TSTP Solution File: SWV768-1 by Twee---2.4.2

View Problem - Process Solution

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : Twee---2.4.2
% Problem  : SWV768-1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v4.1.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : parallel-twee %s --tstp --conditional-encoding if --smaller --drop-non-horn --give-up-on-saturation --explain-encoding --formal-proof

% Computer : n004.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Aug 31 23:06:12 EDT 2023

% Result   : Unsatisfiable 109.51s 14.34s
% Output   : Proof 109.51s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : -

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----WARNING: Could not form TPTP format derivation
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.09/0.11  % Problem  : SWV768-1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v4.1.0.
% 0.09/0.12  % Command  : parallel-twee %s --tstp --conditional-encoding if --smaller --drop-non-horn --give-up-on-saturation --explain-encoding --formal-proof
% 0.11/0.32  % Computer : n004.cluster.edu
% 0.11/0.32  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.11/0.32  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.11/0.32  % Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% 0.11/0.32  % OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.11/0.32  % CPULimit : 300
% 0.11/0.32  % WCLimit  : 300
% 0.11/0.32  % DateTime : Tue Aug 29 05:27:52 EDT 2023
% 0.11/0.33  % CPUTime  : 
% 109.51/14.34  Command-line arguments: --flip-ordering --lhs-weight 1 --depth-weight 60 --distributivity-heuristic
% 109.51/14.34  
% 109.51/14.34  % SZS status Unsatisfiable
% 109.51/14.34  
% 109.51/14.34  % SZS output start Proof
% 109.51/14.34  Take the following subset of the input axioms:
% 109.51/14.35    fof(cls_Crypt__imp__keysFor_0, axiom, ![V_X, V_H, V_K]: (hBOOL(c_in(V_K, c_Message_OkeysFor(V_H), tc_nat)) | (~hBOOL(c_in(V_K, c_Message_OsymKeys, tc_nat)) | ~hBOOL(c_in(c_Message_Omsg_OCrypt(V_K, V_X), V_H, tc_Message_Omsg))))).
% 109.51/14.35    fof(cls_conjecture_1, negated_conjecture, hBOOL(c_in(v_evs2, c_NS__Shared__Mirabelle_Ons__shared, tc_List_Olist(tc_Event_Oevent)))).
% 109.51/14.35    fof(cls_conjecture_13, negated_conjecture, hBOOL(c_in(c_Message_Omsg_OCrypt(v_KAB, c_Message_Omsg_OMPair(c_Message_Omsg_ONonce(v_NB), c_Message_Omsg_ONonce(v_NB))), c_Message_Oparts(c_Event_Oknows(c_Message_Oagent_OSpy, v_evs2)), tc_Message_Omsg))).
% 109.51/14.35    fof(cls_conjecture_2, negated_conjecture, ~hBOOL(c_in(hAPP(c_Message_Omsg_OKey, v_KAB), c_Event_Oused(v_evs2), tc_Message_Omsg))).
% 109.51/14.35    fof(cls_conjecture_3, negated_conjecture, hBOOL(c_in(v_KAB, c_Message_OsymKeys, tc_nat))).
% 109.51/14.35    fof(cls_new__keys__not__used_0, axiom, ![V_evs, V_K2]: (~hBOOL(c_in(V_K2, c_Message_OkeysFor(c_Message_Oparts(c_Event_Oknows(c_Message_Oagent_OSpy, V_evs))), tc_nat)) | (~hBOOL(c_in(V_evs, c_NS__Shared__Mirabelle_Ons__shared, tc_List_Olist(tc_Event_Oevent))) | (~hBOOL(c_in(V_K2, c_Message_OsymKeys, tc_nat)) | hBOOL(c_in(hAPP(c_Message_Omsg_OKey, V_K2), c_Event_Oused(V_evs), tc_Message_Omsg)))))).
% 109.51/14.35  
% 109.51/14.35  Now clausify the problem and encode Horn clauses using encoding 3 of
% 109.51/14.35  http://www.cse.chalmers.se/~nicsma/papers/horn.pdf.
% 109.51/14.35  We repeatedly replace C & s=t => u=v by the two clauses:
% 109.51/14.35    fresh(y, y, x1...xn) = u
% 109.51/14.35    C => fresh(s, t, x1...xn) = v
% 109.51/14.35  where fresh is a fresh function symbol and x1..xn are the free
% 109.51/14.35  variables of u and v.
% 109.51/14.35  A predicate p(X) is encoded as p(X)=true (this is sound, because the
% 109.51/14.35  input problem has no model of domain size 1).
% 109.51/14.35  
% 109.51/14.35  The encoding turns the above axioms into the following unit equations and goals:
% 109.51/14.35  
% 109.51/14.35  Axiom 1 (cls_conjecture_3): hBOOL(c_in(v_KAB, c_Message_OsymKeys, tc_nat)) = true2.
% 109.51/14.35  Axiom 2 (cls_Crypt__imp__keysFor_0): fresh344(X, X, Y, Z) = true2.
% 109.51/14.35  Axiom 3 (cls_new__keys__not__used_0): fresh172(X, X, Y, Z) = true2.
% 109.51/14.35  Axiom 4 (cls_Crypt__imp__keysFor_0): fresh345(X, X, Y, Z) = hBOOL(c_in(Y, c_Message_OkeysFor(Z), tc_nat)).
% 109.51/14.35  Axiom 5 (cls_conjecture_1): hBOOL(c_in(v_evs2, c_NS__Shared__Mirabelle_Ons__shared, tc_List_Olist(tc_Event_Oevent))) = true2.
% 109.51/14.35  Axiom 6 (cls_new__keys__not__used_0): fresh370(X, X, Y, Z) = hBOOL(c_in(hAPP(c_Message_Omsg_OKey, Y), c_Event_Oused(Z), tc_Message_Omsg)).
% 109.51/14.35  Axiom 7 (cls_new__keys__not__used_0): fresh369(X, X, Y, Z) = fresh370(hBOOL(c_in(Y, c_Message_OsymKeys, tc_nat)), true2, Y, Z).
% 109.51/14.35  Axiom 8 (cls_Crypt__imp__keysFor_0): fresh345(hBOOL(c_in(c_Message_Omsg_OCrypt(X, Y), Z, tc_Message_Omsg)), true2, X, Z) = fresh344(hBOOL(c_in(X, c_Message_OsymKeys, tc_nat)), true2, X, Z).
% 109.51/14.35  Axiom 9 (cls_new__keys__not__used_0): fresh369(hBOOL(c_in(X, c_NS__Shared__Mirabelle_Ons__shared, tc_List_Olist(tc_Event_Oevent))), true2, Y, X) = fresh172(hBOOL(c_in(Y, c_Message_OkeysFor(c_Message_Oparts(c_Event_Oknows(c_Message_Oagent_OSpy, X))), tc_nat)), true2, Y, X).
% 109.51/14.35  Axiom 10 (cls_conjecture_13): hBOOL(c_in(c_Message_Omsg_OCrypt(v_KAB, c_Message_Omsg_OMPair(c_Message_Omsg_ONonce(v_NB), c_Message_Omsg_ONonce(v_NB))), c_Message_Oparts(c_Event_Oknows(c_Message_Oagent_OSpy, v_evs2)), tc_Message_Omsg)) = true2.
% 109.51/14.35  
% 109.51/14.35  Goal 1 (cls_conjecture_2): hBOOL(c_in(hAPP(c_Message_Omsg_OKey, v_KAB), c_Event_Oused(v_evs2), tc_Message_Omsg)) = true2.
% 109.51/14.35  Proof:
% 109.51/14.35    hBOOL(c_in(hAPP(c_Message_Omsg_OKey, v_KAB), c_Event_Oused(v_evs2), tc_Message_Omsg))
% 109.51/14.35  = { by axiom 6 (cls_new__keys__not__used_0) R->L }
% 109.51/14.35    fresh370(true2, true2, v_KAB, v_evs2)
% 109.51/14.35  = { by axiom 1 (cls_conjecture_3) R->L }
% 109.51/14.35    fresh370(hBOOL(c_in(v_KAB, c_Message_OsymKeys, tc_nat)), true2, v_KAB, v_evs2)
% 109.51/14.35  = { by axiom 7 (cls_new__keys__not__used_0) R->L }
% 109.51/14.35    fresh369(true2, true2, v_KAB, v_evs2)
% 109.51/14.35  = { by axiom 5 (cls_conjecture_1) R->L }
% 109.51/14.35    fresh369(hBOOL(c_in(v_evs2, c_NS__Shared__Mirabelle_Ons__shared, tc_List_Olist(tc_Event_Oevent))), true2, v_KAB, v_evs2)
% 109.51/14.35  = { by axiom 9 (cls_new__keys__not__used_0) }
% 109.51/14.35    fresh172(hBOOL(c_in(v_KAB, c_Message_OkeysFor(c_Message_Oparts(c_Event_Oknows(c_Message_Oagent_OSpy, v_evs2))), tc_nat)), true2, v_KAB, v_evs2)
% 109.51/14.35  = { by axiom 4 (cls_Crypt__imp__keysFor_0) R->L }
% 109.51/14.35    fresh172(fresh345(true2, true2, v_KAB, c_Message_Oparts(c_Event_Oknows(c_Message_Oagent_OSpy, v_evs2))), true2, v_KAB, v_evs2)
% 109.51/14.35  = { by axiom 10 (cls_conjecture_13) R->L }
% 109.51/14.35    fresh172(fresh345(hBOOL(c_in(c_Message_Omsg_OCrypt(v_KAB, c_Message_Omsg_OMPair(c_Message_Omsg_ONonce(v_NB), c_Message_Omsg_ONonce(v_NB))), c_Message_Oparts(c_Event_Oknows(c_Message_Oagent_OSpy, v_evs2)), tc_Message_Omsg)), true2, v_KAB, c_Message_Oparts(c_Event_Oknows(c_Message_Oagent_OSpy, v_evs2))), true2, v_KAB, v_evs2)
% 109.51/14.35  = { by axiom 8 (cls_Crypt__imp__keysFor_0) }
% 109.51/14.35    fresh172(fresh344(hBOOL(c_in(v_KAB, c_Message_OsymKeys, tc_nat)), true2, v_KAB, c_Message_Oparts(c_Event_Oknows(c_Message_Oagent_OSpy, v_evs2))), true2, v_KAB, v_evs2)
% 109.51/14.35  = { by axiom 1 (cls_conjecture_3) }
% 109.51/14.35    fresh172(fresh344(true2, true2, v_KAB, c_Message_Oparts(c_Event_Oknows(c_Message_Oagent_OSpy, v_evs2))), true2, v_KAB, v_evs2)
% 109.51/14.35  = { by axiom 2 (cls_Crypt__imp__keysFor_0) }
% 109.51/14.35    fresh172(true2, true2, v_KAB, v_evs2)
% 109.51/14.35  = { by axiom 3 (cls_new__keys__not__used_0) }
% 109.51/14.35    true2
% 109.51/14.35  % SZS output end Proof
% 109.51/14.35  
% 109.51/14.35  RESULT: Unsatisfiable (the axioms are contradictory).
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