TPTP Problem File: SWW955+1.p
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- Solve Problem
%--------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : SWW955+1 : TPTP v9.0.0. Released v7.4.0.
% Domain : Software Verification
% Problem : Attack on Shamir-Rivest-Adleman Three pass protocol
% Version : [LT19] axioms : Especial.
% English : Attack demonstrates secrecy violation of secret message.
% Refs : [BO97] Bull & Otway (1997), The Authentication Protocol
% : [RS98] Ryan & Schneider (1998), An Attack on a Recursive Auth
% : [LT19] Li & Tiu (2019), Combining ProVerif and Automated Theo
% : [Li20] Li (2020), Email to Geoff Sutcliffe
% Source : [Li20]
% Names : Shamir-Rivest-Adleman-Three-Pass.p [LT20]
% Status : Theorem
% Rating : 0.45 v9.0.0, 0.47 v8.2.0, 0.50 v8.1.0, 0.47 v7.5.0, 0.50 v7.4.0
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 82 ( 59 unt; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 111 ( 47 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 3 ( 1 avg)
% Number of connectives : 74 ( 45 ~; 0 |; 6 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 23 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 5 ( 2 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 3 ( 1 avg)
% Number of predicates : 4 ( 3 usr; 0 prp; 1-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 24 ( 24 usr; 12 con; 0-2 aty)
% Number of variables : 35 ( 35 !; 0 ?)
% SPC : FOF_THM_RFO_SEQ
% Comments : Generated by a modified version of ProVerif used in the
% ProVerif-ATP project [LT19].
%--------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(ax0,axiom,
constr_CONST_0x30 != constr_CONST_1 ).
fof(ax1,axiom,
constr_CONST_0x30 != constr_CONST_2 ).
fof(ax2,axiom,
constr_CONST_0x30 != constr_CONST_3 ).
fof(ax3,axiom,
constr_CONST_0x30 != constr_CONST_4 ).
fof(ax4,axiom,
constr_CONST_0x30 != name_Ka ).
fof(ax5,axiom,
constr_CONST_0x30 != name_Kb ).
fof(ax6,axiom,
constr_CONST_0x30 != name_c ).
fof(ax7,axiom,
constr_CONST_0x30 != name_m_9 ).
fof(ax8,axiom,
constr_CONST_0x30 != name_objective ).
fof(ax9,axiom,
constr_CONST_1 != constr_CONST_2 ).
fof(ax10,axiom,
constr_CONST_1 != constr_CONST_3 ).
fof(ax11,axiom,
constr_CONST_1 != constr_CONST_4 ).
fof(ax12,axiom,
constr_CONST_1 != name_Ka ).
fof(ax13,axiom,
constr_CONST_1 != name_Kb ).
fof(ax14,axiom,
constr_CONST_1 != name_c ).
fof(ax15,axiom,
constr_CONST_1 != name_m_9 ).
fof(ax16,axiom,
constr_CONST_1 != name_objective ).
fof(ax17,axiom,
constr_CONST_2 != constr_CONST_3 ).
fof(ax18,axiom,
constr_CONST_2 != constr_CONST_4 ).
fof(ax19,axiom,
constr_CONST_2 != name_Ka ).
fof(ax20,axiom,
constr_CONST_2 != name_Kb ).
fof(ax21,axiom,
constr_CONST_2 != name_c ).
fof(ax22,axiom,
constr_CONST_2 != name_m_9 ).
fof(ax23,axiom,
constr_CONST_2 != name_objective ).
fof(ax24,axiom,
constr_CONST_3 != constr_CONST_4 ).
fof(ax25,axiom,
constr_CONST_3 != name_Ka ).
fof(ax26,axiom,
constr_CONST_3 != name_Kb ).
fof(ax27,axiom,
constr_CONST_3 != name_c ).
fof(ax28,axiom,
constr_CONST_3 != name_m_9 ).
fof(ax29,axiom,
constr_CONST_3 != name_objective ).
fof(ax30,axiom,
constr_CONST_4 != name_Ka ).
fof(ax31,axiom,
constr_CONST_4 != name_Kb ).
fof(ax32,axiom,
constr_CONST_4 != name_c ).
fof(ax33,axiom,
constr_CONST_4 != name_m_9 ).
fof(ax34,axiom,
constr_CONST_4 != name_objective ).
fof(ax35,axiom,
name_Ka != name_Kb ).
fof(ax36,axiom,
name_Ka != name_c ).
fof(ax37,axiom,
name_Ka != name_m_9 ).
fof(ax38,axiom,
name_Ka != name_objective ).
fof(ax39,axiom,
name_Kb != name_c ).
fof(ax40,axiom,
name_Kb != name_m_9 ).
fof(ax41,axiom,
name_Kb != name_objective ).
fof(ax42,axiom,
name_c != name_m_9 ).
fof(ax43,axiom,
name_c != name_objective ).
fof(ax44,axiom,
name_m_9 != name_objective ).
fof(ax45,axiom,
! [VAR_K_8,VAR_M_7] : constr_dec(constr_enc(VAR_M_7,VAR_K_8),VAR_K_8) = VAR_M_7 ).
fof(ax46,axiom,
! [VAR_K_0X30,VAR_M_0X30] : constr_comm_dec(constr_comm_enc(VAR_M_0X30,VAR_K_0X30),VAR_K_0X30) = VAR_M_0X30 ).
fof(ax47,axiom,
pred_attacker(tuple_true) ).
fof(ax48,axiom,
pred_attacker(tuple_false) ).
fof(ax49,axiom,
! [VAR_V_29,VAR_V_30X30] :
( ( pred_attacker(VAR_V_29)
& pred_attacker(VAR_V_30X30) )
=> pred_attacker(constr_enc(VAR_V_29,VAR_V_30X30)) ) ).
fof(ax50,axiom,
! [VAR_V_33,VAR_V_34] :
( ( pred_attacker(VAR_V_33)
& pred_attacker(VAR_V_34) )
=> pred_attacker(constr_dec(VAR_V_33,VAR_V_34)) ) ).
fof(ax51,axiom,
! [VAR_V_37,VAR_V_38] :
( ( pred_attacker(VAR_V_37)
& pred_attacker(VAR_V_38) )
=> pred_attacker(constr_comm_enc(VAR_V_37,VAR_V_38)) ) ).
fof(ax52,axiom,
! [VAR_V_41,VAR_V_42] :
( ( pred_attacker(VAR_V_41)
& pred_attacker(VAR_V_42) )
=> pred_attacker(constr_comm_dec(VAR_V_41,VAR_V_42)) ) ).
fof(ax53,axiom,
pred_attacker(constr_CONST_4) ).
fof(ax54,axiom,
pred_attacker(constr_CONST_3) ).
fof(ax55,axiom,
pred_attacker(constr_CONST_2) ).
fof(ax56,axiom,
pred_attacker(constr_CONST_1) ).
fof(ax57,axiom,
pred_attacker(constr_CONST_0x30) ).
fof(ax58,axiom,
! [VAR_V_44] :
( pred_attacker(VAR_V_44)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_B_out_2(VAR_V_44)) ) ).
fof(ax59,axiom,
! [VAR_V_47] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_B_out_2(VAR_V_47))
=> pred_attacker(VAR_V_47) ) ).
fof(ax60,axiom,
! [VAR_V_50X30] :
( pred_attacker(VAR_V_50X30)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_B_in_3(VAR_V_50X30)) ) ).
fof(ax61,axiom,
! [VAR_V_53] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_B_in_3(VAR_V_53))
=> pred_attacker(VAR_V_53) ) ).
fof(ax62,axiom,
! [VAR_V_56] :
( pred_attacker(VAR_V_56)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_B_in_1(VAR_V_56)) ) ).
fof(ax63,axiom,
! [VAR_V_59] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_B_in_1(VAR_V_59))
=> pred_attacker(VAR_V_59) ) ).
fof(ax64,axiom,
! [VAR_V_62] :
( pred_attacker(VAR_V_62)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_4(VAR_V_62)) ) ).
fof(ax65,axiom,
! [VAR_V_65] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_4(VAR_V_65))
=> pred_attacker(VAR_V_65) ) ).
fof(ax66,axiom,
! [VAR_V_68] :
( pred_attacker(VAR_V_68)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_3(VAR_V_68)) ) ).
fof(ax67,axiom,
! [VAR_V_71] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_3(VAR_V_71))
=> pred_attacker(VAR_V_71) ) ).
fof(ax68,axiom,
! [VAR_V_74] :
( pred_attacker(VAR_V_74)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_1(VAR_V_74)) ) ).
fof(ax69,axiom,
! [VAR_V_77] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_1(VAR_V_77))
=> pred_attacker(VAR_V_77) ) ).
fof(ax70,axiom,
! [VAR_V_80X30] :
( pred_attacker(VAR_V_80X30)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_A_in_2(VAR_V_80X30)) ) ).
fof(ax71,axiom,
! [VAR_V_83] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_A_in_2(VAR_V_83))
=> pred_attacker(VAR_V_83) ) ).
fof(ax72,axiom,
! [VAR_V_89,VAR_V_90X30] :
( ( pred_mess(VAR_V_90X30,VAR_V_89)
& pred_attacker(VAR_V_90X30) )
=> pred_attacker(VAR_V_89) ) ).
fof(ax73,axiom,
! [VAR_V_91,VAR_V_92] :
( ( pred_attacker(VAR_V_92)
& pred_attacker(VAR_V_91) )
=> pred_mess(VAR_V_92,VAR_V_91) ) ).
fof(ax74,axiom,
pred_attacker(name_c) ).
fof(ax75,axiom,
! [VAR_V_94] : pred_equal(VAR_V_94,VAR_V_94) ).
fof(ax76,axiom,
! [VAR_V_95] : pred_attacker(name_new0x2Dname(VAR_V_95)) ).
fof(ax77,axiom,
pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_1(constr_comm_enc(name_m_9,name_Ka))) ).
fof(ax78,axiom,
! [VAR_MSG1_128] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_A_in_2(VAR_MSG1_128))
=> pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_3(constr_comm_dec(VAR_MSG1_128,name_Ka))) ) ).
fof(ax79,axiom,
! [VAR_MSG1_142] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_A_in_2(VAR_MSG1_142))
=> pred_attacker(tuple_A_out_4(constr_enc(name_objective,name_m_9))) ) ).
fof(ax80,axiom,
! [VAR_MSG1_162] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_B_in_1(VAR_MSG1_162))
=> pred_attacker(tuple_B_out_2(constr_comm_enc(VAR_MSG1_162,name_Kb))) ) ).
fof(co0,conjecture,
pred_attacker(name_objective) ).
%--------------------------------------------------------------------------