TSTP Solution File: SWV235+1 by CSE_E---1.5
View Problem
- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : CSE_E---1.5
% Problem : SWV235+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v3.2.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : java -jar /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/mcs_scs.jar %d %s
% Computer : n023.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Aug 31 21:37:08 EDT 2023
% Result : Theorem 0.53s 0.65s
% Output : CNFRefutation 0.53s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 12
% Number of leaves : 31
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 74 ( 32 unt; 15 typ; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 113 ( 16 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 4 ( 1 avg)
% Number of connectives : 97 ( 43 ~; 40 |; 8 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 6 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 8 ( 3 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 4 ( 1 avg)
% Number of types : 2 ( 0 usr)
% Number of type conns : 7 ( 4 >; 3 *; 0 +; 0 <<)
% Number of predicates : 3 ( 1 usr; 1 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 14 ( 14 usr; 11 con; 0-2 aty)
% Number of variables : 85 ( 1 sgn; 42 !; 0 ?; 0 :)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
tff(decl_22,type,
xor: ( $i * $i ) > $i ).
tff(decl_23,type,
crypt: ( $i * $i ) > $i ).
tff(decl_24,type,
decrypt: ( $i * $i ) > $i ).
tff(decl_25,type,
id: $i ).
tff(decl_26,type,
p: $i > $o ).
tff(decl_27,type,
km: $i ).
tff(decl_28,type,
imp: $i ).
tff(decl_29,type,
exp: $i ).
tff(decl_30,type,
kp: $i ).
tff(decl_31,type,
data: $i ).
tff(decl_32,type,
pin: $i ).
tff(decl_33,type,
pp: $i ).
tff(decl_34,type,
rand: $i ).
tff(decl_35,type,
kek: $i ).
tff(decl_36,type,
a: $i ).
fof(key_part_import___part_2,axiom,
! [X6,X9,X11] :
( ( p(X6)
& p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X9)),X11))
& p(X9) )
=> p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X9,kp)),xor(X6,X11))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',key_part_import___part_2) ).
fof(xor_rules_2,axiom,
! [X1] : xor(X1,X1) = id,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',xor_rules_2) ).
fof(key_part_import___part_1,axiom,
! [X10,X9] :
( ( p(X10)
& p(X9) )
=> p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X9)),X10)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',key_part_import___part_1) ).
fof(xor_commutative,axiom,
! [X1,X2] : xor(X1,X2) = xor(X2,X1),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',xor_commutative) ).
fof(xor_associative,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X3] : xor(X1,xor(X2,X3)) = xor(xor(X1,X2),X3),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',xor_associative) ).
fof(an_account_number,axiom,
p(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',an_account_number) ).
fof(xor_rules_1,axiom,
! [X1] : xor(X1,id) = X1,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',xor_rules_1) ).
fof(combine_with_XOR,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( p(X1)
& p(X2) )
=> p(xor(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',combine_with_XOR) ).
fof(key_export,axiom,
! [X9,X6,X4] :
( ( p(crypt(xor(km,X9),X6))
& p(X9)
& p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X4)) )
=> p(crypt(xor(X4,X9),X6)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',key_export) ).
fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_1,axiom,
p(kp),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_1) ).
fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_11,axiom,
p(exp),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_11) ).
fof(find_pin,conjecture,
p(crypt(pp,a)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',find_pin) ).
fof(encrypt_knowledge,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( p(X2)
& p(X1) )
=> p(crypt(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',encrypt_knowledge) ).
fof(decrypt_knowledge,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( p(crypt(X1,X2))
& p(X1) )
=> p(X2) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',decrypt_knowledge) ).
fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_6,axiom,
p(crypt(xor(km,pin),pp)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_6) ).
fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_5,axiom,
p(pin),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_5) ).
fof(c_0_16,plain,
! [X31,X32,X33] :
( ~ p(X31)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X32)),X33))
| ~ p(X32)
| p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X32,kp)),xor(X31,X33))) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[key_part_import___part_2])]) ).
fof(c_0_17,plain,
! [X20] : xor(X20,X20) = id,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[xor_rules_2]) ).
fof(c_0_18,plain,
! [X29,X30] :
( ~ p(X29)
| ~ p(X30)
| p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X30)),X29)) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[key_part_import___part_1])]) ).
cnf(c_0_19,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X2,kp)),xor(X1,X3)))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X2)),X3))
| ~ p(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_16]) ).
cnf(c_0_20,plain,
xor(X1,X1) = id,
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_17]) ).
cnf(c_0_21,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X2)),X1))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_18]) ).
fof(c_0_22,plain,
! [X12,X13] : xor(X12,X13) = xor(X13,X12),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[xor_commutative]) ).
fof(c_0_23,plain,
! [X14,X15,X16] : xor(X14,xor(X15,X16)) = xor(xor(X14,X15),X16),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[xor_associative]) ).
cnf(c_0_24,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X1,kp)),id))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X2) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_19,c_0_20]),c_0_21]) ).
cnf(c_0_25,plain,
p(a),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[an_account_number]) ).
cnf(c_0_26,plain,
xor(X1,X2) = xor(X2,X1),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_22]) ).
cnf(c_0_27,plain,
xor(X1,xor(X2,X3)) = xor(xor(X1,X2),X3),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_23]) ).
fof(c_0_28,plain,
! [X19] : xor(X19,id) = X19,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[xor_rules_1]) ).
cnf(c_0_29,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X1,kp)),id))
| ~ p(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_24,c_0_25]) ).
cnf(c_0_30,plain,
xor(X1,xor(X2,X3)) = xor(X3,xor(X1,X2)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26,c_0_27]) ).
cnf(c_0_31,plain,
xor(X1,id) = X1,
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_28]) ).
cnf(c_0_32,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X1)),id))
| ~ p(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_29,c_0_26]) ).
cnf(c_0_33,plain,
xor(X1,xor(X1,X2)) = X2,
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_30,c_0_20]),c_0_31]) ).
cnf(c_0_34,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,X1),id))
| ~ p(xor(kp,X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_32,c_0_33]) ).
cnf(c_0_35,plain,
xor(X1,xor(X2,X3)) = xor(X2,xor(X1,X3)),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_27,c_0_26]),c_0_27]) ).
fof(c_0_36,plain,
! [X47,X48] :
( ~ p(X47)
| ~ p(X48)
| p(xor(X47,X48)) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[combine_with_XOR])]) ).
cnf(c_0_37,plain,
( p(crypt(X1,id))
| ~ p(xor(km,xor(kp,X1))) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_34,c_0_33]),c_0_35]) ).
cnf(c_0_38,plain,
( p(xor(X1,X2))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_36]) ).
fof(c_0_39,plain,
! [X26,X27,X28] :
( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X26),X27))
| ~ p(X26)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X28))
| p(crypt(xor(X28,X26),X27)) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[key_export])]) ).
cnf(c_0_40,plain,
( p(crypt(X1,id))
| ~ p(xor(km,xor(X1,kp))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_37,c_0_26]) ).
cnf(c_0_41,plain,
( p(xor(X1,xor(X2,X3)))
| ~ p(xor(X1,X2))
| ~ p(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_38,c_0_27]) ).
cnf(c_0_42,plain,
p(kp),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_1]) ).
cnf(c_0_43,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(X3,X1),X2))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X1),X2))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X3)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_39]) ).
cnf(c_0_44,plain,
( p(crypt(X1,id))
| ~ p(xor(km,X1)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_40,c_0_41]),c_0_42])]) ).
cnf(c_0_45,plain,
xor(id,X1) = X1,
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_31,c_0_26]) ).
cnf(c_0_46,plain,
p(exp),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_11]) ).
fof(c_0_47,negated_conjecture,
~ p(crypt(pp,a)),
inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[find_pin])]) ).
fof(c_0_48,plain,
! [X51,X52] :
( ~ p(X52)
| ~ p(X51)
| p(crypt(X51,X52)) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[encrypt_knowledge])]) ).
fof(c_0_49,plain,
! [X49,X50] :
( ~ p(crypt(X49,X50))
| ~ p(X49)
| p(X50) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[decrypt_knowledge])]) ).
cnf(c_0_50,plain,
( p(crypt(X1,X2))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X1),X2))
| ~ p(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_43,c_0_44]),c_0_45]),c_0_33]),c_0_46])]) ).
cnf(c_0_51,plain,
p(crypt(xor(km,pin),pp)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_6]) ).
cnf(c_0_52,plain,
p(pin),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_5]) ).
cnf(c_0_53,negated_conjecture,
~ p(crypt(pp,a)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_47]) ).
cnf(c_0_54,plain,
( p(crypt(X2,X1))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_48]) ).
cnf(c_0_55,plain,
( p(X2)
| ~ p(crypt(X1,X2))
| ~ p(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_49]) ).
cnf(c_0_56,plain,
p(crypt(pin,pp)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_50,c_0_51]),c_0_52])]) ).
cnf(c_0_57,negated_conjecture,
~ p(pp),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_54]),c_0_25])]) ).
cnf(c_0_58,plain,
$false,
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_56]),c_0_52])]),c_0_57]),
[proof] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.06/0.12 % Problem : SWV235+1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v3.2.0.
% 0.06/0.13 % Command : java -jar /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/mcs_scs.jar %d %s
% 0.13/0.34 % Computer : n023.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % DateTime : Tue Aug 29 04:09:25 EDT 2023
% 0.13/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 0.51/0.57 start to proof: theBenchmark
% 0.53/0.65 % Version : CSE_E---1.5
% 0.53/0.65 % Problem : theBenchmark.p
% 0.53/0.65 % Proof found
% 0.53/0.65 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 0.53/0.65 % SZS output start Proof
% See solution above
% 0.53/0.65 % Total time : 0.074000 s
% 0.53/0.65 % SZS output end Proof
% 0.53/0.65 % Total time : 0.078000 s
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------