TSTP Solution File: SWV233+1 by Enigma---0.5.1
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- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Enigma---0.5.1
% Problem : SWV233+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v3.2.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : enigmatic-eprover.py %s %d 1
% Computer : n012.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 600s
% DateTime : Wed Jul 20 17:46:17 EDT 2022
% Result : Theorem 9.47s 2.59s
% Output : CNFRefutation 9.47s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 23
% Number of leaves : 20
% Syntax : Number of clauses : 81 ( 32 unt; 0 nHn; 73 RR)
% Number of literals : 206 ( 25 equ; 133 neg)
% Maximal clause size : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 8 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 3 ( 1 usr; 1 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 19 ( 19 usr; 9 con; 0-2 aty)
% Number of variables : 113 ( 21 sgn)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(i_0_11,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(concatenate(X2,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_11) ).
cnf(i_0_31,plain,
knows(concatenate(n,concatenate(k_c,sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c))))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_31) ).
cnf(i_0_12,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(concatenate(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_12) ).
cnf(i_0_29,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| head(tail(extract(X3,X1))) != X1
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_29) ).
cnf(i_0_18,plain,
extract(sign(X1,inverse(X2)),X2) = X1,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_18) ).
cnf(i_0_3,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(sign(X1,inverse(X2))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_3) ).
cnf(i_0_20,plain,
tail(concatenate(X1,X2)) = X2,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_20) ).
cnf(i_0_19,plain,
head(concatenate(X1,X2)) = X1,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_19) ).
cnf(i_0_30,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(tail(extract(X2,k_ca)))))))
| head(extract(X2,k_ca)) != s
| head(tail(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(tail(extract(X2,k_ca)))))) != n
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_30) ).
cnf(i_0_4,plain,
( knows(sign(X1,X2))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_4) ).
cnf(i_0_16,plain,
decrypt(encrypt(X1,X2),inverse(X2)) = X1,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_16) ).
cnf(i_0_9,plain,
( knows(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_9) ).
cnf(i_0_1,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(inverse(X2))
| ~ knows(encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_1) ).
cnf(i_0_28,plain,
knows(k_ca),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_28) ).
cnf(i_0_10,plain,
( knows(concatenate(X1,X2))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_10) ).
cnf(i_0_15,plain,
( knows(head(X1))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_15) ).
cnf(i_0_2,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(symmetric_encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_2) ).
cnf(i_0_32,negated_conjecture,
~ knows(secret),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_32) ).
cnf(i_0_27,plain,
knows(inverse(k_a)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_27) ).
cnf(i_0_26,plain,
knows(k_a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/enigma-theBenchmark.p-ve0ebyrn/input.p',i_0_26) ).
cnf(c_0_53,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(concatenate(X2,X1)) ),
i_0_11 ).
cnf(c_0_54,plain,
knows(concatenate(n,concatenate(k_c,sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c))))),
i_0_31 ).
cnf(c_0_55,plain,
knows(concatenate(k_c,sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c)))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_54]) ).
cnf(c_0_56,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(concatenate(X1,X2)) ),
i_0_12 ).
cnf(c_0_57,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| head(tail(extract(X3,X1))) != X1
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2) ),
i_0_29 ).
cnf(c_0_58,plain,
extract(sign(X1,inverse(X2)),X2) = X1,
i_0_18 ).
cnf(c_0_59,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(sign(X1,inverse(X2))) ),
i_0_3 ).
cnf(c_0_60,plain,
knows(sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_55]) ).
cnf(c_0_61,plain,
knows(k_c),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_56,c_0_55]) ).
cnf(c_0_62,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| head(tail(X3)) != X1
| ~ knows(sign(X3,inverse(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57,c_0_58]) ).
cnf(c_0_63,plain,
tail(concatenate(X1,X2)) = X2,
i_0_20 ).
cnf(c_0_64,plain,
head(concatenate(X1,X2)) = X1,
i_0_19 ).
cnf(c_0_65,plain,
knows(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_60]),c_0_61])]) ).
cnf(c_0_66,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(tail(extract(X2,k_ca)))))))
| head(extract(X2,k_ca)) != s
| head(tail(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(tail(extract(X2,k_ca)))))) != n
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
i_0_30 ).
cnf(c_0_67,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(k_c),concatenate(X1,eol)),inverse(k_s)),k_c),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_60]),c_0_63]),c_0_64]),c_0_61])]) ).
cnf(c_0_68,plain,
knows(concatenate(k_c,eol)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_65]) ).
cnf(c_0_69,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(tail(X2))))))
| head(tail(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(tail(X2))))) != n
| head(X2) != s
| ~ knows(sign(X2,inverse(k_ca)))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_58]) ).
cnf(c_0_70,plain,
( knows(sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_67]) ).
cnf(c_0_71,plain,
knows(eol),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_68]) ).
cnf(c_0_72,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(X2)))))
| head(tail(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(X2)))) != n
| X3 != s
| ~ knows(sign(concatenate(X3,X2),inverse(k_ca)))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_69,c_0_63]),c_0_64]) ).
cnf(c_0_73,plain,
knows(sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_70,c_0_71]) ).
cnf(c_0_74,plain,
( knows(sign(X1,X2))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
i_0_4 ).
cnf(c_0_75,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),k_s))))
| head(tail(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),k_s))) != n
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_72,c_0_73]),c_0_64]),c_0_64]) ).
cnf(c_0_76,plain,
decrypt(encrypt(X1,X2),inverse(X2)) = X1,
i_0_16 ).
cnf(c_0_77,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| head(tail(X3)) != X1
| ~ knows(inverse(X1))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_74]) ).
cnf(c_0_78,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(X1,k_s))))
| head(tail(extract(X1,k_s))) != n
| ~ knows(encrypt(X1,k_c)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_75,c_0_76]) ).
cnf(c_0_79,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(tail(X1))),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),head(tail(X1))),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(tail(X1))))
| ~ knows(head(tail(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(er,[status(thm)],[c_0_77]) ).
cnf(c_0_80,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(X1)))
| head(tail(X1)) != n
| ~ knows(encrypt(sign(X1,inverse(k_s)),k_c)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_78,c_0_58]) ).
cnf(c_0_81,plain,
( knows(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
i_0_9 ).
cnf(c_0_82,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(inverse(X2))
| ~ knows(encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
i_0_1 ).
cnf(c_0_83,plain,
( knows(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(tail(X1))),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),head(tail(X1))))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(tail(X1))))
| ~ knows(head(tail(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_56,c_0_79]) ).
cnf(c_0_84,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(X1)))
| head(tail(X1)) != n
| ~ knows(sign(X1,inverse(k_s))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_80,c_0_81]),c_0_61])]) ).
cnf(c_0_85,plain,
( knows(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(tail(X1))),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(tail(X1))))
| ~ knows(head(tail(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_82,c_0_83]) ).
cnf(c_0_86,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,kgen(head(tail(X1)))))
| X2 != n
| ~ knows(inverse(head(tail(X1))))
| ~ knows(head(tail(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_85]),c_0_64]),c_0_63]),c_0_64]) ).
cnf(c_0_87,plain,
knows(n),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_56,c_0_54]) ).
cnf(c_0_88,plain,
knows(k_ca),
i_0_28 ).
cnf(c_0_89,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,kgen(head(tail(X1)))))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(tail(X1))))
| ~ knows(head(tail(X1)))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_86,c_0_87]) ).
cnf(c_0_90,plain,
( knows(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(concatenate(X3,X1))
| ~ knows(head(X1))
| ~ knows(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_85,c_0_63]) ).
cnf(c_0_91,plain,
( knows(concatenate(X1,X2))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
i_0_10 ).
cnf(c_0_92,plain,
( knows(head(X1))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
i_0_15 ).
cnf(c_0_93,plain,
knows(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_73]),c_0_88])]) ).
cnf(c_0_94,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,kgen(head(X1))))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(concatenate(X2,X1))
| ~ knows(head(X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_89,c_0_63]) ).
cnf(c_0_95,plain,
( knows(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X3) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_90,c_0_91]),c_0_92]) ).
cnf(c_0_96,plain,
knows(s),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_56,c_0_93]) ).
cnf(c_0_97,plain,
knows(concatenate(k_s,eol)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_93]) ).
cnf(c_0_98,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,kgen(head(X1))))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_94,c_0_91]),c_0_92]) ).
cnf(c_0_99,plain,
( knows(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_95,c_0_96]) ).
cnf(c_0_100,plain,
knows(k_s),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_56,c_0_97]) ).
cnf(c_0_101,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(symmetric_encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
i_0_2 ).
cnf(c_0_102,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,kgen(head(X1))))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_98,c_0_96]) ).
cnf(c_0_103,negated_conjecture,
~ knows(secret),
i_0_32 ).
cnf(c_0_104,plain,
( knows(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_99]),c_0_100])]) ).
cnf(c_0_105,plain,
( ~ knows(kgen(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_101,c_0_102]),c_0_103]) ).
cnf(c_0_106,plain,
( ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_56,c_0_104]),c_0_105]) ).
cnf(c_0_107,plain,
( ~ knows(concatenate(X1,X2))
| ~ knows(inverse(X1))
| ~ knows(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_106,c_0_64]) ).
cnf(c_0_108,plain,
( ~ knows(inverse(X1))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_107,c_0_91]) ).
cnf(c_0_109,plain,
knows(inverse(k_a)),
i_0_27 ).
cnf(c_0_110,plain,
knows(k_a),
i_0_26 ).
cnf(c_0_111,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_108,c_0_109]),c_0_110])]) ).
cnf(c_0_112,plain,
~ knows(X1),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_111,c_0_96]) ).
cnf(c_0_113,plain,
$false,
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[c_0_88,c_0_112]),
[proof] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.07/0.12 % Problem : SWV233+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v3.2.0.
% 0.07/0.12 % Command : enigmatic-eprover.py %s %d 1
% 0.12/0.33 % Computer : n012.cluster.edu
% 0.12/0.33 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.12/0.33 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.12/0.33 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.12/0.33 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.12/0.33 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.12/0.33 % WCLimit : 600
% 0.12/0.33 % DateTime : Wed Jun 15 10:48:11 EDT 2022
% 0.12/0.33 % CPUTime :
% 0.19/0.44 # ENIGMATIC: Selected complete mode:
% 9.47/2.59 # ENIGMATIC: Solved by autoschedule:
% 9.47/2.59 # No SInE strategy applied
% 9.47/2.59 # Trying AutoSched0 for 150 seconds
% 9.47/2.59 # AutoSched0-Mode selected heuristic G_E___200_B02_F1_AE_CS_SP_PI_S0Y
% 9.47/2.59 # and selection function SelectMaxLComplexAvoidPosPred.
% 9.47/2.59 #
% 9.47/2.59 # Preprocessing time : 0.024 s
% 9.47/2.59
% 9.47/2.59 # Proof found!
% 9.47/2.59 # SZS status Theorem
% 9.47/2.59 # SZS output start CNFRefutation
% See solution above
% 9.47/2.59 # Training examples: 0 positive, 0 negative
% 9.47/2.59
% 9.47/2.59 # -------------------------------------------------
% 9.47/2.59 # User time : 0.112 s
% 9.47/2.59 # System time : 0.008 s
% 9.47/2.59 # Total time : 0.120 s
% 9.47/2.59 # Maximum resident set size: 7124 pages
% 9.47/2.59
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------