TSTP Solution File: SWV233+1 by ET---2.0
View Problem
- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : ET---2.0
% Problem : SWV233+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v3.2.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_ET %s %d
% Computer : n014.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 600s
% DateTime : Wed Jul 20 18:15:40 EDT 2022
% Result : Theorem 0.18s 1.37s
% Output : CNFRefutation 0.18s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 23
% Number of leaves : 15
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 92 ( 39 unt; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 276 ( 47 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 21 ( 3 avg)
% Number of connectives : 335 ( 151 ~; 142 |; 34 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 8 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 13 ( 4 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 7 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 3 ( 1 usr; 1 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 23 ( 23 usr; 9 con; 0-2 aty)
% Number of variables : 145 ( 16 sgn 52 !; 0 ?)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(construct_message_2,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( knows(concatenate(X1,X2))
=> ( knows(X1)
& knows(X2) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',construct_message_2) ).
fof(protocol,axiom,
! [X7,X8,X9,X10,X11] :
( knows(concatenate(n,concatenate(k_c,sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c)))))
& ( ( knows(X10)
& knows(X11)
& first(extract(X11,k_ca)) = s
& second(extract(decrypt(X10,inverse(k_c)),second(extract(X11,k_ca)))) = n )
=> knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,first(extract(decrypt(X10,inverse(k_c)),second(extract(X11,k_ca)))))) )
& ( ( knows(X7)
& knows(X8)
& knows(X9)
& second(extract(X9,X8)) = X8 )
=> knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X8),concatenate(X7,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X8),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',protocol) ).
fof(second_axiom,axiom,
! [X5] : second(X5) = head(tail(X5)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',second_axiom) ).
fof(sign_axiom,axiom,
! [X3,X4] : extract(sign(X3,inverse(X4)),X4) = X3,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',sign_axiom) ).
fof(sign_equation,axiom,
! [X3,X4] :
( ( knows(sign(X3,inverse(X4)))
& knows(X4) )
=> knows(X3) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',sign_equation) ).
fof(tail_axiom,axiom,
! [X5,X6] : tail(concatenate(X5,X6)) = X6,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',tail_axiom) ).
fof(head_axiom,axiom,
! [X5,X6] : head(concatenate(X5,X6)) = X5,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',head_axiom) ).
fof(first_axiom,axiom,
! [X5] : first(X5) = head(X5),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',first_axiom) ).
fof(decrypt_axiom,axiom,
! [X3,X4] : decrypt(encrypt(X3,X4),inverse(X4)) = X3,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',decrypt_axiom) ).
fof(construct_message_1,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( knows(X1)
& knows(X2) )
=> ( knows(concatenate(X1,X2))
& knows(encrypt(X1,X2))
& knows(symmetric_encrypt(X1,X2))
& knows(decrypt(X1,X2))
& knows(symmetric_decrypt(X1,X2))
& knows(extract(X1,X2))
& knows(sign(X1,X2)) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',construct_message_1) ).
fof(previous_knowledge,axiom,
( knows(k_ca)
& knows(inverse(k_a))
& knows(k_a) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',previous_knowledge) ).
fof(construct_message_3,axiom,
! [X3] :
( knows(X3)
=> ( knows(head(X3))
& knows(tail(X3))
& knows(hash(X3)) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',construct_message_3) ).
fof(encrypt_equation,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( knows(encrypt(X1,X2))
& knows(inverse(X2)) )
=> knows(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',encrypt_equation) ).
fof(attack,conjecture,
knows(secret),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',attack) ).
fof(symmetric_encrypt_equation,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( knows(symmetric_encrypt(X1,X2))
& knows(X2) )
=> knows(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',symmetric_encrypt_equation) ).
fof(c_0_15,plain,
! [X3,X4] :
( ( knows(X3)
| ~ knows(concatenate(X3,X4)) )
& ( knows(X4)
| ~ knows(concatenate(X3,X4)) ) ),
inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[construct_message_2])])]) ).
fof(c_0_16,plain,
! [X15,X16,X12,X13,X14] :
( knows(concatenate(n,concatenate(k_c,sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c)))))
& ( ~ knows(X15)
| ~ knows(X16)
| first(extract(X16,k_ca)) != s
| second(extract(decrypt(X15,inverse(k_c)),second(extract(X16,k_ca)))) != n
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,first(extract(decrypt(X15,inverse(k_c)),second(extract(X16,k_ca)))))) )
& ( ~ knows(X12)
| ~ knows(X13)
| ~ knows(X14)
| second(extract(X14,X13)) != X13
| knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X13),concatenate(X12,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X13),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))) ) ),
inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[protocol])])])]) ).
fof(c_0_17,plain,
! [X6] : second(X6) = head(tail(X6)),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[second_axiom]) ).
cnf(c_0_18,plain,
( knows(X2)
| ~ knows(concatenate(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_15]) ).
cnf(c_0_19,plain,
knows(concatenate(n,concatenate(k_c,sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c))))),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_16]) ).
cnf(c_0_20,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| second(extract(X3,X1)) != X1
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_16]) ).
cnf(c_0_21,plain,
second(X1) = head(tail(X1)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_17]) ).
fof(c_0_22,plain,
! [X5,X6] : extract(sign(X5,inverse(X6)),X6) = X5,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[sign_axiom]) ).
fof(c_0_23,plain,
! [X5,X6] :
( ~ knows(sign(X5,inverse(X6)))
| ~ knows(X6)
| knows(X5) ),
inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[sign_equation])])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_24,plain,
knows(concatenate(k_c,sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c)))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_18,c_0_19]) ).
cnf(c_0_25,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(concatenate(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_15]) ).
cnf(c_0_26,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| head(tail(extract(X3,X1))) != X1
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_20,c_0_21]) ).
cnf(c_0_27,plain,
extract(sign(X1,inverse(X2)),X2) = X1,
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_22]) ).
fof(c_0_28,plain,
! [X7,X8] : tail(concatenate(X7,X8)) = X8,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[tail_axiom]) ).
fof(c_0_29,plain,
! [X7,X8] : head(concatenate(X7,X8)) = X7,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[head_axiom]) ).
cnf(c_0_30,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(sign(X1,inverse(X2))) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_23]) ).
cnf(c_0_31,plain,
knows(sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_18,c_0_24]) ).
cnf(c_0_32,plain,
knows(k_c),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_25,c_0_24]) ).
fof(c_0_33,plain,
! [X6] : first(X6) = head(X6),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[first_axiom]) ).
cnf(c_0_34,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| head(tail(X3)) != X1
| ~ knows(sign(X3,inverse(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26,c_0_27]) ).
cnf(c_0_35,plain,
tail(concatenate(X1,X2)) = X2,
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_28]) ).
cnf(c_0_36,plain,
head(concatenate(X1,X2)) = X1,
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_29]) ).
cnf(c_0_37,plain,
knows(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_30,c_0_31]),c_0_32])]) ).
cnf(c_0_38,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,first(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),second(extract(X2,k_ca))))))
| second(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),second(extract(X2,k_ca)))) != n
| first(extract(X2,k_ca)) != s
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_16]) ).
cnf(c_0_39,plain,
first(X1) = head(X1),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_33]) ).
fof(c_0_40,plain,
! [X5,X6] : decrypt(encrypt(X5,X6),inverse(X6)) = X5,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[decrypt_axiom]) ).
fof(c_0_41,plain,
! [X3,X4] :
( ( knows(concatenate(X3,X4))
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X4) )
& ( knows(encrypt(X3,X4))
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X4) )
& ( knows(symmetric_encrypt(X3,X4))
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X4) )
& ( knows(decrypt(X3,X4))
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X4) )
& ( knows(symmetric_decrypt(X3,X4))
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X4) )
& ( knows(extract(X3,X4))
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X4) )
& ( knows(sign(X3,X4))
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X4) ) ),
inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[construct_message_1])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_42,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(k_c),concatenate(X1,eol)),inverse(k_s)),k_c),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_34,c_0_31]),c_0_35]),c_0_36]),c_0_32])]) ).
cnf(c_0_43,plain,
knows(concatenate(k_c,eol)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_18,c_0_37]) ).
cnf(c_0_44,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(tail(extract(X2,k_ca)))))))
| head(extract(X2,k_ca)) != s
| head(tail(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(tail(extract(X2,k_ca)))))) != n
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_38,c_0_39]),c_0_39]),c_0_21]),c_0_21]),c_0_21]) ).
cnf(c_0_45,plain,
decrypt(encrypt(X1,X2),inverse(X2)) = X1,
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_40]) ).
cnf(c_0_46,plain,
( knows(sign(X2,X1))
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_41]) ).
cnf(c_0_47,plain,
( knows(sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_18,c_0_42]) ).
cnf(c_0_48,plain,
knows(eol),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_18,c_0_43]) ).
cnf(c_0_49,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(X1,head(tail(extract(X2,k_ca)))))))
| head(tail(extract(X1,head(tail(extract(X2,k_ca)))))) != n
| head(extract(X2,k_ca)) != s
| ~ knows(encrypt(X1,k_c))
| ~ knows(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_45]) ).
cnf(c_0_50,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| head(tail(X3)) != X1
| ~ knows(inverse(X1))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_34,c_0_46]) ).
cnf(c_0_51,plain,
knows(sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_47,c_0_48]) ).
cnf(c_0_52,plain,
knows(k_ca),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[previous_knowledge]) ).
cnf(c_0_53,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(X1)))
| head(extract(X2,k_ca)) != s
| head(tail(X1)) != n
| ~ knows(encrypt(sign(X1,inverse(head(tail(extract(X2,k_ca))))),k_c))
| ~ knows(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_27]) ).
cnf(c_0_54,plain,
( knows(encrypt(X2,X1))
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_41]) ).
cnf(c_0_55,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| head(X3) != X1
| ~ knows(concatenate(X4,X3))
| ~ knows(inverse(X1))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_50,c_0_35]) ).
cnf(c_0_56,plain,
( knows(concatenate(X2,X1))
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_41]) ).
fof(c_0_57,plain,
! [X4] :
( ( knows(head(X4))
| ~ knows(X4) )
& ( knows(tail(X4))
| ~ knows(X4) )
& ( knows(hash(X4))
| ~ knows(X4) ) ),
inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[construct_message_3])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_58,plain,
knows(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_30,c_0_51]),c_0_52])]) ).
cnf(c_0_59,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(X1)))
| head(extract(X2,k_ca)) != s
| head(tail(X1)) != n
| ~ knows(sign(X1,inverse(head(tail(extract(X2,k_ca))))))
| ~ knows(X2) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_54]),c_0_32])]) ).
cnf(c_0_60,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| head(X3) != X1
| ~ knows(inverse(X1))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X4)
| ~ knows(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_56]) ).
cnf(c_0_61,plain,
( knows(head(X1))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_57]) ).
cnf(c_0_62,plain,
knows(concatenate(k_s,eol)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_18,c_0_58]) ).
cnf(c_0_63,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(X1)))
| head(tail(X1)) != n
| head(X2) != s
| ~ knows(sign(X1,inverse(head(tail(X2)))))
| ~ knows(sign(X2,inverse(k_ca))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_27]) ).
cnf(c_0_64,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),head(X1)),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(er,[status(thm)],[c_0_60]),c_0_61]) ).
cnf(c_0_65,plain,
knows(k_s),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_25,c_0_62]) ).
cnf(c_0_66,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(X1)))
| head(tail(X1)) != n
| X2 != s
| ~ knows(sign(concatenate(X2,X3),inverse(k_ca)))
| ~ knows(sign(X1,inverse(head(X3)))) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_63,c_0_35]),c_0_36]) ).
fof(c_0_67,plain,
! [X3,X4] :
( ~ knows(encrypt(X3,X4))
| ~ knows(inverse(X4))
| knows(X3) ),
inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[encrypt_equation])])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_68,plain,
( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),head(X1)),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_65]) ).
cnf(c_0_69,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(X1)))
| head(tail(X1)) != n
| ~ knows(sign(X1,inverse(k_s))) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_51]),c_0_36]) ).
cnf(c_0_70,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(inverse(X2))
| ~ knows(encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_67]) ).
cnf(c_0_71,plain,
( knows(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),head(X1)))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_25,c_0_68]) ).
cnf(c_0_72,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,X1))
| head(X2) != n
| ~ knows(sign(concatenate(X1,X2),inverse(k_s))) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_69,c_0_36]),c_0_35]) ).
cnf(c_0_73,plain,
( knows(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_70,c_0_71]) ).
fof(c_0_74,negated_conjecture,
~ knows(secret),
inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[attack]) ).
fof(c_0_75,plain,
! [X3,X4] :
( ~ knows(symmetric_encrypt(X3,X4))
| ~ knows(X4)
| knows(X3) ),
inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[symmetric_encrypt_equation])])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_76,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,kgen(head(X1))))
| X2 != n
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_72,c_0_73]),c_0_36]) ).
cnf(c_0_77,plain,
knows(n),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_25,c_0_19]) ).
fof(c_0_78,negated_conjecture,
~ knows(secret),
inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[c_0_74]) ).
cnf(c_0_79,plain,
( knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(symmetric_encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_75]) ).
cnf(c_0_80,plain,
( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,kgen(head(X1))))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_76,c_0_77]) ).
cnf(c_0_81,negated_conjecture,
~ knows(secret),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_78]) ).
cnf(c_0_82,plain,
( knows(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_30,c_0_73]),c_0_65])]) ).
cnf(c_0_83,plain,
( ~ knows(kgen(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_79,c_0_80]),c_0_81]) ).
cnf(c_0_84,plain,
( ~ knows(inverse(head(X1)))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_25,c_0_82]),c_0_83]) ).
cnf(c_0_85,plain,
( ~ knows(concatenate(X1,X2))
| ~ knows(inverse(X1))
| ~ knows(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_36]) ).
cnf(c_0_86,plain,
( ~ knows(inverse(X1))
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_85,c_0_56]) ).
cnf(c_0_87,plain,
knows(inverse(k_a)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[previous_knowledge]) ).
cnf(c_0_88,plain,
knows(k_a),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[previous_knowledge]) ).
cnf(c_0_89,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_86,c_0_87]),c_0_88])]) ).
cnf(c_0_90,plain,
~ knows(X1),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_89,c_0_65]) ).
cnf(c_0_91,plain,
$false,
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[c_0_52,c_0_90]),
[proof] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.10 % Problem : SWV233+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v3.2.0.
% 0.00/0.10 % Command : run_ET %s %d
% 0.10/0.30 % Computer : n014.cluster.edu
% 0.10/0.30 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.10/0.30 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.10/0.30 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.10/0.30 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.10/0.30 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.10/0.30 % WCLimit : 600
% 0.10/0.30 % DateTime : Wed Jun 15 10:50:06 EDT 2022
% 0.10/0.31 % CPUTime :
% 0.18/1.37 # Running protocol protocol_eprover_4a02c828a8cc55752123edbcc1ad40e453c11447 for 23 seconds:
% 0.18/1.37 # SinE strategy is GSinE(CountFormulas,hypos,1.4,,04,100,1.0)
% 0.18/1.37 # Preprocessing time : 0.012 s
% 0.18/1.37
% 0.18/1.37 # Failure: Out of unprocessed clauses!
% 0.18/1.37 # OLD status GaveUp
% 0.18/1.37 # Parsed axioms : 19
% 0.18/1.37 # Removed by relevancy pruning/SinE : 18
% 0.18/1.37 # Initial clauses : 1
% 0.18/1.37 # Removed in clause preprocessing : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Initial clauses in saturation : 1
% 0.18/1.37 # Processed clauses : 1
% 0.18/1.37 # ...of these trivial : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # ...subsumed : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # ...remaining for further processing : 1
% 0.18/1.37 # Other redundant clauses eliminated : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Clauses deleted for lack of memory : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Backward-subsumed : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Backward-rewritten : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Generated clauses : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # ...of the previous two non-trivial : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Contextual simplify-reflections : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Paramodulations : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Factorizations : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Equation resolutions : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Current number of processed clauses : 1
% 0.18/1.37 # Positive orientable unit clauses : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Negative unit clauses : 1
% 0.18/1.37 # Non-unit-clauses : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Current number of unprocessed clauses: 0
% 0.18/1.37 # ...number of literals in the above : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Current number of archived formulas : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Current number of archived clauses : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Non-unit clause-clause subsumptions : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Rewrite failures with RHS unbound : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # BW rewrite match attempts : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # BW rewrite match successes : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Condensation attempts : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Condensation successes : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Termbank termtop insertions : 274
% 0.18/1.37
% 0.18/1.37 # -------------------------------------------------
% 0.18/1.37 # User time : 0.011 s
% 0.18/1.37 # System time : 0.001 s
% 0.18/1.37 # Total time : 0.012 s
% 0.18/1.37 # Maximum resident set size: 2676 pages
% 0.18/1.37 # Running protocol protocol_eprover_f171197f65f27d1ba69648a20c844832c84a5dd7 for 23 seconds:
% 0.18/1.37 # Preprocessing time : 0.014 s
% 0.18/1.37
% 0.18/1.37 # Proof found!
% 0.18/1.37 # SZS status Theorem
% 0.18/1.37 # SZS output start CNFRefutation
% See solution above
% 0.18/1.37 # Proof object total steps : 92
% 0.18/1.37 # Proof object clause steps : 62
% 0.18/1.37 # Proof object formula steps : 30
% 0.18/1.37 # Proof object conjectures : 4
% 0.18/1.37 # Proof object clause conjectures : 1
% 0.18/1.37 # Proof object formula conjectures : 3
% 0.18/1.37 # Proof object initial clauses used : 22
% 0.18/1.37 # Proof object initial formulas used : 15
% 0.18/1.37 # Proof object generating inferences : 37
% 0.18/1.37 # Proof object simplifying inferences : 28
% 0.18/1.37 # Training examples: 0 positive, 0 negative
% 0.18/1.37 # Parsed axioms : 19
% 0.18/1.37 # Removed by relevancy pruning/SinE : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Initial clauses : 32
% 0.18/1.37 # Removed in clause preprocessing : 4
% 0.18/1.37 # Initial clauses in saturation : 28
% 0.18/1.37 # Processed clauses : 1138
% 0.18/1.37 # ...of these trivial : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # ...subsumed : 610
% 0.18/1.37 # ...remaining for further processing : 528
% 0.18/1.37 # Other redundant clauses eliminated : 2
% 0.18/1.37 # Clauses deleted for lack of memory : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Backward-subsumed : 464
% 0.18/1.37 # Backward-rewritten : 3
% 0.18/1.37 # Generated clauses : 3804
% 0.18/1.37 # ...of the previous two non-trivial : 3729
% 0.18/1.37 # Contextual simplify-reflections : 863
% 0.18/1.37 # Paramodulations : 3782
% 0.18/1.37 # Factorizations : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Equation resolutions : 4
% 0.18/1.37 # Current number of processed clauses : 43
% 0.18/1.37 # Positive orientable unit clauses : 5
% 0.18/1.37 # Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Negative unit clauses : 9
% 0.18/1.37 # Non-unit-clauses : 29
% 0.18/1.37 # Current number of unprocessed clauses: 15
% 0.18/1.37 # ...number of literals in the above : 36
% 0.18/1.37 # Current number of archived formulas : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Current number of archived clauses : 489
% 0.18/1.37 # Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 118636
% 0.18/1.37 # Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 11868
% 0.18/1.37 # Non-unit clause-clause subsumptions : 1727
% 0.18/1.37 # Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 1235
% 0.18/1.37 # Rewrite failures with RHS unbound : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # BW rewrite match attempts : 6
% 0.18/1.37 # BW rewrite match successes : 2
% 0.18/1.37 # Condensation attempts : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Condensation successes : 0
% 0.18/1.37 # Termbank termtop insertions : 122888
% 0.18/1.37
% 0.18/1.37 # -------------------------------------------------
% 0.18/1.37 # User time : 0.207 s
% 0.18/1.37 # System time : 0.004 s
% 0.18/1.37 # Total time : 0.211 s
% 0.18/1.37 # Maximum resident set size: 4760 pages
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------