0.00/0.10	% Problem    : theBenchmark.p : TPTP v0.0.0. Released v0.0.0.
0.07/0.10	% Command    : run_portfolio.sh /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p /export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/tmp.SDZWYum5Cv
0.07/0.29	% Computer   : n011.cluster.edu
0.07/0.29	% Model      : x86_64 x86_64
0.07/0.29	% CPU        : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
0.07/0.29	% Memory     : 8042.1875MB
0.07/0.29	% OS         : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
0.07/0.30	% CPULimit   : 960
0.07/0.30	% DateTime   : Thu Jul  2 06:33:31 EDT 2020
0.07/0.30	% CPUTime    : 
0.07/0.30	% Running portfolio for 120 s
0.07/0.30	% File         : /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
0.07/0.30	% Number of cores: 8
0.13/0.34	% Python version: Python 3.6.8
0.13/0.34	% Running in FO mode
0.20/0.78	% Running /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/fo/fo7.sh for 25
0.20/0.78	% Solved by: fo/fo7.sh
0.20/0.78	To remain in the chosen logic fragment, unification with booleans has been disabled.
0.20/0.78	% done 58 iterations in 0.038s
0.20/0.78	% SZS status Theorem for '/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p'
0.20/0.78	% SZS output start Refutation
0.20/0.78	tff(b_is_party_of_protocol, axiom, (party_of_protocol(b))).
0.20/0.78	tff('0', plain,  party_of_protocol(b),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [b_is_party_of_protocol])).
0.20/0.78	tff(intruder_holds_key, axiom,
0.20/0.78	  (![V,W]:
0.20/0.78	     ((party_of_protocol(W) & intruder_message(V)) =>
0.20/0.78	      intruder_holds(key(V,W))))).
0.20/0.78	tff('1', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X0, X1]:
0.20/0.78	      (~ intruder_message(X0)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
0.20/0.78	       |  intruder_holds(key(X0, X1))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_holds_key])).
0.20/0.78	tff('2', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X0, X1]:
0.20/0.78	      (~ intruder_message(X0)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
0.20/0.78	       |  intruder_holds(key(X0, X1))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_holds_key])).
0.20/0.78	tff(intruder_key_encrypts, axiom,
0.20/0.78	  (![U,V,W]:
0.20/0.78	     ((intruder_message(U) & intruder_holds(key(V,W)) & party_of_protocol(W)) =>
0.20/0.78	      intruder_message(encrypt(U,V))))).
0.20/0.78	tff('3', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X3, X4, X5]:
0.20/0.78	      ( intruder_message(encrypt(X3, X4))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ intruder_message(X3)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ intruder_holds(key(X4, X5))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ party_of_protocol(X5)),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_key_encrypts])).
0.20/0.78	tff('4', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X0, X1, X2]:
0.20/0.78	      (~ party_of_protocol(X0)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ intruder_message(X1)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ intruder_message(X2)
0.20/0.78	       |  intruder_message(encrypt(X2, X1))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['2', '3'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('5', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X0, X1, X2]:
0.20/0.78	      ( intruder_message(encrypt(X2, X1))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ intruder_message(X2)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ intruder_message(X1)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ party_of_protocol(X0)),
0.20/0.78	    inference('simplify', [status(thm)], ['4'])).
0.20/0.78	tff(a_sent_message_i_to_b, axiom, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))).
0.20/0.78	tff('6', plain,  message(sent(a, b, pair(a, an_a_nonce))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [a_sent_message_i_to_b])).
0.20/0.78	tff(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time, axiom,
0.20/0.78	  (![U,V]:
0.20/0.78	     ((fresh_to_b(V) & message(sent(U,b,pair(U,V)))) =>
0.20/0.78	      (b_stored(pair(U,V)) & 
0.20/0.78	       message(sent(b,t,
0.20/0.78	                    triple(b,generate_b_nonce(V),
0.20/0.78	                           encrypt(triple(U,V,generate_expiration_time(V)),bt)))))))).
0.20/0.78	tff('7', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X20, X21]:
0.20/0.78	      ( message(
0.20/0.78	          sent(b, t, 
0.20/0.78	            triple(b, generate_b_nonce(X21), 
0.20/0.78	              encrypt(triple(X20, X21, generate_expiration_time(X21)), bt))))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ message(sent(X20, b, pair(X20, X21)))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ fresh_to_b(X21)),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time])).
0.20/0.78	tff('8', plain,
0.20/0.78	    (~ fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)
0.20/0.78	     |  message(
0.20/0.78	          sent(b, t, 
0.20/0.78	            triple(b, generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce), 
0.20/0.78	              encrypt(
0.20/0.78	                triple(a, an_a_nonce, generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)), 
0.20/0.78	                bt))))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['6', '7'])).
0.20/0.78	tff(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b, axiom, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))).
0.20/0.78	tff('9', plain,  fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b])).
0.20/0.78	tff('10', plain,
0.20/0.78	     message(
0.20/0.78	       sent(b, t, 
0.20/0.78	         triple(b, generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce), 
0.20/0.78	           encrypt(
0.20/0.78	             triple(a, an_a_nonce, generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)), bt)))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('demod', [status(thm)], ['8', '9'])).
0.20/0.78	tff(intruder_can_record, axiom,
0.20/0.78	  (![U,V,W]: (message(sent(U,V,W)) => intruder_message(W)))).
0.20/0.78	tff('11', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X29, X30, X31]:
0.20/0.78	      ( intruder_message(X29) | ~ message(sent(X30, X31, X29))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_can_record])).
0.20/0.78	tff('12', plain,
0.20/0.78	     intruder_message(
0.20/0.78	       triple(b, generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce), 
0.20/0.78	         encrypt(
0.20/0.78	           triple(a, an_a_nonce, generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)), bt))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['10', '11'])).
0.20/0.78	tff(intruder_decomposes_triples, axiom,
0.20/0.78	  (![U,V,W]:
0.20/0.78	     (intruder_message(triple(U,V,W)) =>
0.20/0.78	      (intruder_message(U) & intruder_message(V) & intruder_message(W))))).
0.20/0.78	tff('13', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X17, X18, X19]:
0.20/0.78	      ( intruder_message(X19) | ~ intruder_message(triple(X17, X18, X19))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_decomposes_triples])).
0.20/0.78	tff('14', plain,
0.20/0.78	     intruder_message(
0.20/0.78	       encrypt(triple(a, an_a_nonce, generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)), 
0.20/0.78	         bt)),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['12', '13'])).
0.20/0.78	tff(intruder_composes_pairs, axiom,
0.20/0.78	  (![U,V]:
0.20/0.78	     ((intruder_message(V) & intruder_message(U)) =>
0.20/0.78	      intruder_message(pair(U,V))))).
0.20/0.78	tff('15', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X32, X33]:
0.20/0.78	      (~ intruder_message(X32)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ intruder_message(X33)
0.20/0.78	       |  intruder_message(pair(X32, X33))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_composes_pairs])).
0.20/0.78	tff(intruder_message_sent, axiom,
0.20/0.78	  (![U,V,W]:
0.20/0.78	     ((intruder_message(U) & party_of_protocol(W) & party_of_protocol(V)) =>
0.20/0.78	      message(sent(V,W,U))))).
0.20/0.78	tff('16', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X40, X41, X42]:
0.20/0.78	      (~ party_of_protocol(X40)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ intruder_message(X41)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ party_of_protocol(X42)
0.20/0.78	       |  message(sent(X40, X42, X41))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_message_sent])).
0.20/0.78	tff(b_accepts_secure_session_key, axiom,
0.20/0.78	  (![V,X,Y]:
0.20/0.78	     ((b_stored(pair(X,Y)) & 
0.20/0.78	       message(sent(X,b,
0.20/0.78	                    pair(encrypt(triple(X,V,generate_expiration_time(Y)),bt),
0.20/0.78	                         encrypt(generate_b_nonce(Y),V))))) =>
0.20/0.78	      b_holds(key(V,X))))).
0.20/0.78	tff('17', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X34, X35, X36]:
0.20/0.78	      ( b_holds(key(X34, X35))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ b_stored(pair(X35, X36))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ message(
0.20/0.78	             sent(X35, b, 
0.20/0.78	               pair(
0.20/0.78	                 encrypt(triple(X35, X34, generate_expiration_time(X36)), bt), 
0.20/0.78	                 encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X36), X34))))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [b_accepts_secure_session_key])).
0.20/0.78	tff('18', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X0, X1, X2]:
0.20/0.78	      (~ party_of_protocol(b)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ intruder_message(
0.20/0.78	             pair(encrypt(triple(X2, X0, generate_expiration_time(X1)), bt), 
0.20/0.78	               encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1), X0)))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ b_stored(pair(X2, X1))
0.20/0.78	       |  b_holds(key(X0, X2))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['16', '17'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('19', plain,  party_of_protocol(b),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [b_is_party_of_protocol])).
0.20/0.78	tff('20', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X0, X1, X2]:
0.20/0.78	      (~ intruder_message(
0.20/0.78	           pair(encrypt(triple(X2, X0, generate_expiration_time(X1)), bt), 
0.20/0.78	             encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1), X0)))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ b_stored(pair(X2, X1))
0.20/0.78	       |  b_holds(key(X0, X2))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('demod', [status(thm)], ['18', '19'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('21', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X0, X1, X2]:
0.20/0.78	      (~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1), X0))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ intruder_message(
0.20/0.78	             encrypt(triple(X2, X0, generate_expiration_time(X1)), bt))
0.20/0.78	       |  b_holds(key(X0, X2))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ b_stored(pair(X2, X1))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['15', '20'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('22', plain,
0.20/0.78	    (~ party_of_protocol(a)
0.20/0.78	     | ~ b_stored(pair(a, an_a_nonce))
0.20/0.78	     |  b_holds(key(an_a_nonce, a))
0.20/0.78	     | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce), an_a_nonce))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['14', '21'])).
0.20/0.78	tff(a_is_party_of_protocol, axiom, (party_of_protocol(a))).
0.20/0.78	tff('23', plain,  party_of_protocol(a),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [a_is_party_of_protocol])).
0.20/0.78	tff('24', plain,  message(sent(a, b, pair(a, an_a_nonce))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [a_sent_message_i_to_b])).
0.20/0.78	tff('25', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X20, X21]:
0.20/0.78	      ( b_stored(pair(X20, X21))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ message(sent(X20, b, pair(X20, X21)))
0.20/0.78	       | ~ fresh_to_b(X21)),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time])).
0.20/0.78	tff('26', plain, (~ fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) |  b_stored(pair(a, an_a_nonce))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['24', '25'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('27', plain,  fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b])).
0.20/0.78	tff('28', plain,  b_stored(pair(a, an_a_nonce)),
0.20/0.78	    inference('demod', [status(thm)], ['26', '27'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('29', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce, a))
0.20/0.78	     | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce), an_a_nonce))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('demod', [status(thm)], ['22', '23', '28'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('30', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X0]:
0.20/0.78	      (~ party_of_protocol(X0)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))
0.20/0.78	       |  b_holds(key(an_a_nonce, a))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['5', '29'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('31', plain,  message(sent(a, b, pair(a, an_a_nonce))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [a_sent_message_i_to_b])).
0.20/0.78	tff('32', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X29, X30, X31]:
0.20/0.78	      ( intruder_message(X29) | ~ message(sent(X30, X31, X29))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_can_record])).
0.20/0.78	tff('33', plain,  intruder_message(pair(a, an_a_nonce)),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['31', '32'])).
0.20/0.78	tff(intruder_decomposes_pairs, axiom,
0.20/0.78	  (![U,V]:
0.20/0.78	     (intruder_message(pair(U,V)) =>
0.20/0.78	      (intruder_message(V) & intruder_message(U))))).
0.20/0.78	tff('34', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X38, X39]:
0.20/0.78	      ( intruder_message(X38) | ~ intruder_message(pair(X39, X38))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_decomposes_pairs])).
0.20/0.78	tff('35', plain,  intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['33', '34'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('36', plain,
0.20/0.78	     intruder_message(
0.20/0.78	       triple(b, generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce), 
0.20/0.78	         encrypt(
0.20/0.78	           triple(a, an_a_nonce, generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)), bt))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['10', '11'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('37', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X17, X18, X19]:
0.20/0.78	      ( intruder_message(X18) | ~ intruder_message(triple(X17, X18, X19))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_decomposes_triples])).
0.20/0.78	tff('38', plain,  intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['36', '37'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('39', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X0]: (~ party_of_protocol(X0) |  b_holds(key(an_a_nonce, a))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('demod', [status(thm)], ['30', '35', '38'])).
0.20/0.78	tff(co1, conjecture, (?[U]: (b_holds(key(U,a)) & intruder_holds(key(U,b))))).
0.20/0.78	tff(zf_stmt_0, negated_conjecture,
0.20/0.78	  (~(?[U]: (b_holds(key(U,a)) & intruder_holds(key(U,b)))))).
0.20/0.78	tff('40', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X2]: (~ b_holds(key(X2, a)) | ~ intruder_holds(key(X2, b))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [zf_stmt_0])).
0.20/0.78	tff('41', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X0]: (~ party_of_protocol(X0) | ~ intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce, b))),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['39', '40'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('42', plain,
0.20/0.78	    ![X0]:
0.20/0.78	      (~ party_of_protocol(b)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
0.20/0.78	       | ~ party_of_protocol(X0)),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['1', '41'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('43', plain,  party_of_protocol(b),
0.20/0.78	    inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [b_is_party_of_protocol])).
0.20/0.78	tff('44', plain,  intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
0.20/0.78	    inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['33', '34'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('45', plain, ![X0]: ~ party_of_protocol(X0),
0.20/0.78	    inference('demod', [status(thm)], ['42', '43', '44'])).
0.20/0.78	tff('46', plain, $false, inference('sup-', [status(thm)], ['0', '45'])).
0.20/0.78	
0.20/0.78	% SZS output end Refutation
0.20/0.78	
0.20/0.78	% Zipperpin 1.5 exiting
0.20/0.78	EOF