4,X2) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | ~ in(X4,X1) | in(X4,X3) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | in(X4,X1) | ~ in(X4,X2) | ~ in(X4,X3) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X1) | in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X2) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X1) | in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X3) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | ~ in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X1) | ~ in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X2) | ~ in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X3) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(X1,set_difference(X2,X3)) | ~ in(X4,X1) | in(X4,X2) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(X1,set_difference(X2,X3)) | ~ in(X4,X1) | ~ in(X4,X3) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(X1,set_difference(X2,X3)) | in(X4,X1) | ~ in(X4,X2) | in(X4,X3) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,set_difference(X2,X3)) | in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X1) | in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X2) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,set_difference(X2,X3)) | in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X1) | ~ in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X3) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,set_difference(X2,X3)) | ~ in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X1) | ~ in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X2) | in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X3) ))
    & (( ~ disjoint(X1,X2) | equal___(set_intersection2(X1,X2),empty_set) ))
    & (( disjoint(X1,X2) | ~ equal___(set_intersection2(X1,X2),empty_set) ))
    & (( ~ proper_subset(X1,X2) | subset(X1,X2) ))
    & (( ~ proper_subset(X1,X2) | ~ equal___(X1,X2) ))
    & (( proper_subset(X1,X2) | ~ subset(X1,X2) | equal___(X1,X2) ))
    & (( empty(empty_set) ))
    & (( empty(X1) | ~ empty(set_union2(X1,X2)) ))
    & (( empty(X1) | ~ empty(set_union2(X2,X1)) ))
    & (( equal___(set_union2(X1,X1),X1) ))
    & (( equal___(set_intersection2(X1,X1),X1) ))
    & (( ~ proper_subset(X1,X1) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(set_difference(X1,X2),empty_set) | subset(X1,X2) ))
    & (( equal___(set_difference(X1,X2),empty_set) | ~ subset(X1,X2) ))
    & (( empty(f_skolem_6) ))
    & (( ~ empty(f_skolem_7) ))
    & (( subset(X1,X1) ))
    & (( ~ disjoint(X1,X2) | disjoint(X2,X1) ))
    & (( ~ subset(X1,X2) | equal___(set_union2(X1,X2),X2) ))
    & (( subset(set_intersection2(X1,X2),X1) ))
    & (( subset(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | ~ subset(X1,X2) | ~ subset(X1,X3) ))
    & (( equal___(set_union2(X1,empty_set),X1) ))
    & (( subset(X1,X2) | ~ subset(X1,X3) | ~ subset(X3,X2) ))
    & (( ~ subset(X1,X2) | subset(set_intersection2(X1,X3),set_intersection2(X2,X3)) ))
    & (( ~ subset(X1,X2) | equal___(set_intersection2(X1,X2),X1) ))
    & (( equal___(set_intersection2(X1,empty_set),empty_set) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,X2) | ~ in(f_skolem_8(X2,X1),X1) | ~ in(f_skolem_8(X2,X1),X2) ))
    & (( equal___(X1,X2) | in(f_skolem_8(X2,X1),X1) | in(f_skolem_8(X2,X1),X2) ))
    & (( subset(empty_set,X1) ))
    & (( ~ subset(X1,X2) | subset(set_difference(X1,X3),set_difference(X2,X3)) ))
    & (( subset(set_difference(X1,X2),X1) ))
    & (( ~ equal___(set_difference(X1,X2),empty_set) | subset(X1,X2) ))
    & (( equal___(set_difference(X1,X2),empty_set) | ~ subset(X1,X2) ))
    & (( equal___(set_union2(X1,set_difference(X2,X1)),set_union2(X1,X2)) ))
    & (( equal___(set_difference(X1,empty_set),X1) ))
    & (( disjoint(X1,X2) | in(f_skolem_9(X2,X1),X1) ))
    & (( disjoint(X1,X2) | in(f_skolem_9(X2,X1),X2) ))
    & (( ~ disjoint(X1,X2) | ~ in(X3,X1) | ~ in(X3,X2) ))
    & (( ~ subset(X1,empty_set) | equal___(X1,empty_set) ))
    & (( equal___(set_difference(set_union2(X1,X2),X2),set_difference(X1,X2)) ))
    & (( ~ subset(X1,X2) | equal___(X2,set_union2(X1,set_difference(X2,X1))) ))
    & (( equal___(set_difference(X1,set_difference(X1,X2)),set_intersection2(X1,X2)) ))
    & (( equal___(set_difference(empty_set,X1),empty_set) ))
    & (( disjoint(X1,X2) | in(f_skolem_10(X2,X1),set_intersection2(X1,X2)) ))
    & (( ~ in(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | ~ disjoint(X2,X3) ))
    & (( ~ subset(X1,X2) | ~ proper_subset(X2,X1) ))
    & (( ~ empty(X1) | equal___(X1,empty_set) ))
    & (( ~ in(X1,X2) | ~ empty(X2) ))
    & (( subset(X1,set_union2(X1,X2)) ))
    & (( ~ empty(X1) | equal___(X1,X2) | ~ empty(X2) ))
    & (( subset(set_union2(X1,X2),X3) | ~ subset(X1,X3) | ~ subset(X2,X3) )) ),
    inference(clausify,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[f_skolem_1,f_skolem_10,f_skolem_11,f_skolem_12,f_skolem_13,f_skolem_2,f_skolem_3,f_skolem_4,f_skolem_5,f_skolem_6,f_skolem_7,f_skolem_8,f_skolem_9]),new_symbols(predicate,[equal___])],[satresetcop_input_1,satresetcop_input_2,satresetcop_input_3,satresetcop_input_4,satresetcop_input_5,satresetcop_input_6,satresetcop_input_7,satresetcop_input_8,satresetcop_input_9,satresetcop_input_10,satresetcop_input_11,satresetcop_input_12,satresetcop_input_13,satresetcop_input_14,satresetcop_input_15,satresetcop_input_16,satresetcop_input_17,satresetcop_input_18,satresetcop_input_19,satresetcop_input_20,satresetcop_input_21,satresetcop_input_22,satresetcop_input_23,satresetcop_input_24,satresetcop_input_25,satresetcop_input_26,satresetcop_input_27,satresetcop_input_28,satresetcop_input_29,satresetcop_input_30,satresetcop_input_31,satresetcop_input_32,satresetcop_input_33,satresetcop_input_34,satresetcop_input_35,satresetcop_input_36,satresetcop_input_37,satresetcop_input_38,satresetcop_input_39,satresetcop_input_40,satresetcop_input_41,satresetcop_input_42,satresetcop_input_43,satresetcop_input_44,satresetcop_input_45,satresetcop_input_46,satresetcop_input_47,satresetcop_input_48,satresetcop_input_49,satresetcop_input_50,satresetcop_negated_conjecture_51,satresetcop_input_52,satresetcop_input_53,satresetcop_input_54,satresetcop_input_55,satresetcop_input_56])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_1,plain,
    ( subset(f_skolem_11,f_skolem_12) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_2,plain,
    ( disjoint(f_skolem_12,f_skolem_13) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_3,plain,
    ( ~ disjoint(f_skolem_11,f_skolem_13) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_4,plain,
    ( equal___(set_difference(X1,X2),set_difference(X3,X4)) | ~ equal___(X1,X3) | ~ equal___(X2,X4) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_5,plain,
    ( equal___(set_intersection2(X1,X2),set_intersection2(X3,X4)) | ~ equal___(X1,X3) | ~ equal___(X2,X4) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_6,plain,
    ( equal___(set_union2(X1,X2),set_union2(X3,X4)) | ~ equal___(X1,X3) | ~ equal___(X2,X4) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_7,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_8,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(X1,X2) | equal___(X2,X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_9,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,X2) | ~ equal___(X1,X3) | ~ equal___(X3,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_10,plain,
    ( proper_subset(X1,X2) | ~ proper_subset(X3,X4) | ~ equal___(X3,X1) | ~ equal___(X4,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_11,plain,
    ( in(X1,X2) | ~ in(X3,X4) | ~ equal___(X3,X1) | ~ equal___(X4,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_12,plain,
    ( empty(X1) | ~ equal___(X2,X1) | ~ empty(X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_13,plain,
    ( subset(X1,X2) | ~ subset(X3,X4) | ~ equal___(X3,X1) | ~ equal___(X4,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_14,plain,
    ( disjoint(X1,X2) | ~ disjoint(X3,X4) | ~ equal___(X3,X1) | ~ equal___(X4,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_15,plain,
    ( ~ in(X1,X2) | ~ in(X2,X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_16,plain,
    ( ~ proper_subset(X1,X2) | ~ proper_subset(X2,X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_17,plain,
    ( equal___(set_union2(X1,X2),set_union2(X2,X1)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_18,plain,
    ( equal___(set_intersection2(X1,X2),set_intersection2(X2,X1)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_19,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(X1,X2) | subset(X1,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_20,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(X1,X2) | subset(X2,X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_21,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,X2) | ~ subset(X1,X2) | ~ subset(X2,X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_22,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(X1,empty_set) | ~ in(X2,X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_23,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,empty_set) | in(f_skolem_1(X1),X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_24,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(X1,set_union2(X2,X3)) | in(X4,X1) | ~ in(X4,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_25,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(X1,set_union2(X2,X3)) | in(X4,X1) | ~ in(X4,X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_26,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(X1,set_union2(X2,X3)) | ~ in(X4,X1) | in(X4,X2) | in(X4,X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_27,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,set_union2(X2,X3)) | ~ in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X1) | ~ in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_28,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,set_union2(X2,X3)) | ~ in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X1) | ~ in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_29,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,set_union2(X2,X3)) | in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X1) | in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X2) | in(f_skolem_2(X1,X3,X2),X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_30,plain,
    ( subset(X1,X2) | in(f_skolem_3(X2,X1),X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_31,plain,
    ( subset(X1,X2) | ~ in(f_skolem_3(X2,X1),X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_32,plain,
    ( ~ subset(X1,X2) | ~ in(X3,X1) | in(X3,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_33,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | ~ in(X4,X1) | in(X4,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_34,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | ~ in(X4,X1) | in(X4,X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_35,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | in(X4,X1) | ~ in(X4,X2) | ~ in(X4,X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_36,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X1) | in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_37,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X1) | in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_38,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | ~ in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X1) | ~ in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X2) | ~ in(f_skolem_4(X1,X3,X2),X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_39,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(X1,set_difference(X2,X3)) | ~ in(X4,X1) | in(X4,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_40,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(X1,set_difference(X2,X3)) | ~ in(X4,X1) | ~ in(X4,X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_41,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(X1,set_difference(X2,X3)) | in(X4,X1) | ~ in(X4,X2) | in(X4,X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_42,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,set_difference(X2,X3)) | in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X1) | in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_43,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,set_difference(X2,X3)) | in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X1) | ~ in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_44,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,set_difference(X2,X3)) | ~ in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X1) | ~ in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X2) | in(f_skolem_5(X1,X3,X2),X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_45,plain,
    ( ~ disjoint(X1,X2) | equal___(set_intersection2(X1,X2),empty_set) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_46,plain,
    ( disjoint(X1,X2) | ~ equal___(set_intersection2(X1,X2),empty_set) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_47,plain,
    ( ~ proper_subset(X1,X2) | subset(X1,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_48,plain,
    ( ~ proper_subset(X1,X2) | ~ equal___(X1,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_49,plain,
    ( proper_subset(X1,X2) | ~ subset(X1,X2) | equal___(X1,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_50,plain,
    ( empty(empty_set) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_51,plain,
    ( empty(X1) | ~ empty(set_union2(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_52,plain,
    ( empty(X1) | ~ empty(set_union2(X2,X1)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_53,plain,
    ( equal___(set_union2(X1,X1),X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_54,plain,
    ( equal___(set_intersection2(X1,X1),X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_55,plain,
    ( ~ proper_subset(X1,X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_56,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(set_difference(X1,X2),empty_set) | subset(X1,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_57,plain,
    ( equal___(set_difference(X1,X2),empty_set) | ~ subset(X1,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_58,plain,
    ( empty(f_skolem_6) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_59,plain,
    ( ~ empty(f_skolem_7) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_60,plain,
    ( subset(X1,X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_61,plain,
    ( ~ disjoint(X1,X2) | disjoint(X2,X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_62,plain,
    ( ~ subset(X1,X2) | equal___(set_union2(X1,X2),X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_63,plain,
    ( subset(set_intersection2(X1,X2),X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_64,plain,
    ( subset(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | ~ subset(X1,X2) | ~ subset(X1,X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_65,plain,
    ( equal___(set_union2(X1,empty_set),X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_66,plain,
    ( subset(X1,X2) | ~ subset(X1,X3) | ~ subset(X3,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_67,plain,
    ( ~ subset(X1,X2) | subset(set_intersection2(X1,X3),set_intersection2(X2,X3)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_68,plain,
    ( ~ subset(X1,X2) | equal___(set_intersection2(X1,X2),X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_69,plain,
    ( equal___(set_intersection2(X1,empty_set),empty_set) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_70,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,X2) | ~ in(f_skolem_8(X2,X1),X1) | ~ in(f_skolem_8(X2,X1),X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_71,plain,
    ( equal___(X1,X2) | in(f_skolem_8(X2,X1),X1) | in(f_skolem_8(X2,X1),X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_72,plain,
    ( subset(empty_set,X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_73,plain,
    ( ~ subset(X1,X2) | subset(set_difference(X1,X3),set_difference(X2,X3)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_74,plain,
    ( subset(set_difference(X1,X2),X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_75,plain,
    ( ~ equal___(set_difference(X1,X2),empty_set) | subset(X1,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_76,plain,
    ( equal___(set_difference(X1,X2),empty_set) | ~ subset(X1,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_77,plain,
    ( equal___(set_union2(X1,set_difference(X2,X1)),set_union2(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_78,plain,
    ( equal___(set_difference(X1,empty_set),X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_79,plain,
    ( disjoint(X1,X2) | in(f_skolem_9(X2,X1),X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_80,plain,
    ( disjoint(X1,X2) | in(f_skolem_9(X2,X1),X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_81,plain,
    ( ~ disjoint(X1,X2) | ~ in(X3,X1) | ~ in(X3,X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_82,plain,
    ( ~ subset(X1,empty_set) | equal___(X1,empty_set) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_83,plain,
    ( equal___(set_difference(set_union2(X1,X2),X2),set_difference(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_84,plain,
    ( ~ subset(X1,X2) | equal___(X2,set_union2(X1,set_difference(X2,X1))) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_85,plain,
    ( equal___(set_difference(X1,set_difference(X1,X2)),set_intersection2(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_86,plain,
    ( equal___(set_difference(empty_set,X1),empty_set) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_87,plain,
    ( disjoint(X1,X2) | in(f_skolem_10(X2,X1),set_intersection2(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_88,plain,
    ( ~ in(X1,set_intersection2(X2,X3)) | ~ disjoint(X2,X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_89,plain,
    ( ~ subset(X1,X2) | ~ proper_subset(X2,X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_90,plain,
    ( ~ empty(X1) | equal___(X1,empty_set) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_91,plain,
    ( ~ in(X1,X2) | ~ empty(X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_92,plain,
    ( subset(X1,set_union2(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_93,plain,
    ( ~ empty(X1) | equal___(X1,X2) | ~ empty(X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_matrix_94,plain,
    ( subset(set_union2(X1,X2),X3) | ~ subset(X1,X3) | ~ subset(X2,X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_cnf_matrix])).
cnf(satresetcop_ground_1,plain,
    ( ~ subset(f_skolem_11, f_skolem_12) | ~ in(f_skolem_9(f_skolem_13, f_skolem_11), f_skolem_11) | in(f_skolem_9(f_skolem_13, f_skolem_11), f_skolem_12) ),
    inference(instantiate,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_matrix_32])).
cnf(satresetcop_ground_2,plain,
    ( ~ disjoint(f_skolem_12, f_skolem_13) | ~ in(f_skolem_9(f_skolem_13, f_skolem_11), f_skolem_13) | ~ in(f_skolem_9(f_skolem_13, f_skolem_11), f_skolem_12) ),
    inference(instantiate,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_matrix_81])).
cnf(satresetcop_ground_3,plain,
    ( disjoint(f_skolem_11, f_skolem_13) | in(f_skolem_9(f_skolem_13, f_skolem_11), f_skolem_13) ),
    inference(instantiate,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_matrix_80])).
cnf(satresetcop_ground_4,plain,
    ( disjoint(f_skolem_11, f_skolem_13) | in(f_skolem_9(f_skolem_13, f_skolem_11), f_skolem_11) ),
    inference(instantiate,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_matrix_79])).
cnf(satresetcop_ground_5,plain,
    ( disjoint(f_skolem_12, f_skolem_13) ),
    inference(instantiate,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_matrix_2])).
cnf(satresetcop_ground_6,plain,
    ( subset(f_skolem_11, f_skolem_12) ),
    inference(instantiate,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_matrix_1])).
cnf(satresetcop_ground_7,plain,
    ( ~ disjoint(f_skolem_11, f_skolem_13) ),
    inference(instantiate,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_matrix_3])).
cnf(satresetcop_false,plain,
    $false,
    inference(sat_refutation,[status(thm)],[satresetcop_ground_1,satresetcop_ground_2,satresetcop_ground_3,satresetcop_ground_4,satresetcop_ground_5,satresetcop_ground_6,satresetcop_ground_7]),
    [proof]).
% SZS output end CNFRefutation for SEU140+2

SPASS-SCL 0.1.1

Solution for COM003+1

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file COM003+1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name COM003+1.p from annotated formula p4
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'c_136' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture prove_this as the proved formula
SUCCESS: 'ren12_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren12'
SUCCESS: 'ren13_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren13'
SUCCESS: 'ren14_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren14'
SUCCESS: 'ren15_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren15'
SUCCESS: 'ren11_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren11'
SUCCESS: 'ren9_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren9'
SUCCESS: 'ren10_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren10'
SUCCESS: 'ren1_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren1'
SUCCESS: 'ren2_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren2'
SUCCESS: 'ren3_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren3'
SUCCESS: 'ren4_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren4'
SUCCESS: 'ren5_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren5'
SUCCESS: 'ren6_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren6'
SUCCESS: 'ren8_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren8'
SUCCESS: 'ren7_defn' is a symbol definition of 'ren7'
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% FILE RECORD
fof(p4,axiom,
    (? [X5] :
(program(X5)
& ! [X2] :
(((program(X2)
& halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts2(X5,X2)
& outputs(X5,good)) ) 
& ((program(X2)
& ~ halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts2(X5,X2)
& outputs(X5,bad)) ) ) ) 
=> ? [X6] :
(program(X6)
& ! [X2] :
(((program(X2)
& halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> ~ halts2(X6,X2)) 
& ((program(X2)
& ~ halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts2(X6,X2)
& outputs(X6,bad)) ) ) ) ) ,
    file('COM003+1.p',p4) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(p4_elimTB,axiom,
    (? [X1] :
(program(X1)
& ! [X2] :
(((program(X2)
& halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts2(X1,X2)
& outputs(X1,good)) ) 
& ((program(X2)
& ~ halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts2(X1,X2)
& outputs(X1,bad)) ) ) ) 
=> ? [X3] :
(program(X3)
& ! [X4] :
(((program(X4)
& halts2(X4,X4)) 
=> ~ halts2(X3,X4)) 
& ((program(X4)
& ~ halts2(X4,X4)) 
=> (halts2(X3,X4)
& outputs(X3,bad)) ) ) ) ) ,
    inference(elimTB,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[p4])]) ).

% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren12_defn,definition,
    ! [X2] :
! [X1] :
(ren12(X2,X1)
<= ((program(X2)
& halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts2(X1,X2)
& outputs(X1,good)) ) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren12])],[p4_elimTB]) ).

% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren13_defn,definition,
    ! [X2] :
! [X1] :
(ren13(X2,X1)
<= ((program(X2)
& ~ halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts2(X1,X2)
& outputs(X1,bad)) ) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren13])],[p4_elimTB]) ).

% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren14_defn,definition,
    ! [X3] :
! [X4] :
(ren14(X3,X4)
=> (halts2(X3,X4)
& outputs(X3,bad)) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren14])],[p4_elimTB]) ).

% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren15_defn,definition,
    ! [X3] :
(ren15(X3)
=> (program(X3)
& ! [X4] :
(((program(X4)
& halts2(X4,X4)) 
=> ~ halts2(X3,X4)) 
& ((program(X4)
& ~ halts2(X4,X4)) 
=> ren14(X3,X4)) ) ) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren15])],[p4_elimTB]) ).

% FOF RENAMING INFERENCE
fof(p4_renObv,axiom,
    (? [X1] :
(program(X1)
& ! [X2] :
(ren12(X2,X1)
& ren13(X2,X1)) ) 
=> ? [X3] :
ren15(X3)) ,
    inference(renaming,[status(esa)],[p4_elimTB,ren12_defn,ren13_defn,ren14_defn,ren15_defn]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(p4_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,axiom,
    (! [X1] :
(~ program(X1)
| (? [X2] :
~ ren12(X2,X1)
| ? [X3] :
~ ren13(X3,X1)) ) 
| ? [X4] :
ren15(X4)) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[p4_renObv]) ).

% FOF SKOLEM INFERENCE. WIP!!
fof(p4_skol,axiom,
    (! [X1] :
(~ program(X1)
| (~ ren12(skf9(X1),X1)
| ~ ren13(skf10(X1),X1)) ) 
| ren15(skc11)) ,
    inference(skolemize, [status(esa),
                          new_symbols(skolem,[skf9,skf10,skc11]),
                          skolemize(X2,skf9(X1)),
                          skolemize(X3,skf10(X1)),
                          skolemize(X4,skc11)], [p4_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_40,plain,
    ~program(X0) | ~ren12(skf9(X0),X0) | ~ren13(skf10(X0),X0) | ren15(skc11),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[p4_skol])]) ).

% FILE RECORD
fof(p3,axiom,
    (? [X4] :
(program(X4)
& ! [X2] :
(((program(X2)
& halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts3(X4,X2,X2)
& outputs(X4,good)) ) 
& ((program(X2)
& ~ halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts3(X4,X2,X2)
& outputs(X4,bad)) ) ) ) 
=> ? [X5] :
(program(X5)
& ! [X2] :
(((program(X2)
& halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts2(X5,X2)
& outputs(X5,good)) ) 
& ((program(X2)
& ~ halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts2(X5,X2)
& outputs(X5,bad)) ) ) ) ) ,
    file('COM003+1.p',p3) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(p3_elimTB,axiom,
    (? [X1] :
(program(X1)
& ! [X2] :
(((program(X2)
& halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts3(X1,X2,X2)
& outputs(X1,good)) ) 
& ((program(X2)
& ~ halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts3(X1,X2,X2)
& outputs(X1,bad)) ) ) ) 
=> ? [X3] :
(program(X3)
& ! [X4] :
(((program(X4)
& halts2(X4,X4)) 
=> (halts2(X3,X4)
& outputs(X3,good)) ) 
& ((program(X4)
& ~ halts2(X4,X4)) 
=> (halts2(X3,X4)
& outputs(X3,bad)) ) ) ) ) ,
    inference(elimTB,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[p3])]) ).

% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren11_defn,definition,
    ! [X3] :
(ren11(X3)
=> (program(X3)
& ! [X4] :
(((program(X4)
& halts2(X4,X4)) 
=> ren9(X3,X4)) 
& ((program(X4)
& ~ halts2(X4,X4)) 
=> ren10(X3,X4)) ) ) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren11])],[p3_elimTB]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren11_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
(~ ren11(X1)
| (program(X1)
& (! [X2] :
((~ program(X2)
| ~ halts2(X2,X2)) 
| ren9(X1,X2)) 
& ! [X3] :
((~ program(X3)
| halts2(X3,X3)) 
| ren10(X1,X3)) ) ) ) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren11_defn]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_26,plain,
    ~ren11(X0) | ~program(X1) | ~halts2(X1,X1) | ren9(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren11_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren9_defn,definition,
    ! [X3] :
! [X4] :
(ren9(X3,X4)
=> (halts2(X3,X4)
& outputs(X3,good)) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren9])],[p3_elimTB]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren9_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
(~ ren9(X1,X2)
| (halts2(X1,X2)
& outputs(X1,good)) ) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren9_defn]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_21,plain,
    ~ren9(X0,X1) | halts2(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren9_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_27,plain,
    ~ren11(X0) | ~program(X1) | halts2(X1,X1) | ren10(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren11_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren10_defn,definition,
    ! [X3] :
! [X4] :
(ren10(X3,X4)
=> (halts2(X3,X4)
& outputs(X3,bad)) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren10])],[p3_elimTB]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren10_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
(~ ren10(X1,X2)
| (halts2(X1,X2)
& outputs(X1,bad)) ) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren10_defn]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_23,plain,
    ~ren10(X0,X1) | halts2(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren10_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_46,plain,
    ~ren11(X0) | ~program(X1) | halts2(X1,X1) | halts2(X0,X1),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_27, c_23]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_104,plain,
    ~ren11(X0) | ~program(X1) | halts2(X0,X1),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_26, c_21, c_46]) ).


% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren13_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
(((program(X1)
& ~ halts2(X1,X1)) 
& (~ halts2(X2,X1)
| ~ outputs(X2,bad)) ) 
| ren13(X1,X2)) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren13_defn]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_34,plain,
    ~halts2(X0,X1) | ~outputs(X0,bad) | ren13(X1,X0),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren13_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_32,plain,
    program(X0) | ren13(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren13_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_128,plain,
    ~ren11(X0) | ~outputs(X0,bad) | ren13(X1,X0),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_104, c_34, c_32]) ).


% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_25,plain,
    ~ren11(X0) | program(X0),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren11_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_22,plain,
    ~ren9(X0,X1) | outputs(X0,good),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren9_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FILE RECORD
fof(p1,axiom,
    (? [X1] :
(algorithm(X1)
& ! [X2] :
(program(X2)
=> ! [X3] :
decides(X1,X2,X3)) ) 
=> ? [X4] :
(program(X4)
& ! [X2] :
(program(X2)
=> ! [X3] :
decides(X4,X2,X3)) ) ) ,
    file('COM003+1.p',p1) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(p1_elimTB,axiom,
    (? [X1] :
(algorithm(X1)
& ! [X2] :
(program(X2)
=> ! [X3] :
decides(X1,X2,X3)) ) 
=> ? [X4] :
(program(X4)
& ! [X5] :
(program(X5)
=> ! [X6] :
decides(X4,X5,X6)) ) ) ,
    inference(elimTB,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[p1])]) ).

% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren1_defn,definition,
    ! [X2] :
! [X1] :
(ren1(X2,X1)
<= (program(X2)
=> ! [X3] :
decides(X1,X2,X3)) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren1])],[p1_elimTB]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren1_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
((program(X1)
& ? [X3] :
~ decides(X2,X1,X3)) 
| ren1(X1,X2)) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren1_defn]) ).

% FOF SKOLEM INFERENCE. WIP!!
fof(ren1_skol,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
((program(X1)
& ~ decides(X2,X1,skf1(X1,X2))) 
| ren1(X1,X2)) ,
    inference(skolemize, [status(esa),
                          new_symbols(skolem,[skf1]),
                          skolemize(X3,skf1(X1,X2))], [ren1_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_1,plain,
    program(X0) | ren1(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren1_skol])]) ).

% FILE RECORD
fof(prove_this,conjecture,
    ~ ? [X7] :
(algorithm(X7)
& ! [X8] :
(program(X8)
=> ! [X9] :
decides(X7,X8,X9)) ) ,
    file('COM003+1.p',prove_this) ).

% NEGATING CONJECTURE
fof(prove_this_nc,negated_conjecture,
    ? [X7] :
(algorithm(X7)
& ! [X8] :
(program(X8)
=> ! [X9] :
decides(X7,X8,X9)) ) ,
    inference(negating_conjecture,[status(cth)],[prove_this]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(prove_this_nc_elimTB,negated_conjecture,
    ? [X1] :
(algorithm(X1)
& ! [X2] :
(program(X2)
=> ! [X3] :
decides(X1,X2,X3)) ) ,
    inference(elimTB,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[prove_this_nc])]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(prove_this_nc_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,negated_conjecture,
    ? [X1] :
(algorithm(X1)
& ! [X2] :
(~ program(X2)
| ! [X3] :
decides(X1,X2,X3)) ) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[prove_this_nc_elimTB]) ).

% FOF SKOLEM INFERENCE. WIP!!
fof(prove_this_nc_skol,negated_conjecture,
    (algorithm(skc12)
& ! [X2] :
(~ program(X2)
| ! [X3] :
decides(skc12,X2,X3)) ) ,
    inference(skolemize, [status(esa),
                          new_symbols(skolem,[skc12]),
                          skolemize(X1,skc12)], [prove_this_nc_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_42,plain,
    ~program(X0) | decides(skc12,X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[prove_this_nc_skol])]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_2,plain,
    ~decides(X0,X1,skf1(X1,X0)) | ren1(X1,X0),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren1_skol])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_55,plain,
    ~program(X0) | ren1(X0,skc12),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_42, c_2]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_56,plain,
    ren1(X0,skc12),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_1, c_55]) ).


% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren2_defn,definition,
    ! [X4] :
(ren2(X4)
=> (program(X4)
& ! [X5] :
(program(X5)
=> ! [X6] :
decides(X4,X5,X6)) ) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren2])],[p1_elimTB]) ).

% FOF RENAMING INFERENCE
fof(p1_renObv,axiom,
    (? [X1] :
(algorithm(X1)
& ! [X2] :
ren1(X2,X1)) 
=> ? [X4] :
ren2(X4)) ,
    inference(renaming,[status(esa)],[p1_elimTB,ren1_defn,ren2_defn]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(p1_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,axiom,
    (! [X1] :
(~ algorithm(X1)
| ? [X2] :
~ ren1(X2,X1)) 
| ? [X3] :
ren2(X3)) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[p1_renObv]) ).

% FOF SKOLEM INFERENCE. WIP!!
fof(p1_skol,axiom,
    (! [X1] :
(~ algorithm(X1)
| ~ ren1(skf2(X1),X1)) 
| ren2(skc3)) ,
    inference(skolemize, [status(esa),
                          new_symbols(skolem,[skf2,skc3]),
                          skolemize(X2,skf2(X1)),
                          skolemize(X3,skc3)], [p1_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_5,plain,
    ~algorithm(X0) | ~ren1(skf2(X0),X0) | ren2(skc3),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[p1_skol])]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_41,plain,
    algorithm(skc12),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[prove_this_nc_skol])]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren2_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
(~ ren2(X1)
| (program(X1)
& ! [X2] :
(~ program(X2)
| ! [X3] :
decides(X1,X2,X3)) ) ) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren2_defn]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_3,plain,
    ~ren2(X0) | program(X0),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren2_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FILE RECORD
fof(p2,axiom,
    ! [X4] :
((program(X4)
& ! [X2] :
(program(X2)
=> ! [X3] :
decides(X4,X2,X3)) ) 
=> ! [X2] :
! [X3] :
(((program(X2)
& halts2(X2,X3)) 
=> (halts3(X4,X2,X3)
& outputs(X4,good)) ) 
& ((program(X2)
& ~ halts2(X2,X3)) 
=> (halts3(X4,X2,X3)
& outputs(X4,bad)) ) ) ) ,
    file('COM003+1.p',p2) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(p2_elimTB,axiom,
    ! [X1] :
((program(X1)
& ! [X2] :
(program(X2)
=> ! [X3] :
decides(X1,X2,X3)) ) 
=> ! [X4] :
! [X5] :
(((program(X4)
& halts2(X4,X5)) 
=> (halts3(X1,X4,X5)
& outputs(X1,good)) ) 
& ((program(X4)
& ~ halts2(X4,X5)) 
=> (halts3(X1,X4,X5)
& outputs(X1,bad)) ) ) ) ,
    inference(elimTB,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[p2])]) ).

% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren3_defn,definition,
    ! [X2] :
! [X1] :
(ren3(X2,X1)
<= (program(X2)
=> ! [X3] :
decides(X1,X2,X3)) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren3])],[p2_elimTB]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren3_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
((program(X1)
& ? [X3] :
~ decides(X2,X1,X3)) 
| ren3(X1,X2)) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren3_defn]) ).

% FOF SKOLEM INFERENCE. WIP!!
fof(ren3_skol,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
((program(X1)
& ~ decides(X2,X1,skf4(X1,X2))) 
| ren3(X1,X2)) ,
    inference(skolemize, [status(esa),
                          new_symbols(skolem,[skf4]),
                          skolemize(X3,skf4(X1,X2))], [ren3_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_6,plain,
    program(X0) | ren3(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren3_skol])]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_4,plain,
    ~ren2(X0) | ~program(X1) | decides(X0,X1,X2),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren2_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_7,plain,
    ~decides(X0,X1,skf4(X1,X0)) | ren3(X1,X0),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren3_skol])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_47,plain,
    ~ren2(X0) | ~program(X1) | ren3(X1,X0),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_4, c_7]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_48,plain,
    ~ren2(X0) | ren3(X1,X0),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_6, c_47]) ).


% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren4_defn,definition,
    ! [X1] :
! [X4] :
! [X5] :
(ren4(X1,X4,X5)
=> (halts3(X1,X4,X5)
& outputs(X1,good)) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren4])],[p2_elimTB]) ).

% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren5_defn,definition,
    ! [X1] :
! [X4] :
! [X5] :
(ren5(X1,X4,X5)
=> (halts3(X1,X4,X5)
& outputs(X1,bad)) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren5])],[p2_elimTB]) ).

% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren6_defn,definition,
    ! [X4] :
! [X5] :
! [X1] :
(ren6(X4,X5,X1)
=> (((program(X4)
& halts2(X4,X5)) 
=> ren4(X1,X4,X5)) 
& ((program(X4)
& ~ halts2(X4,X5)) 
=> ren5(X1,X4,X5)) ) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren6])],[p2_elimTB]) ).

% FOF RENAMING INFERENCE
fof(p2_renObv,axiom,
    ! [X1] :
((program(X1)
& ! [X2] :
ren3(X2,X1)) 
=> ! [X4] :
! [X5] :
ren6(X4,X5,X1)) ,
    inference(renaming,[status(esa)],[p2_elimTB,ren3_defn,ren4_defn,ren5_defn,ren6_defn]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(p2_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,axiom,
    ! [X1] :
((~ program(X1)
| ? [X2] :
~ ren3(X2,X1)) 
| ! [X3] :
! [X4] :
ren6(X3,X4,X1)) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[p2_renObv]) ).

% FOF SKOLEM INFERENCE. WIP!!
fof(p2_skol,axiom,
    ! [X1] :
((~ program(X1)
| ~ ren3(skf5(X1),X1)) 
| ! [X3] :
! [X4] :
ren6(X3,X4,X1)) ,
    inference(skolemize, [status(esa),
                          new_symbols(skolem,[skf5]),
                          skolemize(X2,skf5(X1))], [p2_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_14,plain,
    ~program(X0) | ~ren3(skf5(X0),X0) | ren6(X1,X2,X0),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[p2_skol])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_57,plain,
    ~ren2(X0) | ~program(X0) | ren6(X1,X2,X0),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_48, c_14]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_58,plain,
    ~ren2(X0) | ren6(X1,X2,X0),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_3, c_57]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_75,plain,
    ren6(X0,X1,skc3),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_56, c_5, c_41, c_58]) ).


% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren5_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
! [X3] :
(~ ren5(X1,X2,X3)
| (halts3(X1,X2,X3)
& outputs(X1,bad)) ) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren5_defn]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_11,plain,
    ~ren5(X0,X1,X2) | outputs(X0,bad),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren5_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren6_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
! [X3] :
(~ ren6(X1,X2,X3)
| (((~ program(X1)
| ~ halts2(X1,X2)) 
| ren4(X3,X1,X2)) 
& ((~ program(X1)
| halts2(X1,X2)) 
| ren5(X3,X1,X2)) ) ) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren6_defn]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_13,plain,
    ~ren6(X0,X1,X2) | ~program(X0) | halts2(X0,X1) | ren5(X2,X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren6_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_59,plain,
    ~ren6(X0,X1,X2) | ~program(X0) | outputs(X2,bad) | halts2(X0,X1),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_11, c_13]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_76,plain,
    ren2(skc3),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_56, c_5, c_41]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_92,plain,
    program(skc3),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_3, c_76]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_64,plain,
    ~program(X0) | ~ren3(skf5(X0),X0) | ~program(X1) | halts2(X1,X2) | ren5(X0,X1,X2),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_14, c_13]) ).


% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren4_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
! [X3] :
(~ ren4(X1,X2,X3)
| (halts3(X1,X2,X3)
& outputs(X1,good)) ) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren4_defn]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_8,plain,
    ~ren4(X0,X1,X2) | halts3(X0,X1,X2),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren4_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_12,plain,
    ~ren6(X0,X1,X2) | ~program(X0) | ~halts2(X0,X1) | ren4(X2,X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren6_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_74,plain,
    ~program(X0) | ~halts2(X0,X1) | ren4(skc3,X0,X1),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_56, c_5, c_41, c_58, c_12]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_79,plain,
    ~program(X0) | ~halts2(X0,X1) | halts3(skc3,X0,X1),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_8, c_74]) ).


% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_10,plain,
    ~ren5(X0,X1,X2) | halts3(X0,X1,X2),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren5_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_87,plain,
    ~program(X0) | ~ren3(skf5(X0),X0) | ~program(X1) | halts3(skc3,X1,X2) | halts3(X0,X1,X2),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_64, c_79, c_10]) ).


% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren8_defn,definition,
    ! [X2] :
! [X1] :
(ren8(X2,X1)
<= ((program(X2)
& ~ halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts3(X1,X2,X2)
& outputs(X1,bad)) ) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren8])],[p3_elimTB]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren8_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
(((program(X1)
& ~ halts2(X1,X1)) 
& (~ halts3(X2,X1,X1)
| ~ outputs(X2,bad)) ) 
| ren8(X1,X2)) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren8_defn]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_18,plain,
    program(X0) | ren8(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren8_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_89,plain,
    ~program(X0) | ~ren3(skf5(X0),X0) | halts3(skc3,X1,X2) | halts3(X0,X1,X2) | ren8(X1,X3),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_87, c_18]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_90,plain,
    ~program(skc3) | halts3(skc3,X0,X1) | ren8(X0,X2),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_48, c_76, c_89]) ).


% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_20,plain,
    ~halts3(X0,X1,X1) | ~outputs(X0,bad) | ren8(X1,X0),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren8_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_91,plain,
    ~outputs(skc3,bad) | ren8(X0,skc3),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_3, c_76, c_90, c_20]) ).


% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_9,plain,
    ~ren4(X0,X1,X2) | outputs(X0,good),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren4_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_65,plain,
    ~ren6(X0,X1,X2) | ~program(X0) | ~halts2(X0,X1) | outputs(X2,good),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_9, c_12]) ).


% FOF INTRODUCE RENAMING
fof(ren7_defn,definition,
    ! [X2] :
! [X1] :
(ren7(X2,X1)
<= ((program(X2)
& halts2(X2,X2)) 
=> (halts3(X1,X2,X2)
& outputs(X1,good)) ) ) ,
    introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[ren7])],[p3_elimTB]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren7_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
(((program(X1)
& halts2(X1,X1)) 
& (~ halts3(X2,X1,X1)
| ~ outputs(X2,good)) ) 
| ren7(X1,X2)) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren7_defn]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_17,plain,
    ~halts3(X0,X1,X1) | ~outputs(X0,good) | ren7(X1,X0),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren7_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_67,plain,
    ~ren6(X0,X1,X2) | ~program(X0) | ~halts2(X0,X1) | ~halts3(X2,X3,X3) | ren7(X3,X2),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_65, c_17]) ).


% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_16,plain,
    halts2(X0,X0) | ren7(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren7_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_15,plain,
    program(X0) | ren7(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren7_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_77,plain,
    ~ren6(X0,X1,skc3) | ~program(X0) | ~halts2(X0,X1) | ren7(X2,skc3),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_8, c_74, c_67, c_16, c_15]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_78,plain,
    ~program(X0) | ~halts2(X0,X1) | ren7(X2,skc3),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_75, c_77]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_81,plain,
    ren7(X0,skc3),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_78, c_16, c_15]) ).


% FOF RENAMING INFERENCE
fof(p3_renObv,axiom,
    (? [X1] :
(program(X1)
& ! [X2] :
(ren7(X2,X1)
& ren8(X2,X1)) ) 
=> ? [X3] :
ren11(X3)) ,
    inference(renaming,[status(esa)],[p3_elimTB,ren7_defn,ren8_defn,ren9_defn,ren10_defn,ren11_defn]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(p3_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,axiom,
    (! [X1] :
(~ program(X1)
| (? [X2] :
~ ren7(X2,X1)
| ? [X3] :
~ ren8(X3,X1)) ) 
| ? [X4] :
ren11(X4)) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[p3_renObv]) ).

% FOF SKOLEM INFERENCE. WIP!!
fof(p3_skol,axiom,
    (! [X1] :
(~ program(X1)
| (~ ren7(skf6(X1),X1)
| ~ ren8(skf7(X1),X1)) ) 
| ren11(skc8)) ,
    inference(skolemize, [status(esa),
                          new_symbols(skolem,[skf6,skf7,skc8]),
                          skolemize(X2,skf6(X1)),
                          skolemize(X3,skf7(X1)),
                          skolemize(X4,skc8)], [p3_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_28,plain,
    ~program(X0) | ~ren7(skf6(X0),X0) | ~ren8(skf7(X0),X0) | ren11(skc8),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[p3_skol])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_84,plain,
    ~program(skc3) | ~ren8(skf7(skc3),skc3) | ren11(skc8),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_81, c_28]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_93,plain,
    ~outputs(skc3,bad) | ~program(skc3) | ren11(skc8),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_91, c_84]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_94,plain,
    ~outputs(skc3,bad) | ren11(skc8),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_92, c_93]) ).


% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren12_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
(((program(X1)
& halts2(X1,X1)) 
& (~ halts2(X2,X1)
| ~ outputs(X2,good)) ) 
| ren12(X1,X2)) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren12_defn]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_30,plain,
    halts2(X0,X0) | ren12(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren12_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_29,plain,
    program(X0) | ren12(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren12_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_100,plain,
    ~ren11(X0) | halts2(X0,X1) | ren12(X1,X2),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_26, c_21, c_30, c_29]) ).


% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_31,plain,
    ~halts2(X0,X1) | ~outputs(X0,good) | ren12(X1,X0),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren12_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_101,plain,
    ~program(skc8) | ~outputs(skc8,good) | ren12(X0,skc8),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_75, c_59, c_94, c_100, c_31]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_118,plain,
    ~ren11(skc8) | ~program(skc8) | ren12(X0,skc8),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_22, c_26, c_101, c_104]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_119,plain,
    ~ren11(skc8) | ren12(X0,skc8),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_25, c_118]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_102,plain,
    ~program(X0) | halts2(X0,X1) | ren11(skc8),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_75, c_59, c_94]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_68,plain,
    ~ren6(X0,X1,X2) | ~program(X0) | ~halts2(X0,X1) | ~halts2(X2,X3) | ren12(X3,X2),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_65, c_31]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_103,plain,
    ~program(X0) | outputs(skc3,bad) | halts2(X0,X1),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_75, c_59]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_122,plain,
    ~program(skc3) | ren11(skc8) | ren12(X0,skc3) | outputs(skc3,bad),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_102, c_68, c_75, c_103]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_123,plain,
    ren11(skc8) | ren12(X0,skc3) | outputs(skc3,bad),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_92, c_122]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_124,plain,
    ren11(skc8) | ren12(X0,skc3),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_94, c_123]) ).


% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_33,plain,
    ~halts2(X0,X0) | ren13(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren13_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_121,plain,
    ren11(skc8) | ren13(X0,X1),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_102, c_32, c_33]) ).


% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren14_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
! [X2] :
(~ ren14(X1,X2)
| (halts2(X1,X2)
& outputs(X1,bad)) ) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren14_defn]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_35,plain,
    ~ren14(X0,X1) | halts2(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren14_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FOF SIMPLE INFERENCE
fof(ren15_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,plain,
    ! [X1] :
(~ ren15(X1)
| (program(X1)
& (! [X2] :
((~ program(X2)
| ~ halts2(X2,X2)) 
| ~ halts2(X1,X2)) 
& ! [X3] :
((~ program(X3)
| halts2(X3,X3)) 
| ren14(X1,X3)) ) ) ) ,
    inference(elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope,[status(thm)],[ren15_defn]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_39,plain,
    ~ren15(X0) | ~program(X1) | halts2(X1,X1) | ren14(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren15_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_38,plain,
    ~ren15(X0) | ~program(X1) | ~halts2(X1,X1) | ~halts2(X0,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren15_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_37,plain,
    ~ren15(X0) | program(X0),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren15_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_45,plain,
    ~ren15(X0),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_35, c_39, c_38, c_37]) ).


% FOF PUSH DISJ SPLITTING.
cnf(c_24,plain,
    ~ren10(X0,X1) | outputs(X0,bad),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[inference(push_disj,[status(thm)],[ren10_elimImpEquivPushNegMiniScope])]) ).

% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_130,plain,
    ~ren11(X0) | ~program(X1) | halts2(X1,X1) | outputs(X0,bad),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_27, c_24]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_131,plain,
    ~ren11(X0) | outputs(X0,bad) | ren13(X1,X2),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_130, c_32, c_33]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_133,plain,
    ~ren11(X0) | ~ren11(skc8) | outputs(X0,bad),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_131, c_40, c_119, c_25, c_45]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_134,plain,
    outputs(skc8,bad),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_40, c_124, c_121, c_92, c_45, c_133]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_135,plain,
    ren11(skc8),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_40, c_124, c_121, c_92, c_45]) ).


% CNF SPASS RESOLUTION.
cnf(c_136,plain,
    $false,
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[
      c_40, c_128, c_119, c_25, c_134, c_45, c_135]) ).

SUPr 1.0

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'f21' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture f1 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start Proof for SEU140+2
fof(f1, conjecture, (! [A,B,C] : ((subset(A,B) & disjoint(B,C)) => disjoint(A,C))), file('problem')).
fof(f2, negated_conjecture, (~ (! [A,B,C] : ((subset(A,B) & disjoint(B,C)) => disjoint(A,C)))), inference(negate_conjecture, [status(cth)], [f1])).
fof(f3, plain, disjoint(sk0,sk1), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(esa)], [f2])).
fof(f4, axiom, (! [A,B] : (disjoint(A,B) <=> (set_intersection2(A,B) = empty_set))), file('problem')).
fof(f5, plain, (set_intersection2(sk0,sk1) = empty_set), inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [f3,f4])).
fof(f6, plain, subset(sk2,sk0), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(esa)], [f2])).
fof(f7, axiom,
  (! [A,B,C] :
    (subset(A,B)
    => subset(set_intersection2(A,C),set_intersection2(B,C)))), file('problem')).
fof(f8, plain, (! [V0] : subset(set_intersection2(sk2,V0),set_intersection2(sk0,V0))), inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [f6,f7])).
fof(f9, axiom, (! [A] : (empty(A) => (A = empty_set))), file('problem')).
fof(f10, axiom, (? [A] : empty(A)), file('problem')).
fof(f11, plain, (empty_set = sk3), inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [f9,f10])).
fof(f12, plain, (~ disjoint(sk2,sk1)), inference(cnf_transformation, [status(esa)], [f2])).
fof(f13, axiom, (! [A,B] : (disjoint(A,B) <=> (set_intersection2(A,B) = empty_set))), file('problem')).
fof(f14, plain, (~ (set_intersection2(sk2,sk1) = empty_set)), inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [f12,f13])).
fof(f15, axiom, (! [A] : (subset(A,empty_set) => (A = empty_set))), file('problem')).
fof(f16, plain, (~ subset(set_intersection2(sk2,sk1),empty_set)), inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [f14,f15])).
fof(f17, axiom, (! [A,B] : ((set_difference(A,B) = empty_set) <=> subset(A,B))), file('problem')).
fof(f18, plain, (~ (set_difference(set_intersection2(sk2,sk1),empty_set) = empty_set)), inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [f16,f17])).
fof(f19, axiom, (! [A,B] : ((set_difference(A,B) = empty_set) <=> subset(A,B))), file('problem')).
fof(f20, plain, (~ subset(set_intersection2(sk2,sk1),sk3)), inference(resolve, [status(thm)], [f11,f18,f19])).
fof(f21, plain, $false, inference(superpos, [status(thm)], [f5,f8,f11,f20])).
% SZS output end Proof for SEU140+2

Twee 2.7

Solution for BOO001-1

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file BOO001-1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name BOO001-1.p from annotated formula c1
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'c26' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the negated conjecture c1 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation
cnf(c1, negated_conjecture, inverse(inverse(a))!=a, file('BOO001-1.p', prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling)).
cnf(c2, axiom, multiply(X, Y, inverse(Y))=X, file('BOO001-1.p', right_inverse)).
cnf(c3, plain, multiply(X2, X3, inverse(X3))=X2, inference(substitution, [status(thm)], [c2])).
cnf(c4, plain, X2=multiply(X2, X3, inverse(X3)), inference(symmetry, [status(thm)], [c3])).
cnf(c5, plain, multiply(X3, inverse(X3), X2)=multiply(X3, inverse(X3), multiply(X2, X3, inverse(X3))), inference(congruence, [status(thm)], [c4])).
cnf(c6, axiom, multiply(Y2, X2, X2)=X2, file('BOO001-1.p', ternary_multiply_1)).
cnf(c7, plain, multiply(X3, X2, X2)=X2, inference(substitution, [status(thm)], [c6])).
cnf(c8, plain, X2=multiply(X3, X2, X2), inference(symmetry, [status(thm)], [c7])).
cnf(c9, plain, multiply(X2, X5, multiply(X3, X2, X4))=multiply(multiply(X3, X2, X2), X5, multiply(X3, X2, X4)), inference(congruence, [status(thm)], [c8])).
cnf(c10, axiom, multiply(multiply(V, W, X2), Y2, multiply(V, W, Z))=multiply(V, W, multiply(X2, Y2, Z)), file('BOO001-1.p', associativity)).
cnf(c11, plain, multiply(multiply(X5, X4, X4), X3, multiply(X5, X4, X2))=multiply(X5, X4, multiply(X4, X3, X2)), inference(substitution, [status(thm)], [c10])).
cnf(c12, plain, multiply(X4, X3, multiply(X5, X4, X2))=multiply(X5, X4, multiply(X4, X3, X2)), inference(transitivity, [status(thm)], [c9, c11])).
cnf(c13, plain, multiply(X4, X3, multiply(X2, X4, X3))=multiply(X2, X4, multiply(X4, X3, X3)), inference(substitution, [status(thm)], [c12])).
cnf(c14, plain, multiply(X3, X2, X2)=X2, inference(substitution, [status(thm)], [c6])).
cnf(c15, plain, multiply(X2, X4, multiply(X4, X3, X3))=multiply(X2, X4, X3), inference(congruence, [status(thm)], [c14])).
cnf(c16, plain, multiply(X4, X3, multiply(X2, X4, X3))=multiply(X2, X4, X3), inference(transitivity, [status(thm)], [c13, c15])).
cnf(c17, plain, multiply(X3, inverse(X3), multiply(X2, X3, inverse(X3)))=multiply(X2, X3, inverse(X3)), inference(substitution, [status(thm)], [c16])).
cnf(c18, plain, multiply(X2, X3, inverse(X3))=X2, inference(substitution, [status(thm)], [c2])).
cnf(c19, plain, multiply(X3, inverse(X3), multiply(X2, X3, inverse(X3)))=X2, inference(transitivity, [status(thm)], [c17, c18])).
cnf(c20, plain, multiply(X3, inverse(X3), X2)=X2, inference(transitivity, [status(thm)], [c5, c19])).
cnf(c21, plain, multiply(X2, inverse(X2), inverse(inverse(X2)))=inverse(inverse(X2)), inference(substitution, [status(thm)], [c20])).
cnf(c22, plain, inverse(inverse(X2))=multiply(X2, inverse(X2), inverse(inverse(X2))), inference(symmetry, [status(thm)], [c21])).
cnf(c23, plain, multiply(X2, inverse(X2), inverse(inverse(X2)))=X2, inference(substitution, [status(thm)], [c2])).
cnf(c24, plain, inverse(inverse(X2))=X2, inference(transitivity, [status(thm)], [c22, c23])).
cnf(c25, plain, inverse(inverse(a))=a, inference(substitution, [status(thm)], [c24])).
cnf(c26, plain, $false, inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c1, c25])).
% SZS output end CNFRefutation

Vampire 4.8

Solution for NLP042+1

% SZS status CounterSatisfiable for NLP042+1
% SZS output start Saturation.
cnf(u147,negated_conjecture,
    woman(sK0,sK1)).

cnf(u151,negated_conjecture,
    mia_forename(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u155,negated_conjecture,
    forename(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u159,negated_conjecture,
    shake_beverage(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u163,negated_conjecture,
    event(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u167,negated_conjecture,
    nonreflexive(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u171,negated_conjecture,
    order(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u175,negated_conjecture,
    of(sK0,sK2,sK1)).

cnf(u179,negated_conjecture,
    agent(sK0,sK4,sK1)).

cnf(u183,negated_conjecture,
    patient(sK0,sK4,sK3)).

cnf(u187,axiom,
    ~nonhuman(X0,X1) | ~human(X0,X1)).

cnf(u191,axiom,
    ~nonexistent(X0,X1) | ~existent(X0,X1)).

cnf(u195,axiom,
    ~nonliving(X0,X1) | ~animate(X0,X1)).

cnf(u199,axiom,
    ~food(X0,X1) | substance_matter(X0,X1)).

cnf(u203,axiom,
    ~beverage(X0,X1) | food(X0,X1)).

cnf(u207,axiom,
    ~shake_beverage(X0,X1) | beverage(X0,X1)).

cnf(u211,axiom,
    ~relname(X0,X1) | relation(X0,X1)).

cnf(u215,axiom,
    ~substance_matter(X0,X1) | object(X0,X1)).

cnf(u219,axiom,
    ~relation(X0,X1) | abstraction(X0,X1)).

cnf(u223,axiom,
    forename(X0,X1) | ~mia_forename(X0,X1)).

cnf(u227,axiom,
    ~act(X0,X1) | event(X0,X1)).

cnf(u231,axiom,
    ~nonliving(X0,X1) | ~living(X0,X1)).

cnf(u235,axiom,
    female(X0,X1) | ~woman(X0,X1)).

cnf(u239,axiom,
    act(X0,X1) | ~order(X0,X1)).

cnf(u243,axiom,
    human_person(X0,X1) | ~woman(X0,X1)).

cnf(u247,axiom,
    event(X0,X1) | ~order(X0,X1)).

cnf(u251,axiom,
    animate(X0,X1) | ~human_person(X0,X1)).

cnf(u255,axiom,
    living(X0,X1) | ~organism(X0,X1)).

cnf(u259,axiom,
    human(X0,X1) | ~human_person(X0,X1)).

cnf(u263,axiom,
    organism(X0,X1) | ~human_person(X0,X1)).

cnf(u267,axiom,
    entity(X0,X1) | ~organism(X0,X1)).

cnf(u271,axiom,
    general(X0,X1) | ~abstraction(X0,X1)).

cnf(u275,axiom,
    ~abstraction(X0,X1) | nonhuman(X0,X1)).

cnf(u279,axiom,
    ~eventuality(X0,X1) | nonexistent(X0,X1)).

cnf(u283,axiom,
    ~object(X0,X1) | nonliving(X0,X1)).

cnf(u287,axiom,
    ~eventuality(X0,X1) | specific(X0,X1)).

cnf(u291,axiom,
    ~object(X0,X1) | entity(X0,X1)).

cnf(u295,axiom,
    ~eventuality(X0,X1) | unisex(X0,X1)).

cnf(u299,axiom,
    unisex(X0,X1) | ~abstraction(X0,X1)).

cnf(u303,axiom,
    ~object(X0,X1) | unisex(X0,X1)).

cnf(u307,axiom,
    ~specific(X0,X1) | ~general(X0,X1)).

cnf(u311,axiom,
    relname(X0,X1) | ~forename(X0,X1)).

cnf(u315,axiom,
    existent(X0,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1)).

cnf(u319,axiom,
    specific(X0,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1)).

cnf(u323,axiom,
    ~female(X0,X1) | ~unisex(X0,X1)).

cnf(u327,axiom,
    ~event(X0,X1) | eventuality(X0,X1)).

cnf(u332,negated_conjecture,
    beverage(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u337,negated_conjecture,
    food(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u342,negated_conjecture,
    substance_matter(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u347,negated_conjecture,
    object(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u353,negated_conjecture,
    nonliving(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u359,negated_conjecture,
    ~living(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u365,negated_conjecture,
    entity(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u369,negated_conjecture,
    ~animate(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u374,negated_conjecture,
    ~organism(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u379,negated_conjecture,
    ~human_person(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u385,negated_conjecture,
    unisex(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u389,negated_conjecture,
    ~woman(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u398,negated_conjecture,
    eventuality(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u402,axiom,
    ~nonreflexive(X0,X1) | ~agent(X0,X1,X3) | ~patient(X0,X1,X3)).

cnf(u409,negated_conjecture,
    unisex(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u414,negated_conjecture,
    specific(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u419,negated_conjecture,
    nonexistent(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u423,axiom,
    ~of(X0,X3,X1) | ~forename(X0,X2) | ~of(X0,X2,X1) | ~forename(X0,X3) | X2 = X3 | ~entity(X0,X1)).

cnf(u428,negated_conjecture,
    ~general(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u435,negated_conjecture,
    ~existent(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u440,negated_conjecture,
    ~abstraction(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u444,axiom,
    relation(X0,X1) | ~forename(X0,X1)).

cnf(u448,negated_conjecture,
    ~entity(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u454,negated_conjecture,
    ~organism(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u459,negated_conjecture,
    ~human_person(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u463,axiom,
    ~general(X0,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1)).

cnf(u468,negated_conjecture,
    ~woman(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u473,axiom,
    ~woman(X0,X1) | ~unisex(X0,X1)).

cnf(u478,negated_conjecture,
    ~unisex(sK0,sK1)).

cnf(u482,axiom,
    ~order(X0,X1) | eventuality(X0,X1)).

cnf(u487,negated_conjecture,
    ~abstraction(sK0,sK1)).

cnf(u492,axiom,
    ~forename(X0,X1) | abstraction(X0,X1)).

cnf(u498,negated_conjecture,
    abstraction(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u502,negated_conjecture,
    ~patient(sK0,sK4,X0) | ~agent(sK0,sK4,X0)).

cnf(u507,negated_conjecture,
    nonhuman(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u513,negated_conjecture,
    ~human(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u518,negated_conjecture,
    ~human_person(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u525,negated_conjecture,
    ~of(sK0,X0,sK1) | sK2 = X0 | ~forename(sK0,X0)).

cnf(u543,negated_conjecture,
    ~woman(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u548,negated_conjecture,
    ~agent(sK0,sK4,sK3)).

cnf(u552,axiom,
    ~abstraction(X0,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1)).

cnf(u557,negated_conjecture,
    ~entity(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u562,axiom,
    ~mia_forename(X0,X1) | abstraction(X0,X1)).

cnf(u566,negated_conjecture,
    ~organism(sK0,sK2)).

% SZS output end Saturation.

Solution for SWV017+1

% SZS status Satisfiable for SWV017+1
% SZS output start FiniteModel for SWV017+1
tff(declare_$i,type,$i:$tType).
tff(declare_$i1,type,at:$i).
tff(declare_$i2,type,t:$i).
tff(finite_domain,axiom,
      ! [X:$i] : (
         X = at | X = t
      ) ).

tff(distinct_domain,axiom,
         at != t
).

tff(declare_bool,type,$o:$tType).
tff(declare_bool1,type,fmb_bool_1:$o).
tff(finite_domain,axiom,
      ! [X:$o] : (
         X = fmb_bool_1
      ) ).

tff(declare_a,type,a:$i).
tff(a_definition,axiom,a = t).
tff(declare_b,type,b:$i).
tff(b_definition,axiom,b = at).
tff(declare_an_a_nonce,type,an_a_nonce:$i).
tff(an_a_nonce_definition,axiom,an_a_nonce = t).
tff(declare_bt,type,bt:$i).
tff(bt_definition,axiom,bt = at).
tff(declare_an_intruder_nonce,type,an_intruder_nonce:$i).
tff(an_intruder_nonce_definition,axiom,an_intruder_nonce = t).
tff(declare_key,type,key: $i * $i > $i).
tff(function_key,axiom,
           key(at,at) = t
         & key(at,t) = at
         & key(t,at) = t
         & key(t,t) = t

).

tff(declare_pair,type,pair: $i * $i > $i).
tff(function_pair,axiom,
           pair(at,at) = t
         & pair(at,t) = t
         & pair(t,at) = t
         & pair(t,t) = t

).

tff(declare_sent,type,sent: $i * $i * $i > $i).
tff(function_sent,axiom,
           sent(at,at,at) = at
         & sent(at,at,t) = at
         & sent(at,t,at) = at
         & sent(at,t,t) = at
         & sent(t,at,at) = at
         & sent(t,at,t) = at
         & sent(t,t,at) = at
         & sent(t,t,t) = at

).

tff(declare_quadruple,type,quadruple: $i * $i * $i * $i > $i).
tff(function_quadruple,axiom,
           quadruple(at,at,at,at) = at
         & quadruple(at,at,at,t) = t
         & quadruple(at,at,t,at) = at
         & quadruple(at,at,t,t) = at
         & quadruple(at,t,at,at) = t
         & quadruple(at,t,at,t) = t
         & quadruple(at,t,t,at) = at
         & quadruple(at,t,t,t) = at
         & quadruple(t,at,at,at) = at
         & quadruple(t,at,at,t) = at
         & quadruple(t,at,t,at) = t
         & quadruple(t,at,t,t) = t
         & quadruple(t,t,at,at) = t
         & quadruple(t,t,at,t) = t
         & quadruple(t,t,t,at) = t
         & quadruple(t,t,t,t) = t

).

tff(declare_encrypt,type,encrypt: $i * $i > $i).
tff(function_encrypt,axiom,
           encrypt(at,at) = at
         & encrypt(at,t) = t
         & encrypt(t,at) = at
         & encrypt(t,t) = t

).

tff(declare_triple,type,triple: $i * $i * $i > $i).
tff(function_triple,axiom,
           triple(at,at,at) = at
         & triple(at,at,t) = at
         & triple(at,t,at) = at
         & triple(at,t,t) = at
         & triple(t,at,at) = t
         & triple(t,at,t) = t
         & triple(t,t,at) = t
         & triple(t,t,t) = t

).

tff(declare_generate_b_nonce,type,generate_b_nonce: $i > $i).
tff(function_generate_b_nonce,axiom,
           generate_b_nonce(at) = t
         & generate_b_nonce(t) = t

).

tff(declare_generate_expiration_time,type,generate_expiration_time: $i > $i).
tff(function_generate_expiration_time,axiom,
           generate_expiration_time(at) = t
         & generate_expiration_time(t) = t

).

tff(declare_generate_key,type,generate_key: $i > $i).
tff(function_generate_key,axiom,
           generate_key(at) = at
         & generate_key(t) = at

).

tff(declare_generate_intruder_nonce,type,generate_intruder_nonce: $i > $i).
tff(function_generate_intruder_nonce,axiom,
           generate_intruder_nonce(at) = at
         & generate_intruder_nonce(t) = t

).

tff(declare_a_holds,type,a_holds: $i > $o ).
tff(predicate_a_holds,axiom,
%         a_holds(at) undefined in model
%         a_holds(t) undefined in model

).

tff(declare_party_of_protocol,type,party_of_protocol: $i > $o ).
tff(predicate_party_of_protocol,axiom,
           party_of_protocol(at)
         & party_of_protocol(t)

).

tff(declare_message,type,message: $i > $o ).
tff(predicate_message,axiom,
           message(at)
         & ~message(t)

).

tff(declare_a_stored,type,a_stored: $i > $o ).
tff(predicate_a_stored,axiom,
           ~a_stored(at)
         & a_stored(t)

).

tff(declare_b_holds,type,b_holds: $i > $o ).
tff(predicate_b_holds,axiom,
%         b_holds(at) undefined in model
%         b_holds(t) undefined in model

).

tff(declare_fresh_to_b,type,fresh_to_b: $i > $o ).
tff(predicate_fresh_to_b,axiom,
           ~fresh_to_b(at)
         & fresh_to_b(t)

).

tff(declare_b_stored,type,b_stored: $i > $o ).
tff(predicate_b_stored,axiom,
%         b_stored(at) undefined in model
%         b_stored(t) undefined in model

).

tff(declare_a_key,type,a_key: $i > $o ).
tff(predicate_a_key,axiom,
           a_key(at)
         & ~a_key(t)

).

tff(declare_t_holds,type,t_holds: $i > $o ).
tff(predicate_t_holds,axiom,
           t_holds(at)
         & t_holds(t)

).

tff(declare_a_nonce,type,a_nonce: $i > $o ).
tff(predicate_a_nonce,axiom,
           ~a_nonce(at)
         & a_nonce(t)

).

tff(declare_intruder_message,type,intruder_message: $i > $o ).
tff(predicate_intruder_message,axiom,
           intruder_message(at)
         & intruder_message(t)

).

tff(declare_intruder_holds,type,intruder_holds: $i > $o ).
tff(predicate_intruder_holds,axiom,
           intruder_holds(at)
         & intruder_holds(t)

).

tff(declare_fresh_intruder_nonce,type,fresh_intruder_nonce: $i > $o ).
tff(predicate_fresh_intruder_nonce,axiom,
           ~fresh_intruder_nonce(at)
         & fresh_intruder_nonce(t)

).

% SZS output end FiniteModel for SWV017+1

Vampire 5.0

Notes regarding saturations

Vampire 5.0.1

Solution for SET014^4

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SET014^4.s
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'f112' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture f15 as the proved formula
SUCCESS: 'f83' is a symbol definition of 'spl4_1'
SUCCESS: 'f87' is a symbol definition of 'spl4_2'
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start Proof for SET014^4
thf(type_def_5, type, sTfun: ($tType * $tType) > $tType).
thf(func_def_0, type, in: ($i > ($i > $o) > $o)).
thf(func_def_2, type, is_a: ($i > ($i > $o) > $o)).
thf(func_def_3, type, emptyset: ($i > $o)).
thf(func_def_4, type, unord_pair: ($i > $i > $i > $o)).
thf(func_def_5, type, singleton: ($i > $i > $o)).
thf(func_def_6, type, union: (($i > $o) > ($i > $o) > $i > $o)).
thf(func_def_7, type, excl_union: (($i > $o) > ($i > $o) > $i > $o)).
thf(func_def_8, type, intersection: (($i > $o) > ($i > $o) > $i > $o)).
thf(func_def_9, type, setminus: (($i > $o) > ($i > $o) > $i > $o)).
thf(func_def_10, type, complement: (($i > $o) > $i > $o)).
thf(func_def_11, type, disjoint: (($i > $o) > ($i > $o) > $o)).
thf(func_def_12, type, subset: (($i > $o) > ($i > $o) > $o)).
thf(func_def_13, type, meets: (($i > $o) > ($i > $o) > $o)).
thf(func_def_14, type, misses: (($i > $o) > ($i > $o) > $o)).
thf(func_def_15, type, vOR: ($o > $o > $o)).
thf(func_def_16, type, vAND: ($o > $o > $o)).
thf(func_def_17, type, db2: !>[X0: $tType]:(X0)).
thf(func_def_18, type, db0: !>[X0: $tType]:(X0)).
thf(func_def_19, type, vNOT: ($o > $o)).
thf(func_def_20, type, db1: !>[X0: $tType]:(X0)).
thf(func_def_21, type, vLAM: !>[X0: $tType, X1: $tType]:((X1) > (X0 > X1))).
thf(func_def_22, type, vPI: !>[X0: $tType]:(((X0 > $o) > $o))).
thf(func_def_23, type, vIMP: ($o > $o > $o)).
thf(func_def_24, type, vEQ: !>[X0: $tType]:((X0 > X0 > $o))).
thf(func_def_27, type, vSIGMA: !>[X0: $tType]:(((X0 > $o) > $o))).
thf(func_def_28, type, sK0: ($i > $o)).
thf(func_def_29, type, sK1: ($i > $o)).
thf(func_def_30, type, sK2: ($i > $o)).
thf(f6,axiom,(
  ((^[X0 : ($i > $o), X1 : ($i > $o), X2 : $i] : ((X0 @ X2) | (X1 @ X2))) = union)),
  file('/Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Axioms/SET008^0.ax',union)).
thf(f12,axiom,(
  (subset = (^[X0 : ($i > $o), X1 : ($i > $o)] : (! [X2 : $i] : ((X0 @ X2) => (X1 @ X2)))))),
  file('/Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Axioms/SET008^0.ax',subset)).
thf(f15,conjecture,(
  ! [X1 : ($i > $o),X2 : ($i > $o),X0 : ($i > $o)] : (((subset @ X0 @ X2) & (subset @ X1 @ X2)) => (subset @ (union @ X0 @ X1) @ X2))),
  file('/Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SET/SET014^4.p',thm)).
thf(f16,negated_conjecture,(
  ~ ! [X1 : ($i > $o),X2 : ($i > $o),X0 : ($i > $o)] : (((subset @ X0 @ X2) & (subset @ X1 @ X2)) => (subset @ (union @ X0 @ X1) @ X2))),
  inference(negated_conjecture,[status(cth)],[f15])).
thf(f23,plain,(
  (subset = (^[X0 : ($i > $o), X1 : ($i > $o)] : (! [X2 : $i] : ((X0 @ X2) => (X1 @ X2)))))),
  inference(rectify,[],[f12])).
thf(f24,plain,(
  (subset = (^[Y0 : $i > $o]: ((^[Y1 : $i > $o]: (!! @ $i @ (^[Y2 : $i]: ((Y0 @ Y2) => (Y1 @ Y2))))))))),
  inference(fool_elimination,[],[f23])).
thf(f26,plain,(
  ~ ! [X0 : ($i > $o),X1 : ($i > $o),X2 : ($i > $o)] : (((subset @ X2 @ X1) & (subset @ X0 @ X1)) => (subset @ (union @ X2 @ X0) @ X1))),
  inference(rectify,[],[f16])).
thf(f27,plain,(
  ~ ! [X1 : ($i > $o),X0 : ($i > $o),X2 : ($i > $o)] : ((($true = ((subset @ X2 @ X1))) & (((subset @ X0 @ X1)) = $true)) => ($true = ((subset @ (union @ X2 @ X0) @ X1))))),
  inference(fool_elimination,[],[f26])).
thf(f39,plain,(
  ((^[X0 : ($i > $o), X1 : ($i > $o), X2 : $i] : ((X0 @ X2) | (X1 @ X2))) = union)),
  inference(rectify,[],[f6])).
thf(f40,plain,(
  (union = (^[Y0 : $i > $o]: ((^[Y1 : $i > $o]: ((^[Y2 : $i]: ((Y1 @ Y2) | (Y0 @ Y2))))))))),
  inference(fool_elimination,[],[f39])).
thf(f41,plain,(
  ? [X1 : ($i > $o),X0 : ($i > $o),X2 : ($i > $o)] : (($true != ((subset @ (union @ X2 @ X0) @ X1))) & (($true = ((subset @ X2 @ X1))) & (((subset @ X0 @ X1)) = $true)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f27])).
thf(f42,plain,(
  ? [X0 : ($i > $o),X2 : ($i > $o),X1 : ($i > $o)] : ((((subset @ X0 @ X1)) = $true) & ($true = ((subset @ X2 @ X1))) & ($true != ((subset @ (union @ X2 @ X0) @ X1))))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f41])).
thf(f43,plain,(
  ? [X0 : ($i > $o),X1 : ($i > $o),X2 : ($i > $o)] : ((((subset @ X0 @ X2)) = $true) & (((subset @ X1 @ X2)) = $true) & ($true != ((subset @ (union @ X1 @ X0) @ X2))))),
  inference(rectify,[],[f42])).
thf(f44,plain,(
  ($true = ((subset @ sK0 @ sK2))) & ($true = ((subset @ sK1 @ sK2))) & (((subset @ (union @ sK1 @ sK0) @ sK2)) != $true)),
  inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK0,sK1,sK2]),skolemize(X0,sK0),skolemize(X1,sK1),skolemize(X2,sK2)],[f43])).
thf(f47,plain,(
  (((subset @ (union @ sK1 @ sK0) @ sK2)) != $true)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f44])).
thf(f48,plain,(
  ($true = ((subset @ sK1 @ sK2)))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f44])).
thf(f49,plain,(
  ($true = ((subset @ sK0 @ sK2)))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f44])).
thf(f51,plain,(
  (subset = (^[Y0 : $i > $o]: ((^[Y1 : $i > $o]: (!! @ $i @ (^[Y2 : $i]: ((Y0 @ Y2) => (Y1 @ Y2))))))))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f24])).
thf(f59,plain,(
  (union = (^[Y0 : $i > $o]: ((^[Y1 : $i > $o]: ((^[Y2 : $i]: ((Y1 @ Y2) | (Y0 @ Y2))))))))),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f40])).
thf(f65,plain,(
  ($true = (((^[Y0 : $i > $o]: ((^[Y1 : $i > $o]: (!! @ $i @ (^[Y2 : $i]: ((Y0 @ Y2) => (Y1 @ Y2))))))) @ sK0 @ sK2)))),
  inference(definition_unfolding,[],[f49,f51])).
thf(f66,plain,(
  ($true = (((^[Y0 : $i > $o]: ((^[Y1 : $i > $o]: (!! @ $i @ (^[Y2 : $i]: ((Y0 @ Y2) => (Y1 @ Y2))))))) @ sK1 @ sK2)))),
  inference(definition_unfolding,[],[f48,f51])).
thf(f67,plain,(
  ($true != (((^[Y0 : $i > $o]: ((^[Y1 : $i > $o]: (!! @ $i @ (^[Y2 : $i]: ((Y0 @ Y2) => (Y1 @ Y2))))))) @ ((^[Y0 : $i > $o]: ((^[Y1 : $i > $o]: ((^[Y2 : $i]: ((Y1 @ Y2) | (Y0 @ Y2))))))) @ sK1 @ sK0) @ sK2)))),
  inference(definition_unfolding,[],[f47,f51,f59])).
thf(f68,plain,(
  ($true = ((!! @ $i @ (^[Y0 : $i]: ((sK0 @ Y0) => (sK2 @ Y0))))))),
  inference(beta-eta_normalization,[],[f65])).
thf(f69,plain,(
  ( ! [X1 : $i] : (($true = (((^[Y0 : $i]: ((sK0 @ Y0) => (sK2 @ Y0))) @ X1)))) )),
  inference(pi_proxy_clausification,[],[f68])).
thf(f70,plain,(
  ( ! [X1 : $i] : (((((sK0 @ X1) => (sK2 @ X1))) = $true)) )),
  inference(beta-eta_normalization,[],[f69])).
thf(f71,plain,(
  ( ! [X1 : $i] : (($false = ((sK0 @ X1))) | (((sK2 @ X1)) = $true)) )),
  inference(imp_proxy_clausification,[],[f70])).
thf(f72,plain,(
  ($true != ((!! @ $i @ (^[Y0 : $i]: (((sK0 @ Y0) | (sK1 @ Y0)) => (sK2 @ Y0))))))),
  inference(beta-eta_normalization,[],[f67])).
thf(f73,plain,(
  ($false = (((^[Y0 : $i]: (((sK0 @ Y0) | (sK1 @ Y0)) => (sK2 @ Y0))) @ sK3)))),
  inference(sigma_proxy_clausification,[],[f72])).
thf(f74,plain,(
  (((((sK0 @ sK3) | (sK1 @ sK3)) => (sK2 @ sK3))) = $false)),
  inference(beta-eta_normalization,[],[f73])).
thf(f75,plain,(
  (((sK2 @ sK3)) = $false)),
  inference(imp_proxy_clausification,[],[f74])).
thf(f76,plain,(
  ($true = (((sK0 @ sK3) | (sK1 @ sK3))))),
  inference(imp_proxy_clausification,[],[f74])).
thf(f77,plain,(
  ($true = ((sK0 @ sK3))) | (((sK1 @ sK3)) = $true)),
  inference(or_proxy_clausification,[],[f76])).
thf(f78,plain,(
  ($true = ((!! @ $i @ (^[Y0 : $i]: ((sK1 @ Y0) => (sK2 @ Y0))))))),
  inference(beta-eta_normalization,[],[f66])).
thf(f79,plain,(
  ( ! [X1 : $i] : (((((^[Y0 : $i]: ((sK1 @ Y0) => (sK2 @ Y0))) @ X1)) = $true)) )),
  inference(pi_proxy_clausification,[],[f78])).
thf(f80,plain,(
  ( ! [X1 : $i] : (($true = (((sK1 @ X1) => (sK2 @ X1))))) )),
  inference(beta-eta_normalization,[],[f79])).
thf(f81,plain,(
  ( ! [X1 : $i] : (($false = ((sK1 @ X1))) | (((sK2 @ X1)) = $true)) )),
  inference(imp_proxy_clausification,[],[f80])).
thf(f83,definition,(
  spl4_1 <=> (((sK1 @ sK3)) = $true)),
  introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl4_1])],[avatar_definition])).
thf(f85,plain,(
  (((sK1 @ sK3)) = $true) | ~spl4_1),
  inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f83])).
thf(f87,definition,(
  spl4_2 <=> ($true = ((sK0 @ sK3)))),
  introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl4_2])],[avatar_definition])).
thf(f89,plain,(
  ($true = ((sK0 @ sK3))) | ~spl4_2),
  inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f87])).
thf(f90,plain,(
  spl4_1 | spl4_2),
  inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f77,f87,f83])).
thf(f92,plain,(
  ($true = $false) | (((sK2 @ sK3)) = $true) | ~spl4_2),
  inference(constrained_superposition,[],[f71,f89])).
thf(f94,plain,(
  (((sK2 @ sK3)) = $true) | ~spl4_2),
  inference(trivial_inequality_removal,[],[f92])).
thf(f98,plain,(
  ($true = $false) | ~spl4_2),
  inference(forward_demodulation,[],[f94,f75])).
thf(f99,plain,(
  $false | ~spl4_2),
  inference(trivial_inequality_removal,[],[f98])).
thf(f100,plain,(
  ~spl4_2),
  inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f99])).
thf(f102,plain,(
  ($true = $false) | (((sK2 @ sK3)) = $true) | ~spl4_1),
  inference(constrained_superposition,[],[f81,f85])).
thf(f105,plain,(
  (((sK2 @ sK3)) = $true) | ~spl4_1),
  inference(trivial_inequality_removal,[],[f102])).
thf(f109,plain,(
  ($true = $false) | ~spl4_1),
  inference(forward_demodulation,[],[f105,f75])).
thf(f110,plain,(
  $false | ~spl4_1),
  inference(trivial_inequality_removal,[],[f109])).
thf(f111,plain,(
  ~spl4_1),
  inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f110])).
cnf(s1, plain, spl4_1 | spl4_2, inference(sat_conversion,[],[f90])).
cnf(s3, plain, ~spl4_2, inference(sat_conversion,[],[f100])).
cnf(s5, plain, ~spl4_1, inference(sat_conversion,[],[f111])).
cnf(s6, plain, $false, inference(rat,[],[s1,s3,s5])).
thf(f112,plain,(
  $false),
  inference(avatar_sat_refutation,[],[s6])).
% SZS output end Proof for SET014^4

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name /Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p from annotated formula f9
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'f750' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture f51 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start Proof for SEU140+2
fof(f9,axiom,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : (X2 = set_intersection2(X0,X1) <=> ! [X3] : (in(X3,X2) <=> (in(X3,X0) & in(X3,X1))))),
  file('/Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p',d3_xboole_0)).
fof(f40,axiom,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (set_difference(X0,X1) = empty_set <=> subset(X0,X1))),
  file('/Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p',t37_xboole_1)).
fof(f42,axiom,(
  ! [X0] : set_difference(X0,empty_set) = X0),
  file('/Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p',t3_boole)).
fof(f43,axiom,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (~(~disjoint(X0,X1) & ! [X2] : ~(in(X2,X0) & in(X2,X1))) & ~(? [X2] : (in(X2,X0) & in(X2,X1)) & disjoint(X0,X1)))),
  file('/Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p',t3_xboole_0)).
fof(f47,axiom,(
  ! [X0,X1] : set_difference(X0,set_difference(X0,X1)) = set_intersection2(X0,X1)),
  file('/Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p',t48_xboole_1)).
fof(f51,conjecture,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((subset(X0,X1) & disjoint(X1,X2)) => disjoint(X0,X2))),
  file('/Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p',t63_xboole_1)).
fof(f52,negated_conjecture,(
  ~ ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((subset(X0,X1) & disjoint(X1,X2)) => disjoint(X0,X2))),
  inference(negated_conjecture,[status(cth)],[f51])).
fof(f62,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : (~(~disjoint(X0,X1) & ! [X2] : ~(in(X2,X0) & in(X2,X1))) & ~(? [X3] : (in(X3,X0) & in(X3,X1)) & disjoint(X0,X1)))),
  inference(rectify,[],[f43])).
fof(f82,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((disjoint(X0,X1) | ? [X2] : (in(X2,X0) & in(X2,X1))) & (! [X3] : (~in(X3,X0) | ~in(X3,X1)) | ~disjoint(X0,X1)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f62])).
fof(f87,plain,(
  ? [X0,X1,X2] : (~disjoint(X0,X2) & (subset(X0,X1) & disjoint(X1,X2)))),
  inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f52])).
fof(f88,plain,(
  ? [X0,X1,X2] : (~disjoint(X0,X2) & subset(X0,X1) & disjoint(X1,X2))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f87])).
fof(f106,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((X2 = set_intersection2(X0,X1) | ? [X3] : (((~in(X3,X0) | ~in(X3,X1)) | ~in(X3,X2)) & ((in(X3,X0) & in(X3,X1)) | in(X3,X2)))) & (! [X3] : ((in(X3,X2) | (~in(X3,X0) | ~in(X3,X1))) & ((in(X3,X0) & in(X3,X1)) | ~in(X3,X2))) | set_intersection2(X0,X1) != X2))),
  inference(nnf_transformation,[],[f9])).
fof(f107,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((X2 = set_intersection2(X0,X1) | ? [X3] : ((~in(X3,X0) | ~in(X3,X1) | ~in(X3,X2)) & ((in(X3,X0) & in(X3,X1)) | in(X3,X2)))) & (! [X3] : ((in(X3,X2) | ~in(X3,X0) | ~in(X3,X1)) & ((in(X3,X0) & in(X3,X1)) | ~in(X3,X2))) | set_intersection2(X0,X1) != X2))),
  inference(flattening,[],[f106])).
fof(f108,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((X2 = set_intersection2(X0,X1) | ? [X3] : ((~in(X3,X0) | ~in(X3,X1) | ~in(X3,X2)) & ((in(X3,X0) & in(X3,X1)) | in(X3,X2)))) & (! [X4] : ((in(X4,X2) | ~in(X4,X0) | ~in(X4,X1)) & ((in(X4,X0) & in(X4,X1)) | ~in(X4,X2))) | set_intersection2(X0,X1) != X2))),
  inference(rectify,[],[f107])).
fof(f109,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1,X2] : ((X2 = set_intersection2(X0,X1) | ((~in(sK3(X0,X1,X2),X0) | ~in(sK3(X0,X1,X2),X1) | ~in(sK3(X0,X1,X2),X2)) & ((in(sK3(X0,X1,X2),X0) & in(sK3(X0,X1,X2),X1)) | in(sK3(X0,X1,X2),X2)))) & (! [X4] : ((in(X4,X2) | ~in(X4,X0) | ~in(X4,X1)) & ((in(X4,X0) & in(X4,X1)) | ~in(X4,X2))) | set_intersection2(X0,X1) != X2))),
  inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK3]),skolemize(X3,sK3(X0,X1,X2))],[f108])).
fof(f120,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((set_difference(X0,X1) = empty_set | ~subset(X0,X1)) & (subset(X0,X1) | empty_set != set_difference(X0,X1)))),
  inference(nnf_transformation,[],[f40])).
fof(f121,plain,(
  ! [X0,X1] : ((disjoint(X0,X1) | (in(sK8(X0,X1),X0) & in(sK8(X0,X1),X1))) & (! [X3] : (~in(X3,X0) | ~in(X3,X1)) | ~disjoint(X0,X1)))),
  inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK8]),skolemize(X2,sK8(X0,X1))],[f82])).
fof(f123,plain,(
  ~disjoint(sK10,sK12) & subset(sK10,sK11) & disjoint(sK11,sK12)),
  inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK10,sK11,sK12]),skolemize(X0,sK10),skolemize(X1,sK11),skolemize(X2,sK12)],[f88])).
fof(f142,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X0,X1,X4] : (in(X4,X1) | ~in(X4,X2) | set_intersection2(X0,X1) != X2) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f109])).
fof(f183,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (~subset(X0,X1) | empty_set = set_difference(X0,X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f120])).
fof(f185,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (set_difference(X0,empty_set) = X0) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f42])).
fof(f186,plain,(
  ( ! [X3,X0,X1] : (~disjoint(X0,X1) | ~in(X3,X1) | ~in(X3,X0)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f121])).
fof(f187,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (disjoint(X0,X1) | in(sK8(X0,X1),X1)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f121])).
fof(f188,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (disjoint(X0,X1) | in(sK8(X0,X1),X0)) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f121])).
fof(f192,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (set_intersection2(X0,X1) = set_difference(X0,set_difference(X0,X1))) )),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f47])).
fof(f197,plain,(
  disjoint(sK11,sK12)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f123])).
fof(f198,plain,(
  subset(sK10,sK11)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f123])).
fof(f199,plain,(
  ~disjoint(sK10,sK12)),
  inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f123])).
fof(f211,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X0,X1,X4] : (in(X4,X1) | ~in(X4,X2) | set_difference(X0,set_difference(X0,X1)) != X2) )),
  inference(definition_unfolding,[],[f142,f192])).
fof(f230,plain,(
  ( ! [X0,X1,X4] : (~in(X4,set_difference(X0,set_difference(X0,X1))) | in(X4,X1)) )),
  inference(equality_resolution,[],[f211])).
fof(f313,plain,(
  empty_set = set_difference(sK10,sK11)),
  inference(resolution,[],[f183,f198])).
fof(f315,plain,(
  in(sK8(sK10,sK12),sK12)),
  inference(resolution,[],[f187,f199])).
fof(f319,plain,(
  in(sK8(sK10,sK12),sK10)),
  inference(resolution,[],[f188,f199])).
fof(f374,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (~in(X0,sK11) | ~in(X0,sK12)) )),
  inference(resolution,[],[f186,f197])).
fof(f543,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (~in(X0,set_difference(sK10,empty_set)) | in(X0,sK11)) )),
  inference(superposition,[],[f230,f313])).
fof(f551,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (~in(X0,sK10) | in(X0,sK11)) )),
  inference(forward_demodulation,[],[f543,f185])).
fof(f631,plain,(
  in(sK8(sK10,sK12),sK11)),
  inference(resolution,[],[f551,f319])).
fof(f741,plain,(
  ~in(sK8(sK10,sK12),sK12)),
  inference(resolution,[],[f631,f374])).
fof(f750,plain,(
  $false),
  inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f741,f315])).
% SZS output end Proof for SEU140+2

Solution for NLP042+1

% SZS output start Saturation.
cnf(u181,negated_conjecture,
    abstraction(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u102,axiom,
    ~woman(X0,X1) | human_person(X0,X1)).

cnf(u130,axiom,
    ~order(X0,X1) | act(X0,X1)).

cnf(u104,axiom,
    ~abstraction(X0,X1) | unisex(X0,X1)).

cnf(u148,negated_conjecture,
    woman(sK0,sK1)).

cnf(u114,axiom,
    existent(X0,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1)).

cnf(u171,negated_conjecture,
    specific(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u100,axiom,
    ~organism(X0,X1) | entity(X0,X1)).

cnf(u128,axiom,
    ~event(X0,X1) | eventuality(X0,X1)).

cnf(u110,axiom,
    ~forename(X0,X1) | relname(X0,X1)).

cnf(u156,negated_conjecture,
    specific(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u122,axiom,
    ~order(X0,X1) | event(X0,X1)).

cnf(u166,negated_conjecture,
    entity(sK0,sK1)).

cnf(u194,negated_conjecture,
    ~organism(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u168,negated_conjecture,
    unisex(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u101,axiom,
    ~human_person(X0,X1) | organism(X0,X1)).

cnf(u129,axiom,
    ~act(X0,X1) | event(X0,X1)).

cnf(u178,negated_conjecture,
    ~female(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u111,axiom,
    ~object(X0,X1) | unisex(X0,X1)).

cnf(u113,axiom,
    ~object(X0,X1) | nonliving(X0,X1)).

cnf(u192,negated_conjecture,
    ~abstraction(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u174,negated_conjecture,
    ~animate(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u135,axiom,
    ~specific(X0,X1) | ~general(X0,X1)).

cnf(u176,negated_conjecture,
    ~female(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u109,axiom,
    ~relname(X0,X1) | relation(X0,X1)).

cnf(u137,axiom,
    ~forename(X0,X2) | X2 = X3 | ~of(X0,X3,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1) | ~forename(X0,X3) | ~of(X0,X2,X1)).

cnf(u186,negated_conjecture,
    ~of(sK0,sK2,X1) | ~of(sK0,X0,X1) | ~entity(sK0,X1) | ~forename(sK0,X0) | sK2 = X0).

cnf(u119,axiom,
    ~food(X0,X1) | substance_matter(X0,X1)).

cnf(u147,negated_conjecture,
    mia_forename(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u121,axiom,
    ~shake_beverage(X0,X1) | beverage(X0,X1)).

cnf(u165,negated_conjecture,
    object(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u193,negated_conjecture,
    ~entity(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u175,negated_conjecture,
    ~existent(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u132,axiom,
    ~nonexistent(X0,X1) | ~existent(X0,X1)).

cnf(u177,negated_conjecture,
    ~patient(sK0,sK4,X0) | ~agent(sK0,sK4,X0)).

cnf(u98,axiom,
    living(X0,X1) | ~organism(X0,X1)).

cnf(u155,negated_conjecture,
    nonexistent(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u199,negated_conjecture,
    ~human_person(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u173,negated_conjecture,
    ~living(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u183,negated_conjecture,
    nonhuman(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u96,axiom,
    animate(X0,X1) | ~human_person(X0,X1)).

cnf(u140,negated_conjecture,
    nonreflexive(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u185,negated_conjecture,
    ~female(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u106,axiom,
    ~abstraction(X0,X1) | nonhuman(X0,X1)).

cnf(u124,axiom,
    ~eventuality(X0,X1) | nonexistent(X0,X1)).

cnf(u152,negated_conjecture,
    relname(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u196,negated_conjecture,
    ~abstraction(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u162,negated_conjecture,
    female(sK0,sK1)).

cnf(u95,axiom,
    ~woman(X0,X1) | female(X0,X1)).

cnf(u180,negated_conjecture,
    relation(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u97,axiom,
    human(X0,X1) | ~human_person(X0,X1)).

cnf(u158,negated_conjecture,
    food(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u160,negated_conjecture,
    ~general(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u170,negated_conjecture,
    entity(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u103,axiom,
    ~mia_forename(X0,X1) | forename(X0,X1)).

cnf(u131,axiom,
    ~nonliving(X0,X1) | ~animate(X0,X1)).

cnf(u188,negated_conjecture,
    ~of(sK0,X0,sK1) | ~forename(sK0,X0) | sK2 = X0).

cnf(u105,axiom,
    general(X0,X1) | ~abstraction(X0,X1)).

cnf(u149,negated_conjecture,
    of(sK0,sK2,sK1)).

cnf(u115,axiom,
    ~entity(X0,X1) | specific(X0,X1)).

cnf(u159,negated_conjecture,
    act(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u161,negated_conjecture,
    human_person(sK0,sK1)).

cnf(u139,negated_conjecture,
    order(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u157,negated_conjecture,
    beverage(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u123,axiom,
    ~eventuality(X0,X1) | unisex(X0,X1)).

cnf(u167,negated_conjecture,
    specific(sK0,sK1)).

cnf(u195,negated_conjecture,
    ~human_person(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u169,negated_conjecture,
    nonliving(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u134,axiom,
    ~nonliving(X0,X1) | ~living(X0,X1)).

cnf(u179,negated_conjecture,
    ~general(sK0,sK1)).

cnf(u108,axiom,
    ~relation(X0,X1) | abstraction(X0,X1)).

cnf(u136,axiom,
    ~unisex(X0,X1) | ~female(X0,X1)).

cnf(u118,axiom,
    ~substance_matter(X0,X1) | object(X0,X1)).

cnf(u146,negated_conjecture,
    forename(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u120,axiom,
    ~beverage(X0,X1) | food(X0,X1)).

cnf(u164,negated_conjecture,
    substance_matter(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u142,negated_conjecture,
    patient(sK0,sK4,sK3)).

cnf(u144,negated_conjecture,
    event(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u154,negated_conjecture,
    unisex(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u198,negated_conjecture,
    ~abstraction(sK0,sK1)).

cnf(u172,negated_conjecture,
    ~general(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u200,negated_conjecture,
    ~agent(sK0,sK4,sK3)).

cnf(u133,axiom,
    ~nonhuman(X0,X1) | ~human(X0,X1)).

cnf(u182,negated_conjecture,
    unisex(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u143,negated_conjecture,
    agent(sK0,sK4,sK1)).

cnf(u184,negated_conjecture,
    ~human(sK0,sK2)).

cnf(u117,axiom,
    ~object(X0,X1) | entity(X0,X1)).

cnf(u145,negated_conjecture,
    shake_beverage(sK0,sK3)).

cnf(u151,axiom,
    ~nonreflexive(X0,X1) | ~agent(X0,X1,X3) | ~patient(X0,X1,X3)).

cnf(u125,axiom,
    ~eventuality(X0,X1) | specific(X0,X1)).

cnf(u153,negated_conjecture,
    eventuality(sK0,sK4)).

cnf(u163,negated_conjecture,
    organism(sK0,sK1)).

% SZS output end Saturation.
% SZS output start Definitions and Model Updates.
for all groundings,
    whenever thing(X0,X1) | ~entity(X0,X1) is false, set thing(X0,X1) to true
for all groundings,
    whenever thing(X0,X1) | ~abstraction(X0,X1) is false, set thing(X0,X1) to true
for all groundings,
    whenever thing(X0,X1) | ~eventuality(X0,X1) is false, set thing(X0,X1) to true
for all groundings,
    whenever impartial(X0,X1) | ~object(X0,X1) is false, set impartial(X0,X1) to true
for all groundings,
    whenever past(sK0,sK4) is false, set past(sK0,sK4) to true
for all groundings,
    whenever actual_world(sK0) is false, set actual_world(sK0) to true
for all groundings,
    whenever singleton(X0,X1) | ~thing(X0,X1) is false, set singleton(X0,X1) to true
for all groundings,
    whenever impartial(X0,X1) | ~organism(X0,X1) is false, set impartial(X0,X1) to true
% SZS output end Definitions and Model Updates.

Solution for SWV017+1

% SZS output start FiniteModel for SWV017+1
tff('declare_$i1',type,'fmb_$i_1':$i).
tff('declare_$i2',type,'fmb_$i_2':$i).
tff('finite_domain_$i',axiom,
      ! [X:$i] : (
         X = 'fmb_$i_1' | X = 'fmb_$i_2'
      ) ).

tff('distinct_domain_$i',axiom,
         'fmb_$i_1' != 'fmb_$i_2'
).

tff(declare_at,type,at:$i).
tff(at_definition,axiom,at = 'fmb_$i_1').
tff(declare_t,type,t:$i).
tff(t_definition,axiom,t = 'fmb_$i_2').
tff(declare_a,type,a:$i).
tff(a_definition,axiom,a = 'fmb_$i_2').
tff(declare_b,type,b:$i).
tff(b_definition,axiom,b = 'fmb_$i_2').
tff(declare_an_a_nonce,type,an_a_nonce:$i).
tff(an_a_nonce_definition,axiom,an_a_nonce = 'fmb_$i_2').
tff(declare_bt,type,bt:$i).
tff(bt_definition,axiom,bt = 'fmb_$i_2').
tff(declare_an_intruder_nonce,type,an_intruder_nonce:$i).
tff(an_intruder_nonce_definition,axiom,an_intruder_nonce = 'fmb_$i_2').
tff(declare_key,type,key: ($i * $i) > $i).
tff(function_key,axiom,
           key('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & key('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & key('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & key('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_1'

).

tff(declare_pair,type,pair: ($i * $i) > $i).
tff(function_pair,axiom,
           pair('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & pair('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & pair('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & pair('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'

).

tff(declare_sent,type,sent: ($i * $i * $i) > $i).
tff(function_sent,axiom,
           sent('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & sent('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & sent('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & sent('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & sent('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & sent('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & sent('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & sent('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_1'

).

tff(declare_quadruple,type,quadruple: ($i * $i * $i * $i) > $i).
tff(function_quadruple,axiom,
           quadruple('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & quadruple('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'

).

tff(declare_encrypt,type,encrypt: ($i * $i) > $i).
tff(function_encrypt,axiom,
           encrypt('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & encrypt('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & encrypt('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & encrypt('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'

).

tff(declare_triple,type,triple: ($i * $i * $i) > $i).
tff(function_triple,axiom,
           triple('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & triple('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & triple('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & triple('fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & triple('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & triple('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & triple('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & triple('fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2','fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'

).

tff(declare_generate_b_nonce,type,generate_b_nonce: ($i) > $i).
tff(function_generate_b_nonce,axiom,
           generate_b_nonce('fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & generate_b_nonce('fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'

).

tff(declare_generate_expiration_time,type,generate_expiration_time: ($i) > $i).
tff(function_generate_expiration_time,axiom,
           generate_expiration_time('fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & generate_expiration_time('fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'

).

tff(declare_generate_key,type,generate_key: ($i) > $i).
tff(function_generate_key,axiom,
           generate_key('fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_1'
         & generate_key('fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_1'

).

tff(declare_generate_intruder_nonce,type,generate_intruder_nonce: ($i) > $i).
tff(function_generate_intruder_nonce,axiom,
           generate_intruder_nonce('fmb_$i_1') = 'fmb_$i_2'
         & generate_intruder_nonce('fmb_$i_2') = 'fmb_$i_2'

).

tff(declare_a_holds,type,a_holds: ($i) > $o).
tff(predicate_a_holds,axiom,
           a_holds('fmb_$i_1')
         & a_holds('fmb_$i_2')

).

tff(declare_party_of_protocol,type,party_of_protocol: ($i) > $o).
tff(predicate_party_of_protocol,axiom,
           ~party_of_protocol('fmb_$i_1')
         & party_of_protocol('fmb_$i_2')

).

tff(declare_message,type,message: ($i) > $o).
tff(predicate_message,axiom,
           message('fmb_$i_1')
         & message('fmb_$i_2')

).

tff(declare_a_stored,type,a_stored: ($i) > $o).
tff(predicate_a_stored,axiom,
           ~a_stored('fmb_$i_1')
         & a_stored('fmb_$i_2')

).

tff(declare_b_holds,type,b_holds: ($i) > $o).
tff(predicate_b_holds,axiom,
           b_holds('fmb_$i_1')
         & b_holds('fmb_$i_2')

).

tff(declare_fresh_to_b,type,fresh_to_b: ($i) > $o).
tff(predicate_fresh_to_b,axiom,
           ~fresh_to_b('fmb_$i_1')
         & fresh_to_b('fmb_$i_2')

).

tff(declare_b_stored,type,b_stored: ($i) > $o).
tff(predicate_b_stored,axiom,
           b_stored('fmb_$i_1')
         & b_stored('fmb_$i_2')

).

tff(declare_a_key,type,a_key: ($i) > $o).
tff(predicate_a_key,axiom,
           a_key('fmb_$i_1')
         & ~a_key('fmb_$i_2')

).

tff(declare_t_holds,type,t_holds: ($i) > $o).
tff(predicate_t_holds,axiom,
           t_holds('fmb_$i_1')
         & t_holds('fmb_$i_2')

).

tff(declare_a_nonce,type,a_nonce: ($i) > $o).
tff(predicate_a_nonce,axiom,
           ~a_nonce('fmb_$i_1')
         & a_nonce('fmb_$i_2')

).

tff(declare_intruder_message,type,intruder_message: ($i) > $o).
tff(predicate_intruder_message,axiom,
           intruder_message('fmb_$i_1')
         & intruder_message('fmb_$i_2')

).

tff(declare_intruder_holds,type,intruder_holds: ($i) > $o).
tff(predicate_intruder_holds,axiom,
           intruder_holds('fmb_$i_1')
         & intruder_holds('fmb_$i_2')

).

tff(declare_fresh_intruder_nonce,type,fresh_intruder_nonce: ($i) > $o).
tff(predicate_fresh_intruder_nonce,axiom,
           ~fresh_intruder_nonce('fmb_$i_1')
         & fresh_intruder_nonce('fmb_$i_2')

).

% SZS output end FiniteModel for SWV017+1

Solution for BOO001-1

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file BOO001-1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name /Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax from annotated formula f1
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'f358' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the negated conjecture f6 as the proved formula
SUCCESS: 'f8' is a symbol definition of 'sF0'
SUCCESS: 'f10' is a symbol definition of 'sF1'
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start Proof for BOO001-1
fof(f1,axiom,(
  ( ! [X2,X3,X0,X1,X4] : (multiply(multiply(X0,X1,X2),X3,multiply(X0,X1,X4)) = multiply(X0,X1,multiply(X2,X3,X4))) )),
  file('/Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax',associativity)).
fof(f2,axiom,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (multiply(X0,X1,X1) = X1) )),
  file('/Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax',ternary_multiply_1)).
fof(f5,axiom,(
  ( ! [X0,X1] : (multiply(X0,X1,inverse(X1)) = X0) )),
  file('/Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Axioms/BOO001-0.ax',right_inverse)).
fof(f6,negated_conjecture,(
  inverse(inverse(a)) != a),
  file('/Users/mezpusz/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/BOO/BOO001-1.p',prove_inverse_is_self_cancelling)).
fof(f7,plain,(
  a != inverse(inverse(a))),
  inference(reorient_equations,[],[f6])).
fof(f8,definition,(
  sF0 = inverse(a)),
  introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sF0])],[function_definition])).
fof(f9,plain,(
  inverse(a) = sF0),
  inference(reorient_equations,[],[f8])).
fof(f10,definition,(
  sF1 = inverse(sF0)),
  introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sF1])],[function_definition])).
fof(f11,plain,(
  inverse(sF0) = sF1),
  inference(reorient_equations,[],[f10])).
fof(f12,plain,(
  a != sF1),
  inference(definition_folding,[],[f7,f11,f9])).
fof(f15,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (multiply(X0,a,sF0) = X0) )),
  inference(superposition,[],[f5,f9])).
fof(f16,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (multiply(X0,sF0,sF1) = X0) )),
  inference(superposition,[],[f5,f11])).
fof(f27,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X3,X0,X1] : (multiply(X1,X0,multiply(X0,X2,X3)) = multiply(X0,X2,multiply(X1,X0,X3))) )),
  inference(superposition,[],[f1,f2])).
fof(f64,plain,(
  ( ! [X2,X0,X1] : (multiply(X1,X2,X0) = multiply(X2,X0,multiply(X1,X2,X0))) )),
  inference(superposition,[],[f27,f2])).
fof(f216,plain,(
  ( ! [X0] : (multiply(a,sF0,X0) = X0) )),
  inference(superposition,[],[f64,f15])).
fof(f274,plain,(
  a = sF1),
  inference(superposition,[],[f216,f16])).
fof(f357,plain,(
  a != a),
  inference(superposition,[],[f12,f274])).
fof(f358,plain,(
  $false),
  inference(trivial_inequality_removal,[],[f357])).
% SZS output end Proof for BOO001-1

VIP 1.718

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name /home/etudiant/Cours/stage/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p from annotated formula d3_xboole_0
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'vip_121' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture t63_xboole_1 as the proved formula
WARNING: No problem provided, cannot do full leaf verification
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

% SZS output start CNFRefutation for /home/etudiant/Cours/stage/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p
fof(d3_xboole_0,axiom,
    ! [A,B,C] :
      ( C = set_intersection2(A,B)
    <=> ! [D] :
          ( in(D,C)
        <=> ( in(D,A)
            & in(D,B) ) ) ) ,file('/home/etudiant/Cours/stage/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p',d3_xboole_0)).
cnf(vip_1,plain,(in(V0,V1) | ~(in(V0,V2)) | V2 != set_intersection2(V1,V3)),inference(cnf_transformation,[status(esa)],[d3_xboole_0])).
fof(t28_xboole_1,lemma,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( subset(A,B)
     => set_intersection2(A,B) = A ) ,file('/home/etudiant/Cours/stage/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p',t28_xboole_1)).
cnf(vip_7,plain,(~(subset(V0,V1)) | set_intersection2(V0,V1) = V0),inference(cnf_transformation,[status(esa)],[t28_xboole_1])).
fof(t3_xboole_0,lemma,
    ! [A,B] :
      ( ~ ( ~ disjoint(A,B)
          & ! [C] :
              ~ ( in(C,A)
                & in(C,B) ) )
      & ~ ( ? [C] :
              ( in(C,A)
              & in(C,B) )
          & disjoint(A,B) ) ) ,file('/home/etudiant/Cours/stage/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p',t3_xboole_0)).
cnf(vip_8,plain,(disjoint(V0,V1) | in(sk2(V0,V1),V0)),inference(cnf_transformation,[status(esa)],[t3_xboole_0])).
cnf(vip_9,plain,(disjoint(V0,V1) | in(sk2(V0,V1),V1)),inference(cnf_transformation,[status(esa)],[t3_xboole_0])).
cnf(vip_10,plain,(~(disjoint(V0,V1)) | ~(in(V2,V0)) | ~(in(V2,V1))),inference(cnf_transformation,[status(esa)],[t3_xboole_0])).
fof(t63_xboole_1,conjecture,
    ! [A,B,C] :
      ( ( subset(A,B)
        & disjoint(B,C) )
     => disjoint(A,C) ) ,file('/home/etudiant/Cours/stage/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p',t63_xboole_1)).
cnf(vip_11,negated_conjecture,(subset(sk3,sk4)),inference(cnf_transformation,[status(cth)],[t63_xboole_1])).
cnf(vip_12,negated_conjecture,(disjoint(sk4,sk5)),inference(cnf_transformation,[status(cth)],[t63_xboole_1])).
cnf(vip_13,negated_conjecture,(~(disjoint(sk3,sk5))),inference(cnf_transformation,[status(cth)],[t63_xboole_1])).
cnf(vip_14,plain,(in(sk2(sk3,sk5),sk3)),inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[vip_13,vip_8])).
cnf(vip_15,plain,(in(sk2(sk3,sk5),sk5)),inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[vip_13,vip_9])).
cnf(vip_16,plain,(set_intersection2(sk3,sk4) = sk3),inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[vip_11,vip_7])).
cnf(vip_17,plain,(~(in(V0,sk4)) | ~(in(V0,sk5))),inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[vip_12,vip_10])).
cnf(vip_23,plain,(sk3 != set_intersection2(V0,V1) | in(sk2(sk5,sk3),V0)),inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[vip_14,vip_1])).
cnf(vip_24,plain,(~(in(sk2(sk3,sk5),sk4))),inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[vip_15,vip_17])).
cnf(vip_33,plain,(V0 != set_intersection2(sk4,V1) | ~(in(sk2(sk5,sk3),V0))),inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[vip_24,vip_1])).
cnf(vip_34,plain,(V0 != sk3 | ~(in(sk2(sk5,sk3),V0))),inference(indexed_superposition,[status(thm)],[vip_16,vip_33])).
cnf(vip_37,plain,(sk3 != sk3 | in(sk2(sk5,sk3),V0)),inference(indexed_superposition,[status(thm)],[vip_16,vip_23])).
cnf(vip_53,plain,(sk3 = sk3),inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[vip_7,vip_11])).
cnf(vip_64,plain,(~(in(sk2(sk5,sk3),sk3))),inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[vip_53,vip_34])).
cnf(vip_66,plain,(in(sk2(sk5,sk3),V0)),inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[vip_53,vip_37])).
cnf(vip_121,plain,($false),inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[vip_64,vip_66])).
% SZS output end CNFRefutation for /home/etudiant/Cours/stage/TPTP-v9.2.1/Problems/SEU/SEU140+2.p

Zipperposition 2.1.9999

Solution for SET014^4

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SET014^4.s
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'zip_derived_cl16' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
WARNING: Refutation has non-false root ''0''
FAILURE: 'zf_stmt_1' has an illegal relationship with its (non-)conjecture parent
FAILURE: Failed verification
% SZS status VerifiedBad

thf(sk__6_type,type,
    sk__6: $i ).

thf(sk__4_type,type,
    sk__4: $i > $o ).

thf(union_type,type,
    union: ( $i > $o ) > ( $i > $o ) > $i > $o ).

thf(sk__3_type,type,
    sk__3: $i > $o ).

thf(sk__5_type,type,
    sk__5: $i > $o ).

thf(subset_type,type,
    subset: ( $i > $o ) > ( $i > $o ) > $o ).

thf(subset,axiom,
    ( subset
    = ( ^ [X: $i > $o,Y: $i > $o] :
        ! [U: $i] :
          ( ( X @ U )
         => ( Y @ U ) ) ) ) ).

thf('0',plain,
    ( subset
    = ( ^ [X: $i > $o,Y: $i > $o] :
        ! [U: $i] :
          ( ( X @ U )
         => ( Y @ U ) ) ) ),
    inference(simplify_rw_rule,[status(thm)],[subset]) ).

thf('1',plain,
    ( subset
    = ( ^ [V_1: $i > $o,V_2: $i > $o] :
        ! [X4: $i] :
          ( ( V_1 @ X4 )
         => ( V_2 @ X4 ) ) ) ),
    define([status(thm)]) ).

thf(union,axiom,
    ( union
    = ( ^ [X: $i > $o,Y: $i > $o,U: $i] :
          ( ( X @ U )
          | ( Y @ U ) ) ) ) ).

thf('2',plain,
    ( union
    = ( ^ [X: $i > $o,Y: $i > $o,U: $i] :
          ( ( X @ U )
          | ( Y @ U ) ) ) ),
    inference(simplify_rw_rule,[status(thm)],[union]) ).

thf('3',plain,
    ( union
    = ( ^ [V_1: $i > $o,V_2: $i > $o,V_3: $i] :
          ( ( V_1 @ V_3 )
          | ( V_2 @ V_3 ) ) ) ),
    define([status(thm)]) ).

thf(thm,conjecture,
    ! [X: $i > $o,Y: $i > $o,A: $i > $o] :
      ( ( ( subset @ X @ A )
        & ( subset @ Y @ A ) )
     => ( subset @ ( union @ X @ Y ) @ A ) ) ).

thf(zf_stmt_0,conjecture,
    ! [X4: $i > $o,X6: $i > $o,X8: $i > $o] :
      ( ( ! [X10: $i] :
            ( ( X4 @ X10 )
           => ( X8 @ X10 ) )
        & ! [X12: $i] :
            ( ( X6 @ X12 )
           => ( X8 @ X12 ) ) )
     => ! [X14: $i] :
          ( ( ( X4 @ X14 )
            | ( X6 @ X14 ) )
         => ( X8 @ X14 ) ) ) ).

thf(zf_stmt_1,negated_conjecture,
    ~ ! [X4: $i > $o,X6: $i > $o,X8: $i > $o] :
        ( ( ! [X10: $i] :
              ( ( X4 @ X10 )
             => ( X8 @ X10 ) )
          & ! [X12: $i] :
              ( ( X6 @ X12 )
             => ( X8 @ X12 ) ) )
       => ! [X14: $i] :
            ( ( ( X4 @ X14 )
              | ( X6 @ X14 ) )
           => ( X8 @ X14 ) ) ),
    inference('cnf.neg',[status(esa)],[zf_stmt_0]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl2,plain,
    ~ ( sk__5 @ sk__6 ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[zf_stmt_1]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl3,plain,
    ( ( sk__3 @ sk__6 )
    | ( sk__4 @ sk__6 ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[zf_stmt_1]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl1,plain,
    ! [X1: $i] :
      ( ( sk__5 @ X1 )
      | ~ ( sk__4 @ X1 ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[zf_stmt_1]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl5,plain,
    ( ( sk__3 @ sk__6 )
    | ( sk__5 @ sk__6 ) ),
    inference('sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl3,zip_derived_cl1]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl2_001,plain,
    ~ ( sk__5 @ sk__6 ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[zf_stmt_1]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl8,plain,
    sk__3 @ sk__6,
    inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl5,zip_derived_cl2]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl0,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( ( sk__5 @ X0 )
      | ~ ( sk__3 @ X0 ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[zf_stmt_1]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl12,plain,
    sk__5 @ sk__6,
    inference('sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl8,zip_derived_cl0]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl16,plain,
    $false,
    inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl2,zip_derived_cl12]) ).

Solution for SEU140+2

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file SEU140+2.s
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
WARNING: No problem file, leaf verification will be incomplete
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'zip_derived_cl1542' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
FAILURE: 'zf_stmt_0' has an illegal relationship with its (non-)conjecture parent
FAILURE: Failed verification
% SZS status VerifiedBad

thf(sk__11_type,type,
    sk__11: $i ).

thf(sk__8_type,type,
    sk__8: $i > $i > $i ).

thf(sk__10_type,type,
    sk__10: $i ).

thf(in_type,type,
    in: $i > $i > $o ).

thf(disjoint_type,type,
    disjoint: $i > $i > $o ).

thf(empty_set_type,type,
    empty_set: $i ).

thf(sk__type,type,
    sk_: $i > $i ).

thf(sk__12_type,type,
    sk__12: $i ).

thf(subset_type,type,
    subset: $i > $i > $o ).

thf(set_intersection2_type,type,
    set_intersection2: $i > $i > $i ).

thf(d1_xboole_0,axiom,
    ! [A: $i] :
      ( ( A = empty_set )
    <=> ! [B: $i] :
          ~ ( in @ B @ A ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl8,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( ( X0 = empty_set )
      | ( in @ ( sk_ @ X0 ) @ X0 ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[d1_xboole_0]) ).

thf(t63_xboole_1,conjecture,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( ( subset @ A @ B )
        & ( disjoint @ B @ C ) )
     => ( disjoint @ A @ C ) ) ).

thf(zf_stmt_0,negated_conjecture,
    ~ ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
        ( ( ( subset @ A @ B )
          & ( disjoint @ B @ C ) )
       => ( disjoint @ A @ C ) ),
    inference('cnf.neg',[status(esa)],[t63_xboole_1]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl81,plain,
    subset @ sk__10 @ sk__11,
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[zf_stmt_0]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl80,plain,
    disjoint @ sk__11 @ sk__12,
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[zf_stmt_0]) ).

thf(d7_xboole_0,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i] :
      ( ( disjoint @ A @ B )
    <=> ( ( set_intersection2 @ A @ B )
        = empty_set ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl30,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
      ( ( ( set_intersection2 @ X0 @ X1 )
        = empty_set )
      | ~ ( disjoint @ X0 @ X1 ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[d7_xboole_0]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl571,plain,
    ( ( set_intersection2 @ sk__11 @ sk__12 )
    = empty_set ),
    inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl80,zip_derived_cl30]) ).

thf(t26_xboole_1,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
      ( ( subset @ A @ B )
     => ( subset @ ( set_intersection2 @ A @ C ) @ ( set_intersection2 @ B @ C ) ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl56,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
      ( ~ ( subset @ X0 @ X1 )
      | ( subset @ ( set_intersection2 @ X0 @ X2 ) @ ( set_intersection2 @ X1 @ X2 ) ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[t26_xboole_1]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl765,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( ~ ( subset @ X0 @ sk__11 )
      | ( subset @ ( set_intersection2 @ X0 @ sk__12 ) @ empty_set ) ),
    inference('s_sup+',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl571,zip_derived_cl56]) ).

thf(t28_xboole_1,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i] :
      ( ( subset @ A @ B )
     => ( ( set_intersection2 @ A @ B )
        = A ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl57,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
      ( ( ( set_intersection2 @ X0 @ X1 )
        = X0 )
      | ~ ( subset @ X0 @ X1 ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[t28_xboole_1]) ).

thf(commutativity_k3_xboole_0,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i] :
      ( ( set_intersection2 @ A @ B )
      = ( set_intersection2 @ B @ A ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl3,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
      ( ( set_intersection2 @ X1 @ X0 )
      = ( set_intersection2 @ X0 @ X1 ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[commutativity_k3_xboole_0]) ).

thf(t4_xboole_0,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i] :
      ( ~ ( ? [C: $i] : ( in @ C @ ( set_intersection2 @ A @ B ) )
          & ( disjoint @ A @ B ) )
      & ~ ( ~ ( disjoint @ A @ B )
          & ! [C: $i] :
              ~ ( in @ C @ ( set_intersection2 @ A @ B ) ) ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl77,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
      ( ~ ( in @ X0 @ ( set_intersection2 @ X1 @ X2 ) )
      | ~ ( disjoint @ X1 @ X2 ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[t4_xboole_0]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl417,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
      ( ~ ( in @ X2 @ ( set_intersection2 @ X1 @ X0 ) )
      | ~ ( disjoint @ X0 @ X1 ) ),
    inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl3,zip_derived_cl77]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl644,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
      ( ~ ( subset @ X0 @ X1 )
      | ~ ( in @ X2 @ X0 )
      | ~ ( disjoint @ X1 @ X0 ) ),
    inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl57,zip_derived_cl417]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl1458,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
      ( ~ ( subset @ X0 @ sk__11 )
      | ~ ( in @ X1 @ ( set_intersection2 @ X0 @ sk__12 ) )
      | ~ ( disjoint @ empty_set @ ( set_intersection2 @ X0 @ sk__12 ) ) ),
    inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl765,zip_derived_cl644]) ).

thf(t3_xboole_0,axiom,
    ! [A: $i,B: $i] :
      ( ~ ( ? [C: $i] :
              ( ( in @ C @ B )
              & ( in @ C @ A ) )
          & ( disjoint @ A @ B ) )
      & ~ ( ~ ( disjoint @ A @ B )
          & ! [C: $i] :
              ~ ( ( in @ C @ A )
                & ( in @ C @ B ) ) ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl68,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
      ( ( disjoint @ X0 @ X1 )
      | ( in @ ( sk__8 @ X1 @ X0 ) @ X0 ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[t3_xboole_0]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl7,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
      ( ~ ( in @ X0 @ X1 )
      | ( X1 != empty_set ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[d1_xboole_0]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl373,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ~ ( in @ X0 @ empty_set ),
    inference(eq_res,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl7]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl862,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] : ( disjoint @ empty_set @ X0 ),
    inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl68,zip_derived_cl373]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl1475,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
      ( ~ ( subset @ X0 @ sk__11 )
      | ~ ( in @ X1 @ ( set_intersection2 @ X0 @ sk__12 ) ) ),
    inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl1458,zip_derived_cl862]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl1484,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ~ ( in @ X0 @ ( set_intersection2 @ sk__10 @ sk__12 ) ),
    inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl81,zip_derived_cl1475]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl1519,plain,
    ( ( set_intersection2 @ sk__10 @ sk__12 )
    = empty_set ),
    inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl8,zip_derived_cl1484]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl31,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
      ( ( disjoint @ X0 @ X1 )
      | ( ( set_intersection2 @ X0 @ X1 )
       != empty_set ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[d7_xboole_0]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl79,plain,
    ~ ( disjoint @ sk__10 @ sk__12 ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[zf_stmt_0]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl524,plain,
    ( ( set_intersection2 @ sk__10 @ sk__12 )
   != empty_set ),
    inference('s_sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl31,zip_derived_cl79]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl1542,plain,
    $false,
    inference('simplify_reflect-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl1519,zip_derived_cl524]) ).

CheckProof 0.1

Verification of COR000+1.s

% SZS status VerifiedGood for COR000+1.s

Verification of EVL000+1.s

% SZS status VerifiedBad for EVL000+1.s
% bad step: s1 (not the negation of the conjecture)

Verification of TMO000+1.s

% SZS status Unknown for TMO000+1.s

GAPT 2.20

Verification of COR000+1.s

% SZS status VerifiedGood

Verification of EVL000+1.s

% SZS status VerifiedBad : inference step with name s1 is incorrect

Verification of TMO000+1.s

% SZS status Timeout

GDV 2.0

Verification of COR000+1.s

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file COR000+1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name Problems/correct_problem.p from annotated formula a1
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
 RESULT: SOT_0HqbAN - Paradox---4.0 says Satisfiable - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: Leaf axiom(_like) formulae are satisfiable
 NOTICE: Reading the problem file Problems/correct_problem.p
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'f1' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture c as the proved formula
 RESULT: SOT_XO7UhS - Paradox---4.0 says Satisfiable - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: Problem axiom(_like) formulae are satisfiable
SUCCESS: Leaf a1 is a copy of a1 (from the problem)
SUCCESS: Leaf c is a copy of c (from the problem)
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
 NOTICE: Making CTH test of 's1' from 'c' a CEQ test
 RESULT: SOT_OnyF3a - E---3.3.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: 's1' is a cth of 'c' (forwards ceq)
 RESULT: SOT_r7_vgC - E---3.3.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.01
SUCCESS: 'c' is a thm of 'neg_s1' (backwards ceq)
SUCCESS: s1 is a ceq of c
 RESULT: SOT_qWQTeb - E---3.3.0 says ContradictoryAxioms - CPU = 0.01
SUCCESS: 'f1' is a thm of 's1 a1'
SUCCESS: Derived formulae are verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

Verification of EVL000+1.s

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file EVL000+1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name Problems/evil_problem.p from annotated formula a1
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
SUCCESS: Leaf axiom(_like) formulae are satisfiable
 NOTICE: Reading the problem file Problems/evil_problem.p
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'f1' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture c as the proved formula
SUCCESS: Problem axiom(_like) formulae are satisfiable
SUCCESS: Leaf a1 is a copy of a1 (from the problem)
SUCCESS: Leaf c is a copy of c (from the problem)
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
 NOTICE: Making CTH test of 's1' from 'c' a CEQ test
 RESULT: SOT_ZBthDX - E---3.3.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.01
SUCCESS: 's1' is a cth of 'c' (forwards ceq)
 RESULT: SOT_dGAhHU - E---3.3.0 says CounterSatisfiable - CPU = 0.00
FAILURE: 'c' fails to be a thm of 'neg_s1' (backwards ceq)
FAILURE: s1 fails in the backward direction to be a ceq of c
FAILURE: Failed verification
% SZS status VerifiedBad

Verification of TMO000+1.s

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file TMO000+1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name Problems/timeout_problem.p from annotated formula a01
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
SUCCESS: Leaf axiom(_like) formulae are satisfiable
 NOTICE: Reading the problem file Problems/timeout_problem.p
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'zfalse' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
WARNING: Refutation has non-false root 's1'
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture c as the proved formula
SUCCESS: Problem axiom(_like) formulae are satisfiable
SUCCESS: Leaf a01 is a copy of a01 (from the problem)
SUCCESS: Leaf c is a copy of c (from the problem)
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
 NOTICE: Making CTH test of 's1' from 'c' a CEQ test
 RESULT: SOT_EWOQEc - E---3.3.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.01
SUCCESS: 's1' is a cth of 'c' (forwards ceq)
 RESULT: SOT_Hrw0V_ - E---3.3.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.02
SUCCESS: 'c' is a thm of 'neg_s1' (backwards ceq)
SUCCESS: s1 is a ceq of c
 RESULT: SOT_6VMIYo - E---3.3.0 says Timeout - CPU = 0.90
FAILURE: 'sk0' fails to be a thm of 'a01' (forwards esa)
 RESULT: SOT_N23sRJ - E---3.3.0 says Timeout - CPU = 30.21
FAILURE: 'a01' fails to be a thm of 'sk0' (backwards esa)
FAILURE: sk0 fails in both directions to be a esa of a01
 NOTICE: Not verified : 2 not verified steps
% SZS status Unknown : 2 not verified steps

GDV-LP 2.0

Verification of COR000+1.s

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file TestFiles/ProoVer2026/Samples/COR000+1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name Problems/COR000+1.p from annotated formula a1
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
 RESULT: SOT_VsvqYR - Paradox---4.0 says Satisfiable - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: Leaf axiom(_like) formulae are satisfiable
SUCCESS: Generated trusted ASked formulae
 NOTICE: Reading the problem file TestFiles/ProoVer2026/Samples/Problems/COR000+1.p
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'f1' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture c as the proved formula
 RESULT: SOT_H3ew_M - Paradox---4.0 says Satisfiable - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: Problem axiom(_like) formulae are satisfiable
SUCCESS: Leaf 'a1' is a copy of 'a1' (from the problem)
 NOTICE: Leaf a1 is a copy of a1_p1 (from the problem), but a proof is required
 RESULT: SOT_3BCy6V - ZenonModulo-LP---0.5.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: 'a1' is a thm of 'a1_p1' (forwards eqv)
 RESULT: SOT_79VG9U - ZenonModulo-LP---0.5.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: 'a1_p1' is a thm of 'a1' (backwards eqv)
SUCCESS: 'a1' is a eqv of 'a1_p1'
SUCCESS: Leaf 'c' is a copy of 'c' (from the problem)
 NOTICE: Leaf c is a copy of c_p2 (from the problem), but a proof is required
 RESULT: SOT__KNwrq - ZenonModulo-LP---0.5.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: 'c' is a thm of 'c_p2' (forwards eqv)
 RESULT: SOT_hXbu1B - ZenonModulo-LP---0.5.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: 'c_p2' is a thm of 'c' (backwards eqv)
SUCCESS: 'c' is a eqv of 'c_p2'
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
 NOTICE: Making CTH test of 's1' from 'c' into a CEQ test
 RESULT: SOT_hb3NWn - ZenonModulo-LP---0.5.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: 's1' is a cth of 'c' (forwards ceq)
 RESULT: SOT_liquRg - ZenonModulo-LP---0.5.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: 'c' is a thm of 'neg_s1' (backwards ceq)
SUCCESS: 's1' is a ceq of 'c'
 RESULT: SOT_Rn7Sp0 - ZenonModulo-LP---0.5.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.01
SUCCESS: 'f1' is a thm of 's1 a1'
SUCCESS: Derived formulae are verified
RECHECK: LambdaPi verification
SUCCESS: LambdaPi verified
SUCCESS: Verified
% SZS status VerifiedGood

Verification of EVL000+1.s

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file TestFiles/ProoVer2026/Samples/EVL000+1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name Problems/EVL000+1.p from annotated formula a1
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
SUCCESS: Leaf axiom(_like) formulae are satisfiable
SUCCESS: Generated trusted ASked formulae
 NOTICE: Reading the problem file TestFiles/ProoVer2026/Samples/Problems/EVL000+1.p
SUCCESS: Derivation has unique formula names
SUCCESS: All derived formulae have parents and inference information
SUCCESS: All new_symbols are really new
 NOTICE: Took the first false root 'f1' as the single derivation root
SUCCESS: Derivation is acyclic
SUCCESS: Derivation looks like a refutation
SUCCESS: Assumptions are propagated
SUCCESS: Assumptions are discharged
 NOTICE: Took the conjecture c as the proved formula
SUCCESS: Problem axiom(_like) formulae are satisfiable
SUCCESS: Leaf 'a1' is a copy of 'a1' (from the problem)
 NOTICE: Leaf a1 is a copy of a1_p1 (from the problem), but a proof is required
 RESULT: SOT_ZF68oE - ZenonModulo-LP---0.5.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: 'a1' is a thm of 'a1_p1' (forwards eqv)
 RESULT: SOT_SZn19q - ZenonModulo-LP---0.5.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: 'a1_p1' is a thm of 'a1' (backwards eqv)
SUCCESS: 'a1' is a eqv of 'a1_p1'
SUCCESS: Leaf 'c' is a copy of 'c' (from the problem)
 NOTICE: Leaf c is a copy of c_p2 (from the problem), but a proof is required
 RESULT: SOT_HZ_ydl - ZenonModulo-LP---0.5.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: 'c' is a thm of 'c_p2' (forwards eqv)
 RESULT: SOT_Wb7wrD - ZenonModulo-LP---0.5.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: 'c_p2' is a thm of 'c' (backwards eqv)
SUCCESS: 'c' is a eqv of 'c_p2'
SUCCESS: Leaves are verified
 NOTICE: Making CTH test of 's1' from 'c' into a CEQ test
 RESULT: SOT_PAbiGN - ZenonModulo-LP---0.5.0 says Theorem - CPU = 0.00
SUCCESS: 's1' is a cth of 'c' (forwards ceq)
 RESULT: SOT_GpDsoR - ZenonModulo-LP---0.5.0 says Unknown - CPU = 0.00
FAILURE: 'c' fails to be a thm of 'neg_s1' (backwards ceq)
FAILURE: 's1' fails in the backward direction to be a ceq of 'c'
FAILURE: 's1' is not a ceq of its parents
 NOTICE: Not verified : 1 not verified steps
% SZS status Unknown : 1 not verified steps

Verification of TMO000+1.s

 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file TestFiles/ProoVer2026/Samples/TMO000+1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name Problems/TMO000+1.p from annotated formula a01
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
SUCCESS: Leaf axiom(_like) formulae are satisfiable
 RESULT: SOT_BFPqqA - ASk---0.2.3 says Success - CPU = 1.72
 NOTICE: Reading the derivation file TestFiles/ProoVer2026/Samples/TMO000+1.s
 NOTICE: Took problem file name Problems/TMO000+1.p from annotated formula a01
 NOTICE: Starting verification processes
SUCCESS: Leaf axiom(_like) formulae are satisfiable
SUCCESS: Trusted Skolemization done for 'sk0'
 RESULT: SOT_tblYPU - ASk---0.2.3 says Success - CPU = 1.74
SUCCESS: Trusted Skolemization done for 'sk0'
SUCCESS: Trusted Skolemization done for 'sk1'
 RESULT: SOT_xoLmyS - ASk---0.2.3 says Success - CPU = 1.73
SUCCESS: Trusted Skolemization done for 'sk1'
SUCCESS: Trusted Skolemization done for 'sk2'
 RESULT: SOT_EaYhez - ASk---0.2.3 says Success - CPU = 1.84
SUCCESS: Trusted Skolemization done for 'sk2'
SUCCESS: Trusted Skolemization done for 'sk3'
 RESULT: SOT_tlViF1 - ASk---0.2.3 says Success - CPU = 1.95
SUCCESS: Trusted Skolemization done for 'sk3'
SUCCESS: Trusted Skolemization done for 'sk4'
    .... lots of lines then ...
 NOTICE: Not verified : 2 not verified steps
% SZS status Unknown : 2 not verified steps

mrs-proover 0.2.0

Verification of COR000+1.s

% step c [rule=-] -> Some(Sound)
% step s1 [rule=negated_conjecture] -> Some(Sound)
% step a1 [rule=-] -> Some(Sound)
% step f1 [rule=consequence] -> Some(Sound)
% SZS status VerifiedGood

Verification of EVL000+1.s

% step c [rule=-] -> Some(Sound)
% step s1 [rule=negated_conjecture] -> Some(Unsound("negated_conjecture is not the negation of its parent"))
% step a1 [rule=-] -> Some(Sound)
% step f1 [rule=consequence] -> Some(Sound)
% SZS status VerifiedBad : step s1: negated_conjecture is not the negation of its parent

Verification of TMO000+1.s

% step c [rule=-] -> Some(Sound)
% step neg_c [rule=negated_conjecture] -> Some(Sound)
% step neg_inst [rule=instantiate] -> Some(Sound)
% step a01 [rule=-] -> Some(Sound)
% step sk0 [rule=skolemize] -> Some(Sound)
% step sk1 [rule=skolemize] -> Some(Sound)
...
% step sk184 [rule=skolemize] -> Some(Sound)
% step inst [rule=instantiate] -> Some(Sound)
% step contradiction [rule=consequence] -> Some(Sound)
% SZS status VerifiedGood

Nörgler 1.1

Verification of COR000+1.s

%%% This output was generated by noergler, version 1.0.
%%% Generated on Wed Jun 24 11:52:55 CEST 2026 using parameters 'mace4path(), eproverpath(/home/lex/bin/eprover), setparallelmode(parallelsteps), setparallelcountermodelmode(offset), findfailingstep'.
% SZS status VerifiedGood for /home/lex/private/casc/proover/2026/samples/COR000+1.s

Verification of EVL000+1.s

%%% This output was generated by noergler, version 1.0.
%%% Generated on Wed Jun 24 11:53:07 CEST 2026 using parameters 'mace4path(), eproverpath(/home/lex/bin/eprover), setparallelmode(parallelsteps), setparallelcountermodelmode(offset), findfailingstep'.
% SZS status VerifiedBad for /home/lex/private/casc/proover/2026/samples/EVL000+1.s : Verification failed for proof step: 's1'. Negation of conjecture is incorrect. Consider rerunning with flag --relax-specified-inference-check .

Verification of TMO000+1.s

%%% This output was generated by noergler, version 1.0.
%%% Generated on Wed Jun 24 11:53:26 CEST 2026 using parameters 'mace4path(), eproverpath(/home/lex/bin/eprover), setparallelmode(parallelsteps), setparallelcountermodelmode(offset), findfailingstep'.
% SZS status VerifiedBad for /home/lex/private/casc/proover/2026/samples/TMO000+1.s : Verification failed for proof step: 'sk0'. Skolemization seems incorrect: Skolemization inference record not well-formed in proof step 'sk0'.

ProofCheck 1.0

Verification of COR000+1.s

Wall-clock timeout: 28s
proofcheck version 1.0, July 2026.
Proof and model verifier (parallel, per-step ATP verification).
Copyright (c) 2026 Jeffrey P. Machado, Larry Lesyna.

ATP backend: /d/bin/eprover
Countermodel finder: /d/bin/mace4
Clausifier (prover9): /d/bin/prover9
Clausifier (vampire): /d/bin/vampire
TPTP syntax: OK
Format: TSTP proof (structural + ATP verification)
Problem: Problems/COR000+1.p (2 formulas, 11 symbols)
  Checking assume_negation 's1'... OK
Structural checks passed (1 steps).
  $false derivation: present (f1)
  Dependency graph: acyclic
  Axiom source: all match problem file
  TSTP conformance: OK
  Axiom consistency: OK
Verifying 1 steps using 1 workers...
  [1/1] f1: OK

% ========== Verification Report ==========
% Structural checks: 1 steps
% ATP-verified steps: 1/1
% Wall clock: 0.046s
% SZS status VerifiedGood

Verification of EVL000+1.s

Wall-clock timeout: 28s
proofcheck version 1.0, July 2026.
Proof and model verifier (parallel, per-step ATP verification).
Copyright (c) 2026 Jeffrey P. Machado, Larry Lesyna.

ATP backend: /d/bin/eprover
Countermodel finder: /d/bin/mace4
Clausifier (prover9): /d/bin/prover9
Clausifier (vampire): /d/bin/vampire
TPTP syntax: OK
Format: TSTP proof (structural + ATP verification)
Problem: Problems/EVL000+1.p (2 formulas, 10 symbols)
  Checking assume_negation 's1'... FAILED
% ========== Verification Report ==========
% Structural flaw: step 's1': assume_negation body does not match ~(parent)
% SZS status VerifiedBad : step 's1': assume_negation body does not match ~(parent)

Verification of TMO000+1.s

Wall-clock timeout: 28s
proofcheck version 1.0, July 2026.
Proof and model verifier (parallel, per-step ATP verification).
Copyright (c) 2026 Jeffrey P. Machado, Larry Lesyna.

ATP backend: /d/bin/eprover
Countermodel finder: /d/bin/mace4
Clausifier (prover9): /d/bin/prover9
Clausifier (vampire): /d/bin/vampire
TPTP syntax: OK
Format: TSTP proof (structural + ATP verification)
Problem: Problems/TMO000+1.p (2 formulas, 11 symbols)
  Checking assume_negation 's1'... OK
  Checking skolemize 'sk0'... FAILED
% ========== Verification Report ==========
% Structural flaw: step 'sk0': skolemize step does not carry the mandated skolemize(Var, sK(...)) record (the old skolemized(Var)+bind(Var, Term) form is not accepted under the ProoVer rules)
% SZS status VerifiedBad : step 'sk0': skolemize step does not carry the mandated skolemize(Var, sK(...)) record (the old skolemized(Var)+bind(Var, Term) form is not accepted under the ProoVer rules)

ProofGuard---1.0

Verification of COR000+1.s

% SZS status VerifiedGood

Verification of EVL000+1.s

% SZS status VerifiedBad : step s1: formula is NOT the negation of the conjecture

Verification of TMO000+1.s

% SZS status VerifiedGood

PyCheck 0.1

Verification of COR000+1.s

% Performing local checks on 'a1'
% Verifying input step 'a1'
% Verified step 'a1'
% Performing local checks on 'c'
% Verifying input step 'c'
% Verified step 'c'
% Performing local checks on 's1'
# Verifying cth step 's1'
% Verified step 's1'
% Performing local checks on 'f1'
# Verifying thm step 'f1'
% Verified step 'f1'
% SZS status VerifiedGood : No problems found with '/Users/schulz/Downloads/samples/COR000+1.s'

Verification of EVL000+1.s

% Verifying input step 'a1'
% Verified step 'a1'
% Performing local checks on 'c'
% Verifying input step 'c'
% Verified step 'c'
% Performing local checks on 's1'
# Verifying cth step 's1'
% SZS status VerifiedBad : 's1' is unsound

Verification of TMO000+1.s

[PyCheck] pycheck.py ~/Downloads/samples/TMO000+1.s
Cputime limit exceeded

VaLeaDate 0.1

Verification of COR000+1.s

% SZS status VerifiedGood

Verification of EVL000+1.s

% SZS status VerifiedBad : Some theorem nodes were satisfiable (are unsound): s1

Verification of TMO000+1.s

% SZS status VerifiedBad : No skolemize term found in skolemization details: [status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK0]),skolemized(Y0),bind(Y0,sK0(X0))]