0.10/0.11 % Problem : theBenchmark.p : TPTP v0.0.0. Released v0.0.0. 0.10/0.12 % Command : java -jar /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/mcs_epr.jar %d %s 0.10/0.31 % Computer : n024.cluster.edu 0.10/0.31 % Model : x86_64 x86_64 0.10/0.31 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz 0.10/0.31 % Memory : 8042.1875MB 0.10/0.31 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64 0.10/0.31 % CPULimit : 960 0.10/0.31 % WCLimit : 120 0.10/0.31 % DateTime : Thu Jul 2 06:35:56 EDT 2020 0.17/0.31 % CPUTime : 0.17/0.38 openjdk version "1.8.0_171" 0.17/0.38 OpenJDK Runtime Environment (build 1.8.0_171-b10) 0.17/0.38 OpenJDK 64-Bit Server VM (build 25.171-b10, mixed mode) 0.17/0.38 file=/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 0.24/0.48 start to proof:theBenchmark.p 0.24/0.58 % Version : CSE_E---1.2 0.24/0.58 % Problem : theBenchmark.p 0.24/0.58 % Proof found! 0.24/0.58 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p 0.24/0.58 % SZS output start Proof 0.24/0.58 fof(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time, axiom, ![X3, X1]:((fresh_to_b(X1)&message(sent(X3,b,pair(X3,X1))))=>(b_stored(pair(X3,X1))&message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X3,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time)). 0.24/0.58 fof(b_accepts_secure_session_key, axiom, ![X1, X4, X5]:(b_holds(key(X1,X4))<=(b_stored(pair(X4,X5))&message(sent(X4,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X4,X1,generate_expiration_time(X5)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X5),X1)))))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', b_accepts_secure_session_key)). 0.24/0.58 fof(a_sent_message_i_to_b, axiom, message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', a_sent_message_i_to_b)). 0.24/0.58 fof(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b, axiom, fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b)). 0.24/0.58 fof(intruder_message_sent, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2]:(message(sent(X1,X2,X3))<=((intruder_message(X3)&party_of_protocol(X2))&party_of_protocol(X1))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_message_sent)). 0.24/0.58 fof(intruder_key_encrypts, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2]:(((intruder_message(X3)&intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)))&party_of_protocol(X2))=>intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_key_encrypts)). 0.24/0.58 fof(intruder_holds_key, axiom, ![X1, X2]:(intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))<=(party_of_protocol(X2)&intruder_message(X1))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_holds_key)). 0.24/0.58 fof(intruder_can_record, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2]:(message(sent(X3,X1,X2))=>intruder_message(X2)), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_can_record)). 0.24/0.58 fof(a_is_party_of_protocol, axiom, party_of_protocol(a), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', a_is_party_of_protocol)). 0.24/0.58 fof(b_is_party_of_protocol, axiom, party_of_protocol(b), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', b_is_party_of_protocol)). 0.24/0.58 fof(intruder_composes_pairs, axiom, ![X3, X1]:((intruder_message(X1)&intruder_message(X3))=>intruder_message(pair(X3,X1))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_composes_pairs)). 0.24/0.58 fof(intruder_decomposes_triples, axiom, ![X3, X1, X2]:(((intruder_message(X3)&intruder_message(X1))&intruder_message(X2))<=intruder_message(triple(X3,X1,X2))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_decomposes_triples)). 0.24/0.58 fof(t_is_party_of_protocol, axiom, party_of_protocol(t), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', t_is_party_of_protocol)). 0.24/0.58 fof(intruder_decomposes_pairs, axiom, ![X3, X1]:((intruder_message(X1)&intruder_message(X3))<=intruder_message(pair(X3,X1))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', intruder_decomposes_pairs)). 0.24/0.58 fof(co1, conjecture, ?[X3]:(intruder_holds(key(X3,b))&b_holds(key(X3,a))), file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p', co1)). 0.24/0.58 fof(c_0_15, plain, ![X28, X29]:((b_stored(pair(X28,X29))|(~fresh_to_b(X29)|~message(sent(X28,b,pair(X28,X29)))))&(message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X29),encrypt(triple(X28,X29,generate_expiration_time(X29)),bt))))|(~fresh_to_b(X29)|~message(sent(X28,b,pair(X28,X29)))))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time])])])). 0.24/0.58 fof(c_0_16, plain, ![X42, X43, X44]:(~b_stored(pair(X43,X44))|~message(sent(X43,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X43,X42,generate_expiration_time(X44)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X44),X42))))|b_holds(key(X42,X43))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[b_accepts_secure_session_key])])])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_17, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_15])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_18, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_19, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_20, plain, (b_holds(key(X3,X1))|~b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X3,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X3))))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_16])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_21, plain, (b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_17, c_0_18]), c_0_19])])). 0.24/0.58 fof(c_0_22, plain, ![X48, X49, X50]:(~intruder_message(X48)|~party_of_protocol(X50)|~party_of_protocol(X49)|message(sent(X49,X50,X48))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[intruder_message_sent])])])). 0.24/0.58 fof(c_0_23, plain, ![X11, X12, X13]:(~intruder_message(X11)|~intruder_holds(key(X12,X13))|~party_of_protocol(X13)|intruder_message(encrypt(X11,X12))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_key_encrypts])])). 0.24/0.58 fof(c_0_24, plain, ![X8, X9]:(~party_of_protocol(X9)|~intruder_message(X8)|intruder_holds(key(X8,X9))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[intruder_holds_key])])])). 0.24/0.58 fof(c_0_25, plain, ![X37, X38, X39]:(~message(sent(X37,X38,X39))|intruder_message(X39)), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_can_record])])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_26, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1)))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_15])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_27, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_20, c_0_21])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_28, plain, (message(sent(X3,X2,X1))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X3)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_22])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_29, plain, (party_of_protocol(a)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_is_party_of_protocol])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_30, plain, (party_of_protocol(b)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_is_party_of_protocol])). 0.24/0.58 fof(c_0_31, plain, ![X40, X41]:(~intruder_message(X41)|~intruder_message(X40)|intruder_message(pair(X40,X41))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_composes_pairs])])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_32, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X3)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_23])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_33, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X2,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_24])). 0.24/0.58 fof(c_0_34, plain, ![X25, X26, X27]:(((intruder_message(X25)|~intruder_message(triple(X25,X26,X27)))&(intruder_message(X26)|~intruder_message(triple(X25,X26,X27))))&(intruder_message(X27)|~intruder_message(triple(X25,X26,X27)))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_triples])])])])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_35, plain, (intruder_message(X3)|~message(sent(X1,X2,X3))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_25])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_36, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26, c_0_18]), c_0_19])])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_37, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_27, c_0_28]), c_0_29]), c_0_30])])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_38, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_31])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_39, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X3)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_32, c_0_33])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_40, plain, (party_of_protocol(t)), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_is_party_of_protocol])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_41, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_34])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_42, plain, (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_35, c_0_36])). 0.24/0.58 fof(c_0_43, plain, ![X46, X47]:((intruder_message(X47)|~intruder_message(pair(X46,X47)))&(intruder_message(X46)|~intruder_message(pair(X46,X47)))), inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_pairs])])])])). 0.24/0.58 fof(c_0_44, negated_conjecture, ~(?[X3]:(intruder_holds(key(X3,b))&b_holds(key(X3,a)))), inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[co1])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_45, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_37, c_0_38])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_46, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39, c_0_40])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_47, plain, (intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_41, c_0_42])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_34])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_43])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_50, plain, (intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_35, c_0_18])). 0.24/0.58 fof(c_0_51, negated_conjecture, ![X10]:(~intruder_holds(key(X10,b))|~b_holds(key(X10,a))), inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_44])])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_52, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(X1)), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_45, c_0_46]), c_0_47])])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48, c_0_42])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49, c_0_50])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_55, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a))), inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_51])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_56, plain, (b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_52, c_0_53]), c_0_54])])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_57, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55, c_0_56])). 0.24/0.58 cnf(c_0_58, negated_conjecture, ($false), inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57, c_0_33]), c_0_54]), c_0_30])]), ['proof']). 0.24/0.58 % SZS output end Proof 0.24/0.58 % User time : 0.015 s 0.24/0.58 % System time : 0.006 s 0.24/0.58 % Total time : 0.021 s 0.24/0.58 0.24/0.59 EOF