0.03/0.12	% Problem    : theBenchmark.p : TPTP v0.0.0. Released v0.0.0.
0.03/0.12	% Command    : eprover --auto -s --tableau=1 [--tableau-equality=1] --tableau-depth=10 %s
0.13/0.33	% Computer   : n007.cluster.edu
0.13/0.33	% Model      : x86_64 x86_64
0.13/0.33	% CPU        : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
0.13/0.33	% Memory     : 8042.1875MB
0.13/0.33	% OS         : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
0.13/0.33	% CPULimit   : 960
0.13/0.33	% WCLimit    : 120
0.13/0.33	% DateTime   : Thu Jul  2 06:40:09 EDT 2020
0.13/0.33	% CPUTime    : 
0.13/0.34	% Running in FOF/CNF-non-UEQ mode
0.21/0.37	# No SInE strategy applied
0.21/0.37	# Auto-Mode selected heuristic G_E___208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d
0.21/0.37	# and selection function SelectCQIPrecWNTNp.
0.21/0.37	#
0.21/0.37	# Presaturation interreduction done
0.21/0.37	# Number of axioms: 38 Number of unprocessed: 38
0.21/0.37	# Tableaux proof search.
0.21/0.37	# 38 beginning clauses after preprocessing and clausification
0.21/0.37	# Creating start rules for all conjectures.
0.21/0.37	# 14 unit axioms, 1 start rules, and 23 other extension candidates.
0.21/0.37	## Beginning tableaux proof search with 1 start rule applications.
0.21/0.38	# Beginning deep saturation check
0.21/0.38	# Saturate returned empty clause 0x2ba5010.
0.21/0.38	# Success
0.21/0.38	# SZS status Theorem for /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
0.21/0.38	# SZS output start CNFRefutation for /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
0.21/0.38	# Begin clausification derivation
0.21/0.38	fof(co1, conjecture, ?[X3]:(intruder_holds(key(X3,b))&b_holds(key(X3,a))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', co1)).
0.21/0.38	fof(server_t_generates_key, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2, X4, X5, X6, X7]:((((message(sent(X3,t,triple(X3,X1,encrypt(triple(X2,X4,X5),X6))))&t_holds(key(X6,X3)))&t_holds(key(X7,X2)))&a_nonce(X4))=>message(sent(t,X2,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X3,X4,generate_key(X4),X5),X7),encrypt(triple(X2,generate_key(X4),X5),X6),X1)))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', server_t_generates_key)).
0.21/0.38	fof(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time, axiom, ![X3, X1]:((fresh_to_b(X1)&message(sent(X3,b,pair(X3,X1))))=>(b_stored(pair(X3,X1))&message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X3,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time)).
0.21/0.38	fof(a_forwards_secure, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2, X4, X5, X6]:((message(sent(a,X5,pair(X4,encrypt(X3,X2))))&a_holds(key(X2,X5)))<=(a_stored(pair(X5,X6))&message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X5,X6,X2,X1),at),X4,X3))))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', a_forwards_secure)).
0.21/0.38	fof(b_accepts_secure_session_key, axiom, ![X1, X4, X5]:(b_holds(key(X1,X4))<=(b_stored(pair(X4,X5))&message(sent(X4,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X4,X1,generate_expiration_time(X5)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X5),X1)))))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', b_accepts_secure_session_key)).
0.21/0.38	fof(intruder_composes_quadruples, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2, X4]:((((intruder_message(X4)&intruder_message(X2))&intruder_message(X1))&intruder_message(X3))=>intruder_message(quadruple(X3,X1,X2,X4))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_composes_quadruples)).
0.21/0.38	fof(intruder_message_sent, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2]:(message(sent(X1,X2,X3))<=((intruder_message(X3)&party_of_protocol(X2))&party_of_protocol(X1))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_message_sent)).
0.21/0.38	fof(intruder_interception, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2]:(((party_of_protocol(X2)&intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)))&intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1)))=>intruder_message(X1)), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_interception)).
0.21/0.38	fof(intruder_composes_triples, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2]:(((intruder_message(X1)&intruder_message(X2))&intruder_message(X3))=>intruder_message(triple(X3,X1,X2))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_composes_triples)).
0.21/0.38	fof(intruder_key_encrypts, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2]:(((intruder_message(X3)&intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)))&party_of_protocol(X2))=>intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_key_encrypts)).
0.21/0.38	fof(intruder_decomposes_quadruples, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2, X4]:(intruder_message(quadruple(X3,X1,X2,X4))=>(((intruder_message(X3)&intruder_message(X1))&intruder_message(X2))&intruder_message(X4))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_decomposes_quadruples)).
0.21/0.38	fof(intruder_composes_pairs, axiom, ![X3, X1]:((intruder_message(X1)&intruder_message(X3))=>intruder_message(pair(X3,X1))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_composes_pairs)).
0.21/0.38	fof(intruder_decomposes_triples, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2]:(((intruder_message(X3)&intruder_message(X1))&intruder_message(X2))<=intruder_message(triple(X3,X1,X2))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_decomposes_triples)).
0.21/0.38	fof(intruder_can_record, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2]:(message(sent(X3,X1,X2))=>intruder_message(X2)), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_can_record)).
0.21/0.38	fof(intruder_holds_key, axiom, ![X1, X2]:(intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))<=(party_of_protocol(X2)&intruder_message(X1))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_holds_key)).
0.21/0.38	fof(intruder_decomposes_pairs, axiom, ![X3, X1]:((intruder_message(X1)&intruder_message(X3))<=intruder_message(pair(X3,X1))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_decomposes_pairs)).
0.21/0.38	fof(generated_keys_are_not_nonces, axiom, ![X3]:~(a_nonce(generate_key(X3))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', generated_keys_are_not_nonces)).
0.21/0.38	fof(generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces, axiom, ![X3]:(a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X3))&a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X3))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces)).
0.21/0.38	fof(a_sent_message_i_to_b, axiom, message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', a_sent_message_i_to_b)).
0.21/0.38	fof(a_holds_key_at_for_t, axiom, a_holds(key(at,t)), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', a_holds_key_at_for_t)).
0.21/0.38	fof(a_stored_message_i, axiom, a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', a_stored_message_i)).
0.21/0.38	fof(b_hold_key_bt_for_t, axiom, b_holds(key(bt,t)), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', b_hold_key_bt_for_t)).
0.21/0.38	fof(t_holds_key_at_for_a, axiom, t_holds(key(at,a)), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', t_holds_key_at_for_a)).
0.21/0.38	fof(t_holds_key_bt_for_b, axiom, t_holds(key(bt,b)), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', t_holds_key_bt_for_b)).
0.21/0.38	fof(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b, axiom, fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b)).
0.21/0.38	fof(an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce, axiom, a_nonce(an_a_nonce), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce)).
0.21/0.38	fof(t_is_party_of_protocol, axiom, party_of_protocol(t), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', t_is_party_of_protocol)).
0.21/0.38	fof(a_is_party_of_protocol, axiom, party_of_protocol(a), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', a_is_party_of_protocol)).
0.21/0.38	fof(b_is_party_of_protocol, axiom, party_of_protocol(b), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', b_is_party_of_protocol)).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_29, negated_conjecture, ~(?[X3]:(intruder_holds(key(X3,b))&b_holds(key(X3,a)))), inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[co1])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_30, plain, ![X18, X19, X20, X21, X22, X23, X24]:(~message(sent(X18,t,triple(X18,X19,encrypt(triple(X20,X21,X22),X23))))|~t_holds(key(X23,X18))|~t_holds(key(X24,X20))|~a_nonce(X21)|message(sent(t,X20,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X18,X21,generate_key(X21),X22),X24),encrypt(triple(X20,generate_key(X21),X22),X23),X19)))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[server_t_generates_key])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_31, plain, ![X28, X29]:((b_stored(pair(X28,X29))|(~fresh_to_b(X29)|~message(sent(X28,b,pair(X28,X29)))))&(message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X29),encrypt(triple(X28,X29,generate_expiration_time(X29)),bt))))|(~fresh_to_b(X29)|~message(sent(X28,b,pair(X28,X29)))))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time])])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_32, plain, ![X55, X56, X57, X58, X59, X60]:((message(sent(a,X59,pair(X58,encrypt(X55,X57))))|(~a_stored(pair(X59,X60))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X59,X60,X57,X56),at),X58,X55)))))&(a_holds(key(X57,X59))|(~a_stored(pair(X59,X60))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X59,X60,X57,X56),at),X58,X55)))))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[a_forwards_secure])])])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_33, plain, ![X42, X43, X44]:(~b_stored(pair(X43,X44))|~message(sent(X43,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X43,X42,generate_expiration_time(X44)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X44),X42))))|b_holds(key(X42,X43))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[b_accepts_secure_session_key])])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_34, plain, ![X14, X15, X16, X17]:(~intruder_message(X17)|~intruder_message(X16)|~intruder_message(X15)|~intruder_message(X14)|intruder_message(quadruple(X14,X15,X16,X17))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_composes_quadruples])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_35, plain, ![X48, X49, X50]:(~intruder_message(X48)|~party_of_protocol(X50)|~party_of_protocol(X49)|message(sent(X49,X50,X48))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[intruder_message_sent])])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_36, plain, ![X30, X31, X32]:(~party_of_protocol(X32)|~intruder_holds(key(X31,X32))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X30,X31))|intruder_message(X31)), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_interception])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_37, plain, ![X51, X52, X53]:(~intruder_message(X52)|~intruder_message(X53)|~intruder_message(X51)|intruder_message(triple(X51,X52,X53))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_composes_triples])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_38, plain, ![X11, X12, X13]:(~intruder_message(X11)|~intruder_holds(key(X12,X13))|~party_of_protocol(X13)|intruder_message(encrypt(X11,X12))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_key_encrypts])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_39, plain, ![X33, X34, X35, X36]:((((intruder_message(X33)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X33,X34,X35,X36)))&(intruder_message(X34)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X33,X34,X35,X36))))&(intruder_message(X35)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X33,X34,X35,X36))))&(intruder_message(X36)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X33,X34,X35,X36)))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_quadruples])])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_40, plain, ![X40, X41]:(~intruder_message(X41)|~intruder_message(X40)|intruder_message(pair(X40,X41))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_composes_pairs])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_41, plain, ![X25, X26, X27]:(((intruder_message(X25)|~intruder_message(triple(X25,X26,X27)))&(intruder_message(X26)|~intruder_message(triple(X25,X26,X27))))&(intruder_message(X27)|~intruder_message(triple(X25,X26,X27)))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_triples])])])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_42, plain, ![X37, X38, X39]:(~message(sent(X37,X38,X39))|intruder_message(X39)), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_can_record])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_43, plain, ![X8, X9]:(~party_of_protocol(X9)|~intruder_message(X8)|intruder_holds(key(X8,X9))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[intruder_holds_key])])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_44, plain, ![X46, X47]:((intruder_message(X47)|~intruder_message(pair(X46,X47)))&(intruder_message(X46)|~intruder_message(pair(X46,X47)))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_pairs])])])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_45, negated_conjecture, ![X10]:(~intruder_holds(key(X10,b))|~b_holds(key(X10,a))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_29])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_46, plain, ![X45]:~a_nonce(generate_key(X45)), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[generated_keys_are_not_nonces])])).
0.21/0.38	fof(c_0_47, plain, ![X54]:(a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X54))&a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X54))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces])).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_48, plain, (message(sent(t,X3,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X4,generate_key(X4),X5),X7),encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X4),X5),X6),X2)))|~message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X2,encrypt(triple(X3,X4,X5),X6))))|~t_holds(key(X6,X1))|~t_holds(key(X7,X3))|~a_nonce(X4)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_30]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_49, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_31]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_50, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_32]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_51, plain, (b_holds(key(X3,X1))|~b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X3,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X3))))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_33]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_52, plain, (a_holds(key(X1,X2))|~a_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4),at),X5,X6)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_32]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X4,X3,X2,X1))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_34]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_54, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_31]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_55, plain, (message(sent(X3,X2,X1))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X3)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_35]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_56, plain, (intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X1))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X2))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_36]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_57, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X3,X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_37]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_58, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X3)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_38]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_59, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_39]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_60, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_39]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_39]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_62, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_39]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_63, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_40]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_64, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_41]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_65, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_41]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_66, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_41]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_67, plain, (intruder_message(X3)|~message(sent(X1,X2,X3))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_42]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_68, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X2,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_43]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_69, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_44]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_70, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_44]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_71, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_45]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_72, plain, (~a_nonce(generate_key(X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_46]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_73, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_74, plain, (a_holds(key(at,t))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_holds_key_at_for_t]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_75, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_stored_message_i]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_76, plain, (b_holds(key(bt,t))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_hold_key_bt_for_t]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_77, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_holds_key_at_for_a]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_78, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_holds_key_bt_for_b]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_79, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_47]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_80, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_47]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_81, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_82, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_83, plain, (party_of_protocol(t)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_is_party_of_protocol]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_84, plain, (party_of_protocol(a)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_is_party_of_protocol]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	cnf(c_0_85, plain, (party_of_protocol(b)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_is_party_of_protocol]), ['final']).
0.21/0.38	
0.21/0.38	# End clausification derivation
0.21/0.38	# Begin listing active clauses obtained from FOF to CNF conversion
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_14, plain, (party_of_protocol(b))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_4, plain, (party_of_protocol(a))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_23, plain, (party_of_protocol(t))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_18, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_17, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_36, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_35, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_2, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_15, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_7, plain, (b_holds(key(bt,t)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_24, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_32, plain, (a_holds(key(at,t)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_33, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_28, plain, (~a_nonce(generate_key(X1)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_3, negated_conjecture, (~b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_holds(key(X1,b)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_30, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_29, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_1, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_25, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_9, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_10, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_11, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_26, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_19, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_20, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_21, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_22, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_5, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3)|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_34, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_16, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X3)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X3)))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_31, plain, (message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_13, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_6, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X4))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_37, plain, (a_holds(key(X1,X2))|~a_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4),at),X5,X6))))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_27, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_38, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_12, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))))).
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_8, plain, (message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))|~a_nonce(X3)|~message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6))))|~t_holds(key(X5,X1))|~t_holds(key(X6,X2)))).
0.21/0.38	# End listing active clauses.  There is an equivalent clause to each of these in the clausification!
0.21/0.38	# Begin printing tableau
0.21/0.38	# 1,0,0,0  c s
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_39, plain, (~b_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),a)))).
0.21/0.38	# 0,2,3,0 
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_3, watchlist, (~b_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),a))|~intruder_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),b)))).
0.21/0.38	
0.21/0.38	# 2,0,0,1  x c
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_112, plain, (intruder_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),b)))).
0.21/0.38	# 1,3,1,0  c
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_40, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),b)))).
0.21/0.38	# 0,2,3,0 
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_3, watchlist, (~b_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),a))|~intruder_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),b)))).
0.21/0.38	
0.21/0.38	# 3,0,0,1  x c
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_246, plain, (intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)))).
0.21/0.38	# 2,2,25,0  c
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_113, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)))).
0.21/0.38	# 1,3,1,0  c
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_40, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),b)))).
0.21/0.38	# 0,2,3,0 
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_3, watchlist, (~b_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),a))|~intruder_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),b)))).
0.21/0.38	
0.21/0.38	# 3,0,0,0  c
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_247, plain, (~message(sent(X355,X356,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))).
0.21/0.38	# 2,2,25,0  c
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_113, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)))).
0.21/0.38	# 1,3,1,0  c
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_40, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),b)))).
0.21/0.38	# 0,2,3,0 
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_3, watchlist, (~b_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),a))|~intruder_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),b)))).
0.21/0.38	
0.21/0.38	# 2,0,0,0  c
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_114, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b))).
0.21/0.38	# 1,3,1,0  c
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_40, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),b)))).
0.21/0.38	# 0,2,3,0 
0.21/0.38	cnf(i_0_3, watchlist, (~b_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),a))|~intruder_holds(key(pair(a,an_a_nonce),b)))).
0.21/0.38	
0.21/0.38	# End printing tableau
0.21/0.38	# SZS output end CNFRefutation for /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
0.21/0.38	# Branches closed with saturation will be marked with an "s"
0.21/0.38	# Proof search success!
0.21/0.38	# Exiting...
0.21/0.38	EOF