TSTP Solution File: SWW963+1 by iProver---3.9
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- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : iProver---3.9
% Problem : SWW963+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v7.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_iprover %s %d THM
% Computer : n031.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Fri May 3 03:27:01 EDT 2024
% Result : Theorem 3.74s 1.20s
% Output : CNFRefutation 3.74s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 16
% Number of leaves : 10
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 63 ( 20 unt; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 150 ( 0 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 7 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 158 ( 71 ~; 65 |; 10 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 12 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 12 ( 4 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 4 ( 1 avg)
% Number of predicates : 5 ( 4 usr; 3 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 19 ( 19 usr; 6 con; 0-2 aty)
% Number of variables : 77 ( 16 sgn 46 !; 0 ?)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f96,axiom,
! [X49,X50] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X49,X50),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax95) ).
fof(f104,axiom,
pred_attacker(tuple_true),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax103) ).
fof(f134,axiom,
! [X109] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X109))
=> pred_attacker(X109) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax133) ).
fof(f135,axiom,
! [X110] :
( pred_attacker(X110)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X110)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax134) ).
fof(f140,axiom,
! [X118] :
( pred_attacker(X118)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X118)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax139) ).
fof(f142,axiom,
! [X120] :
( pred_attacker(X120)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X120)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax141) ).
fof(f144,axiom,
! [X122] :
( pred_attacker(X122)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X122)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax143) ).
fof(f191,axiom,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_1(name_B,name_A)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax190) ).
fof(f193,axiom,
! [X192,X193,X194,X195] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X195))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X195,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X193))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X193,name_skB)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X194))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X192),constr_ecb_dec_1(X194,name_skB)) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax192) ).
fof(f196,conjecture,
pred_attacker(name_objective),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co0) ).
fof(f197,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(negated_conjecture,[],[f196]) ).
fof(f214,plain,
! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(rectify,[],[f96]) ).
fof(f250,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0))
=> pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f134]) ).
fof(f251,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f135]) ).
fof(f256,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f140]) ).
fof(f258,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f142]) ).
fof(f260,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f144]) ).
fof(f293,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB)) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(rectify,[],[f193]) ).
fof(f296,plain,
~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(flattening,[],[f197]) ).
fof(f346,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f250]) ).
fof(f347,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f251]) ).
fof(f353,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f256]) ).
fof(f355,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f258]) ).
fof(f357,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f260]) ).
fof(f398,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f293]) ).
fof(f399,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f398]) ).
fof(f499,plain,
! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f214]) ).
fof(f507,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_true),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f104]) ).
fof(f537,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f346]) ).
fof(f538,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f347]) ).
fof(f543,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f353]) ).
fof(f545,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f355]) ).
fof(f547,plain,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f357]) ).
fof(f593,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_1(name_B,name_A)),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f191]) ).
fof(f595,plain,
! [X2,X3,X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f399]) ).
fof(f598,plain,
~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f296]) ).
cnf(c_141,plain,
pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f499]) ).
cnf(c_149,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_true),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f507]) ).
cnf(c_179,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f537]) ).
cnf(c_180,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f538]) ).
cnf(c_185,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f543]) ).
cnf(c_187,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f545]) ).
cnf(c_189,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f547]) ).
cnf(c_235,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_1(name_B,name_A)),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f593]) ).
cnf(c_237,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X1),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X3,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f595]) ).
cnf(c_240,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f598]) ).
cnf(c_359,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0)) ),
inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_189]) ).
cnf(c_716,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X1),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X3,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_237,c_359]) ).
cnf(c_747,plain,
( ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X1,name_skB))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X2,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(X3)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_716,c_141]) ).
cnf(c_1349,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_747,c_141,c_141]) ).
cnf(c_1881,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_185]) ).
cnf(c_2236,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_1349,c_1881]) ).
cnf(c_3305,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ sP0_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[sP0_iProver_def])],[c_2236]) ).
cnf(c_3306,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
| ~ sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[sP1_iProver_def])],[c_2236]) ).
cnf(c_3307,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| sP0_iProver_def
| sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[])],[c_2236]) ).
cnf(c_3308,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[c_240]) ).
cnf(c_3508,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_187,c_3306]) ).
cnf(c_5999,plain,
~ sP0_iProver_def,
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_235,c_3305]) ).
cnf(c_6002,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_3307,c_3307,c_5999]) ).
cnf(c_6092,plain,
( pred_attacker(name_objective)
| sP1_iProver_def ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6002,c_179]) ).
cnf(c_6093,plain,
sP1_iProver_def,
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6092,c_3308]) ).
cnf(c_6098,plain,
~ pred_attacker(X0),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_180,c_3508,c_6093]) ).
cnf(c_6101,plain,
$false,
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_149,c_6098]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.12/0.12 % Problem : SWW963+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v7.4.0.
% 0.12/0.13 % Command : run_iprover %s %d THM
% 0.14/0.34 % Computer : n031.cluster.edu
% 0.14/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.14/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.14/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.14/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.14/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.14/0.34 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.14/0.34 % DateTime : Thu May 2 22:40:31 EDT 2024
% 0.14/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 0.20/0.47 Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.20/0.47 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/run_problem --schedule fof_schedule --heuristic_context casc_unsat --no_cores 8 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300
% 3.74/1.20 % SZS status Started for theBenchmark.p
% 3.74/1.20 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 %---------------- iProver v3.9 (pre CASC 2024/SMT-COMP 2024) ----------------%
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 ------ iProver source info
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 git: date: 2024-05-02 19:28:25 +0000
% 3.74/1.20 git: sha1: a33b5eb135c74074ba803943bb12f2ebd971352f
% 3.74/1.20 git: non_committed_changes: false
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 ------ Parsing...
% 3.74/1.20 ------ Clausification by vclausify_rel & Parsing by iProver...
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 ------ Preprocessing... sup_sim: 0 sf_s rm: 2 0s sf_e pe_s pe:1:0s pe_e sup_sim: 0 sf_s rm: 1 0s sf_e pe_s pe_e
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 ------ Preprocessing... gs_s sp: 3 0s gs_e snvd_s sp: 0 0s snvd_e
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 ------ Preprocessing... sf_s rm: 1 0s sf_e sf_s rm: 0 0s sf_e
% 3.74/1.20 ------ Proving...
% 3.74/1.20 ------ Problem Properties
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 clauses 191
% 3.74/1.20 conjectures 1
% 3.74/1.20 EPR 91
% 3.74/1.20 Horn 189
% 3.74/1.20 unary 112
% 3.74/1.20 binary 55
% 3.74/1.20 lits 304
% 3.74/1.20 lits eq 94
% 3.74/1.20 fd_pure 0
% 3.74/1.20 fd_pseudo 0
% 3.74/1.20 fd_cond 1
% 3.74/1.20 fd_pseudo_cond 0
% 3.74/1.20 AC symbols 0
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 ------ Schedule dynamic 5 is on
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 ------ Input Options "--resolution_flag false --inst_lit_sel_side none" Time Limit: 10.
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 ------
% 3.74/1.20 Current options:
% 3.74/1.20 ------
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 ------ Proving...
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.20 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
% 3.74/1.20
% 3.74/1.21
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------