TSTP Solution File: SWV016-1 by E---3.1.00
View Problem
- Process Solution
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : E---3.1.00
% Problem : SWV016-1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_E %s %d THM
% Computer : n017.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Sat May 4 09:42:35 EDT 2024
% Result : Satisfiable 0.20s 0.51s
% Output : Saturation 0.20s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : ERROR: Analysing output (Could not find formula named c_0_52)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(c_0_39,plain,
( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))) ),
c_0_37,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_40,plain,
( message(sent(X1,X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
c_0_38,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_41,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
b_is_party_of_protocol_8,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_45,plain,
( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39,c_0_40]),c_0_41])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_46,plain,
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
c_0_42,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_48,plain,
( message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))
| ~ a_nonce(X3)
| ~ message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6))))
| ~ t_holds(key(X5,X1))
| ~ t_holds(key(X6,X2)) ),
c_0_43,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_49,axiom,
t_holds(key(bt,b)),
t_holds_key_bt_for_b_14,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_50,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X3))
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))) ),
c_0_44,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_51,plain,
( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_45,c_0_46]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_54,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))) ),
c_0_47,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_56,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
a_sent_message_i_to_b_3,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_57,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_59,plain,
( message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),X3),bt),X5)))
| ~ a_nonce(X2)
| ~ t_holds(key(X4,X1))
| ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X5,encrypt(triple(X1,X2,X3),bt)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_49]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_60,axiom,
t_holds(key(at,a)),
t_holds_key_at_for_a_13,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_61,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_50,c_0_51]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_62,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
c_0_52,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_63,plain,
( intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
c_0_53,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_64,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_54,c_0_40]),c_0_41])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_66,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,X3,X1)) ),
c_0_55,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_67,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_54,c_0_56]),c_0_57])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_68,plain,
( message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))
| ~ a_stored(pair(X1,X5))
| ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))) ),
c_0_58,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_69,axiom,
a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)),
a_stored_message_i_4,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_70,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_60]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_71,axiom,
a_nonce(an_a_nonce),
an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce_34,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_72,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61,c_0_40]),c_0_41])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_74,axiom,
party_of_protocol(t),
t_is_party_of_protocol_15,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_76,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_46]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_78,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)) ),
c_0_65,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_79,plain,
intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_67]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_82,plain,
( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
| ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_68,c_0_69]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_83,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
a_is_party_of_protocol_2,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_84,plain,
message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_70,c_0_67]),c_0_71])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_85,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_72,c_0_46]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_86,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_73,c_0_74]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_87,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)) ),
c_0_75,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_88,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_76]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_89,plain,
b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39,c_0_56]),c_0_57])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_90,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_70,c_0_40]),c_0_74]),c_0_41])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_91,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
c_0_77,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_92,plain,
intruder_message(b),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_78,c_0_79]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_93,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)) ),
c_0_80,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_94,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_59,c_0_49]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_95,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)) ),
c_0_81,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_96,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_56]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_97,plain,
( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_82,c_0_40]),c_0_83]),c_0_74])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_98,plain,
intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_84]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_100,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X3))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_85,c_0_86]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_101,plain,
( intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_87,c_0_88]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_102,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_50,c_0_89]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_103,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_90,c_0_91]),c_0_92])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_104,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_93,c_0_79]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_105,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_94,c_0_76]),c_0_92]),c_0_41])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_106,plain,
intruder_message(a),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_95,c_0_96]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_107,plain,
( message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X2),X3),at),X5)))
| ~ a_nonce(X2)
| ~ t_holds(key(X4,X1))
| ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X5,encrypt(triple(X1,X2,X3),at)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_60]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_108,plain,
( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_97,c_0_91]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_109,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_78,c_0_98]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_110,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)) ),
c_0_99,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_112,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X4)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_100,c_0_101]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_113,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_93,c_0_88]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_114,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))
| ~ a_key(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_102,c_0_40]),c_0_41]),c_0_83])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_115,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_82,c_0_84]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_116,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_103,c_0_104]),c_0_71])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_117,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_94,c_0_40]),c_0_74]),c_0_41])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_118,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_105]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_119,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_70,c_0_76]),c_0_106]),c_0_83])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_120,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_107,c_0_60]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_121,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_107,c_0_49]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_122,plain,
( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_108,c_0_109]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_123,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_110,c_0_96]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_124,axiom,
a_key(generate_key(X1)),
generated_keys_are_keys_39,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_125,negated_conjecture,
( ~ b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X3)) ),
c_0_111,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_126,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_112,c_0_113]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_127,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))
| ~ a_key(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_114,c_0_46]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_128,plain,
intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_115]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_129,plain,
( message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_82,c_0_116]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_130,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_117,c_0_91]),c_0_92])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_131,plain,
( intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_93,c_0_118]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_132,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_119]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_133,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_120,c_0_40]),c_0_74]),c_0_83])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_134,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at)))
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_121,c_0_40]),c_0_74]),c_0_83])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_135,plain,
( intruder_message(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_122]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_136,plain,
b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),a)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61,c_0_115]),c_0_123]),c_0_106]),c_0_124]),c_0_57]),c_0_83])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_137,negated_conjecture,
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X4)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_125,c_0_126]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_138,plain,
intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_87,c_0_79]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_140,axiom,
b_holds(key(bt,t)),
b_hold_key_bt_for_t_7,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_142,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_110,c_0_128]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_143,plain,
( intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_129]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_144,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_103,c_0_113]),c_0_106]),c_0_83])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_145,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_130,c_0_113]),c_0_92]),c_0_41])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_146,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_100,c_0_131]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_147,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_87,c_0_132]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_148,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_87,c_0_118]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_149,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_133,c_0_91]),c_0_106])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_150,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at))
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_134,c_0_91]),c_0_106])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_152,negated_conjecture,
~ intruder_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_125,c_0_136]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_153,negated_conjecture,
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_137,c_0_63]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_154,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_100,c_0_138]),c_0_123]),c_0_57])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_155,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_key(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_139,c_0_138])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_162,negated_conjecture,
~ intruder_holds(key(bt,X1)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_125,c_0_140]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_163,plain,
( ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
c_0_141,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_164,plain,
( b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_85,c_0_142]),c_0_123]),c_0_124]),c_0_57])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_165,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_128]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_166,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_143]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_167,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_144]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_168,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_145]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_169,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_78,c_0_132]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_170,plain,
( b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),a))
| ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_146,c_0_147]),c_0_106]),c_0_124]),c_0_83])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_171,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_135]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_172,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_78,c_0_118]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_173,plain,
( b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),b))
| ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_146,c_0_148]),c_0_92]),c_0_124]),c_0_41])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_174,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(at)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_149,c_0_86]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_175,plain,
( intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_116]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_176,plain,
( b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_45,c_0_143]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_177,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(at)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_150,c_0_86]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_178,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_103,c_0_86]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_179,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_54,c_0_122]),c_0_106])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_180,plain,
( b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_45,c_0_128]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_181,plain,
( b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_72,c_0_135]),c_0_124])]),c_0_101]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_182,plain,
( b_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_45,c_0_135]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_183,plain,
( b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39,c_0_122]),c_0_106])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_184,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_151,c_0_98]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_185,negated_conjecture,
( ~ intruder_message(generate_key(an_a_nonce))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_152,c_0_63]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_186,plain,
( message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3)))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ a_nonce(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_130,c_0_86]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_187,negated_conjecture,
( ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ fresh_to_b(generate_key(X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X4) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_153,c_0_124]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_188,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ a_key(an_a_nonce)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_154,c_0_113]),c_0_123]),c_0_57])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_189,plain,
( message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3))))
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4))
| ~ intruder_message(at)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_108,c_0_86]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_190,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ a_key(an_a_nonce) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_155,c_0_104]),c_0_123])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_191,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ a_key(X1) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_155,c_0_86]),c_0_87]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_192,plain,
( intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))
| ~ intruder_message(X4)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
c_0_156,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_193,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
c_0_157,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_194,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)) ),
c_0_158,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_195,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)) ),
c_0_159,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_196,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)) ),
c_0_160,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_197,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)) ),
c_0_161,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_198,negated_conjecture,
( ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_162,c_0_63]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_199,plain,
~ a_nonce(generate_key(X1)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_163,c_0_124]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_200,plain,
b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_164,c_0_148]),c_0_92]),c_0_41]),c_0_123]),c_0_71]),c_0_57])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_201,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_95,c_0_128]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_202,axiom,
a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)),
generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces_36,
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_203,axiom,
a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)),
generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces_37,
[final] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.07/0.12 % Problem : SWV016-1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.07/0.14 % Command : run_E %s %d THM
% 0.13/0.34 % Computer : n017.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % DateTime : Fri May 3 16:44:08 EDT 2024
% 0.13/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 0.20/0.48 Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.20/0.48 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/eprover --delete-bad-limit=2000000000 --definitional-cnf=24 -s --print-statistics -R --print-version --proof-object --auto-schedule=8 --cpu-limit=300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/tmp.zkG3pMRhPX/E---3.1_27362.p
% 0.20/0.51 # Version: 3.1.0
% 0.20/0.51 # Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.20/0.51 # Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.20/0.51 # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.20/0.51 # Starting new_bool_3 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.20/0.51 # Starting new_bool_1 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.20/0.51 # Starting sh5l with 300s (1) cores
% 0.20/0.51 # G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with pid 27440 completed with status 1
% 0.20/0.51 # Result found by G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN
% 0.20/0.51 # Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.20/0.51 # Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.20/0.51 # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.20/0.51 # No SInE strategy applied
% 0.20/0.51 # Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 0.20/0.51 # Scheduled 6 strats onto 5 cores with 1500 seconds (1500 total)
% 0.20/0.51 # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d with 811s (1) cores
% 0.20/0.51 # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 151s (1) cores
% 0.20/0.51 # Starting new_bool_3 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.20/0.51 # Starting new_bool_1 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.20/0.51 # Starting sh5l with 136s (1) cores
% 0.20/0.51 # G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d with pid 27445 completed with status 1
% 0.20/0.51 # Result found by G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d
% 0.20/0.51 # Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.20/0.51 # Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.20/0.51 # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.20/0.51 # No SInE strategy applied
% 0.20/0.51 # Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 0.20/0.51 # Scheduled 6 strats onto 5 cores with 1500 seconds (1500 total)
% 0.20/0.51 # Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d with 811s (1) cores
% 0.20/0.51 # Preprocessing time : 0.001 s
% 0.20/0.51 # Presaturation interreduction done
% 0.20/0.51
% 0.20/0.51 # No proof found!
% 0.20/0.51 # SZS status Satisfiable
% 0.20/0.51 # SZS output start Saturation
% See solution above
% 0.20/0.51 # Parsed axioms : 37
% 0.20/0.51 # Removed by relevancy pruning/SinE : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Initial clauses : 37
% 0.20/0.51 # Removed in clause preprocessing : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Initial clauses in saturation : 37
% 0.20/0.51 # Processed clauses : 214
% 0.20/0.51 # ...of these trivial : 4
% 0.20/0.51 # ...subsumed : 29
% 0.20/0.51 # ...remaining for further processing : 181
% 0.20/0.51 # Other redundant clauses eliminated : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Clauses deleted for lack of memory : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Backward-subsumed : 3
% 0.20/0.51 # Backward-rewritten : 1
% 0.20/0.51 # Generated clauses : 205
% 0.20/0.51 # ...of the previous two non-redundant : 158
% 0.20/0.51 # ...aggressively subsumed : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Contextual simplify-reflections : 2
% 0.20/0.51 # Paramodulations : 205
% 0.20/0.51 # Factorizations : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # NegExts : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Equation resolutions : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Disequality decompositions : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Total rewrite steps : 235
% 0.20/0.51 # ...of those cached : 216
% 0.20/0.51 # Propositional unsat checks : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Propositional check models : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Propositional check unsatisfiable : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Propositional clauses : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Propositional clauses after purity: 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Propositional unsat core size : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Propositional preprocessing time : 0.000
% 0.20/0.51 # Propositional encoding time : 0.000
% 0.20/0.51 # Propositional solver time : 0.000
% 0.20/0.51 # Success case prop preproc time : 0.000
% 0.20/0.51 # Success case prop encoding time : 0.000
% 0.20/0.51 # Success case prop solver time : 0.000
% 0.20/0.51 # Current number of processed clauses : 140
% 0.20/0.51 # Positive orientable unit clauses : 31
% 0.20/0.51 # Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Negative unit clauses : 3
% 0.20/0.51 # Non-unit-clauses : 106
% 0.20/0.51 # Current number of unprocessed clauses: 0
% 0.20/0.51 # ...number of literals in the above : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Current number of archived formulas : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Current number of archived clauses : 41
% 0.20/0.51 # Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 3982
% 0.20/0.51 # Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 1171
% 0.20/0.51 # Non-unit clause-clause subsumptions : 30
% 0.20/0.51 # Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 115
% 0.20/0.51 # Rewrite failures with RHS unbound : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # BW rewrite match attempts : 19
% 0.20/0.51 # BW rewrite match successes : 1
% 0.20/0.51 # Condensation attempts : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Condensation successes : 0
% 0.20/0.51 # Termbank termtop insertions : 7845
% 0.20/0.51 # Search garbage collected termcells : 111
% 0.20/0.51
% 0.20/0.51 # -------------------------------------------------
% 0.20/0.51 # User time : 0.019 s
% 0.20/0.51 # System time : 0.004 s
% 0.20/0.51 # Total time : 0.023 s
% 0.20/0.51 # Maximum resident set size: 1784 pages
% 0.20/0.51
% 0.20/0.51 # -------------------------------------------------
% 0.20/0.51 # User time : 0.098 s
% 0.20/0.51 # System time : 0.012 s
% 0.20/0.51 # Total time : 0.110 s
% 0.20/0.51 # Maximum resident set size: 1756 pages
% 0.20/0.51 % E---3.1 exiting
% 0.20/0.52 % E exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------