TPTP Problem File: SWV018-1.p
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- Solve Problem
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% File : SWV018-1 : TPTP v8.2.0. Released v2.4.0.
% Domain : Software Verification
% Problem : Fact 8 of the Neumann-Stubblebine analysis
% Version : [Wei99] axioms.
% English :
% Refs : [Wei99] Weidenbach (1999), Towards and Automatic Analysis of S
% [Bau99] Baumgartner (1999), FTP'2000 - Problem Sets
% Source : [TPTP]
% Names :
% Status : Satisfiable
% Rating : 0.00 v5.5.0, 0.25 v5.4.0, 0.44 v5.3.0, 0.29 v5.0.0, 0.25 v4.1.0, 0.29 v4.0.0, 0.25 v3.5.0, 0.43 v3.4.0, 0.50 v3.3.0, 0.33 v3.2.0, 0.40 v3.1.0, 0.29 v2.7.0, 0.00 v2.6.0, 0.50 v2.5.0, 0.67 v2.4.0
% Syntax : Number of clauses : 41 ( 14 unt; 0 nHn; 38 RR)
% Number of literals : 89 ( 0 equ; 50 neg)
% Maximal clause size : 5 ( 2 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 1 avg)
% Number of predicates : 12 ( 12 usr; 0 prp; 1-1 aty)
% Number of functors : 17 ( 17 usr; 7 con; 0-4 aty)
% Number of variables : 82 ( 29 sgn)
% SPC : CNF_SAT_RFO_NEQ
% Comments : Created by tptp2X -f tptp -t cnf:otter SWV018+1.p
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cnf(a_is_party_of_protocol_2,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a) ).
cnf(a_sent_message_i_to_b_3,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))) ).
cnf(a_stored_message_i_4,axiom,
a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)) ).
cnf(a_forwards_secure_5,axiom,
( message(sent(a,A,pair(E,encrypt(F,C))))
| ~ a_stored(pair(A,B))
| ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,B,C,D),at),E,F))) ) ).
cnf(b_hold_key_bt_for_t_7,axiom,
b_holds(key(bt,t)) ).
cnf(b_is_party_of_protocol_8,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b) ).
cnf(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) ).
cnf(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10,axiom,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(B),encrypt(triple(A,B,generate_expiration_time(B)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(B)
| ~ message(sent(A,b,pair(A,B))) ) ).
cnf(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_11,axiom,
( b_stored(pair(A,B))
| ~ fresh_to_b(B)
| ~ message(sent(A,b,pair(A,B))) ) ).
cnf(b_accepts_secure_session_key_12,axiom,
( b_holds(key(B,A))
| ~ a_key(B)
| ~ b_stored(pair(A,C))
| ~ message(sent(A,b,pair(encrypt(triple(A,B,generate_expiration_time(C)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(C),B)))) ) ).
cnf(t_holds_key_at_for_a_13,axiom,
t_holds(key(at,a)) ).
cnf(t_holds_key_bt_for_b_14,axiom,
t_holds(key(bt,b)) ).
cnf(t_is_party_of_protocol_15,axiom,
party_of_protocol(t) ).
cnf(server_t_generates_key_16,axiom,
( message(sent(t,C,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,D,generate_key(D),E),G),encrypt(triple(C,generate_key(D),E),F),B)))
| ~ a_nonce(D)
| ~ message(sent(A,t,triple(A,B,encrypt(triple(C,D,E),F))))
| ~ t_holds(key(G,C))
| ~ t_holds(key(F,A)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_can_record_17,axiom,
( intruder_message(C)
| ~ message(sent(A,B,C)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_pairs_18,axiom,
( intruder_message(A)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(A,B)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_pairs_19,axiom,
( intruder_message(B)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(A,B)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_triples_20,axiom,
( intruder_message(A)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_triples_21,axiom,
( intruder_message(B)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_triples_22,axiom,
( intruder_message(C)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_quadruples_23,axiom,
( intruder_message(A)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_quadruples_24,axiom,
( intruder_message(B)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_quadruples_25,axiom,
( intruder_message(C)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_quadruples_26,axiom,
( intruder_message(D)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_composes_pairs_27,axiom,
( intruder_message(pair(A,B))
| ~ intruder_message(B)
| ~ intruder_message(A) ) ).
cnf(intruder_composes_triples_28,axiom,
( intruder_message(triple(A,B,C))
| ~ intruder_message(C)
| ~ intruder_message(B)
| ~ intruder_message(A) ) ).
cnf(intruder_composes_quadruples_29,axiom,
( intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D))
| ~ intruder_message(D)
| ~ intruder_message(C)
| ~ intruder_message(B)
| ~ intruder_message(A) ) ).
cnf(intruder_interception_30,axiom,
( intruder_message(B)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(B,C))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(A,B))
| ~ party_of_protocol(C) ) ).
cnf(intruder_message_sent_31,axiom,
( message(sent(B,C,A))
| ~ intruder_message(A)
| ~ party_of_protocol(C)
| ~ party_of_protocol(B) ) ).
cnf(intruder_holds_key_32,axiom,
( intruder_holds(key(A,B))
| ~ intruder_message(A)
| ~ party_of_protocol(B) ) ).
cnf(intruder_key_encrypts_33,axiom,
( intruder_message(encrypt(A,B))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(B,C))
| ~ intruder_message(A)
| ~ party_of_protocol(C) ) ).
cnf(an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce_34,axiom,
a_nonce(an_a_nonce) ).
cnf(generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces_36,axiom,
a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(A)) ).
cnf(generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces_37,axiom,
a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(A)) ).
cnf(nothing_is_a_nonce_and_a_key_38,axiom,
( ~ a_key(A)
| ~ a_nonce(A) ) ).
cnf(generated_keys_are_keys_39,axiom,
a_key(generate_key(A)) ).
cnf(an_intruder_nonce_is_a_fresh_intruder_nonce_40,axiom,
fresh_intruder_nonce(an_intruder_nonce) ).
cnf(can_generate_more_fresh_intruder_nonces_41,axiom,
( fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_intruder_nonce(A))
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(A) ) ).
cnf(fresh_intruder_nonces_are_fresh_to_b_42,axiom,
( fresh_to_b(A)
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(A) ) ).
cnf(fresh_intruder_nonces_are_fresh_to_b_43,axiom,
( intruder_message(A)
| ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(A) ) ).
cnf(co1_44,negated_conjecture,
( ~ b_holds(key(A,C))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(A,B)) ) ).
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