0.00/0.12 % Problem : theBenchmark.p : TPTP v0.0.0. Released v0.0.0. 0.11/0.12 % Command : java -jar /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/mcs_scs.jar %d %s 0.12/0.33 % Computer : n027.cluster.edu 0.12/0.33 % Model : x86_64 x86_64 0.12/0.33 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz 0.12/0.33 % Memory : 8042.1875MB 0.12/0.33 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64 0.12/0.33 % CPULimit : 960 0.12/0.33 % WCLimit : 120 0.12/0.33 % DateTime : Tue Aug 9 03:15:06 EDT 2022 0.12/0.33 % CPUTime : 0.18/0.44 openjdk version "1.8.0_171" 0.18/0.44 OpenJDK Runtime Environment (build 1.8.0_171-b10) 0.18/0.44 OpenJDK 64-Bit Server VM (build 25.171-b10, mixed mode) 0.18/0.45 file=/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 0.52/0.70 start to proof: theBenchmark 0.68/0.89 % Version : CSE_E---1.4 0.68/0.89 % Problem : theBenchmark.p 0.68/0.89 % Proof found 0.68/0.89 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p 0.68/0.89 % SZS output start Proof 0.68/0.89 fof(encrypt_clear_key_as_Tcomms_key, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:(((p(X2)&p(X3))&p(X1))=>p(enc(tc,X1))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', encrypt_clear_key_as_Tcomms_key)). 0.68/0.89 fof(intruder_knows_8, axiom, p(a), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_knows_8)). 0.68/0.89 fof(encrypt_a_stored_comms_key, axiom, ![X1, X2, X3]:(p(enc(enc(i(tmk),X2),enc(i(tc),X1)))<=((p(X2)&p(X3))&p(X1))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', encrypt_a_stored_comms_key)). 0.68/0.89 fof(intruder_knows_6, axiom, p(kk), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_knows_6)). 0.68/0.89 fof(enc_dec_cancel, axiom, ![X1, X2]:X2=enc(i(X1),enc(X1,X2)), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', enc_dec_cancel)). 0.68/0.89 fof(dec_enc_cancel, axiom, ![X1, X2]:X2=enc(X1,enc(i(X1),X2)), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', dec_enc_cancel)). 0.68/0.89 fof(double_inverse_cancel, axiom, ![X1]:i(i(X1))=X1, file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', double_inverse_cancel)). 0.68/0.89 fof(co1, conjecture, p(enc(pp,a)), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', co1)). 0.68/0.89 fof(intruder_knows_1, axiom, p(enc(tmk,pp)), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_knows_1)). 0.68/0.89 fof(c_0_9, plain, ![X70, X71, X72]:(~p(X71)|~p(X72)|~p(X70)|p(enc(tc,X70))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[encrypt_clear_key_as_Tcomms_key])])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_10, plain, (p(enc(tc,X3))|~p(X1)|~p(X2)|~p(X3)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_9])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_11, plain, (p(a)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[intruder_knows_8])). 0.68/0.89 fof(c_0_12, plain, ![X1, X2, X3]:(((p(X2)&p(X3))&p(X1))=>p(enc(enc(i(tmk),X2),enc(i(tc),X1)))), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[encrypt_a_stored_comms_key])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_13, plain, (p(enc(tc,a))|~p(X1)|~p(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_10, c_0_11])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_14, plain, (p(kk)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[intruder_knows_6])). 0.68/0.89 fof(c_0_15, plain, ![X51, X52, X53]:(~p(X52)|~p(X53)|~p(X51)|p(enc(enc(i(tmk),X52),enc(i(tc),X51)))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_12])])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_16, plain, (p(enc(tc,a))|~p(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_13, c_0_14])). 0.68/0.89 fof(c_0_17, plain, ![X46, X47]:X47=enc(i(X46),enc(X46,X47)), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[enc_dec_cancel])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_18, plain, (p(enc(enc(i(tmk),X1),enc(i(tc),X3)))|~p(X1)|~p(X2)|~p(X3)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_15])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_19, plain, (p(enc(tc,a))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_16, c_0_14])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_20, plain, (X1=enc(i(X2),enc(X2,X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_17])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_21, plain, (p(enc(enc(i(tmk),X1),a))|~p(X2)|~p(X1)), inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_18, c_0_19]), c_0_20])). 0.68/0.89 fof(c_0_22, plain, ![X62, X63]:X63=enc(X62,enc(i(X62),X63)), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[dec_enc_cancel])). 0.68/0.89 fof(c_0_23, plain, ![X54]:i(i(X54))=X54, inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[double_inverse_cancel])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_24, plain, (p(enc(enc(i(tmk),X1),a))|~p(X1)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_21, c_0_14])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_25, plain, (X1=enc(X2,enc(i(X2),X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_22])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_26, plain, (i(i(X1))=X1), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_23])). 0.68/0.89 fof(c_0_27, negated_conjecture, ~p(enc(pp,a)), inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[co1])])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_28, plain, (p(enc(X1,a))|~p(enc(tmk,X1))), inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_24, c_0_25]), c_0_26])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_29, plain, (p(enc(tmk,pp))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[intruder_knows_1])). 0.68/0.89 cnf(c_0_30, negated_conjecture, (~p(enc(pp,a))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_27])). 0.68/0.90 cnf(c_0_31, plain, ($false), inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_28, c_0_29]), c_0_30]), ['proof']). 0.68/0.90 % SZS output end Proof 0.68/0.90 % Total time : 0.186000 s 0.68/0.90 EOF